ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (05/23/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Thursday, May 22, 1986 7:59PM
Volume 6, Issue 88
Today's Topics:
A proposed Welcoming message for ARMS-D subscribers
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Thursday, 22 May 1986 19:43-EDT
From: LIN
To: ARMS-D@MIT-XX
Re: A welcome message, for your comments...
What follows below is a welcome to ARMS-D message that I intend to
send to new subscribers. I invite comments on it. I will take your
comments into consideration when I revise this message.
Proposed ARMS-D welcome
Welcome to ARMS-D. This digest is for various and sundry comments and
questions on policy issues related to peace, war, national security,
weapons, the arms race, and the like. The digest is currently
moderated by LIN@MIT-XX, but all administrative requests (e.g.,
additions to the list) should go to ARMS-D-REQUEST@XX.
All substantive contributions should be directed to
ARMS-D@MIT-XX.ARPA. They should NOT be sent to ARMS-D-REQUEST, as
people sometimes do when they reply to a message.
Recent archives live in the file XX:<ARMS-D>ARCHIVE.CURRENT. MIT-XX
supports the ANONYMOUS FTP login protocol: Connect to XX, login as
ANONYMOUS, use the password GUEST, and transfer the file.
The digest currently goes to about 100 individuals, and 30
redistribution points; it also goes over USENET. To maximize the
utility of the discussion group to the ARMS-D community, I ask that
you follow the following ground rules.
1. No personal attacks on contributors or outsiders to the list for
ANY reason. Contributions with these attacks will be returned for
self-censorship. This doesn't mean that you can't say that "Joe Blow
is wrong" but please don't call people names.
2. PLEASE put some thought into your responses to other people's
comments. Obviously, this can't be enforced or verified, but it would
be nice anyway.
3. When you use quotations from other people's messages, don't just
insert the whole thing. While line-by-line commentary can be useful,
please exercise some care in deciding just what of the original
message to include. Also, while it is sometimes useful to have
quotations going back and forth for a few iterations, at some point
they become too much. At that point, you should no longer include the
back and forth. If you like, you can summarize what the substance
of what he said. You can also put the material from his message at
the END of your message; this saves readers the trouble of reading the
whole thing again, but maintains the advantage of allowing the reader
to not hunt down an old message that he has probably deleted. MEA
CULPA: I have been guilty of excessive quotation perhaps more than
anyone else, and I apologize.
I try to let this list be self-maintaining; in particular, I want
discussion to continue free of censorship. But from time to time,
people challenge me by posting procedures for making nerve gas and the
like. Here is my working policy on censorship.
I believe that the courts are correct when they assert that the right
of "free speech" clearly does not include the right to shout "FIRE!"
in a crowded movie theater. Thus, I explicitly recognize the claim
that not absolutely everything should be uncensored.
When I state that the digest should be uncensored, I mean it in a
"common sense" kind of way. That is, the idea in question is what a
"reasonable man" would consider appropriate -- such is the basis of
the "infringment" of free speech described above. How do I as
moderator draw the line between things that are permissible for the
digest and things that are not? For example, since I have no security
clearances, I would allow onto the Digest a newspaper article (other
than copyright concerns) that contained classified information; how
would I know that such information were indeed classified? However, I
would have qualms if I were approached by someone about using ARMS-D
as a forum for leaking classified information, and I would not do so.
Messages that are clearly provocative, and intended to be so, are easy
to handle; those I censor without qualms. How do I make that judgment?
Contributions that are was ENTIRELY technical and procedural in
nature, for example, describing exactly how to make certain toxic
compounds, are suspect. If such contributions are not relevant to
*any* policy question that I can discern, nor to the resolution of any
ARMS-D related question that had previously appeared on the digest, I
will omit them. Indeed, it is not clear to me how messages that fit
this description would fit with the stated purpose of ARMS-D. In
particular, ARMS-D is *NOT* a forum for the discussion of weapons
technology PER SE, except insofar as that is relevant to some policy
question.
Would the description of how to build a rifle or a machine gun be
included? Probably, but only because I am too lazy to keep that
message off. How about building an H-bomb? I would allow a summary
of the Progressive article describing H-bomb construction? Would I
have used ARMS-D as a forum for the first release of the Progressive
article? NO.
