ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) (12/16/85)
Arms-Discussion Digest Monday, December 16, 1985 10:57AM
Volume 5, Issue 64
Today's Topics:
Last full digest on Launch on Warning
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 85 09:27:14 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Moving right along
These standards are applied in other legal contexts too, they
can be generally applied tools, and I will seek to apply the
extreme standard to define a legal precondition for competence
re a first nuclear retaliatory decision.
No argument from me on this one. I think it should be the extreme
standard.
The issue then becomes
(only if the court first accepts the standard) whether I can raise
a reasonable doubt as to the veracity of a warning in all
conceivable situations.
That is indeed the issue. I don't think you can do it for *all*
conceivable conditions. Most, yes, but not all.
Setting aside all we have discussed, do you understand what the
logic behind Emergency Rocket Communication Systems (ERCS) is?
They're Minutemen loaded not with nukes but communications gear for
issuing Emergency Action Messages (launch orders) from space.
Its secret which Minutemen are ERCS, and its presumed they would be
launched first. I don't quite understand their function.
They're not secret -- it is a matter of public record that they are (I
think -- I can look it up if you want) in a MM II wing in Whitman AFB
in Missouri.
Their function is to be a last ditch emergency communication system if
all else fails. Then, you ask, why are they in vulnerable rocket
silos? No one knows. My conclusion is "dumbness."
A more substantial new topic is not whether the Pres can legally
subdelegate LOW, but whether Congress can legally (constitutionally)
delegate any nuclear first use decision at all, since any nuclear
use would seem tantamount to a declaration of unlimited war.
In the opinion of people like you (and me, probably, under most
circumstances), yes. But you can't analytically demonstrate that
proposition, and so the declaratory doctrine of the U.S. is that a
nuclear war can be limited. Thus, the argument fails.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 85 09:27:22 EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Pindown
REPLY TO 12/12/85 06:53 FROM LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA: Pindown
"Where 'plausible arguments' can be advanced by 'reasonable men of
good faith' concerning various foreign and defense policy
alternatives, affecting the security interests of the United States,
the court should refrain from determining the merits of such
questions." (Atlee v. Laird 347 F. Supp. 689 at 706-707 (3-judge
court); 411 U.S. 911 (1973).)
"The law does no idle acts" is a maxim of jurisprudence. This
means that implausible arguments are not allowed, otherwise the
court would noy have bothered to specify plausibility. Likewise, my
case was dismissed for failing to allege present LOWC; this carries
some implication that such an allegation would indeed overcome the
ground for dismissal on lack of standing ... then, the political
question would be reached.
> You think it is implausible that a Pres could be certain beyond
> a reasonable doubt that a warning of attack was genuine.
> I don't, and I can give you some circumstances to illustrate.
> For example, US SSBNs have a provision to radio Washington DC
> if they are sunk; maybe one sank by accident, but three??
> If DC received three such signals in one hour, and then
> received warning of Soviet ICBM attack, I think the Pres
> would be justified in thinking that LOW was a reasonable option.
In these circumstances I'd be most suspicious of an attack warning.
Sinking three SSBNs would have a puny effect on retaliation, and
why telegraph intentions of an attack about to supoosedly "surprise"
the U.S.? I'd be confused rather than certain of anything, and
that's the point ... incompetent to retaliate. Note also the
example fails if the SSBNs are able to radio that a Soviet force
sunk them, since my definition of LOWC is restricted to prior to
the commencement of actual hostilities.
Re "pindown", maybe there'd be 5 minutes after radar confirmation
of attack before the launch order would have to be given to get
the Minutemen into space in time? ... best call the Pres as soon
as the radar comes in ...
Re Sidney Drell, I did write to him, and he's obviously informed
of my case which has been in the Stanford papers many times ...
but I didn't get any response. As an in pro per Plaintiff, and
staff rather than faculty member, Stanford computer and law
faculty have expressed zero and minimal support respectively.
That's why this exchange has been so helpful to me.
To: LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 85 09:27:28 EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Moving right along
REPLY TO 12/12/85 06:54 FROM LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA: Moving right along
> [ERCS] - it is a matter of public record that they are (I
> think -- I can look it up if you want) in a MM II wing in Whitman AFB
> in Missouri.
Yes, but I think it's secret which particular silos in Whitman AFB
house ERCS. Military acronyms are often the opposite of dumb, like
B-MEWS, C-CLAW, WIS. ERCS irks.
