ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) (12/14/85)
Arms-Discussion Digest Saturday, December 14, 1985 3:57PM
Volume 5, Issue 61
Today's Topics:
even more on LOW!!
LOW options in the SIOP
You need a better counter-example than that one
Pindown
LOW options in the SIOP
You need a better counter-example than that one
Pindown
Pindown
Moving right along
Pindown
better red than dead
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Date: Sat, 14 Dec 85 13:08:46 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: even more on LOW!!
just a couple more issues...
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Date: Sat, 14 Dec 85 13:08:52 EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: LOW options in the SIOP
> Is not the SIOP *now and always* in effect? With "peacetime"
> options implemented. Is the phrase "executing the SIOP" more
> properly "changing the current SIOP option"?
|No. The SIOP is as I described it. There is no "peacetime option" in
|the SIOP; the SIOP is a list of forces and times of attack. When the
|Pres decides he wants to use some forces, he looks up in a book the
|various options available to him, and says something like "Execute MAO
|(Major Attack Option) #4, sub-option 5, but withhold attacks on
|targets X, A, and Q in that target set."
Thanks for the info. So when it is said that the SIOP has LOW
and LUA options, it doesn't mean that it has an option whereby
the Pres. can say "OK boys, launch on warning if you get one",
but that it does have a target sets whereby the Pres can say,
*given a warning*, "OK boys, fire at the LOW target set number 2?"
Of course we mustn't forget that in reality the Pres, if he decides
to retaliate, will almost certainly be told which target option to
go for, and that even his go-ahead might be merely token.
To: LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
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Date: Sat, 14 Dec 85 13:09:23 EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: You need a better counter-example than that one
REPLY TO 12/10/85 16:27 FROM LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA: "Beyond reasonable doubt"
Good, we agree on "beyond reasonable doubt"; let's stick to it.
Your objection to my "beyond reasonable doubt" criteria I think
is met by my delimiting the (necessarily "immediate") warning to
circumstances prior to any actual fighting, and thus excludes the
particular counter-example you cited. It also excludes a declared
state of war. Thus, we begin with a blue-sky scenario, although
tension may for some reason be high. I'm saying that however high
the tension level, there are considerations that would clearly
give rise to a reasonable doubt that any NORAD-generated
"massive surprise attack" warning was valid.
This reasonable doubt is created by (1) the fact that the warning is
known to be fallible; (2) the fact that such a warning is by its
nature the very first time such an event happened (and if it had
happened before it would have had a 100% erroneous record);
(3) by several E-W and other strategems, the Soviets would be
likely able to conk out key parts of the warning system, so
an ambiguous warning is in fact to be expected (actually stated by
Weinberger in his FY83 rpt. to Congress); (4) such attack would
likely spell doom for the attacker in any event.
What factors could override these causes for doubt, which could be
resolved in the time available?
To: LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
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Date: Sat, 14 Dec 85 13:09:28 EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Pindown
Just two further points.
You say "if the Pres. wants to keep his head in the sand, we can't
stop him". While this may be the de facto truth, we can, I
believe, work on it, by such tactics as seeking declaratory relief
in court. In a lesser matter, the courts compelled affirmative
(sex) employment practices within the military, issuing an
injunction against the DOD.
The other point is "pindown". If Minutemen are to be launched in
time to avoid destruction by Soviet missiles, they must be launched
in sufficient time to avoid destruction by detonations just after
launch. This necessitates launching them about when radar
confirmation of attack is issued.
To: LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 14 Dec 85 13:09:32 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: LOW options in the SIOP
Of course we mustn't forget that in reality the Pres, if he decides
to retaliate, will almost certainly be told which target option to
go for, and that even his go-ahead might be merely token.