Part of the problem is that ARMS-D exists by the sufferance of the
powers that govern ARPANET usage. I try to strike a balance between
keeping them happy on one hand, and allowing maximal freedom of
expression on the other. Sometimes that balance is difficult to
maintain.
How about an appeals board? I hope we don't need to get that formal,
but if people want such a thing, I will try to set one up.
------------------------------
End of Arms-Discussion Digest
*****************************ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU.UUCP (05/23/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Thursday, May 22, 1986 7:59PM
Volume 6, Issue 88
Today's Topics:
To get the ARMS-D ball rolling again, I am reproducing a digest
originally issued January 20, 1986 (Volume 6, Issue 28). I think it
is a provocative one.
Special Digest: U.S. Security and Arms Control Policy as argued
between "neo-conservative" and "arms controller" perspectives. The
quotation marks indicate approximate congruence to the quoted school,
but no spokesperson claims to represent the quoted school's theology
exactly.
The discussion is presented with the permission of the parties
involved.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Msg#:26299 *Politics*
12/08/85 14:38:59 (Read 2 Times)
From: SAM MCCRACKEN
To: WAYNE MCGUIRE (Rcvd)
Subj: REPLY TO MSG# 26282 (REAGAN'S RELATIVE RIGHT-WINGISM)
... Let's see whether there just might be a base for neo-con
skepticism over the benefits of arms control as now practiced. I
suggest a few opening questions--these are sort of elementary for any
serious discussion of the topic.
. 1. What is the relative power and accuracy of the SS-18
compared to the most modern U.S. missile, the Titan-III?
. 2. What is behind the continued and massive deployment by the
Soviets of SS-20s in Europe, targeted on western european cities?
. 3. Why are the Soviets building a massive phased-array radar
in the central USSR, near missile bases, in defiance of the ABM
treaty?
. 4. Why are the Soviets, in contravention of the Salt II
treaty, continuing to encrypt missile telemetry?
. 5. The Soviets claim that the four series of missiles they
have under development are _all_ merely upgrades of existing missiles,
and thus permitted under Salt II. In the face of their admamant
refusal to permit on-site inspection, should we believe them?
. 6. In the 1920s and 1930s, the arms-control movement scored
once sucess after another. Yet the war came. Is there any lesson
here?
. I will pass over, therefore, your bizarre view that attitude
on arms control is some sort of touchstone for
liberalism/conservatism. You appear to be ignorant of the fact that as
recently as the 1950s, it was the conservatives who opposed spending
on armaments, and the liberals who supported it. You are not,
apparently, aware that John Kennedy spent a _much_ greater proportion
of the federal budget on arms than Ronald Reagan even proposes to.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 86 19:38:19 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Neocon Stuff
Think you could persuade Sam to allow this on the digest? Maybe
anonymously if desired.
Subj: REPLY TO MSG# 26282 (REAGAN'S RELATIVE RIGHT-WINGISM)
... Let's see whether there just might be a base for neo-con
skepticism over the benefits of arms control as now practiced. I
suggest a few opening questions--these are sort of elementary for any
serious discussion of the topic.
. 1. What is the relative power and accuracy of the SS-18
compared to the most modern U.S. missile, the Titan-III?
There is no Titan III.
. 2. What is behind the continued and massive deployment by the
Soviets of SS-20s in Europe, targeted on western european cities?
Intimidation of Western Europe; what else? Why would they want to do
that? That's a different question. What is the purpose of the U.S.
strategic modernization? Intimidation of the Soviet Union -- to make
them more receptive to U.S. proposals on arms control...
. 3. Why are the Soviets building a massive phased-array radar
in the central USSR, near missile bases, in defiance of the ABM
treaty?
The ABM treaty does NOT prohibit large phased array radars.
. 4. Why are the Soviets, in contravention of the Salt II
treaty, continuing to encrypt missile telemetry?
SALT II does not prohibit encryption of telemetry.
. 5. The Soviets claim that the four series of missiles they
have under development are _all_ merely upgrades of existing missiles,
and thus permitted under Salt II. In the face of their admamant
refusal to permit on-site inspection, should we believe them?
I'm less certain of this one, but the only one I know that they have
claimed is an upgrade is the SS-25, claimed to be an upgraded SS-13.
At one point, Weinberger acknowledged that the U.S. could not reliably
state that the ss-25 was a violation of SALT. Moreover, the debate
over the SS-13/SS-25 arises not from disagreement over the SS-25, but
over the characteristics of the SS-13.