> the declaratory doctrine of the U.S. is that a nuclear war can
> be limited.
No, the declaratory doctrine is that nuclear war is unlimited,
which was the express subject of the Nuclear War Strategy Feb 81
report. The reason for damage limiting SIOP options is to deter
the Ruskies from a damage limited first strike because all out
retaliation would not in such circumstances be credible.
The operative, or actual, doctrine is that nuclear war can be
limited, I agree. Then again, "limited" may be legally, rather
than militarily, construed. As such, it merely means that nuclear
first use is such a profound increment in hostility as to exceed
the Pres's limited war powers; it constitutes a "change of state"
as in "declaring" war, which only Congress can OK.
P.S. By the way, I'm not criticising Drell for not responding.
He's a busy man doing important work. I'm some kind of gadfly.
To: LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 85 09:44:28 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Moving right along
> the declaratory doctrine of the U.S. is that a nuclear war can
> be limited.
No, the declaratory doctrine is that nuclear war is unlimited,
which was the express subject of the Nuclear War Strategy Feb 81
report. The reason for damage limiting SIOP options is to deter
the Ruskies from a damage limited first strike because all out
retaliation would not in such circumstances be credible.
If your statement were true, there would be no need for small nuclear
options. Most of the SIOP has limited options. Where in declaratory
doctrine does this appear? Look at any statement of the
countervaliing strategy.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 85 09:44:34 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Pindown
"The law does no idle acts" is a maxim of jurisprudence. This
means that implausible arguments are not allowed, otherwise the
court would noy have bothered to specify plausibility.
But you must recognize that there is a middle ground between plausible
and implausible; there is also indeterminate, where some will argue
one way and some the other way.
> For example, US SSBNs have a provision to radio Washington DC
> if they are sunk; maybe one sank by accident, but three??
> If DC received three such signals in one hour, and then
> received warning of Soviet ICBM attack, I think the Pres
> would be justified in thinking that LOW was a reasonable option.
In these circumstances I'd be most suspicious of an attack warning.
Sinking three SSBNs would have a puny effect on retaliation,
But they might be part of an attempt to disable our SSBNs entirely.
I'd be confused rather than certain of anything, and
that's the point ... incompetent to retaliate. Note also the
example fails if the SSBNs are able to radio that a Soviet force
sunk them,
SSBNs can report that they have been sunk. It is an inference (pretty
good, in my opinion) that the Soviets did it.
since my definition of LOWC is restricted to prior to
the commencement of actual hostilities.
But do you really mean that? Was KAL007 "actual hostilities"?
You still haven't made the case for a state of high tension where no
one has been attacked.
The whole point of LOW is NOT that we would actually like to do it,
but to signal to the Soviets that they cannot disable our retaliatory
force, so they better not try. It is the classic deterrence threat,
only played in a more time-stressing scenario.
Re "pindown", maybe there'd be 5 minutes after radar confirmation
of attack before the launch order would have to be given to get
the Minutemen into space in time? ... best call the Pres as soon
as the radar comes in ...
It takes a minute to launch. For more details on this, you should
consult John Steinbrunner's piece in Sci Am on LUA. (sometime last
year, I think)
Re Sidney Drell, I did write to him, and he's obviously informed
of my case which has been in the Stanford papers many times ...
but I didn't get any response.
Maybe you should just call to make a lunch date with him.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 85 09:44:39 EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: This point seems to be covered; we can agree to disagree
REPLY TO 12/12/85 13:55 FROM LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA: Moving right along
The countervailing strategy is what you say - limited nuclear
war. But the declaratory policy is that nuclear war cannot be
limited, but small nuclear options are needed to deter the
Soviet first-use of limited options. The Feb. 81 report
rams this point home again and again.
(Goldwater dissents - he thinks we should threaten massive
retaliation even for a limited use, but the DOD argument is that
this is not a credible threat to the Soviet mind. The DOD's case
is founded on several citations of *Soviet* limited nuclear war
doctrine.)
Essentially we are in agreement that the *actual* US strategy is
limited nuclear war.
To: LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 85 09:44:42 EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Out to launch
REPLY TO 12/12/85 13:58 FROM LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA: Pindown
> In these circumstances I'd be most suspicious of an attack warning.
