ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (03/08/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Friday, March 7, 1986 10:27PM
Volume 6, Issue 60
Today's Topics:
SDI conference in SF Saturday
Re: Terrorism and Tylenol (V6 #56)
Re: Herb Lin's Detector proposal
Friedman on carrier vulnerability
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Date: Wed, 5 Mar 86 20:52:31 PST
From: rimey@dali.berkeley.edu (Ken Rimey)
Subject: SDI conference in SF Saturday
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
"STAR WARS OR SECURITY?"
Palace of Fine Arts, San Francisco
Saturday, March 8, 1986
9am to 4:30pm
(Registration 8-9am)
Moderator: Lynn Joiner, Broadcast Journalist
Policy Implications: Michael Stafford, Presidential Arms Control Advisor
Coit Blacker, Stanford U
Scientific Feasibility: Gerold Yonas, Chief Scientist, SDI
Richard Garwin, IBM Fellow and Prof, Cornell
Alternative Perspectives: John Holdren, UC Berkeley
Lloyd Dumas, U Texas, Dallas
Thomas Powers, Journalist
David Barach, U Washington
Randall Forsberg, Founder Nuclear Freeze Movt.
Co-Sponsored by
Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR)
SF Nuclear Weapons Freeze Education Project
Federation of American Scientists,
United Nations Assoc SF
Advance tickets $20 ($15 for students)
from PSR office, 2288 Fulton St., Berkeley, 845-8395.
Tickets will be available at door, for $5 more.
When I bought my ticket at the PSR office today, I was told that they
are prepared to seat 1000 people, and that 500 advance tickets have
been sold. No more orders are being taken for box lunches.
Ken Rimey
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Date: Wed, 5 Mar 86 09:50:57 EST
From: Col. G. L. Sicherman <decvax!sunybcs!colonel@ucbvax.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: Terrorism and Tylenol (V6 #56)
> From: Nigel Goddard <goddard@rochester.arpa>
> Subject: Supermarket terrorism
>
> ... He talked at length of the increasing amount of
> money being spent by MLC's to avoid attacks by paying up to
> blackmailing terrorists, and of some of the attacks abroad. When asked
> if any such attacks had taken place here in the U.S. his reply ...
> strongly suggested such attacks had taken place here. ... The
> terrorists aim to make it clear that they can strike in the U.S., thus
> creating a "chilling effect" (his words), which is more important than
> the damage caused by the attack itself. The recent Tylenol case
> illustrates just how damaging that "chilling effect" can be, although I
> suspect that no terrorist organisation was responsible since none have
> claimed responsibility (just think what the feeling would be if,
> say,Islamic Jihad had claimed responsibility).
I regard "supermarket sabotage" as a much more natural form of warfare
than armed combat between national armies. Moreover, it is effective
_only_ against people who are organized into countries! Imagine a
terrorist poisoning a North Dakotan, and people in Texas saying, "Well,
it was only a North Dakotan--I'm glad it wasn't one of _us!"_
So there's a kind of symmetry here. Countries are big enough to
go outside their own territory to exploit people; they're also big
enough so that an injury to one of their citizens is felt as an injury
to the whole country. The vulnerability goes with the power.
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Date: Sun, 2 Mar 86 23:13:42 PST
From: wild%oscar@SUN.ARPA (Will Doherty)
Subject: Re: Herb Lin's Detector proposal
Perhaps I misunderstand, but what does this proposal gain us
except a few minutes time before identical results occur
in an escalation to a nuclear conflict?
Indeed, with such a technical solution, don't we open up all
kinds of other possible errors because of sensor malfunction,
computer malfunction, communications malfunction?
Do we interpret a sensor, computer, or communications breakdown
as a hostile act by the "other side"?
How much is all of this going to cost us? What could we get
instead?
What suggestions do you have for the problem of covert construction
of possible additional launch sites (as mentioned by someone else)?
How about the issue you raised of no verifiable limit on construction
of the warheads themselves?
Could you explain a scenario where these remote sensors would
make a difference?
Thanx,
Will Doherty
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Date: Thu, 6 Mar 86 20:03:36 EST
From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@seismo.CSS.GOV
Subject: Friedman on carrier vulnerability
Herb Lin writes:
> Why should a carrier radar be so distinctive at long range? The only
> thing it needs it for is to support carrier landings, and that could
> in principle be done at very low power. ...
To quote Friedman at some length:
"The basis of any CCA [Carrier Controlled Approach, i.e. blind landing]
system is a very accurate radar which can indicate to the LSO [Landing
Signal Officer] exactly how fast the approaching airplane is moving and
in precisely which direction. If more than one airplane is involved,
it is also necessary to `marshall' the approaching aircraft, feeding
them one by one into a glide path; after all, in very bad visibility
they cannot see each other... in the mid-1950s... US systems generally
consisted of a medium-range air search radar specifically for
marshalling control (then SPN-6, now SPN-43), a precision radar for
guidance from 6nm down to within a minimum of 200ft from touchdown
(SPN-8), and a doppler airspeed indicator (SPN-12, later replaced by
SPN-44). There is also SPN-41, which transmits glide slope and azimuth
errors to the approaching pilot... More recently, all US carriers have
been fitted with a large approach radar, SPN-35, housed in a big radome
abaft the island. It determines aircraft range and height... for final
hand-over to [an optical] system or to SPN-10, the automated successor
to SPN-8 (and now replaced by SPN-42)...
"All the CCA radars face aft, and all require clear arcs... they also
represent unique sources of radar emission, which an enemy can use to
identify a ship as a carrier: many ships share similar air search
radars and even, in the US Navy, similar height-finding radars, but
a radar like SPN-35 is mounted only aboard carriers. It has only a
short range, and in fact the air itself soon absorbs its radiation.
However, it must be visible to a sensitive receiver at some considerable
distance... Nor can it be argued that in any case the approach
equipment would be required only at the conclusion of a successful
strike: carrier operations now demand continuous fighter air cover,
and hence frequent launch and recovery of Combat Air Patrols..."
(page 109)
"V/STOL flying buys a level of simplicity absent from carrier flying
since the 1930s... there is no longer any need for a very precise
approach: the pilot has a far larger target at which to aim, can
come in from any bearing, and lands vertically: several aircraft
can, then, land simultaneously. There need be no mirror landing
aid, no complex array of approach radars beyond general air
control and some means of bringing the airplane to the carrier..."
(page 153)
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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