ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (06/05/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Thursday, June 5, 1986 12:42AM
Volume 6, Issue 98
Today's Topics:
Older missles
how to ensure our survival
meteorites
Debate style debate
WWI arms race and related
ideology vs. survival; joint crisis centers
Bravo, Charlie Crummer!
When is a hair trigger not a hair trigger?
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Date: Thu, 29 May 1986 19:18 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Older missles
From: Will Martin -- AMXAL-RI <wmartin at ALMSA-1.ARPA>
...Now, we are
fielding cruise missles, which sure seem to be higher-tech versions of
the old air-breathing, winged types...
The old cruise missiles were notoriously ineffective. One report has
it that a SNARK (old cruise missile) wound up in the wrong HEMISPHERE
during a test. New cruise missiles are much smaller, more accurate,
etc. Old strategic cruise missiles were indeed dropped in the
intervening period.
------------------------------
Date: Thu 29 May 86 17:51:04-PDT
From: James McGrath <MCGRATH@SU-CSLI.ARPA>
Subject: Re: Older missles
...Now, we are fielding cruise missiles, which sure seem to be
higher-tech versions of the old air-breathing, winged types. Why
did this happen? If cruise missiles are worthwhile now, why were
the lower-tech equivalents completely dropped from our arsenal
during that intervening period?
I read an article in Scientific American a few years ago on Cruise
Missiles (from a technological perspective, not a policy perspective)
that shed some light on this. Apparently the two principle technical
developments since the "buzz bombs" of old are 1) the perfection of
light weight, efficient engines, and 2) light weight and powerful
electronics.
The first allowed the range of these weapons to be expanded from a few
hundred miles to a couple of thousand miles. Before they were
strategic weapons only if launched from extreme forward bases in
Europe - ICBMs provided a lot of advantages in providing a secure (and
less expensive, both economically and politically) basing mode.
The electronics allowed, for the first time, high levels of accuracy
(through terrain mapping and navigation). The old buzz bombs were as
inaccurate as hell (the Germans could barely hit a target the size of
London). I suspect that inertial guidance systems (used in ICBMs) are
heavy and/or perform bad in low level travel (dead reckoning in a
ballistic orbit, where the atmosphere can be ignored for a first
approximation, is quite different from travelling in the troposphere),
and thus cannot be effectively used in cruise missiles.
Finally, terrain navigation (comparing the environment to a stored map
to determine position) depends upon having good maps, which are really
only possible when you have national technical means (satellites) to
construct them.
Jim
------------------------------
Date: Thu 29 May 86 22:37:22-PDT
From: Lynn Gazis <SAPPHO@SRI-NIC.ARPA>
Subject: how to ensure our survival
Before I respond to REM's question, I will state the basic moral
premises I start from. I expect that most of you will consider them
unpractical, and debating them may be beyond the scope of this
interest group, but since they affect the practical policies I would
advocate I feel it is important to state them. As a Quaker, I believe
that I am forbidden by God from "all outward wars and strife and
fightings with outward weapons for any end or under any pretense
whatsoever." So ultimately I would not make it my goal that wars may
be fought more safely, but that we may all live in that power which
takes away the occasion of war. So in the long run what I must do,
to ensure our long term survival and to be faithful to God, is to
answer to that of God in everyone, so that all may come to walk in the
Light.
But, since I do not expect that we will reach that point any time
soon, I also need to consider what is the best way to contain our
self-destructive tendencies in the short run. The problem is that we
don't seem to have found any way of preventing war that works for very
long. Deterrence has been tried, and nations have built up big
arsenals to prevent anyone from attacking them, but they have
eventually had to go to war anyway. Treaties have been made and
leagues formed, but whenever a nation decides enough of its
self-interest is at stake it ignores the treaty and refuses to
recognize the decision of the international organization.
Communication may be helpful, but nations can do plenty of
communicating and still have unreconcilable conflicts. Some people
hope that scattering to space will solve the problem, but I see no
reason to believe that, however vigorously we pursue the space
program, enough of us can leave the planet soon enough to make a
difference (though I do support the space program for other reasons).
Eliminating nuclear weapons, even if such a treaty can be verified and
enforced, won't solve the problem because other destructive weapons
can be used. The same problem applies to technical solutions like
SDI, even if it could be made sufficiently effective to stop the
particular weapons it is aimed to stop.
