Arms-D-Request@MIT-XX.ARPA (Moderator) (01/19/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Sunday, January 19, 1986 2:41PM
Volume 6, Issue 26
Today's Topics:
SM
reply to Spencer's posting
Re: Space Invaders/Offensive Star Wars lasers
Re: Paranoia
re: missile flight test ban
Orbiting lasers > ground targets
Citizen's summit again
Russians and WWII
Citizen's Summit Response
BM Testing Ban
Soviet 'NO NUKES'
Re: Offensive Lasers
Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V6 #22
Unreleased SDIO Computing Panel Report
SDI and Research funding
Aircraft Carriers
Offensive Star Wars lasers
BM Testing Ban
BM Testing Ban
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 86 16:48:28 PST
From: sun!oscar!wild@ucbvax.berkeley.edu (Will Doherty)
Subject: SM
It is probably not appropriate to get into a discussion
of SM on this digest, but if you find it necessary to use
the term, please include a definition of what you mean
by it. The term has a variety of meanings depending on
who's using it, so I think we have to provide definitions if
we want to talk further about it.
Will Doherty
(sun!oscar!wild)
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 86 20:39:31 cst
From: Janos Simon <simon%gargoyle.uchicago.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: reply to Spencer's posting
A small correction to the perceived attitudes and morality of foreign
countries speaking out against war.
Argentina: The Beagle channel dispute was subjected to arbitration. The
veredict was accepted by Argentina, after a popular referendum. In fact
the referendum was considered as a very shrewd political move by President
Alfonsin, as it passed with overwhelming majority, which he could present as
a vote of confidence in his government.
India: Prime Minister Gandhi met recently with the Pakistani president.
They both pledged to solve their differences by paceful means. In addition,
India has shown remarkable restraint over racial incidents in Sri Lanka,
forcing the Tamil insurgents to negotiate with the government, and refusing
to allow them to operate from India.
I am not defending the morality of these countries, but it does not hurt
to set the record straight.
As for the analogy of street gangs asking police protection against the mob:
the analogy could be made more accurate if you assume the gangs involved in
fistfights, while the mob carries machine guns and mortars.
In the Falkland/Malvinas war no outsiders were hurt:
this is unlikely to happen in an USSR-US conflict.
Only the US and the USSR can destroy the whole world: the other countries are
mere amateurs, so to speak.
------------------------------
Date: Wed 15 Jan 1986 17:17:20 EST
From: Paul Dietz <dietz%slb-doll.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: Re: Space Invaders/Offensive Star Wars lasers
I recall sending some notes to arms-d on the ground-attack capabilities
of lasers some time ago.
The only problem I see is the degradation of the beam(s) by the lower
atmosphere. This can be avoided by attacking during quiet times (night,
say) and by using multiple convergent beams against a single target.
This limits power densities until quite near the target, avoiding
thermal blooming.
The reference to nuclear winter is silly, however. Fire starting
with a nuclear weapon is an all-or-nothing thing; you can't target
specific buildings (say). The most likely use for an orbital laser
ground attack system would be pin-point strikes against enemy government,
military centers and terrorist bases. I could see the government
building such a weapon even if it is entirely useless against ICBMs.
------------------------------
Subject: Re: Paranoia
Date: 15 Jan 86 14:31:40 PST (Wed)
From: foy@aero
If RR and MG are paranoid in the clinical sense then their communicating
without the aid of a specialist in medical illness would probably do no
good. Even with specialised assisstance it probably would do no good.
I don't believe that either of them fit that definition. Rather I assume
that their actions are based on a deep suspicion of their intent based on
the past history of their countries and their relationship.
In this case personal communications will allow them to build up a mutual
understanding what each other. We are more able to form workable agreements
with someone we know than someone we don't. We are also more able to
seperate truth from falsehood be personal conversation, even with translators,
than we are by what we read and hear second hand.
