ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) (01/04/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Saturday, January 4, 1986 10:20AM
Volume 5, Issue 87
Today's Topics:
"Legitimate" Soviet defense needs
Aircraft Carriers
WWII & WWI
Book Review
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Date: Thu, 2 Jan 86 16:21:09 pst
From: Gary Chapman <PARC-CSLI!chapman@glacier>
Subject: "Legitimate" Soviet defense needs
I would prefer to sidestep the question about whether *any* weapons buildup
can be considered "legitimate" if the nation's self-interest is bound up with
that buildup. In terms of conventional weapons in Europe, I think it's fairly
clear that the Soviet Union has gone far over the brink of weapons procure-
ment for self-defense. The numbers there would be comical if they weren't so
alarming.
Soviet NATO
Main battle tanks 46,230 26,900
Artillery and Mortar tubes 38,800 19,900
Armored personnel carriers 94,800 53,000
Transport/support helicopters 6,000 1,960
The total military forces for the Warsaw Pact are 6,000,000 people, and for
NATO, 4,000,000 (roughly). Two million extra troops is quite a difference.
When one considers "legitimate" Soviet defense, then it seems to me one is bound
to consider the expenses, troops, equipment and so on necessary to maintain the
obedience of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and perhaps even Estonia, Lithuania
and other parts of the Soviet Union. Can this be considered "legitimate"? (I
forgot East Germany, perhaps the most important to the Soviets.)
Gary Chapman
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Date: Thu, 2 Jan 86 20:42:11 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Aircraft Carriers
From: "Morton Jim" at LLL-MFE.ARPA
I can think of several reasons for Aircraft Carriers. First is fleet
defense. A carrier can provide several hundred miles of extension to
the "umbrella" of defense afforded by ship-board radar and missile systems.
But the fleet *is* largely the carrier. To say that a reason for a
carrier is so that it can protect itself (which is true) strikes me as
somewhat silly.
ASW air operations
allow
aircraft ( both fixed and rotary wing ) to "Sweep" an area clear of hostile
submarines before the task force moves within range of those submarines.
But you have to keep the subs out. Also, there are not enough
aircraft to do this for very large areas with high confidence.
Finally, this has relevance only in a power projection role.
When we had battleships off the coast of Lebanon shelling the coast,
Carrier based aircraft provided both radar and fighter cover to
those gunships.
(Remember the Libyan fighters shot down by Navy F-14's ? ? )
Yup. The US fleet wasn't doing anything at the time except
establishing the US right to be in the Gulf of Sidra; that's hardly a
"mission".
Force projection is also valid.
I agree, but you don't need 15 carriers to do force projection against
Uganda and Argentina in the Falklands.
Even in the event of theatre or larger nuclear war, the carrier
is valuable.
For what role?? It's job surely is not merely to survive.
Since the carrier is a nuclear capable platform of significant
capability that must be countered by any enemy who would attack
the U.S. it
makes their planning and execution of attack much more difficult.
Maybe that was true in the past, but in a world of 10,000 strategic
warheads, 15 x 50 = 750 warheads hardly makes a blip.
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Date: Thu, 2 Jan 86 20:43:03 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: WWII & WWI
From: foy at aero
In addition I have some where else of a study of the use of fighting in
WWII. (Again I don't remember the reference). This study indicated that
something like 50% of the combantants in WWII did not fire their rifles.
Most of us have a strong built in mechanism that prevents us from killing
one of our own species. It takes a lot of dehumanising of the
enemy to get troops to kill each other.
This one is true, but not for the reasons you indicate. Army studies
indicated that when firing took place, it was often because the one
guy with an automatic weapon firing gave the others the confidence to
fire. That's largely why soldiers have automatic weapons now.
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Date: Thu 2 Jan 86 21:22:51-EST
From: "Jim McGrath" <MCGRATH@OZ.AI.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Boof Review
Reply-to: mcgrath%mit-oz@mit-mc
Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, Joseph S. Nye, eds.. Hawks,
Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War. 1985. W.W.
Norton and Company. 282 pages.
It is mainly the work of Owls (who, unlike Doves and Hawks, view the
most danger to lie in the irrational, accidental causes of war).
Contributors include the editors and Paul Bracken, Richard Betts, Fen
Osler Hampson, Francis Fukuyama, Henry Rowen, and Stephen Meyer).
Although not terribly original, this collection of essays is well done
and contains a great deal of information concerning the classical
possible paths to nuclear war (accidental, surprise and preemption,
escalation in Europe, escalation in the Middle East, catalytic nuclear
war). It also has an essay on Soviet perspectives on the paths to
nuclear war. It is one of the few systematic approaches to the
problem that I have found, and recommend it.
Their agenda (the conclusion of the book) is as follows:
1 Maintain a credible nuclear deterrent.
DO modernize the strategic triad.
DO put alliance politics first.
DON'T adopt a no-first use policy.
DON'T pursue a comprehensive freeze.
DON'T confuse MAD with strategy.
DON'T assume that cities can be defended.
2 Obtain a credible conventional deterrent.
DO strengthen NATO and the RDF.
DO raise the nuclear threshold.
DON'T provoke the USSR.
DON'T pretend that nuclear weapons deter only nuclear war.
3 Enhance crisis stability.
DO take a decapitation seriously.
DO send a top leader out of Washington during crises.
DO develop a survivable small ICBM.
DON'T adopt a LOW policy
DON'T plan for a nuclear demonstration shot in Europe.
4 Reduce the impact of accidents.
DO reduce reliance on short-range theater nuclear weapons.
DO add safety devices and procedures.
DO upgrade warning systems.
DON'T use nuclear alerts for political signaling.
DON'T multiply crises.
5 Develop procedures for war termination
DO plan for ending a war if it begins.
DO develop a survivable US-Soviet communications system.
DO maintain civilian control over nuclear weapons.
DON'T plan for early use of nuclear weapons.
DON'T decapitate.
6 Prevent and manage crises.
DO prepare decision makers to deal with nuclear crises.
DO work with the Soviets to prevent and manage crises.
DO install bilateral hot lines between all nuclear powers.
DON'T engage American and Soviet forces in direct combat.
DON'T try to change rapidly the situation in Eastern Europe.
DON'T use nuclear weapons against third parties.
7 Invigorate nonproliferation efforts.
DO maintain security guarantees.
DO support the nonproliferation regime.
DO explore sanctions against proliferators.
DO protect against nuclear terrorism.
DON'T be fatalistic about proliferation.
8 Limit misperceptions.
DO meet regularly with Soviet leaders.
DO encourage non-governmental contacts with the Soviets.
DO expect the unexpected.
DON'T treat nuclear weapons like other weapons.
DON'T exaggerate military imbalances.
DON'T cut off communications as a sanction.
9 Pursue arms control negotiations.
DO preserve existing arms control treaties.
DO pursue crisis stability through arms control.
DO reduce uncertainties through arms control negotiations.
DON'T oversell arms control.
DON'T abuse bargaining chips.
DON'T restrict arms control to formal agreements.
10 Reduce reliance on nuclear deterrence over the long term.
DO assume that nuclear deterrence will last forever.
DON'T intensify the search for alternatives to deterrence.
Jim
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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