True. But that is true for anything the President does. That is not
something you can enforce.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 14 Dec 85 13:09:38 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: You need a better counter-example than that one
REPLY TO 12/10/85 16:27 FROM LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA: "Beyond reasonable doubt"
I talked to a couple of lawyers about the phrase "Beyond reasonable
doubt". It has meaning within the context of criminal cases such as
murder. In this context, it rests on two points -- the concept of the
canonical "reasonable man" and the fact that you have to convince a
jury of 12 people rather than just one.
Two problems with this definition of BRD. (1) It is not clear what "a
reasonable man" is in the context of nuclear war. You can get
apparently sober and serious men (i.e., people that would pass any
other test not involving nuclear issues you might set up for
"reasonableness" arguing all sides of whether or not LOW is a
reasonable thing. (2) The President is a special person, by
definition, since he is elected to discharge all those
responsibilities; therefore, you need a 12-fold ensemble of Presidents
to run a jury test.
Your objection to my "beyond reasonable doubt" criteria I think
is met by my delimiting the (necessarily "immediate") warning to
circumstances prior to any actual fighting, and thus excludes the
particular counter-example you cited. It also excludes a declared
state of war. Thus, we begin with a blue-sky scenario, although
tension may for some reason be high. I'm saying that however high
the tension level, there are considerations that would clearly
give rise to a reasonable doubt that any NORAD-generated
"massive surprise attack" warning was valid.
Describe for me a very high scenario in which tensions are very high
but in which no fighting (= conflict between US/Soviet forces) has
occurred.
This reasonable doubt is created by (1) the fact that the warning is
known to be fallible;
Yes; that is cause for some doubt, and then the Pres has to evaluate
the warning in the contxt of the totality of events.
(2) the fact that such a warning is by its
nature the very first time such an event happened (and if it had
happened before it would have had a 100% erroneous record);
But we pay Presidents to make decisions in new situations; i.e., they
are expected, so that by itself is not reason for doubt.
(3) by several E-W and other strategems, the Soviets would be
likely able to conk out key parts of the warning system, so
an ambiguous warning is in fact to be expected (actually stated by
Weinberger in his FY83 rpt. to Congress);
If the Soviets had killed some part of the warning system, they
certainly didn't have good motives for it, and so I would take that
act as an act that would increase my subjective assessment that the
attack were real.
(4) such attack would
likely spell doom for the attacker in any event.
No, since that attributes a symmetry of interests for the S.U. For
example, the SU might have decided that the only way to avoid an
imminent American attack would be to launch first, in the slim hope
that they might decapitate the US NCA and avoid retaliation
altogether. Indeed, a bolt-from-the-blue attack is probably the only
time that they might have any chance at all of doing this.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 14 Dec 85 13:09:44 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Pindown
You say "if the Pres. wants to keep his head in the sand, we can't
stop him". While this may be the de facto truth, we can, I
believe, work on it, by such tactics as seeking declaratory relief
in court. In a lesser matter, the courts compelled affirmative
(sex) employment practices within the military, issuing an
injunction against the DOD.
But the courts can't tell the president what advice he can get.
The other point is "pindown". If Minutemen are to be launched in
time to avoid destruction by Soviet missiles, they must be launched
in sufficient time to avoid destruction by detonations just after
launch. This necessitates launching them about when radar
confirmation of attack is issued.
Don't use the word "pindown" in this context, since that refers to
explosions high above the atmosphere, though still in boost.
I don't understand your general point, though.
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Date: Sat, 14 Dec 85 13:09:49 EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Pindown
REPLY TO 12/11/85 16:22 FROM LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA: Pindown
Here is a relevant citation re the availability of court remedies
if a Presidential action can be shown based on implausible
arguments:
"Where 'plausible arguments' can be advanced by 'reasonable men of
good faith' concerning various foreign and defense policy
alternatives, affecting the security interests of the United States,
the court should refrain from determining the merits of such
questions." (Atlee v. Laird 347 F. Supp. 689 at 706-707 (3-judge
court); 411 U.S. 911 (1973).)