. 6. In the 1920s and 1930s, the arms-control movement scored
once sucess after another. Yet the war came. Is there any lesson
here?
And in 1910 or so, the nations of western Europe rearmed to the hilt,
yet that war came; is there a lesson there?
. I will pass over, therefore, your bizarre view that attitude
on arms control is some sort of touchstone for
liberalism/conservatism.
Here is the first sensible thing I have seen -- many liberals also
dump on arms control as merely codifying the arms race, without
touching on genuine problems. No, the only people squarely behind
arms control are not the liberals or the conservatives, but rather the
moderates.
You are not,
apparently, aware that John Kennedy spent a _much_ greater proportion
of the federal budget on arms than Ronald Reagan even proposes to.
Neither liberals nor conservatives admit that the defense budget in
proportion to the federal budget is IRRELEVANT to national security
needs. What matters -- if any input matters -- is the absolute level
-- what capabilties does it buy you.
I find the comments to which I have briefly responded astoundingly
ignorant of basic facts about the nuclear balance and the state of
U.S. Soviet military relations. When a writer doesn't even know what
the treaty *says*, it's hard to carry out a meaningful discussion.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 86 19:38:22 EST
From: "Wayne C. Gramlich" <Wayne McGuire <Wayne%MIT-OZ at MIT-MC.ARPA>@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: McCracken's Reply
Following is Sam McCracken's reply to your comments on his anti-arms
control message. You are referred to as ''X'' therein, since even
though this exchange is occurring on a small, intimate local board, I
thought you might want to preserve your anonymity unless you
specifically indicated otherwise. I'm trying to talk Sam into
pursuing the discussion on Arms-D, since it seems a trifle silly to go
about it in this roundabout way:
Msg#:27114 *Politics*
12/18/85 04:18:44 (Read 9 Times)
From: SAM MCCRACKEN
To: WAYNE MCGUIRE (Rcvd)
Subj: REPLY TO MSG# 27108 (ARMS CONTROL REPLIES #1)
There is one advantage in debating you here rather than debating Helen
Caldicott on the platform: when one hears things being said at you
that you are sure are not so, you can go back and verify your belief.
I will respond here to some of "X"'s points, and be back shortly on
the rest.
. 1. Yes, there is no Titan-III. That was a _lapsus calami_ on my
part, which you and "X" are free to make of all you want. Let me
restate the question without the slip: what are "X"'s views on the
relative capabilities of the SS-18 and the Minuteman-III?
. 2. And indeed, the ABM treaty does not, _tout court_, forbid
large phased-array radars. It makes exceptions for such radars _on
the periphery_ of the national territory. Surely "X," if he is the
sort of expert you claim, must know that. Moreover, he must know that
the radar in question--in the center of the USSR--is a matter of
dispute between the US and the USSR. It would have been susbtantially
more impressive of him--not to say more honest--to have dealt with
this issue squarely rather than to have engaged in this equivocation.
. 3. On the question of what the SS-20s are for, "X"'s guess is as
good as mine. But he raises an interesting question: why the do the
Soviets wish to intimidate the Western Europeans? Does "X" believe
that the Soviets fear an attack, either conventional or nuclear, by
the Western Europeans?
. 4. On the arms race that allegedly led to WWI, we are now in an
area where my professional expertise is perhaps barely comparable to
that of X. That "race" was about as bogus as the one we are now said
to be in. It was, if a race at all, highly asymmetrical. The most
serious competition was in battleships and battlecruisers, an area in
which the British were determined to get and in fact did get an
overwhelming superiority over the Germans. In the event, the surface
naval war was trivial. The Grand Fleet ventured out of the Baltic
only once, for the inconclusive battle of Jutland. Aside from the
skirmishes at Dogger Bank and two hard fought small-squadron actions
in the South Pacific and South Atlantic--Coromel and the
Falklands--the vaunted navies were never engaged except at Jutland.
However--the British never built up their army to match that of
Germany--the tiny expeditionary force sent to France in 1914 was a
fraction of the German force. The British did not have a peace-time
draft. By and large, one nation was racing--Germany. I would still
like to have someone's views--yours, "X"'s or even "Y"'s--on the
effectiveness of arms control in the 20s and 30s. Finally, you did
indeed make arms control a touchstone. In your failed attempt to show
that Reagan is the most right-wing president of the century, you
relied almost entirely on the arms control views of his advisers.