So I have to conclude that at this point we don't know any way to
ensure the survival of the species, and the best we can do is to try
to make such a war less likely and hope that we can buy time to figure
out how to do better. I can't, consistent with the principles I
mentioned above, support deterrence for this purpose. International
organizations like the UN can't prevent all wars, but at a minimum
they can help to avoid some wars by providing a face-saving mechanism
for countries to make concessions to each other. Also we can at least
try to reduce the chance of war due to accident or misunderstanding.
We can continue to work on improving our techniques for detecting
violations of arms control treaties so that such treaties will be more
practical. And we can keep up exchanges that help us to be aware of
each other's humanity. Those will not prevent us from going to war,
but they will make it more likely that we go to war only when it is in
our interest, rather than out of a warped view of the enemy. Also, we
should each look to our possessions to see whether the roots of war
are there.
I do think that in the long term it *may* be possible to end war. Not
conflict, for there has always been conflict and it is part of the our
nature. There has even always been some degree of violence, though
different societies vary widely in the prevalence of violence. But
the forms in which we solve conflicts change, either through advances
in technology or through changes in laws, customs, and socialization.
We do not practice cannibalism or slavery. And not all societies have
fought wars. Not all people in our society consent to fighting wars,
and, though it may be comfortable now for Quakers, Mennonites, and
Brethren to be pacifist, our founders maintained their nonresistance
in the face of incredible violence. I know of no arms race which has
not ended in war. So I do not think it is less practical to hope to
end war than to hope that deterrence will work indefinitely. But in
the short run I recognize that we don't know how to end war, and I
don't expect our nation to unilaterally disarm, so it is worth
exploring methods of minimizing the chances of war and the destruction
that it causes while I hope in the long run for its abolition.
Lynn Gazis
sappho@sri-nic
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 29 May 86 08:20:20 pdt
From: hplabs!tektronix!uw-beaver!tikal!sigma!bill@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU (William Swan)
Subject: meteorites
>Meteoric explosions on the scale of the 1908 event in Siberia (12 Megatons)
>are expected about once per century, and somewhat smaller (but still in the
>range of nuclear explosions) events should happen more frequently.
> [...]
>Even without a military response, the after-effects could be devastating:
>filling the atmosphere with sun-blocking particles and curbing food
>production. Currently, there is roughly a 70-day supply of food on hand in
>the world [which surprises me -- LW] but a very large meteor could reduce
>sunlight for two years.
> [...]
>Hope this hasn't gone too far afield from the focus of this mailing list...
>Larry West
Nice, but what's the probability of an impact from this "very large meteor"?
This is significantly larger than your (once per century) Tunguska meteor.
Planning for a once-per-thousand-millenia event seems unlikely for the
human race.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 29 May 86 21:59:21 pdt
From: Dave Benson <benson%wsu.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: Debate style debate
[indented lines are quotation from Lin]
|I don't think misrepresentation of the facts is justifiable under
|any circumstances.
Apologies. "Misrepresent" was a poor choice of word. Perhaps "misreport"
is closer to my perception of email debates. Many people frequently
misreport the facts for a variety of reasons, mostly related to the
imperfection of human thought. Few intentionally mangle facts.
|In most circumstances, I have a great deal of tolerance for people
|who ask questions, and for people who give answers if they know their
|stuff; I have much less for people who give answers in ignorance.
Yup. And that last, I believe, causes some whose perceptions I would
appreciate reading on ARMS-D to go away and not contribute. Ignorance
is a major determiner of human affairs: The book "Deadly Gambits"
alluded to in crummer's contribution (msg 787) demonstrates how
throughly ignorance has dominated arms control and armament policies
since 1981---in my opinion, of course. (Is this a fact? Perhaps the
reports I read, the books I read, all misreport the facts.)
How knowledgeable does one need to be before you develop
tolerance? How do you measure or determine the degree of un-ignorance?
Might it not be preferable to simply accept that everyone has something
to contribute, even if it is only their (mistaken) perceptions? Of
course one ought point out errors, which brings us to the next point.
Your style of debate with S. McCracken caused me some confusion
for severalof the reported exchanges before I finally found out what the
text of treaties actually said and what was your interpretation of this
language. Thus you fell into the error --in my opinion-- of distorting
the facts and issues in the same manner as S. McCraken did. The final
outcome was informative, useful, and more trustworthy --in my opinion--
than most email messages I receive. However, the process of several
exchanges which arrived at this outcome might have been less blunt.
