ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) (01/05/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Saturday, January 4, 1986 11:08PM
Volume 6, Issue 8.4
Today's Topics:
see #8.1
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Date: Sat, 4 Jan 86 22:50:34 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Putting a Man in the Loop
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
From: Jim McGrath <MCGRATH at OZ.AI.MIT.EDU>
The model to think of is a sophisticated computer game. The
human operator(s) would take care of truly strange cases
(rising moons, flocks of interplanetary geese)..
But the major problem is not the things that the computer isn't
sure about, but rather the things that it is sure about that are
not true. How would the human ever know to intervene?
I thought a bit about that, and have a suitable elaboration.
Basically, you require a "two key" system, with the computer holding
one key and a human operator/monitor another. This is primarily for
the "go/no go" decision.
You mean fire/don't fire?
After an attack is acknowledged, you concede
the possibility of overkilling by the computer (taking out third party
satellites and the like) in return for the more immediate response to
attack provided by the computer.
So your solution is that you kill everything, and don't do discrimination?
This takes care of the computer going off half cocked. If you are
worried about the computer missing an actual attack, you can now set
the sensitivity low, trusting to the human monitor to not activate
when appropriate.
Actually, the SDIO has said that boost-phase will be treated
separately; it expects terminal and midcourse to be on all the time.
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Date: Sat 4 Jan 86 19:52:46-PST
From: Jim McGrath <J.JPM@Epic>
Subject: Re: Independent Battlestations
Reply-to: mcgrath%mit-oz@mit-mc.arpa
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
This is the fundamental point of disagreement. If SDI is just
another defensive system, then all that you say is right. But it
isn't. I will stop beating the perfect system horse when the SDI
supporters acknowledge that large-scale population defense can
never be made certifiably reliable.
What do you mean by "certifiably reliable?" While politicians may
talk about 100% reliability, we are all scientists and engineers here
- we know that nothing, including such things as the sun rising, is
100% reliable. You must really mean X% reliable, where X is a high
number (perhaps high enough so as to reduce to a very low probability
the chance of a single warhead getting through). In that case,
independent battlestations, and other measures, might give you the
number you need. I submit that it is too early to dismiss these
approaches out of hand, since you are really talking about a
quantative difference and we do not have good numbers yet.
Anyway, I am arguing for a highly reliable, but by no means perfect,
system. My X would probably be lower than yours. I really do think
that there is a difference between a few million dead (horrible, on
the scale of WW II) and hundreds of millions dead (utterly
unprecedented). And while I am certain that we all, including the
public, would like as high an X as possible, they would agree that
losing a city or two and some missile bases/airfields would be a lot
better than losing everything.
Besides, complaints that politicians are lying do not sit well with
me. Of course they are lying. WE WANT THEM TO LIE. Politicians who
tell the truth get kicked out of office. Our entire posture of
extended deterrence is a joke, since we do not have the capability to
creditably back it up. But you try to get someone elected promising
to reinstate the draft, raise the defense budget further, or pull back
our troops and cut Europe/Japan loose.
We have to make do with what we have.
Jim
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Date: Sat, 4 Jan 86 23:03:58 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Independent Battlestations
From: Jim McGrath <J.JPM at Epic>
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
This is the fundamental point of disagreement. If SDI is just
another defensive system, then all that you say is right. But it
isn't. I will stop beating the perfect system horse when the SDI
supporters acknowledge that large-scale population defense can
never be made certifiably reliable.
What do you mean by "certifiably reliable?"
A system whose performance is known in advance to be adequate to the
task. I don't care if the number for reliability isn't 100%, just
high enough so that no one dies.
We all, including the
public, would like as high an X as possible, they would agree that
losing a city or two and some missile bases/airfields would be a lot
better than losing everything.
But that is not the goal of the SDI.
Besides, complaints that politicians are lying do not sit well with
me. Of course they are lying. WE WANT THEM TO LIE. Politicians who
tell the truth get kicked out of office. Our entire posture of
extended deterrence is a joke, since we do not have the capability to
creditably back it up. But you try to get someone elected promising
to reinstate the draft, raise the defense budget further, or pull back
our troops and cut Europe/Japan loose.
We have to make do with what we have.
So you condone lying to the public as a tool of public policy? How
would you like to acknowledge that publically in a letter to the NY
Times? Don't forget to add that you support SDI, and that truth
doesn't matter when you try to justify a weapon system -- never mind
what it actually does. We can say that we will spend millions of
dollars on AIDS research since that will save lives, and spend the
money instead on nerve gas, which will also help to eliminate AIDS (by
killing homosexual soldiers).
Sorry; I believe that elected leaders have a responsibility to tell
the truth to the public, and to educate them away from fairy tales. I
would rather see precious defense dollars go to create good anti-tank
weapons; that would have some chance of improving extended deterrence.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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