Re "pindown", what I mean is that Minutemen must be fired early
enough to avoid being destroyed by atmosphaeric explosions after
launch. Because of this, the missiles are effectively "pinned
down" before the silos are themselves hit. They must be launched
a couple of minutes before such impact; ergo, on radar warning.
To: LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 14 Dec 85 13:09:54 EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Moving right along
The law has four levels of "proof".
The weakest is to raise a reasonable doubt that something is false.
Then there is to prove by a preponderance of evidence.
Then there is to proof by clear and convincing evidence.
Then there is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
The second level is all that is generally required in a civil
suit; in a criminal suit, the extremes apply; all the defense
has to do is raise a reasonable doubt.
These standards are applied in other legal contexts too, they
can be generally applied tools, and I will seek to apply the
extreme standard to define a legal precondition for competence
re a first nuclear retaliatory decision. The issue then becomes
(only if the court first accepts the standard) whether I can raise
a reasonable doubt as to the veracity of a warning in all
conceivable situations.
I think the listed four points are not well set out yet, I shall
try to rewrite them (expand/reduce) them for clarity, but feel that
this will be the way to manage the facts. It's been a substantial
advance getting to this point.
The scenario that troubles me most is when the Pres has a warning
from his top spy in the Kremlin that the USSR will launch at 1:00 AM
tomorrow, and then the sensors confirm ... But I think my case is
even in such circumstances arguable, though stretched to the limit.
I need to do some more thinking.
**************
Setting aside all we have discussed, do you understand what the
logic behind Emergency Rocket Communication Systems (ERCS) is?
They're Minutemen loaded not with nukes but communications gear for
issuing Emergency Action Messages (launch orders) from space.
Its secret which Minutemen are ERCS, and its presumed they would be
launched first. I don't quite understand their function.
***************
A more substantial new topic is not whether the Pres can legally
subdelegate LOW, but whether Congress can legally (constitutionally)
delegate any nuclear first use decision at all, since any nuclear
use would seem tantamount to a declaration of unlimited war.
This is the thrust of Arthur S, Miller's article, and the position
of the F.A.S. (Jeremy Stone). This would mean alleging that the
1946 Atomic Energy Act (which authorizes the Pres - and only the
Pres - to use nukes as he deems fit) unconstitutional. My research
continues.
Cheers, Cliff
To: LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 14 Dec 85 13:10:00 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Pindown
Here is a relevant citation re the availability of court remedies
if a Presidential action can be shown based on implausible
arguments:
"Where 'plausible arguments' can be advanced by 'reasonable men of
good faith' concerning various foreign and defense policy
alternatives, affecting the security interests of the United States,
the court should refrain from determining the merits of such
questions." (Atlee v. Laird 347 F. Supp. 689 at 706-707 (3-judge
court); 411 U.S. 911 (1973).)
Two comments, one minor.
Minor comment: This says if there is a plausible argument, the court
should stay out. It does not say that if there isn't a plausible
argument, the court should intervene. Since courts decide things on
the narrowest possible grounds, these aren't the same thing.
More importantly, the question of "what is plausible" is the crux of
your argument -- you think that LOW could happen only under
implausible circumstances (i.e., it is implausible that a Pres could
be certain beyond a reasonable doubt that a warning of attack was in
fact genuine.) I don't, and I can give you some circumstances to
illustrate. For example, US SSBNs have a provision to radio
Washington DC if they are sunk; maybe one sank by accident, but
three?? If DC received three such signals in one hour, and then
received warning of Soviet ICBM attack, I think the Pres would be
justified in thinking that LOW was a reasonable option.
Re "pindown", what I mean is that Minutemen must be fired early
enough to avoid being destroyed by atmosphaeric explosions after
launch. Because of this, the missiles are effectively "pinned
down" before the silos are themselves hit. They must be launched
a couple of minutes before such impact; ergo, on radar warning.
Radar confirmation happens about 15 minutes into the attack (if ICBM).
If you're not worrying about my kind of pindown, then you have at
least 10 minutes more.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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