If less blunt, I believe that I would have understood sooner
and that S. McCracken might still be exchanging messages with you,
messages which I found informative.
|I do insist that a person know his facts if he wants his opinions
|to be taken seriously.
There are two ways (at least) in which opinions need be taken
seriously. First, the opinions of experts. These are opinions to be
weighed in attempting to understand the true nature of the universe,
to formulate rational plans and policies, etc. Second, the opinions
that American citizens hold, irrespective of the merit behind such
opinions. For all such opinions are somehow entered into the
political process by which arms policies are made in the United States.
For me, one of the most useful aspects of ARMS-D is seeing the variety
of opinion on this forum.
So it depends on what one means by "seriously". I try to take all
opinions seriously in the second sense I mentioned above. I know
that you take the opinions of cabinet officers and other public
officials seriously, irrespective of their possession of the facts.
I want to stress that email, as an information medium, has
certain aspects which need be taken into consideration: No guarantee
of actual authorship by the message-header attributed party. Free, easy
exchange--little formality. The inability of many contributors, I
believe, to check sources at the time the message is composed and sent...
So, it is an opportunity for a world-wide grown-up bull-session,
especially with the topic(s) of ARMS-D. It is not --in my opinion--
a suitable forum for a formal debate designed to produce winners ("He
had all the facts and good points on his side") and losers. It is
a good forum for presenting the facts as one sees them, citing sources
when possible (((Please, contributors, cite sources! Kevin Sullivan at
Tufts, where did you get or derive the ICBM availability and reliability
figures? ))), and also for the exchange of opinion.
Certainly opinions based on ignorance require a response from
someone who has pertinent facts to offer. The value of this forum
will be enhanced if those with (what they believe to be) the facts
take the time to present such coherently and with patience. Unfortunately,
email does not enhance one's ability to do so.
Finally, I hope we can put this to rest. ARMS-D is one of the
most valuable fora to which I subscribe. The value lies in rapidity,
diversity and the citation of substantive sources I would not have
found myself. Ok?
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 30 May 86 02:57:20 PDT
From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.berkeley.edu
Subject: WWI arms race and related
Another historical arms race that is worth attention is the naval arms
race between Britain and France that lasted for most of the 19th century
and into the 20th. Its most interesting aspect is that it did NOT lead
to war between the two nations.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 30 May 86 03:00:06 PDT
From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.berkeley.edu
Subject: ideology vs. survival; joint crisis centers
> Here is the first sensible thing I have seen -- many liberals also
> dump on arms control as merely codifying the arms race, without
> touching on genuine problems...
There is another example of this sort of thing that is relevant: the
cool response of the soi-disant "peace" movement to the "joint crisis
centers" idea. This notion hasn't had much exposure here, and it's
important, so a brief summary:
Just what "joint crisis centers" implies in detail depends on who is
talking about it, but the basic notion is to upgrade the Hotline. The
existing Washington-Moscow Hotline isn't much: a few teletypes (contrary
to popular belief, it is not a voice line), a few operators and translators,
regular tests and occasional exercises. Nevertheless it has made a large
contribution to our survival, by reducing the possibility of war through
misunderstanding. The idea can be taken further. Consider a pair of
specialized centers, linked by high-quality multi-media communications,
with access to remote sensing facilities and such, and training regularly
to cope with crises. This would provide some chance for joint resolution
of the confusion and uncertainty that would occur in a major crisis, e.g.
a nuclear attack by a minor power. Such situations are probably a bigger
danger than an out-and-out superpower clash.
This concept has a lot going for it, largely for the same reasons as the
Hotline, only more so. It benefits both sides and threatens neither.
It does not require that the two sides trust each other very far. There
is bipartisan support for the idea, and signs of support from the Soviets.
It would not be particularly expensive. It would not weaken military forces
or present verification difficulties.
And the "peace" movement is largely ignoring it, because it smacks of
living with nuclear weapons rather than abolishing them. Never mind that
it might save our lives; it doesn't fit their ideology.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 30 May 86 9:45:21 EDT
From: Bruce Nevin <bnevin@cch.bbn.com>
Subject: Bravo, Charlie Crummer!
Bravo, bravo!
If change is our aim, then for us to focus on the impediments to change
is contrary to our aim.
