ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (02/23/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Sunday, February 23, 1986 1:10PM
Volume 6, Issue 51
Today's Topics:
ALS vs. SDI
Nuclear Test Ban and On-Site inspection
McNeil Lehrer
Friedman on carrier vulnerability
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Date: Sat, 22 Feb 86 23:04:07 eet
From: FYS-TS%FINHUT.BITNET@WISCVM.WISC.EDU
Subject: ALS vs. SDI
Henry Spencer from Toronto writes:
>As I recall it, the ALS is a synchrotron light source. There is no real
>resemblance between this and an X-ray laser; in particular, synchrotron
>sources are not lasers and do not produce coherent beams. They are
>similar to X-ray lasers in the sense that spotlights are similar to
>visible lasers, i.e. they both produce light.
A comment on this. Synchrotron radiation sources do NOT YET produce
coherent radiation, but with devices called probably UNDULATORS,
which are located in straight sections of a synchrotron, researchers
are on the verge of producing X-rays which have coherence. I don't
know about the intensities, but a coherent X-ray source might be
useful in X-ray battle laser development - unfortunately.
A coherent X-ray source would be useful especially in atomic physics,
it would enable better studies of inner-shell electrons, for which
the excitation energies are in the X-ray region.
My info stems from The Physics Days, organized by Finnish Physical
Society, Tampere 1986.
This technical comment was by
Tero Siili
Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
P.S. If my info is incorrect, please comment; otherwise comments
on synchrotron radiation vs. SDI and others of the kind
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Date: Sat, 22 Feb 86 14:24:16 est
From: David Rogers <drogers%farg.umich.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: Nuclear Test Ban and On-Site inspection
News article just appeared here, stating that the Soviets offered on-site
inspection to verify a nuclear test ban, but that the US govt was cool to
the offer.
Since it seems that most of this list's membership likes the (allegedly)
stabilizing influence of a test ban, I'd like to hear from someone
arguing the other side of the case: I had always thought that verification
was the sticking point to a test-ban, and want to know why on-site
inspection seems to hold so little charm when it once seemed the
major disagreement.
Shame the Soviets didn't offer this one 10 or so years ago, when we might
have accepted...
David Rogers
DRogers@SUMEX-AIM.ARPA, drogers%farg.umich@CSNET-Relay.ARPA
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Date: Sat, 22 Feb 86 14:13:18 pst
From: <ucsbcsl!uncle@ucbvax.berkeley.edu>
re: McNeil Lehrer
MacNeil Lehrer, in another of their ever more frequent
friendly (viz. sycophantine) interviews with the reaganauts,
did a segemnt on that great southern saviour of the budget
mr phill graham : " (jim): what'you-alll think about that,
sen'ter? ; (graham): Jim, we jest wan ta pit mur the piples
money back in ther pockits, now ya see ONE DOLLAR SPENT ON
THE MX-SYSTEM IS A DOLLARR IN THE PEOPLE'S POCKITS, ONE DOLLAR
SPENT ON *STAR-WARS* IZ FIVE DOLLARS IN THE PEOPLE'S POCKITS,
AND ONE DOLLAR SPENT ON THE SUCKCESSOR TA STAR-WARS IS
TWELVE DOLLARS IN THE PEOPLE'S POCKITS."
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Date: Sun, 23 Feb 86 00:59:04 EST
From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@seismo.CSS.GOV
Subject: Friedman on carrier vulnerability
I just finished reading Norman Friedman's "Carrier Air Power" (Rutledge
Press 1981). He had some observations on the vulnerability of carriers,
especially supercarriers, that may be of interest.
Friedman is generally very optimistic about carrier survivability, but
notes some major reservations:
- Ordinary carrier operations (as opposed to "Harrier carrier" operations)
currently require use of unusual and distinctive radars, which potentially
offer an opponent an easy way to locate the carrier.
- Carrier aviation-weaponry magazines are very well protected, armored and
buried deep within the hull. But if something does manage to penetrate to
one, it's all over. A full magazine on a Nimitz-class carrier contains
roughly 1250 *tons* of bombs and missiles, more than enough to blow the
carrier to fragments.
- US carriers are very poorly prepared for chemical attacks. The official
position is that chemical (and radiological, e.g. fallout) threats will be
localized and brief, and it suffices to button up the carrier for the
duration and rinse things down afterward. This minimal-preparation policy
apparently is due to a combination of "official disbelief in the reality
of the threat, and severe operating problems [with continued operations
in contaminated environments]". Unfortunately, Friedman observes that some
persistent nerve agents are very difficult to get off metal surfaces, and
the Soviets are big on chemical warfare in general. Sounds like a spray
tank might be a more effective anti-carrier-missile warhead than explosives.
Finally, he finishes with a general comment:
"...there is one great proviso. Most of the carriers lost
in World War II sank not because of some gross lapse in
protective design, but because of some relatively small
problem: an inept damage control officer who did not
understand gasoline vapor, inefficient fire fighting gear,
even missing watertight doors... no one has any idea of
what severe shock damage [e.g. from a torpedo exploding
*underneath* the carrier -- hs] or cruise missile hits
in a carrier's hull will do, in practice rather than in
a computer. We can only hope that we have been more careful
than the pre-1939 experts..."
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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