[mod.politics.arms-d] Arms-Discussion Digest V6 #8.2

ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) (01/05/86)

Arms-Discussion Digest               Saturday, January 4, 1986 11:08PM
Volume 6, Issue 8.2

Today's Topics:

see #8.1

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Date: Sat,  4 Jan 86 18:47:18 EST
From: "James E. O'Dell" <Jim McGrath <MCGRATH at OZ.AI.MIT.EDU>@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject:    Putting the Man in the Loop

I found the calculations involving SDI reliability interesting.  As
well the debate on SDI software.  But it appears as if people may be
making some aspects of the problem too hard.  Hoping that I have not
missed this part of the conversation....

Obviously some problems (precise aiming of weapons for instance)
demand computer control.  And the time constraints involved in boost
phase interception may require computer control.  But other aspects
(such as initial activation of weapons for mid-course and terminal
phase interception, target discrimination, neutralization of
counter-measures) could be made with substantial human input.  Thus no
need for monster AI programs to cope with all possible contingencies -
humans are ready made for that purpose.

The model to think of is a sophisticated computer game.  The human
operator(s) would take care of truly strange cases (rising moons,
flocks of interplanetary geese) and either determine strategy and/or
provide input parameters for the actual computer controllers (e.g.
"Looks like they are using dummy decoys of the DUMDUM class - better
change certain probabilities in your expert systems target
discriminator in the following manner").  The trade off here is
decreased reliance on sophisticated AI programs that we all concede
that state of the art is not capable of producing and increased
reliance on software that provides an excellent interface to the human
operator.  That would seem to be the easier task (we already have
experience in designing control systems for high performance jet
fighters).

Of course, this increases the problems associated with real time
secure communications, but you were going to have to face them anyway.

Jim

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Date: Sat,  4 Jan 86 18:47:23 EST
From: "James E. O'Dell" <Jim McGrath <MCGRATH at OZ.AI.MIT.EDU>@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject:    Testing SDI

From Risks, Volume 1 : Issue 33:

> From: horning@decwrl.DEC.COM (Jim Horning)
> - The systems that you cite, and that he cited, are all ones where each
> component is in routine use under the exact circumstances that they
> must be reliable for. No matter how many independent subsystems the
> Lipton SDI is divided into, NONE of them will get this kind of routine
> use under conditions of saturation attack where reliability will be
> most critical. Thus there is a high probability that each of them would
> fail (perhaps in independent ways!).

This seems to be a common problem with any modern weapon system (or
even not so modern - it took WWI for the Germans to realize that the
lessons of the 1880's concerning rapid infantry fire (and thus the
rise of infantry over calvary) did not take artillery development
adequately into account).  But this might be easier to manage than
most.

What if, after suitable advance notice, the SDI system was fully
activated and targeted against one of our periodic meteor swarms?
While not perfect targets, they would be quite challenging (especially
with respect to numbers!), except for boost phase, and CHEAP.  If the
system was regenerative (i.e. you only expended energy and the like),
then the total cost would be very low.

Meteors are just a casual example.  My point is that the costs of
partial (but system wide) testing does not have to lie with the
targets (which many people seem to assume) as much as with weapons
discharge - which may be quite manageable.

Jim

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Date: Sat,  4 Jan 86 18:47:27 EST
From: prandt!mikes at AMES-NAS.ARPA (Peter O. Mikes)@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU

Re: I'm sure everyone will decide there's nothing sinister about this.     
   J.Miller:
   The Sovs and their E. European allies operate a different guage of 
   railroad than that of the W. European countries.   
   ..Sovs have.. spiffy kits which allow rapid conversion of their rolling
   stock to travel on W. European rails.  Interestingly enough, none of
   the NATO allies have the same set-up for going east.

         Peter Mikes: ( mikes@ames-nas or Informatics (415) 964-9900 )
    This is really mixed up: The railroad stock was build during
    the times of the Austrio-Hungarian empire and of Czarist empire. 
    Soviet occupied countries of Central Europe such as Hungary or 
    Czechoslovakia have the same gauge as Western Europe and nations
    incorporated forcibly into the Soviet Union such as Ruthenians have
    the Asian gauge -  Whom do you mean by E. European allies???
     The relevance also escapes me: Are you implying that NATO forces have
    no capability of taking the action into the enemy territory or are you
    suggesting that NATO would use air-lift rather then railroads? If you
    would travel in those parts, you may find that not to be a bad choice.

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Date: Sat,  4 Jan 86 18:52:04 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject:  Putting the Man in the Loop


    From: Jim McGrath <MCGRATH at OZ.AI.MIT.EDU>

    The model to think of is a sophisticated computer game.  The human
    operator(s) would take care of truly strange cases (rising moons,
    flocks of interplanetary geese)..

But the major problem is not the things that the computer isn't sure
about, but rather the things that it is sure about that are not true.
How would the human ever know to intervene?

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Date: Sat,  4 Jan 86 18:54:43 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject:  Testing SDI


    From: Jim McGrath <MCGRATH at OZ.AI.MIT.EDU>

    This [full-scale system testing -- HL] seems to be a common problem with 
    any modern weapon system (or
    even not so modern - it took WWI for the Germans to realize that the
    lessons of the 1880's concerning rapid infantry fire (and thus the
    rise of infantry over calvary) did not take artillery development
    adequately into account).

And there have been disasters.  Only here, the disaster is bigger.

    What if, after suitable advance notice, the SDI system was fully
    activated and targeted against one of our periodic meteor swarms?
    While not perfect targets, they would be quite challenging (especially
    with respect to numbers!), except for boost phase, and CHEAP.  If the
    system was regenerative (i.e. you only expended energy and the like),
    then the total cost would be very low.

Interesting example, but problematic.  No kill assessment for one,
under some circumstances.  Entirely different signatures for another.

    Meteors are just a casual example.  My point is that the costs of
    partial (but system wide) testing does not have to lie with the
    targets (which many people seem to assume) as much as with weapons
    discharge - which may be quite manageable.

But if the tests are to be realistic, then the right targets are
essential, especially since a counter-measure is to try to fool with
the targets that the defense sees.

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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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