It is not an easy process to develope an understanding when their have been
years of finger pointing, but it can be done.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 86 10:31:14 PST
From: ihnp4!ihuxl!dcn@ucbvax.berkeley.edu
Subject: re: missile flight test ban
I see two potential problems with a missile flight test ban:
1. When the boosters get old and unreliable, a "use it or lose it"
choice may have to be made. This is similar to a problem
in SDI deployment. If full replacement of parts is allowed
(including a whole booster?), then this seems like a hold
on the status quo - no improvement at all.
2. Since many ICBM boosters double as satellite boosters, how is
flight testing of new space hardware limited by this ban?
Dave Newkirk, ihnp4!ihuxl!dcn
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 86 10:35:27 CST
From: Will Martin -- AMXAL-RI <wmartin@ALMSA-1.ARPA>
Subject: Orbiting lasers > ground targets
> The most likely use for an orbital laser
> ground attack system would be pin-point strikes against enemy government,
> military centers and terrorist bases. I could see the government
> building such a weapon even if it is entirely useless against ICBMs.
>
>I agree such is possible; that is my fear.
To me, the capability of "pin-point strikes against enemy government,
military centers and terrorist bases" sounds like a good thing to have!
What could be better than being able to attack enemy targets precisely,
without having to do things like destroy the civilian population of a
city surrounding them, which we have done in previous wars?
Of course, if your viewpoint is from the perspective that all weapons
are evil and any war is wrong and should never be enaged in, then of
course such a capability is "a bad thing".
As a practical matter, though, I would think that the smoke obscuration
caused by the initial laser attack would diffuse and/or absorb the beam
so that continuing this long enough to destroy fortified targets, or
hitting closely-spaced targets in succession, would not be successful.
It could be used to attack widely-spaced targets, or start forest or
grass fires over wide areas, I suppose.
But postulate having such a weapon in existence in the current (or
recent, depending when you read this) Libyan situation. If we could
exterminate the Libyan leadership and much of its military equipment
and resources by zapping just the reviewing stand and the military
parade, without having to kill off vast numbers of the civilians
living around that site, wouldn't that be a useful option?
Of course, if our having such a capability were known, I suppose the
leadership would stay underground, and there wouldn't be any military
parades, and most military equipment would be in bunkers or at least
under camouflage, so there would always be countermeasures. In the
long run, it might not be cost-effective. [Is any weapon system *ever*
cost-effective?]
Will
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 86 18:05:56 PST
From: walton%Deimos@Hamlet.Caltech.Edu
Subject: Citizen's summit again
>From: foy@aero
On the subject of the Citizens' Summit:
>
>>From: walton%Deimos@Hamlet.Caltech.Edu
>
>
>The posting included a lot of comments from the LA Times which painted
>the Soviets black and us white. My comments are from my own observation
>of the NBC broadcast.
Please point to one of the many comments which painted the Soviets black and
us white.
>I don't recall a lot of American's discussing the "bag ladies" that any
>one can see on the streets of many large US cities, nor the thousands of
>homeless, nor acid rain, smog, toxic wastes, nor Kent State, nor the
>1968 Democratic Convention.
None of the mentioned issues affect US-Soviet relations. Moreover, you fail
to mention an instance of a Soviet citizen expressing a SINGLE disagreement
with policies of the Soviet government. I think you'll find there weren't
any, while several Americans criticized American government policies.
>Steve, I observed that Donahue fielded many of the more difficult questions
>that the Soviets raised.
Does "difficult" in this context mean "requiring special expertise" or just
"politically sensitive?" Pozner clearly used the latter meaning.
>The point of my posting is that it is much easier to see someone else's faults
>than it is our own. Our media, even including the liberal LA Times tends to
>see only our side in a direct exchange between our country and any other
>country. Ignoring our oun problems, seeing the world in terms of black and
>white does no one any good.
I agree entirely. The main point is that the Soviets see only American
faults. Americans consistently show ourselves willing to criticize ourselves,
even in front of Soviet citizens. The fact that there wasn't a tremendous
amount of self-criticism by Americans on this program mainly reflects the fact
that one doesn't discuss one's family's shortcomings in front of others.
