[mod.politics.arms-d] Arms-Discussion Digest V5 #63

ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) (12/16/85)

Arms-Discussion Digest                Monday, December 16, 1985 9:16AM
Volume 5, Issue 63

Today's Topics:

                            Administrivia
                             SDI software
                             SDI software
                              US vs. SU

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Herb Lin

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Date: Sun, 15 Dec 85 17:56:17 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject:  SDI software


    From: Samuel McCracken <oth104%BOSTONU.bitnet at WISCVM.arpa>
          I recently heard Robert Jastrow claim that the software used by
    AT&T to switch the national telephone network is longer than any current
    estimate for SDI battle management code, is connected to many more nodes,
    was debugged using simulations, and has run flawlessly from the day
    it was put up.  Comments?

One estimate from ATT is 20 M lines for the entire system -- I have
seen estimates from SDIO itself at about 35 M.  More importantly, the
"20 M lines" includes (my guess) lots of replicated code from site to
site, which is slightly different in each node.

It wasn't debugged entirely on simulators.  The range of possible user
responses is small compared to SDI/BMD scenarios.

It is also vulnerable to blue boxes.

It hasn't run flawlessly, as at least one state that was temporarily
disconnected from the rest of the US found out.

People have been doing manual switching for decades.

This analogy is one that most of the SDIO folk are now pushing,
because it's their best argument.  In my view, it fails miserably.

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Date: 16 Dec 1985  01:18 EST (Mon)
From: Wayne McGuire <Wayne%MIT-OZ@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: SDI software

    Date: Friday, 13 December 1985  11:23-EST
    From: Samuel McCracken <oth104%BOSTONU.bitnet at WISCVM.arpa>

          I recently heard Robert Jastrow claim that the software used by
    AT&T to switch the national telephone network is longer than any current
    estimate for SDI battle management code, is connected to many more nodes,
    was debugged using simulations, and has run flawlessly from the day
    it was put up.  Comments?

_The New York Times_ recently reported (12/4/85, p. A5) that Jastrow's
argument was also made by Solomon J. Buchsbaum, a vice president at
AT&T's Bell Labs, in answer to David Parnas in testimony before the
Senate Armed Services Subcommittee:

     ''Dr. Buchsbaum said experience with the United States telephone
system showed that the United States could develop a highly reliable
system that could function well despite occasional small failures.

     '''The network as a whole is more reliable than its individual
components,' Dr. Buchsbaum said.

     ''Dr. Parnas took exception to this analogy, arguing that the
telephone system--unlike 'Star Wars'--has been used extensively and
does not have to work in the face of [an] enemy who is trying to make
it fail.''

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Date:     Sun, 15 Dec 85 23:59:01 PST
From:     walton%Deimos@CIT-Hamlet.ARPA
Subject:  US vs. SU

Mr. Karl Dahlke asks in issue #58 the connection between his message in
issue #29 and my response.  I was primarily touched off by his statement
that the Soviet perspective on human rights issues is rarely considered,
and that the Soviets have been "infinitely more reasonable" on arms control
issues than we have--he did not specify when, but the context implies
"since SDI." 

The US and its allies have, to my mind, only two rational ways to deal with
the SU. One is to agree that the SU has a nasty, brutal government, but
that we have to share the planet with them as best we can, as it appears
unlikely that their government will disappear on its own. The other is to
decide that the government is so bad that it will inevitably collapse and
that our entire foreign policy should be geared towards hastening that
collapse.  I am of the former opinion, and I believe that Mr. Dahlke and
most of the other readers of this net are as well.  However, the Soviets'
ideology requires them to hold the second opinion about us, as they have
said so many times, and I think that most of the high government officials
there actually belive it.  When considering the Soviet perspective on
any issue, and particularly arms control, you must consider this fact as
well.

Mr. Dahlke failed to point out that THEY must also consider our point of
view, a difficult effort considering that there is little accurate
information about life in the US in the SU, even in the higher reaches of
their government.  A high-ranking Soviet defector of a few years back,
whose name escapes me, says that much of what Soviets in the US send back
to the SU is what they think their bosses want to hear, which is that our
government is on the verge of collapse due to the inherent contradictions
of capitalism.  While we certainly have our share of problems, I don't 
think anyone reading this message believes this.

Have the Soviets been infinitely more reasonable on arms control than us? I
will not recap the tangled history of the last 5 years of offers and
counter-offers.  (I would point out, though, that the Soviets are so badly
scared by SDI that they are willing to offer to substantially reduce the
size of their nuclear arsenal for the first time in history.	This fact
alone may be worth the $2.5 billion we are spending on SDI.)  Our
counter-offers have in many respects been one-sided and self serving, but
so have theirs. They claim, though, that their proposals are the height of
reasonableness, while the US is the leading threat to world peace.  Mr.
Dahlke seems willing to lend his name to this opinion, and thus join a
discussion in which Americans shake their heads over the US government's
actions, and Soviets join them in shaking their heads over the US
government's actions.  If I am mistaken in this, please inform me.

We must certainly consider the Soviet perspective in all of our dealings
with them, but we must consider it in its entirety, which I believe Mr.
Dahlke failed to do.

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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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