> Sinking three SSBNs would have a puny effect on retaliation,
| But they MIGHT be part of an attempt to disable our SSBNs entirely.
> I'd be confused rather than certain of anything, and
> that's the point ... incompetent to retaliate. Note also the
> example fails if the SSBNs are able to radio that a Soviet force
> sunk them,
| SSBNs can report that they have been sunk. It is an INFERENCE (pretty
| good, in my opinion) that the Soviets did it.
The emphasised words kind-of prove my point re uncertainty. What
I'm saying is that at best the Pres could have "clear and
convincing" evidence of attack, but not evidence "beyond
reasonable DOUBT" ... the word DOUBT means exactly that - is there
any set of conceivable circumstances which could have generated
the warning spuriously? If so, the Pres is not competent to act,
even if evidence is clear and convincing. He becomes competent
to take decisions on this basis after war is declared or hostilities
commenced, according to my legal theory.
| But do you really mean that? Was KAL007 "actual hostilities"?
Had KAL007's destruction been outside Soviet territory, it
would have been actual hostilities, likewise re the US soldier shot
in East Germany. According to my theory, yes, the Pres could have
swung into LOWC at that time if the killings had been over the
Pacific or in West Germany.
N.B. KAL007 was evidently an unconstitutionally authorized spy
plane. So, this instance doesn't really apply. Incidentally, I'm
not saying I would approve of LOWC or nukes in any contingency
whatsoever, I'm delimiting my suit so as to come up with something
modest enough as to have a positive chance of success.
| You still haven't made the case for a state of high tension where no
| one has been attacked.
There are factual circumstances in which the U.S. might benefit from
a Presidential ability to implement LOWC off the bat. All I'm
saying is that's a question for Congress to expressly determine.
The Atomic Energy Act does not provide for this.
Silence is NOT express permission. Thus my case presents not so much
an argument as to LOWC's advisability, as to who has the constitutional
mandate to authorize it. It's a key point of law.
| Maybe you should just call to make a lunch date with him
Yes, I'll have another go.
To: LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 85 09:44:46 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Out to launch
The emphasised words kind-of prove my point re uncertainty. What
I'm saying is that at best the Pres could have "clear and
convincing" evidence of attack, but not evidence "beyond
reasonable DOUBT" ... the word DOUBT means exactly that - is there
any set of conceivable circumstances which could have generated
the warning spuriously?
NO. The phrase is REASONABLE DOUBT, which is not the same as "any set
of conceivable circumstances." Under the scenario that I outlined, I
think most responsible U.S. decision-makers would make the reasonable
inference that a Soviet attack was indeed underway.
If so, the Pres is not competent to act,
even if evidence is clear and convincing. He becomes competent
to take decisions on this basis after war is declared or hostilities
commenced, according to my legal theory.
I guess I don't understand this. I thought incompetence was based on
the lack of clear evidence. If he gets clear evidence even if
hostilities have not started (e.g., the Sovs have declared war, but
nothing has yet happened), then can he act?
N.B. KAL007 was evidently an unconstitutionally authorized spy
plane.
My reading of it is that it was used after it went off course on its
own; not quite the same thing.
Thus my case presents not so much
an argument as to LOWC's advisability, as to who has the constitutional
mandate to authorize it. It's a key point of law.
I'd like to see that happen too.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 85 09:44:52 EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: At law terminological exactitudes
| Under the scenario that I outlined, I
| think most responsible U.S. decision-makers would make the REASONABLE
| INFERENCE that a Soviet attack was indeed underway.
I agree. The point is it would not be reasonable to say that there
was no POSSIBILITY that the warning was an accident. The one thing
all these decisions have in common is that regardless of the
including environment, they are ultimately precipitated by
computerized sensor systems that could be erroneous. I'm reminded
of the bomb that was accidentally dropped over N. Carolina in the
early 60s, and only the last of eight safety devices saved
detonation (I recall McNamara in charge?). With the end of the
world at stake, it's just not a decision that can be taken where
there is no time to check data ... unless, at least, Congress says
it's OK.
(I'm a bit puzzled that you could consider your example warning
certain enough for a peacetime for response. I'd think the described
attack very weird, maybe a problem with WWMCCS re the subs? Back to
the computer aspects, not only Star Wars, but all nuclear LOWC
necessarily concerns a complex system UNTESTED END-TO-END.)