There is certainly a tremendous amount of criticism of the US goverment by
US citizens in the US domestic news media.
Steve Walton
walton%deimos@hamlet.caltech.edu
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 1986 00:54 EST
From: Rob Austein <SRA@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Russians and WWII
(Forgive me if I somebody else has already brought this up, am still
slogging my way through about 50 back issues of ARMS-D...).
Date: Saturday, 4 January 1986 23:18-EST
From: Jim McGrath <J.JPM@Epic>
Re: Russians and WWII
Actually, the Russians DID enter WWII before she was attacked, if you
count carving up Poland, invading Finland, and entering into a
neutrality pact with Germany. She just was not on our side until
Germany attacked in 1941. Russia was initially prompted by sheer
territorial greed, and Stalin was simply double crossed by Hitler.
There is an argument (no real evidence either way unless somebody read
Stalin's mind) that this was not entirely greed. Germany had just
gone from being a bankrupt and defeated country to being one of the
top military powers in the world, in very short time. So Stalin
wanted a buffer zone, to wit, as much of Poland as he could get ahold
of. (Finland had also been used as a staging ground for invading
Russia just after WWI, which may or may not be relevant.) So I am not
quite so sure that this was "sheer territorial greed". Strikes me as
somewhat similar to the current situation with regard to the Warsaw
Pact countries; if you find that a fight is inevitable you want to do
it on somebody else's real estate, yes?
(It's not that I am a fan of Joe Stalin, but it bothers me to see
people throwing rocks for the wrong reasons...).
--Rob
------------------------------
Subject: Citizen's Summit Response
Date: 16 Jan 86 08:54:38 PST (Thu)
From: foy@aero
>From: walton%Deimos@Hamlet.Caltech.Edu
[Walton] The following excerpts from Howard Rosenberg's review of "A
Citizens' Summit" are reprinted without permission from the Jan. 1
issue of the Los Angeles Times:
The posting included a lot of comments from the LA Times which painted
the Soviets black and us white. My comments are from my own observation
of the NBC broadcast.
[LAT] "The Soviets hit American faults and the Americans hit Soviet
faults. Unlike the Soviet audience, significantly, the Americans
acknowledge their nation's imperfections.
I don't recall a lot of American's discussing the "bag ladies" that any
one can see on the streets of many large US cities, nor the thousands of
homeless, nor acid rain, smog, toxic wastes, nor Kent State, nor the
1968 Democratic Convention.
[LAT] down of a Korean jetliner, it is Pozner the Kremlin spokesman who
fields the question, not a member of his audience.
Steve, I observed that Donahue fielded many of the more difficult questions
that the Soviets raised.
The point of my posting is that it is much easier to see someone else's faults
than it is our own. Our media, even including the liberal LA Times tends to
see only our side in a direct exchange between our country and any other
country. Ignoring our oun problems, seeing the world in terms of black and
white does no one any good.
Richard Foy, Redondo Beach, CA
The opinions I have expressed are the result of many years in the school of
hard knocks. Thus they are my own.
------------------------------
Date: Fri 17 Jan 86 02:47:35-EST
From: "Jim McGrath" <MCGRATH%OZ.AI.MIT.EDU@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: BM Testing Ban
Reply-to: mcgrath%mit-oz@mit-mc.arpa
From: Herb Lin <LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU> (v 6, i 19)
Another method to achieve the same goal would be a comprehensive
ban on the flight testing of all ballistic missiles.
I've often dreamed of this (as you perhaps could tell from previous
contributions, I like the neatness of a game theoritic approach to a
problem, and thus like increasing uncertainty as a way to decrease
expected payoff). The problems are twofold. First, technological
breakout is very easy. What do you do if the other sides tests, and
"overnight" increases dramatically its confidence levels (especially
if they hide this new information from you, via encoding, so your
confidence levels are unchanged.