------------------------------
Msg#:27131 *Politics*
12/18/85 14:27:09 (Read 13 Times)
From: SAM MCCRACKEN
To: WAYNE MCGUIRE (Rcvd)
Subj: REPLY TO MSG# 27108 (ARMS CONTROL REPLIES #1)
I have just been in touch with Mr. M, whose credentials may equal or
even surpass those of Mr. X. He is a professor of international
relations at Boston University who is not merely quoted but regularly
published in WSJ and also in the NYT. He confirms me in saying that
a) the ABM Treaty explicitly prohibits phased-array radars away from
the periphery, the only kind I was talking about, and that b) Salt II
requires that telemetry be open. Since if even X is not infallible, M
may not be infallible either, so he is sending me documentation on
these two points. On the question of the four Soviet missiles: I was
relying on an oral summary of recently de-classified testimony before
Congress. I had already ordered a copy, and will post a further
response when it comes in. But note that X confirms the point I was
trying to make: absent on-site inspection. we are stuck with taking
the Soviets on their word about upgrades. I have no objection to this
stuff going on the net ON THE FOLLOWING UNDERSTANDING. That our
exchanges will be published in full, and not before I have had time to
make a documented response to X's charge that I do not know what is in
the treaties, or, alternatively, that if a digest is to be posted, I
will have approval of its scope.
[Note from Moderator: Sam has agreed to publish the correspondence; he
will produce the documented response as stated above.]
--------------------------------------
. 1. The ABM Treaty and phased-array radars. Article VI(b)
prohibits the deployment of phased-array radars except on the
periphery. The Soviets have constructed such an array at
Krasnoyarsk, far inside the Soviet Union. It is substantially
identical to another radar which the Soviets concede to be an early
warning radar. Although the Soviets claim that this facility is for
space tracking, all early warning radars have limited space-tracking
functions. Neither the location nor the geometry of the Krasnoyarsk
facility are appropriate for a dedicated space-tracking radar.
Naturally, the Soviets are unwilling to have their claim verified by
on-site inspection.
. In a related matter, Article V(1) of the ABM Treaty bans mobile
ABM radar. The Soviets deployed such a radar in Kamchatka in 1975
and continue development.
. 2. Encryption of telemetry. _Three_ separate treaties [Salt I,
Article V(3); ABM Treaty, Article XII(3); Salt II, Article XV(3)]
contain provisions forbidding the use of _any_ deliberate concealment
measures to foil verification of compliance by national technical
means. If encryption of telemetry is not such a concealment measure,
I do not know what is. This issue is of especial interest because the
telemetry of the SS-25 (which the Soviets claim is an upgrade of the
SS-13) is encrypted. That is why Cap Weinberger says we can't
determine if they are telling the truth.
. It is, as Mr. X says, indeed difficult to have a discussion with
someone who does not know what the Treaties contain.
--------------------------------------
As long as we are on the subject of Soviet adherence to arms-control
agreements. I have cited only a few of the numerous failures at
compliance cited in the unclassified version of the October 1984
report of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and
Disarmament. Some others:
. 1. The Salt I Treaty prohibits the signatories from converting
light ICBM launchers into heavy launchers. The Soviets have
converted launchers for the light SS-11 into launchers for the heavy
SS-17 and SS-19.
. 2. The Salt I Treaty limited the Soviets to 740 launchers on
modern missile submarines without dismantling a compensating number of
older ICBM or SLBM launchers. During the 1976-77 sea trials of their
Delta class submarines, they failed to dismantle compensating older
launchers.
. 3. Their violations are not limited to strategic arms. For
example, they have several times violated the Helsinki Accord by
holding manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 troops without the
requisite notice.
. 4. They are signatories of the 1936 Montreux Convention, which
forbids the passage through the Dardanelles of aircraft carriers.
Their Kiev-class carriers regularly violate the Convention, as will
the larger carrier they have laid down if it ever leaves the Black Sea
for the Mediterranean.
--------------------------------------
. I must say I find this latest _demarche_ of yours nothing less
than lurid. You have long been citing the unsatisfactory views of
neo-cons on arms control as one of their principal beastlinesses. I
say, OK, let's discuss whether their admitted skepticism may be
justified. You jig and prance and whiffle for a while. Finally, you
say that you have considered reading up so as to become an expert on
the "minutiae" of arms control. I am astonished that you find the
issue of verification a piece of minutia. Do you really not
understand that an arms control agreement that cannot be verified is
worth little or nothing?