If so, the Pres is not competent to act,
even if evidence is clear and convincing. He becomes competent
to take decisions on this basis after war is declared or hostilities
commenced, according to my legal theory.
| I guess I don't understand this. I thought incompetence was based on
| the lack of clear evidence. If he gets clear evidence even if
| hostilities have not started (e.g., the Sovs have declared war, but
| nothing has yet happened), then can he act?
Aha! This explains our difference. "Beyond reasonable doubt" is a
more stringent standard of proof than "clear and convincing". Law
deals in uncertainties and nonmathematical proof. Even " clear and
and convincing" is not confused with definitely true. There is
an "inherent improbability doctrine" even more stringent than
"beyond reasonable doubt" which deals with facts scientifically
demonstrable, e.g. if someone says they drove from S.F. to N.Y.
on a thimbleful of gas, that's "inherently improbable".
To: LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 85 09:44:55 EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Why fix on LOW for legal action?
Re T. Siili's question (why talk of launch on warning when there's
many other nuclear madnesses?). In terms of a lawsuit I can only
throw a penalty flag on an illegal (unconstitutional) procedure.
This becomes next-to-impossible where a decision is taken
intentionally, based on plausible political judgments. Thus, if
Reagan wants he can launch all the U.S.'s nukes without a
procedural violation. He could say that the nuclear winter
theory is just that - a theory - and anyway there's an attrition
rate on the missiles. The remedy here is to vote for someone whose
intentional acts are supportable; the remedy is not in court.
To: LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 85 09:44:59 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: At law terminological exactitudes
| Under the scenario that I outlined, I
| think most responsible U.S. decision-makers would make the REASONABLE
| INFERENCE that a Soviet attack was indeed underway.
I agree. The point is it would not be reasonable to say that there
was no POSSIBILITY that the warning was an accident.
But there is ALWAYS a possibility that a warning is mistaken. What
you are trying to do is impose mathematical certainty on the process
by saying that only when a warning is that certain could someone LOW.
Of course, that precludes any sucn possibility of LOW. That is of
course your point, but I think you're getting at it in a somewhat
unsavory way, because that argument could be used for ANY action the
President wants to take.
(I'm a bit puzzled that you could consider your example warning
certain enough for a peacetime for response. I'd think the described
attack very weird, maybe a problem with WWMCCS re the subs?
The signal doesn't go through WWMCCS.
Back to
the computer aspects, not only Star Wars, but all nuclear LOWC
necessarily concerns a complex system UNTESTED END-TO-END.)
I'm not convinced, unless by end-to-end you mean including a nuclear
explosion.
| I guess I don't understand this. I thought incompetence was based on
| the lack of clear evidence. If he gets clear evidence even if
| hostilities have not started (e.g., the Sovs have declared war, but
| nothing has yet happened), then can he act?
Aha! This explains our difference. "Beyond reasonable doubt" is a
more stringent standard of proof than "clear and convincing".
I understand that. I was using the word "clear" in everyday language.
I meant if the SU sent a msg to the US on the hot line and also
announced in the US that they had declared war on the US. Then what?
Law
deals in uncertainties and nonmathematical proof.
Then why are you insisting on the mere existence of ANY doubt as
killing LOW.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 85 09:45:06 EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: The element of surprise
Hmmm.
As an afterthought, the Bayesian counter-examples that could be
constructed might be side-stepped (or rather eliminated from my
complaint) by the addition that the attack be "surpise" in some
sense. This would overcome my own counter-example where Reagan's
top spy in the Kremlin says the Ruskies will launch at 1:00 AM,
and the sensors then confirm.
You see, I think we really have to a point of concurrence on the
facts? Bear in mind that my goal is to come up with a cause of
action so modest as to be justiciable, while nevertheless having
a real implication re operational policies.
To: LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 85 09:45:09 EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: The Bayesian Commander-in-Chief
REPLY TO 12/13/85 12:26 FROM LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA: At law terminological exactitudes
| (I'm a bit puzzled that you could consider your example warning
| certain enough for a peacetime for response. I'd think the described
| attack very weird, maybe a problem with WWMCCS re the subs?
|
| The signal doesn't go through WWMCCS.