Second, I don't see how you could properly distinguish between
military and civilian testing. This is especially a problem for us,
since the Soviet civilian and military space programs are more closer
integrated, often using only slightly modified hardware (although note
that the Soviets have claimed that the spcce shuttle is a military
vehicle). Logically, one would have to shut down all space actiities.
Given that the test ban would not end the threat of destruction (we
still would be left with commercial jets and suitcases, if nothing
else), and given that I feel that expension into space offers one of
the few long term solutions to destructive superpower competition on
earth, this would be a bad trade off.
Jim
------------------------------
Subject: Soviet 'NO NUKES'
Date: 17 Jan 86 12:23:22 EST (Fri)
From: wesm@mitre-bedford.ARPA
A brief question to throw out there. Maybe I'm stating the obvious
but, if the Soviet Union has just proposed to eliminate all nuclear weapons
by the year 2000, why are they insistant that SDI be scrapped as part of the
deal? It seems to me that SDI would be a 'useless' system if there were no
incoming missles to stop and therefore of no concern...if they are being
sincere. I would think that they would want some tactical weapons systems
eliminated since they would become more important.
wesm@mitre-bedford
------------------------------
Date: Fri 17 Jan 86 19:34:24-EST
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Offensive Lasers
From: Michael_Joseph_Edelman%Wayne-MTS%UMich-MTS.Mailnet@MIT-MULTICS.ARPA
From: Dave Caulkins:
... 'in a matter of hours, a laser defense
system powerful enough to cope with the ballistic missile threat
can also destroy the enemy's major cities by fire. ... the
attack time for each city beung only a matter of minutes. ...'
... 'Such mass fires might be
expected to generate smoke in amounts comparable to the amounts
generated in some major nuclear exchange scenarios.' ... That
could cause 'a climatic disaster similar to nuclear winter,' ...
Seems like another attempted end-run by the anti-SDI group.
^^^
Michael,
I agree with you that this report sounds a bit far-fetched. But
it's from a defense think-tank, not an anti-SDI group, or "the"
anti-SDI group (What do you mean by that, anyway?).
It's far-fetched because the short duration of laser pulses likely
to be sustainable would have difficulty igniting a major conflagration.
But it makes sense -- doesn't it? -- that a contractor for SDI would
casually proposed far-fetched ideas. That's what SDI contractors are
for!
I'm suspicious of this particular argument. It sounds more like
bait for unsuspecting SDI opponents than a serious attempt to discredit
SDI. Better arguments concern the ability to destroy human targets on
the ground or battle satellites in space.
-rich
------------------------------
End of Arms-Discussion Digest
*****************************Arms-D-Request@MIT-XX.ARPA (Moderator) (01/19/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Sunday, January 19, 1986 2:41PM
Volume 6, Issue 26 (extension)
Today's Topics:
This digest continues Issue #26, with the following
headers duplicated from the last #26. (sorry!)
Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V6 #22
Unreleased SDIO Computing Panel Report
SDI and Research funding
Aircraft Carriers
Offensive Star Wars lasers
BM Testing Ban
BM Testing Ban
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 86 18:50:14 est
From: decwrl!decvax!linus!alliant!gottlieb@ucbvax.berkeley.edu (Bob Gottlieb)
Subject: Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V6 #22
... 'in a matter of hours, a laser defense
system powerful enough to cope with the ballistic missile threat
can also destroy the enemy's major cities by fire. ... the
attack time for each city beung only a matter of minutes. ...'
The problem with this is that is assumes two things:
1. The laser operates in a frequency range that is transparent to the
atmosphere. Many infrared and optical lasers are badly attenuated
by traversing the atmosphere.
2. In order to strike a target on earth, and not diverge as to merely
warm things up over a general area, some form of abaptive lens would
be needed to counteract the defocussing effects of the atmosphere.
I don't say you can't use a laser as a "death ray" for cities; merely
that the extra equipment you need to make an anti-spacecraft weapon
into an atmosphere-penetrating weapon is somewhat extra and obvious.
-- Bob Gottlieb
UUCP: ...!linus!alliant!gottlieb
Mail: Alliant Computer Systems Corp, 42 Nagog Park, Acton, MA 01720
Phone: (617) 263-9110
Foot: "You can't get there from here".
