ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (02/05/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Tuesday, February 4, 1986 7:41PM
Volume 6, Issue 42
Today's Topics:
"Yellow Rain"
Military Spending, Economic Decline, and Conventional Hostilities
SDI - Architecture study
any women here?
A hard rain is gonna fall.]
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Date: Mon, 3 Feb 86 14:09 PST
From: Schuster.pasa@Xerox.COM
Subject: "Yellow Rain"
We've been having something of a discussion on the "Yellow Rain" issue
locally and someone told me that this subject had been kicked around
quite a bit on the ARPA-Net.
Most recently I read two letters, pro and con on the subject in the
January issue of Scientific American which didn't settle it in my mind.
I now plan to read the article in the September issue of the magazine
that these letters referred to.
Any enlightenment would be appreciated.
Norm
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Date: Mon 3 Feb 86 20:55:00-EST
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Military Spending, Economic Decline, and Conventional Hostilities
> From: Paul Dietz <dietz%slb-doll.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
> Subject: How Much Is Enough For Defense
> How much money is enough for defense? It depends on what you mean by
> "defense". Louis Rukyser (sp?) asked his guest this question on last
> week's Wall Street Week (the guest was a financial analyst specializing
> in defense investments). The guest responded that for defending *the
> United States*, today's defense budget is more than adequate. Defense
> is expensive because we're defending a good fraction of the rest of the
> world, too.
It's important to ask why we are "defending" the "rest of the world."
Perhaps we ARE truly defending PART of the world, but a good portion
of our military posture is instead used to "defend" our economic
interests. This may mean, for example, that we defend dictators from
angry citizens who are being exploited for cash crops and receive
little of the fruits of their labor. And it may mean that we actually
"defend" people from liberal democratic rule to protect corporate
interests, as in the overthrow of democratic governments in Guatemala
(1954?) and Chile (1973).
But whether or not one believes that our global military posture is
necessary today, I doubt we'll be able to continue to be the world's
police force ten years from now. I hope the country soon realizes
this. The reasons are economic, and are related to the rise of the
Third World and our emphasis on military research.
The problem is this:
Historically, technological development in the United States has
justified with military goals in mind first, and civilian applications
come second. Because the United States had vast economic and military
superiority in the 50's and 60's (50% of the world's wealth), the US was
able to stay fairly strong with this inefficient mode of development.
Now other countries are funding the civilian side of technology directly,
completely blowing away the United States, which continues to subscribe
to the myth that civilian spinoffs of massive military research will pay
off. But all the great spinoffs occurred 20-30 years ago, few occur
today, and if any do occur and are worthwhile, it is likely that other
countries will put them to use before we do 'cause we're busy with our
government contracts.
We have a $180 billion trade deficit, and our ability to sell goods
is rapidly declining in major world markets that are being infiltrated
by countries such as Brazil, India, and of course Japan. Our defense
buildup has been temporarily propping up GNP growth while dampening
civilian initiative; when the buildup ends, GNP will decline. A
recession, decreased standards of living, pressure for trade
restrictions, and retaliatory trade measures by other countries are
almost inevitable. Will the US finally heed Eisenhower's warning,
recognizing its military overemphasis and change its ways
technologically? Or will it continue to decline and go to war in a
vain attempt to salvage its economic interests militarily?
-Rich (Cowan@xx)
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Date: Mon, 3 Feb 86 23:32:02 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: SDI - Architecture study
From: mcvax!doc.ic.ac.uk!cdsm at seismo.CSS.GOV
Sir Ronald
Mason argued that the design of the battle management system for
the SDI would be the first real infringement of the ABM treaty.
While the treaty does not ban basic research, any work on the
system as a whole can only be regarded as 'development', hence
the whole architecture study is a problem for the ABM treaty.
But such work can't be verified by NTM, and that was the basis of the
distinction between research and development as set forth to the US
Congress by the negotiators.
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Date: Tue, 4 Feb 86 12:44:09 EST
From: Bruce Nevin <bnevin@BBNCCH.ARPA>
Subject: any women here?
Interesting question: _are_ there any women on this list?
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Date: Mon 3 Feb 86 15:18:48-EST
From: Marc Vilain <MVILAIN at G.BBN.COM>
To: RISKS-LIST:, risks at SRI-CSL.ARPA
Re: A hard rain is gonna fall.
Larry Shilkoff observed in RISKS 1-45 that future shuttle missions have
(or maybe had) been planned to carry plutonium-powered spacecraft, the
Galileo probe in particular. Had Challenger carried such a spacecraft,
Southern Florida would have been exposed to substantial plutonium fallout.
This brings up a similar issue with the Strategic Defense Initiative. In
a recent Forum article in New Scientist (16 January 1986), physicist Raymond
Harwell considered the after-effects of a *successful* interception of
Soviet ICBM boosters. He looked at the levels of radioactive fallout that
would ensue from the return to Earth of disabled ICBMs and their warheads.
Quoting from his article:
Some simple calculations indicate the likely consequences of SDI
interceptions of Soviet ICBMs. A Soviet first strike could involve the
simultaneous launching of some 5000 nuclear warheads at targets in the US.
If only 20 percent of these warheads, each containing 10 kg of plutonium
239, are disintegrated (without a nuclear explosion) in the northern
hemisphere, about 10^13 lethal doses (if inhaled or ingested) of
alpha-emitting plutonium would be released -- about 5,000 doses per person
in the northern hemisphere. If that radioactive debris were distributed
uniformly, there would be one lethal dose for every 25 square metres of the
northern hemisphere. Not all the radioactive material will have immediate
effects on Earth but, however delayed the fallout of stratospheric plutonium
might be, its long half-life (24,000 years) would ensure its eventual
arrival at altitudes likely to be occupied by human beings, other animals
and plants.
Most of the technical discussion of the risks in deploying the SDI has
focussed on its failure modes. Harrowell's analysis brings up another face
of the problem, namely that the success mode of the system may be so
narrowly defined as to ensure significant, if not unacceptable, risks --
whether the system succeeds or fails.
The regrettable lesson, is that success of an engineering
application, if defined overly narrowly, may not be success at all.
marc vilain.
PS: Full reference to the article: Raymond Harrowell, "Debris that
shatters the star wars myth", _New Scientist_, 16 January 1986, page 55.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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