. So you consult the famous Mr. X. His performance is sheer
pettifoggery. Let me enumerate:
. 1. He seizes on my Titan/Minuteman slip to ignore the important
question of the capabilities of Minuteman III versus SS-18.
. 2. He illicitly converts the issue of whether the ABM Treaty
prohibits a certain class of phased-array radar into one of whether it
prohibits all such radars wherever located. If Mr. X is the man you
say he is, he is well aware of the controversy of the installation of
Krasnoyarsk. He should have dealt with it rather than dealing in
equivocation.
. 3. He illicitly converts the issue of whether encrypting
telemetry is forbidden by SALT-II to one of whether it is mentioned by
name. Again, surely he is aware of the controversy over this issue.
. I don't think X has served you very well. The intellectual tone around here has not been
improved by the importation of big guns from the celebrated
world-class multimillion $ commnet. What you have done reminds me of
the achievement of Cibber in the Dunciad: to bring the standards of
Grub-Street to Mayfair.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 86 19:38:31 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: More McCracken Replies
From: SAM MCCRACKEN
I have just been in touch with Mr. M, whose credentials may equal or
even surpass those of Mr. X. He is a professor of international
relations at Boston University who is not merely quoted but regularly
published in WSJ and also in the NYT. He confirms me in saying that
a) the ABM Treaty explicitly prohibits phased-array radars away from
the periphery, the only kind I was talking about,
Mr. M is wrong as well. The text of the treaty does NOT prohibit all
phased-array radars, only phased array *ABM* radars (Article III). It
is *early warning* radars that are prohibited except along the
periphery (Article VI). Agreed Statement E places a *limit* on the
power-aperature product of phased-array radars, but exempts *entirely*
space track radars or those used as NTM.
Conclusion: the ABM Treaty does not prohibit all PARs.
Unless Mr. M knows something about secret understandings about
technical terms, I am correct, as anyone who cares to read the actual
treaty will confirm.
b) Salt II
requires that telemetry be open.
SALT II does NOT require open telemetry; it simply forbids encryption
"that impedes verification". (Article 15) The Soviets have asserted
that the U.S. has other ways of monitoring missile performance, and
have asked the U.S. to specify what they cannot monitor allegedly so
that the Soviets can unencrypt what the U.S. needs for verification.
It is the U.S. that has refused, in the (justified) fear that this
would reveal too much about U.S. intelligence methods.
The "blame" rests with the U.S. side in that it is a problem of its
own making. That clause was a bad clause, since it was bound to
result in hassles like this, but since the Soviets have taken the
first step towards fulfilling its obligations under the "no impeding"
clause, we have no real right to complain.
On the question of the four Soviet missiles: I was
relying on an oral summary of recently de-classified testimony before
Congress. I had already ordered a copy, and will post a further
response when it comes in.
Pls include citation to the testimony.
But note that X confirms the point I was
trying to make: absent on-site inspection. we are stuck with taking
the Soviets on their word about upgrades.
The logic of this one escapes me. Pls explain where I confirmed this.
I have no objection to this
stuff going on the net ON THE FOLLOWING UNDERSTANDING. That our
exchanges will be published in full, and not before I have had time to
make a documented response to X's charge that I do not know what is in
the treaties.
I agree to these conditions.
. 1. The ABM Treaty and phased-array radars. Article VI(b)
prohibits the deployment of phased-array radars except on the
periphery.
False. See the text of the treaty.
The Soviets have constructed such an array at
Krasnoyarsk, far inside the Soviet Union. It is substantially
identical to another radar which the Soviets concede to be an early
warning radar.
True.
Although the Soviets claim that this facility is for
space tracking, all early warning radars have limited space-tracking
functions. Neither the location nor the geometry of the Krasnoyarsk
facility are appropriate for a dedicated space-tracking radar.
Nothing in the treaty says a radar has to be built in a smart way; it
specifies only USE.
Naturally, the Soviets are unwilling to have their claim verified by
on-site inspection.
Again, false. On the other hand, Richard Perle states (correctly in
my view) that even OSI would not solve the matter, since it is a
matter of software that determines the function of the radar, and no
one believe the Soviets would show us the software.