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
"I don't know what I'm doing, and Alliant isn't responsible either, so there!"
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 18 Jan 86 12:08:56 est
From: Walter Hamscher <hamscher@mit-htvax>
Subject: Unreleased SDIO Computing Panel Report
>From the Boston Globe, page 1, Saturday, 18 Jan 1986
SPECIALISTS FAULT `STAR WARS' WORK
By Fred Kaplan
Globe Staff
WASHINGTON - In a report commissioned by the Pentagon's Strategic
Defense Initiative Office, a group of top coputer software experts
concludes that the SDI office is going about the task of building a
`star wars' missile-defense system the wrong way.
The report does say developing a proper software program for SDI is
feasible. However, it says the SDI office and its defense
contractors are assuming they can develop the `star wars' weapons
and sensors first and write its computer software afterward - when,
in fact, an effective defense will be impossible unless this order
is reversed.
The authors of the report, all avowed supporters of the SDI program,
met for 17 days last summer and held further discussions before
writing the report. The report was submitted to the SDI office last
month, and has not been released publicly.
Software must be programmed to enable automatic communication
between the satellites that detect Soviet missiles and the SDI
weapons that will shoot the missiles down; between these weapons and
other sensors that can distinguish missiles from decoys and assess
whther the target was hit or missed; and between this entire network
and political authorities on the ground. Hundreds of satellites,
battle stations, sensors, giant space mirrors and other devices
would be involved. Computations must be made, and orders must be
given, in a matter of microseconds, with continuous updates and
revisions.
The report says all the various designs for strategic defense
systems proposed thus far demand "excessively sophisticated
software" that "cannot be adequately tested." A design "that cannot
be tested ... is of no value," the report says. And "excessively
complex software cannot be produced at any cost."
John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists, a critic of SDI
who did not serve on the panel that wrote the report, puts the
problem this way: "It's like buying a home computer first and then
discovering that the software you need won't run on it. Or it's
like buying a Betamax and then discovering that your favorite movies
are only on VHS.
"This report," Pike continues, "says a lot of the money in the [SDI]
budget now is wasted because you'll end up buying the wrong
machines."
The report emphasizes that computer software programming is still a
young field with many unknown elements. The report states, "The
panel expects no technological breakthrough that would make it
possible to write the celebrated `10 million lines of error-free
code,'" which SDI officials have acknowledged are necesary to make
the system, as currently envisioned, work.
Moreover, "there are no laws or formulae that can accurately predict
the successs or failure of a large software development." Nor is it
possible today, the report says, to measure whether a software
program can be applied to an SDI battle-management system.
The report says these problems are not impossible to solve.
However, it says it will take at least two decades - and then only
if the organization of the program is radically changed. Assuming
these fundamental uncertainties can be resolved, the report cites
other computer and software difficulties. Among them:
* Flights of the space shuttle have frequently been delayed because
of computer problems found at the last moment. Yet whereas the
shuttle's computers are designed to reain in operation for 1,000
hours without breaking down, the computers on board the satellites
used in an SDI system would have to be built to break down only once
every 100,000 hours.
David Parnas, a software specialist at the University of Victoria in
British Columbia, also says the experience of several shuttle
flights has allowed NASA to work out programming "bugs" over time.
"This kind of thing couldn't possibly work with SDI," he says. "You
can't call the Russians in the middle of a war and say, `Wait a
minute, we have to recalculate some things.'"
Parnas was appointed a member of the panel that wrote the report.
However, he resigned a few weeks after its formation, saying its
work was pointless because SDI's software requirements were
impossible to fulfill.
Stephen Berlin of MIT's Laboratory for Computer Sciences [sic],
notes another difference between SDI and the shuttle: "The space
shuttle is not being shot at. An SDI system almost certainly would
be."
