ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) (01/11/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Saturday, January 11, 1986 12:06PM
Volume 6, Issue 18.2
Today's Topics:
See 18.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Sat 11 Jan 86 03:18:51-EST
From: "Jim McGrath" <MCGRATH%OZ.AI.MIT.EDU@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: A lesson in the irrationality of Politics
Reply-to: mcgrath%mit-oz@mit-mc.arpa
This is a tale about how a well conceived public program can be
undermined by not paying attention to political forces. In October of
1965 a Presidential task force, consisting of academics and interest
group leaders, but no members of the bureaucracy and only one of
Congress (who was not there most of the time), designed a Model Cities
program. Their goal, based on long experience, was to make the
program effective by:
1) concentrating federal assistance into a small number of urban
areas to enhance its impact,
2) pay more attention to social issues than physical reconstruction,
3) tightly coordinate federal housing programs to get more bang
for the buck.
Originally they proposed a 5 to 10 city experimental program. But as
they talked, the numbers grew. First 36, and then 50 cities were
included (to give the Senate, with 50 states, some reason to approve
the "experiment"). Finally, they requested 66 cities.
It took 10 months to pass this high priority Presidential program.
Sections dealing with integration were knocked out, to appease
southern Democrats. Spending was reduced from $2.3 billion over five
years to $900 million and three years, to appease conservative
Republicans. The role of the federal coordinator, one of the three
goals, was practically eliminated.
But the real change came in the number of cities and what type of
cities were considered. The Senate doubled the number of cities, and
special provisions were put in so that certain cities would be sure to
be selected. Over 100 Congressmen were promised that their cities
would be selected before any applications had even been filed. But
even though goals 1 and 3 (and to a large extent 2) had been
abandoned, the program passed.
Next year the cities had to be picked by the civil servants in HUD,
and Congress had to appropriate the operating funds. HUD put off the
decision point until after the appropriations battle. After a very
hard and close battle, HUD awarded programs to 53% of their
supporters, and only 2% of those who opposed them. That 2%
represented one lone person, the ranking Republican on the Independent
Offices Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee (the HUD
funding committee) - a man they could not afford to alienate. The
next and last year of the program, there was no real opposition.
While the allocation of the military budget among districts is
somewhat less openly political, this episode drives home the lesson
that politics count no matter what the program is. Moreover, a
wholly "rational" program was turned into an irrational pork barrel
mess by the political process.
People should keep the lesson of the Model Cities Program alive in
their minds when debating SDI, conventional weapons modernization,
etc... Like it or not, our political system, eminently rational on
its own merits, is often irrational with respect to solving problems.
Jim
------------------------------
Date: Sat 11 Jan 86 03:20:05-EST
From: "Jim McGrath" <MCGRATH%OZ.AI.MIT.EDU@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Switzerland
Reply-to: mcgrath%mit-oz@mit-mc.arpa
Pays a high price for peace. They really practice the theory of the
citizen army. All males must serve, all are required in civilian life
to keep arms around the home (none of this gun control nonsense).
They also have a very active civil defense program.
All in all, they do well. Except that, in case of an all out nuclear
war, all there plans (with the possible exception of civil defense)
would go for nought.
Jim
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 11 Jan 86 09:43:33 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: A lesson in the irrationality of Politics
From: mcgrath%mit-oz at mit-mc.arpa
While the allocation of the military budget among districts is
somewhat less openly political [than Model Cities], this
episode drives home the lesson
that politics count no matter what the program is. Moreover, a
wholly "rational" program was turned into an irrational pork barrel
mess by the political process.
People should keep the lesson of the Model Cities Program alive in
their minds when debating SDI, conventional weapons modernization,
etc... Like it or not, our political system, eminently rational on
its own merits, is often irrational with respect to solving problems.
True. What does this have to do with SDI? The President is
irrationally proposing a comprehensive defense that everyone
acknowledges will not work, and others are tagging along to get what
they can get on his coattails. That is a reasonable description to
me. I think there is a BIG downside to what these people are
trying to do; however, I can't get people to listen to the downside
without someone waving the President's vision in front of me. I will
debate the limited goals people on their merits when they acknowledge
the President is foisting a fraud on the American people, but not
before, and that this one is qualitatively different than other
politicians.
You never did respond to my research on immortality comments.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 11 Jan 86 09:49:06 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Paranoia
From: foy at aero
It makes a big difference if [Soviet] expansionism is coming from
paranoia rather than something else. The worst way of dealing with
paranoia is to do things which reinforce their belief that the world
is out to get them, ie installing cruise misssiles in Germany etc.
What is a better way of dealing with paranoia? Remember, you have to
consider the cost of being wrong. What is they're not just paranoid,
and they really do have expansionist desires that are motivated
ideologically?
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 11 Jan 86 09:55:00 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Deep Strike
From: Jim McGrath <J.JPM at Epic>
The only problem I can see with a Deep Strike strategy is that, if the
Soviets feel we are carrying the battle to their homeland (ala the
Germans in '41), then they might be tempted to launch a preemptive
strike. This risk can be minimized by 1) confining targets to Eastern
Europe (why else do they have a buffer zone?), 2) making sure that
targets are tactical, not strategic (even if they are in the USSR),
and/or 3) communicating these plans to the Soviets so that all sides
will know that both parties want to keep things limited. On the whole
it is a good option to have, and probably to use, if use carefully.
Any thoughts on how we convince the Soviets during actual conflict of
(1) and (2)? Why should they believe -- in the extreme fog of war --
that a given attack in progress is one on EE and not on the SU? Would
you believe that a large flock of Soviet missiles aimed over the north
pole were aimed at Canada and not at the US if you saw them during
boost phase?
Do the plans now in existence incorporate any of these elements?
This is indeed part of the controversy; opponents of deep strike often
suggest that current plans do not provide reassurance to the SU, while
proponents suggest that the lack of reassurance to the Soviets is a
desirable *feature* of deep strike.
------------------------------
End of Arms-Discussion Digest
*****************************