Moreover, the radar is not completed, and is not *yet* a violation.
I do believe that the Soviets should not have built that radar there;
even if the Soviets are not yet in technical violation there, they are
certainly violating the spirit of the treaty, and the appropriate
response from the SU should be to dismantle the radar for the purposes
of preserving the ABM Treaty -- which is in their interest as well as
ours.
. In a related matter, Article V(1) of the ABM Treaty bans mobile
ABM radar. The Soviets deployed such a radar in Kamchatka in 1975
and continue development.
Citation pls?
. 2. Encryption of telemetry. _Three_ separate treaties [Salt I,
Article V(3); ABM Treaty, Article XII(3); Salt II, Article XV(3)]
contain provisions forbidding the use of _any_ deliberate concealment
measures to foil verification of compliance by national technical
means. If encryption of telemetry is not such a concealment measure,
I do not know what is. This issue is of especial interest because the
telemetry of the SS-25 (which the Soviets claim is an upgrade of the
SS-13) is encrypted. That is why Cap Weinberger says we can't
determine if they are telling the truth.
See my above comments on SALT II, which deals especially with the SS-25.
I will deal with his claims of other Soviet AC violations later.
. So you consult the famous Mr. X. His performance is sheer
pettifoggery. Let me enumerate:
. 1. He seizes on my Titan/Minuteman slip to ignore the important
question of the capabilities of Minuteman III versus SS-18.
. 2. He illicitly converts the issue of whether the ABM Treaty
prohibits a certain class of phased-array radar into one of whether it
prohibits all such radars wherever located. If Mr. X is the man you
say he is, he is well aware of the controversy of the installation of
Krasnoyarsk. He should have dealt with it rather than dealing in
equivocation.
. 3. He illicitly converts the issue of whether encrypting
telemetry is forbidden by SALT-II to one of whether it is mentioned by
name. Again, surely he is aware of the controversy over this issue.
I plead entirely guilty to the charge that I did not deal with the
issues substantively. I *am* capable of addressing these issues, and
I will do so if warranted. I made the response I did to point out
sloppiness in the neo-con persepctive as described by McCracken. I do
believe there is a legitimate debate about Soviet/US strategic
relations, but it isn't addressed when the McCrackens of the world
pursue their arguments with selective ignorance.
Essentially, I wanted to give McCracken a taste for how his style of
argumentation comes across to folks like me. Now, if he wants to
declare a truce in which we both discuss these issues like reasonable
men, then so be it; I declare my willingness. Is he so willing?
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 86 19:38:34 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: McCracken's Reply
. 3. On the question of what the SS-20s are for, "X"'s guess is as
good as mine. But he raises an interesting question: why the do the
Soviets wish to intimidate the Western Europeans? Does "X" believe
that the Soviets fear an attack, either conventional or nuclear, by
the Western Europeans?
Under certain circumstances, yes. For example, a revolt in East
Germany might prompt West Germany to come to its aid.
I would still
like to have someone's views--yours, "X"'s or even "Y"'s--on the
effectiveness of arms control in the 20s and 30s.
X's view on arms control in the 20s and 30s is that it was a failure.
So what? To make that relevant, you have to argue convincingly that
the situation is now like it was then.
In your failed attempt to show
that Reagan is the most right-wing president of the century, you
relied almost entirely on the arms control views of his advisers.
Who else should one examine? RR doesn't know much about the whole
business.
Besides, why should you care if RR is "right-wing"? I would have
thought you thought that was a virtue!
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 86 19:38:39 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: More McCracken Replies
I promised I'd deal with the other claims of violation.
From: SAM MCCRACKEN
. 1. The Salt I Treaty prohibits the signatories from converting
light ICBM launchers into heavy launchers. The Soviets have
converted launchers for the light SS-11 into launchers for the heavy
SS-17 and SS-19.
There was no definition of heavy missile in SALT I; in SALT II both
sides agreed that the SS-17 and SS-19 missile were light missiles.
Moreover, the Soviets told the US that it was going to convert the
SS-11 launchers before the treaty was signed. The blame for this
incident actually belongs to Kissinger, who told the US Senate that
the US unilateral statement on the matter would cover it.
The Soviets are "guilty" of violating a unilateral statement of the
U.S. on the meaning of the SALT I treaty.