* The system would be highly vulnerable not only to direct attack
but to nuclear weapons exploded in space as far as 1,000 kilometers
away. "The high-energy neutron flux from a nuclear explosion is
expected to `erase' volatile semiconductor memory," the report says.
"Effective shielding is difficult."
The report recommends new ways of dealing with strategic defense
that organize the various components of an SDI system in a "loose
hierarchy," with tasks "delegated to and localized within parts of a
system." Such a system would involve less complex and more testable
software, and could be adapted more easily to change.
The authors of the report - all software specialists at top
universities - acknowledge that it is not clear how to do all this,
and that the SDI office should "use independent contractors" who
could "tap the talent of leading researchers in the scientific
community," to study the problem further.
------------------------------
Date: Sat 18 Jan 86 14:55:52-EST
From: "Jim McGrath" <MCGRATH%OZ.AI.MIT.EDU@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: SDI and Research funding
Reply-to: mcgrath%mit-oz@mit-mc.arpa
From: Nicholas.Spies@H.CS.CMU.EDU
In ARMS-D V6 #18.3 Herb Lin says: "No matter what goal you
give it, SDI isn't the way to go."
...with one exception: SDI has proven to be a wonderful way to
part fools and their money. The political processes that can
give life to such fantasies as SDI have a greater strategic
importance in the long term than SDI itself, for after SDI what
new bogosity will be foisted on us and the world, and why?
True, which is why I have to disagree with Parnas's essay dealing with
this topic (of whether SDI can be justified as a means of funding
worthwhile research). While he obviously is the expert when it comes
to how SDIO allocates funds, and while I am willing to believe they do
a suboptimal job, the fact remains that if SDIO had not securred these
funds from Congress they would have almost exclusively been used for
non-research activities. Congress seems incapable of bold research
funding unless they can peg it to a "war" on some disease, some
prestige trip (NASA), or defense. SIDO would have to almost plan on
destroying our research assets to do as much damage as Congress
routinely does in the appropriations process.
Note that peer review is being slowly strangled as he need for large
amounts of physical resources (research centers) allows Congress to
start playing around with the pork barrel. A new Computing Center
looks very much like a dam, or a post office, or a highway to most
politicians, so major resource allocations decisions are becoming
increasingly political (they have always been political to some extent
- why do you think the Johnson Space Center is in Texas anyway?).
Jim
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 19 Jan 86 00:32:36 EST
From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@seismo.CSS.GOV
Subject: Aircraft Carriers
Herb Lin commented a little while ago (I'm catching up on back issues...):
> ...[power projection is] a mission that could be
> accomplished at a small fraction of the cost by a few fighter-bomber
> and tanker aircraft, if it weren't for inter-service rivalry.
Not necessarily so. For one thing, it takes a lot of tanker support when
there are no bases nearby -- not an easy job if more than a token raid is
involved. For another thing, "power projection" doesn't just mean bombing
someone, it also means *threatening* to bomb someone, as in the Idi Amin
example. For that you need conspicuous forces in the vicinity, which can
be *seen* to be preparing for trouble. Sending someone a telegram telling
him that you've got tankers on the runway isn't quite the same thing...
> Britain doesn't have what we consider to be true aircraft carriers,
> just "ski-jump" carriers for the V/STOL Harriers. Not much more than
> a freighter and a ramp...
And US carriers are just huge barges with a flat top and a few catapults.
Now can we stop name-calling and get back to serious issues? The US Navy
used to operate small carriers, too. (In fact the Hermes was a "full size"
carrier in its day, before it was converted for Harrier-only operation.)
The major limitation of small carriers is that they can't operate aircraft
that need very long deck runs. And you can't fly a B-1 off the Enterprise
either.
> And recall the heavy losses among the support
> vessels required by even this ship (e.g., HMS Sheffield).
"Heavy" losses among support vessels? The Sheffield is the *only* loss
I can think of that was directly attributable to carrier support -- she
was on radar-picket duty, since the British carriers did not have AEW
aircraft (a defect since remedied, to some degree). Most of the other
ships lost were hundreds of miles from the carriers, defending the landing
area -- not the carriers -- against attack.