Then the signal WAS a mistake! (The point that the signalling system
might have kaputted has not been met, whether Wimmix or semaphore.)
| Back to
| the computer aspects, not only Star Wars, but all nuclear LOWC
| necessarily concerns a complex system UNTESTED END-TO-END.)
|
| I'm not convinced, unless by end-to-end you mean including a nuclear
| explosion.
I mean untested in response to a "massive surprise attack". (This
point is key in debunking Star Wars' computational feasibility.)
| I was using the word "clear" in everyday language.
In this instance the law uses "clear" pretty much as in everyday
language.
| I meant if the SU sent a msg to the US on the hot line and also
| announced in the US that they had declared war on the US. Then what?
Then it's up to the Pres, my theory does not apply, that's a
conclusive commencement.
| Law deals in uncertainties and nonmathematical proof.
|
| Then why are you insisting on the mere existence of ANY doubt as
| killing LOW.
Not ANY doubt: any REASONABLE DOUBT. The possibility of a false
alert in the time to verify provides a REASONABLE POSSIBILITY of
error, is all I'm saying. You have admitted such a possibility,
and that's all that's required at this stringent level of
uncertainty. Sure, after a war's begun the Pres must exercise
his best judgment. But he can't go ahead and wage a war off
his own bat.
I'm not saying that the Pres can't perfectly weigh all other
matters of state and military intelligence in taking a
retaliatory decision. But he cannot eliminate the possibility
of straitforward technical error in a warning, however
Bayesian his analysis may be, because to do that he needs time
to properly trace a lot of variables.
Unless you disagree, it seems we've narrowed the issue to one
of definition?
To: LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 85 09:45:13 EST
From: Elizabeth Martin <Martin C. Jordan <jordan%marlin at nosc.ARPA>@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: LOW and unconstitutionality
-------
After reading several letters regarding LOW and the possible
unconsitutionality of the "policy," I have decided to add my nickel's
worth to the discussion. There are two points I would like to make.
First, does the "legality" of the policy really matter? If the Russians
HAVE launched, within half an hour a great deal of the U.S. will be
glowing in the dark, a large segment of the population dead or dying,
and very little chance for an appeal [:-)]. Any decision by a committee
to retaliate or not retaliate becomes moot. If we DO launch on warning,
then Russian missles either already are, or soon will be (if we launch
due to "computer error," flights of geese, etc.) on their way to the
U.S. If we were wrong, we go down in history as the "bad guys." This
assumes that there are enough survivors left to record who was right or
who was wrong. Perhaps this is a pessimistic outlook, but in the final
analysis, I feel it is realistic. During a Nuclear Winter, I doubt if
the compilation of history tomes has a very high priority.
Second, we have to look at the way many of the 20th Century
wars and conflicts have started. By and large (correct me if I'm wrong),
pre-20th Century times featured formal declarations of war, several
weeks or months of mustering forces, marching off to battle(s), an
eventual surrender with what I shall call an attitude of "chivalry"
prevailing. Starting with the Russo-Japanese War (no personal offenses,
please!), the sneak attack on the opponent became increasingly popular.
A Russian fleet devastated at Tsushima Bay (sic??), the Kaiser marching
through the neutral countries of Holland and Belgium. Japan "occupies"
Manchuria, Mussolini invades Ethiopia (??...whatta man!), Hitler strikes
without warning at Poland, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and....
finally turns and pulls off another sneak attack against his ally Russia.
Japan pulls off a sneak attack at Pearl Harbor. If I recall correctly,
a sneak attack started the Korean War. Let us also not forget the sneak
attacks by the Arabs against Israel in '67 and '73. Iraq also invaded
Iran with essentially no warning. This loss of "honor among thieves"
or "you don't attack after sundown," this loss of "chivalry" has led
to the ever popularization of strike-without-warning guerilla warfare
and other terrorist acts. Perhaps I am an anachronism in my on time,
but I feel that if people must fight, they should at least do it as
gentlemen.
What has this to do with my point? Simply this, History is
showing us that you cannot expect an aggressor nation to "play war
by the rules." The attitude is "every nation (man) for himself and
I'll feel even better if I stab him in the back." The Russians are not
going to say "U.S., we don't like you are doing __________ (they fill
in the excuse). It is making us very nervous and upset. Unless you quit
within ________ (hours, days, weeks) and/or get out of ______________
(your favorite country) we will feel forced to launch a first-strike."
