ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) (01/07/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Monday, January 6, 1986 5:46PM
Volume 6, Issue 11
Today's Topics:
Re: Testing SDI
Another SDI problem
Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V6 #9
more carriers in action
Soviet Defense
reluctance to shoot
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Date: Sun 5 Jan 1986 18:37:42 EST
From: Paul Dietz <dietz%slb-doll.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: Re: Testing SDI
Actually, testing even the midcourse and terminal phases of a BMD system
is not likely to be fully practical. It will not be possible to
simulate accurately Soviet countermeasures, since these are unknown.
It will not be possible to conduct full scale test attacks on the BMD
components, since this would be expensive and could distribute debris
in orbit. Any real attempt to penetrate the defense will certainly
use nuclear weapons to blind or dazzle sensors, project air into space
to block particle beams, and disrupt communications; the effects of such
explosions cannot be fully simulated and a realistic full scale test cannot
be performed for obvious reasons.
Paul
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Date: Sun 5 Jan 1986 18:47:07 EST
From: Paul Dietz <dietz%slb-doll.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: Another SDI problem
It seems to me there's an inherent problem with any SDI scheme that
puts a lot of mass into orbit for boost phase defense (chemical lasers,
for example). If putting thousands of tons of defensive hardware
into orbit is practical, what is to keep to opposing side from placing
thousands of tons of OFFENSIVE hardware in orbit? This is banned by
treaty, of course, but SDI assumes the ABM treaty is abrogated, so why
not the Outer Space treaty? Nuclear reentry vehicles are not terribly
massive; placing them in orbit ahead of time eliminates boost phase
defense completely, and can shorten the midcourse phase to a few minutes
for warheads that begin the war over the target (and can reduce the
warning time to zero for EMP-producing weapons).
It could be that nuclear weapons in space are too vulnerable to space
based lasers, for example. If this is the case then those lasers should
also be vulnerable to other lasers, so a defense dominated world
would be highly unstable. The warheads could take (say) 90% losses
and still be effective; the laser defense would be crippled by losses of
the same magnitude.
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Date: Sun, 5 Jan 86 23:41:19 pst
From: ucdavis!lll-crg!amdcad!cae780!weitek!mmm@ucbvax.berkeley.edu (Mark Thorson)
Subject: Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V6 #9
Recent discussion of nuclear devices delivered via
dope smugglers inspires some comments:
1. If "they" were to plant these devices in anticipation
of a war, they'd already be here. They would have been here
since their hour of greatest need, or shortly thereafter.
Say, 1965 at the latest.
2. "They" are really big on central control. I bet "they"
wouldn't trust anybody to walk around with one of "their"
bombs. At best (worst) it would have to be dis-assembled
components only to be assembled after several layers of
passwords and other checks.
3. This brings up a point. Several individual bomb parts
are quite identifiable. What's a schoolteacher doing with
a chunk of weapons-grade U-235? Or a precision-machined
beryllium sphere? I'm sure our Slavic friends would be
considerably embarrassed if they could be connected to such
a find. No, I don't think a nuke is what they would send here.
4. Which brings me to the topic I find alarming. Binary nerve
gas. It would be easy to handle, prior to use. It wouldn't
be TOO embarrassing, if one of the components were discovered.
And it would be just as effective as a small nuke.
Which brings me to another topic I find more threatening than
the possibility of WW3, the possibility of terrorist use of
binary nerve gas. It's soooo easy to make. A one-step
synthesis from small organics than can easily be made from
common feedstocks (ethyl alchohol, sulphuric acid, phosphorus
trichloride, etc.). Guess what? Iraq is widely believed to
have such chemicals installed along the Iran-Iraq border.
If Iran mounts that final "human wave" attack they've been
threatening, Iraq will use it. And from that point on,
people are going to pay a lot more attention to nerve gas.
And it will rapidly become known how easy it is to make
this stuff.
Mark Thorson (...!cae780!weitek!mmm)
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From: ihnp4!ihuxl!dcn@ucbvax.berkeley.edu
Date: Mon Jan 6 09:33:41 1986
Subject: more carriers in action
Carriers are made to do more than protect themselves.
Good reasons have already been mentioned, although minor arguments
picked them to death. These are: force projection, fleet defense,
shipping escort, and full-attack mode. Their major role now is force
projection, which they do almost too well (can be very threatening to
see a nuke carrier off your coast). Fleet defense means more than
protecting the carrier, although that is implied. It also includes all
the smaller ships that can't defend themselves against large missile
attacks, subs or aircraft, such as supply ships, tankers, troop
carriers, etc. A shipping escort is a similar role, such as convoy
protection across the Atlantic. Of course, convoys could be destroyed
by nukes, but so can everything else. I think an attack on a convoy
would generate a nuclear response in the same way that an attack on
an airfield would. By the way, a group of C-5's could not send enough
supplies across the Atlantic to make much of a difference. A large
convoy is the only way at present.
The last use is for a wartime task force. The carrier is the
only source of air cover far from friendly bases, and it's vital if
you want any other surface ships to survive. A carrier is pretty tough.
It can take several hits before losing its offensive capabilities.
If it's hit many times, it can sink, but it would last longer than any
other type of surface ship. Remember how long even the old WWII carriers
lasted against attack. Today's carriers are much larger, tougher and
harder to damage. Armored flight decks make a big difference.
The smaller British carriers used in the Falklands were relatively
ineffective at providing air superiority with the Harriers, which were
built purely for ground support roles. The Marines want Harriers since
they need ground support, and they only have helicopters for that role
now (low & slow).
P.S. I just saw The Day the Earth Stood Still, and just realized it's
an endorsement for an autonomous SDI system, with Gort as the AI
element and the saucer at the super weapon.
Dave Newkirk, ihnp4!ihuxl!dcn
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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