> Recall ... the long-range air raid by refuelled land-based British bombers.
What do you mean, "bombers"? "Bomber", singular. And it took most of the
RAF's tanker force to get it there, plus some terribly risky operational
practices. This is a good example of the limitations of the "few fighter-
bomber and tanker aircraft" approach, when there aren't any handy bases.
If there had been substantial air defences at the receiving end, or if
Argentina had waited a few months until the Vulcan force was retired, those
missions could never have been flown.
> Besides, the Harrier (the only fixed-wing plane
> on British carriers) was not there for "air cover," but for close support
> of ground troops, who found themselves plenty harried by Argentine aircraft
> anyway.
Uh, make up your mind, Herb -- were the Harriers there to support ground
troops, or for air cover? (If they were there for close support, then they
weren't there to shoo Argentine aircraft away!) In fact they were there
for both -- the RAF Harriers for both close support and attack missions,
and the Sea Harriers for air defence and some attack work. The Sea Harrier
is quite definitely aimed at air defence, with a secondary attack mission,
and that's how they were used. Quite successfully, too, considering the
lack of radar support: twenty-odd Argentine aircraft shot down. Most of
the Argentine aircraft losses were to Harriers.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 19 Jan 86 14:01:42 EST
From: wolit%mhuxd.UUCP at harvard.HARVARD.EDU@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Offensive Star Wars lasers
> From: Michael_Joseph_Edelman%Wayne-MTS%UMich-MTS.Mailnet@MIT-MULTICS.ARPA
>
> From: "Dave Caulkins; Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility; 415-322-3778" <cdp!caulkins@glacier>
> Subject: Offensive Star Wars lasers
>
> ... 'in a matter of hours, a laser defense
> system powerful enough to cope with the ballistic missile threat
> can also destroy the enemy's major cities by fire. ... the
> attack time for each city beung only a matter of minutes. ...'
>
> ... 'Such mass fires might be
> expected to generate smoke in amounts comparable to the amounts
> generated in some major nuclear exchange scenarios.' ... That
> could cause 'a climatic disaster similar to nuclear winter,' ...
>
> This seems a little doubtful to me; there's a great deal of difference
> between destroying a warhead- which requires a lot of energy- and
> setting cities afire. As others have pointed out, New York isn't
> quite as flammable as Tokyo was in 1943.
> And that still leaves the somewhat thorny problem for the
> attacker of retaliation from ICBMs in their rather laser-resistant
> concrete and earth silos. Seems like another attempted end-run by
> the anti-SDI group.
Tell the residents of the area around where Osage Avenue (formerly the
home of MOVE) used to be in Philadelphia that American cities aren't
very flammable! And while igniting midtown Manhattan might not be so easy,
I'm sure the residential areas of the city would burn quite nicely.
As for the question of retaliation, space-based lasers might best be used
as decapitation weapons, disrupting the coordination of retaliation.
That also could answer the question of why the Pentagon is interested in
spending so much money on a weapon that's so vulnerable that it could never
survive the first few minutes of a battle.
Jan Wolitzky, AT&T Bell Labs, Murray Hill, NJ; 201 582-2998; mhuxd!wolit
(Affiliation given for identification purposes only)
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 19 Jan 86 14:26:54 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: BM Testing Ban
From: Herb Lin <LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU> (v 6, i 19)
Another method to achieve the same goal would be a comprehensive
ban on the flight testing of all ballistic missiles.
From: Jim McGrath <MCGRATH%OZ.AI.MIT.EDU at XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
The problems are twofold. First, technological
breakout is very easy. What do you do if the other sides tests, and
"overnight" increases dramatically its confidence levels?
Always a problem with any ban on anything that is possible. The
answer is that you maintain your own ability to test quickly, so that
you can respond in appropriate time.
Second, I don't see how you could properly distinguish between
military and civilian testing...
Logically, one would have to shut down all space actiities.
A ballistic missile is a different beast from a lift vehicle; we can
distinguish between the two.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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