. 2. The Salt I Treaty limited the Soviets to 740 launchers on
modern missile submarines without dismantling a compensating number of
older ICBM or SLBM launchers. During the 1976-77 sea trials of their
Delta class submarines, they failed to dismantle compensating older
launchers.
This was resolved in the SCC, and their numbers did subsequently drop
below the appropriate limits.
. 3. Their violations are not limited to strategic arms. For
example, they have several times violated the Helsinki Accord by
holding manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 troops without the
requisite notice.
The Helsinki accord is not binding under international law.
. 4. They are signatories of the 1936 Montreux Convention, which
forbids the passage through the Dardanelles of aircraft carriers.
Their Kiev-class carriers regularly violate the Convention.
Even the DoD states that their Kiev-class carriers are comparable to
our Guided Missile Cruisers; they have STOL aircraft capability only,
and more than half their armament is guided missiles. The Soviets
classify it as a cruiser -- apparently to circumvent the Convention.
as will
the larger carrier they have laid down if it ever leaves the Black Sea
for the Mediterranean.
True. We'll see.
I have bothered to answer these points only to illustrate that what
McCracken and the Administration present as "clear-cut" violations
aren't clear-cut at all. I acknowledge that all of the activities
raise questions, but my objection to the McCracken approach is that he
apparently ignores utterly evidence that might weaken his position.
If the debate is going to be couched in simplistic, binary (we're
right/good, they're wrong/bad) terms and conducted in the gutter -- as
McCracken tries to do by omitting evidence on the other side -- then I
feel no qualms about using his tactics myself. However, if he wants
to engage in an intelligent discussion to attempt to make sense out of
what is in reality a very complex situation, and then try to figure
out what to do to resolve the problems that arise (rather than
pointing fingers of blame), then I would be glad to engage him more
substantively.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 86 19:39:10 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: My understanding of what the debate is all about...
I am interested in both your positions (Wayne and Sam) on arms control.
From: Samuel McCracken <GZT.SAM at OZ.AI.MIT.EDU>
>>Needless to say, you have presented an extremely
self-serving and distorted version of our debate to
date, one designed to put yourself in the best
possible light.
One is tempted to wonder why, if this is "needless to say,"
you have said it. The truth is that a third party can weigh our
views of each other's messages only by reading them. While I
cannot believe Herb is that interested in the matter, I am
entirely willing to upload our debates from Bob Soron's files to
my library at OZ..
Sam, you are right; I am not interested in the details of your
argument on this point. Of course people take "self-serving" points
of view, to "put themselves in the best possible light." I don't find
that objectionable at all, except when I don't know I have waded into
the middle of it. The tone of my responses would most likely have
been different had I known, and I suspect Sam's would have been too.
On the other hand, I read Wayne as complaining generically about what
I suspect he finds to be an unwillingness on the neo-con side to
recognize that the argument does have at least two intellectually
respectable sides; my complaint about the neo-cons is that they
appear to me to believe that if you don't agree with them, you are
either misguided or a fool. Moreover, as a rule I have not been able
to get neo-cons to engage the points that I raise.
Sam has different views on arms control and treaty compliance etc than
I have (though probably matters of degree); I invite him to write a
response to my last substantive note, in which I said that his
information about the treaty was misleading and in some places wrong.
>>I have repeatedly challenged you on the larger
strategic and ideological issues pertaining to
necoconservatism, and you have kept ducking those
challenges and attempted to divert the discussion into
technical minutiae which ignore the deeper
philosophical assumptions which undergird
neoconservatism.
I am sorry to be repetitious, but you give me no choice.
Such questions as whether arms control agreements are properly
verifiable are not "minutiae." They go to the heart of the
argument over the issue.
Wayne is right to insist on a response to global strategic issues.
But Sam is right to bring up verification issues. Where you disagree
is on the notion that verification is or is not a fundamental point.
I invite Sam to articulate why verification is central, and Wayne to
articulate why it is minutiae.
On the specifics of the points referred to in this msg, I'd really
like to respond on ARMS-D.
Herb
------------------------------
From: Herb Lin <LIN at XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Still waiting...
as an addendum to this debate, I point out that Sam McCracken has not
yet composed the reply he had promised (as of 05/23/86). (Of course,
if I have lost it by mistake, I apologize. Please resubmit it you
have a copy available.)
------------------------------
End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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