The whole idea behind a first-strike is basically a "hah! we caught you
with your pants down, now do what we say, or else!" A successful first-
strike leaves the aggressor nation holding all the cards. The fact
that we do not, cannot, and dare not trust the Soviets requires that
the U.S. have a LOW policy to deter Soviet agression against our own
country. In this day and age, mutual trust is the only true solution
to the problem. But since most Americans don't trust their own neighbor,
I doubt if they would trust the "Russkis." By the same token, the Soviets
feel they can't even trust their own people (therefore, a totally regulated
society) so, how can they trust "capitalist swine" such as ourselves.
Such a trust between people will not come overnight.
To conclude, a law prohibiting LOW and such like does not get
our head out of the hangman's noose. Either way, we, the Russians, and
the world lose. With LOW, we have deterrence and the knowledge that we
are getting our money's worth out of the President. Let's face it, he
is getting paid to make just such decisions. I'm also enough of a flag-
lovin', John Wayne American to want to drag the Russians down with
me if they opt for a suprise first-strike. So, if your going to waste
bucks in an ultimately no-win court case, why not donate the dollars
instead to some other worthy cause which CAN have beneficial effects
such as African Relief?
Respectfully,
Martin Jordan
jordan@nosc.arpa
p.s. All flames, comments, and meaningful discussions welcomed
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 85 09:45:18 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: The Bayesian Commander-in-Chief
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe>
| (I'm a bit puzzled that you could consider your example warning
| certain enough for a peacetime for response. I'd think the described
| attack very weird, maybe a problem with WWMCCS re the subs?
|
| The signal doesn't go through WWMCCS.
Then the signal WAS a mistake! (The point that the signalling system
might have kaputted has not been met, whether Wimmix or semaphore.)
Huh?? Sunk subs don't report thru WWMCCS at all -- why is it
relevant? I'm totally confused...
| Back to
| the computer aspects, not only Star Wars, but all nuclear LOWC
| necessarily concerns a complex system UNTESTED END-TO-END.)
|
| I'm not convinced, unless by end-to-end you mean including a nuclear
| explosion.
I mean untested in response to a "massive surprise attack". (This
point is key in debunking Star Wars' computational feasibility.)
I understand the SDI argument -- being responsible for some forms of
it myself. I regard the Nov 79 false tape incident as a test of a
"massive surprise attack"; indeed, some number of tests do simulate
large scale attack..
Besides, the main point that you're addressing is NOT the functioning
of the entire system, but rather the part that centers on the
President and when he must make a decision.. That probably hasn't been
tested either, but that's the perogative of the President to not
participate in such an exercise. Maybe your suit could force the Pres
to learn something!!
| I meant if the SU sent a msg to the US on the hot line and also
| announced in the US that they had declared war on the US. Then what?
Then it's up to the Pres, my theory does not apply, that's a
conclusive commencement.
But under my scenario, no hostilities have commenced -- i.e., no one
has been killed or planes shot, or anything!
| I was using the word "clear" in everyday language.
In this instance the law uses "clear" pretty much as in everyday
language.
| Law deals in uncertainties and nonmathematical proof.
|
| Then why are you insisting on the mere existence of ANY doubt as
| killing LOW.
Not ANY doubt: any REASONABLE DOUBT. The possibility of a false
alert in the time to verify provides a REASONABLE POSSIBILITY of
error, is all I'm saying. You have admitted such a possibility,
and that's all that's required at this stringent level of
uncertainty.
I understand where we disagree. You are insisting that the accuracy
of a sensor is subject to reasonable doubt. I have been insisting
that the President might believe that an attack were underway beyond
a reasonable doubt.
We have been arguing about two different things, and they are not
incompatible. It is possible to believe that an attack were underway
on the basis of sensor warnings AND other information about the world
and still believe that the sensors might be in error. The question
again is what level of certainty a President needs in his sensors.
"Possibility" simply means any non-zero probability -- and that always
exists.
I'm not saying that the Pres can't perfectly weigh all other
matters of state and military intelligence in taking a
retaliatory decision. But he cannot eliminate the possibility
of straitforward technical error in a warning, however
Bayesian his analysis may be, because to do that he needs time
to properly trace a lot of variables.
When you talk about ELIMINATING the possibility of error, that is what
I mean by mathematical certainty, and where I think you are insisting
on absolutely zero doubt.
Unless you disagree, it seems we've narrowed the issue to one
of definition?
See above.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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