We need to focus instead on the OUTCOMES WE WANT (what could real
peace--read "balance"--be like?), and on the myriad PROCESSES, small or
large, simple or complex, that MOVE US IN THAT DIRECTION.
The impediments to change then become part of the process of change,
rather than reasons to give up.
If you go on a white-water trip down a river like the Colorado, are the
rocks part of the process of moving downriver? You bet! Do people give
up when they see them? Some do. Some.
Bruce Nevin
bn@bbncch.arpa
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 30 May 86 09:19:22 PDT
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ@SU-Forsythe.ARPA>
Subject: When is a hair trigger not a hair trigger?
I'm not sure if this got out to Arms-D readers. I think they are
two critical DOD statements re the present launch on warning posture.
Note that Daniel Ford argued the U.S. posture was first-strike
hair-trigger, and when confronted with his admission of a
hair-trigger, General Herres said he'd meant LOW. (Usually, a
"hair-trigger" means instant response on order, as chillingly
described by President Richard Nixon to a group of
Congressmen in 1973, when the Watergate crisis was unfolding:
"I can go into my office and pick up the telephone and in 25
minutes 70 million people will be dead.") Latham got it the other
way round later in the day, but his testimony was unfortunately
cut-off at a most interesting point. As Blair points out, though
we build first-strike weapons, until that awful day the missiles
by default are geared to LOW.
The following was sent about a month ago:
The transcript of Sep. 26 1985 House Gov't Op. Commiittee on launch
on warning has just been released. Was delayed months due to DOD not
knowing whether the number of detected Soviet launches per year was
secret. (1984 total: 580, 488 of them Soviet.)
Does the DOD have a launch on warning policy? General Herres,
NORAD's C-in-C, said definitely yes, because the U.S. couldn't
afford to make its hardware invulnerable. Then Latham (Weinberger's
C3I boss) said definitely no:
BROOKS: General Herres, in Ford's book you were quoted as saying
that our nuclear forces are on a hair trigger. How did we get into
this situation? How do we get out of it, if we do?
HERRES: Mr. Ford interviewed me a little over two years ago when I
was director on the Joint Staff, and it has been a while, but, as I
recall the conversation, we were talking about the launch on
warning, the relative need to depend on launch-on-warning posture, a
posture which none of us likes, which we would like to avoid. We,
in the military, would like to provide the National Command
Authority with the flexibility to be able to ride out at least some
portion of a nuclear attack if that should be necessary; or if that
had to be an option for deterrence and still have the capability to
launch on warning. Unfortunately it takes a lot more survivability
for some of your systems to ride out an attack. That means a lot
more money. The pace of technology has rendered our systems
vulnerable, and any system that I know of is vulnerable to something
-- even our weapon systems; even the ones that are most heavily
protected and armored are all vulnerable to something. ... The
vulnerabilities have many dimensions -- electronic, physical, and so
on ... Dealing with them costs a great deal of money. A cheaper way
out is to be able to survive perhaps the trans-attack stage and be
able to launch out from underneath an attack. That is referred to
by some people as the LAUNCH-ON-WARNING posture or strategy or
POLICY, OR WHATEVER ONE MIGHT CHOOSE TO CALL IT. To wait longer and
still have a command and control system that can survive means to
invest more money in survivability. Because the threats which are
paced by the technology continue to be a challenge, WE HAVE BEEN
ABLE TO KEEP UP WITH THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH ON WARNING, BUT TO GO
BEYOND THAT TAKES QUITE A BIT OF INVESTMENT. Nobody likes the hair
trigger posture of the launch-on-warning situation, and that is what
I was referring to in that discussion and that is what I refer to
now.
(Later ...)
LATHAM: First of all, on a policy basis, our policy is not one of
launch on warning, absolutely not. We do not have that sort of a
policy for deterrence. It is not the policy.
BROOKS: What is the policy?
LATHAM: The policy is to have a strong deterrent, and our
capability to launch quickly is there. That creates uncertainty in
the minds of potential adversaries, and actually gives them pause in
thinking about it. Our deterrent plans and acquisition strategy
supports the policies that we have today. Our policy that you have
heard earlier, is one of flexible response and escalation control.
It is not one of launch on warning. That is a very dangerous type
of policy, and it is not part of our deterrent posture. However,
our forces can react quickly if the President so desired. ... One of
the things we are trying to do is develop the forces and the
supporting logistics and the supporting command, control,
communications and intelligence such that the President has the
option to do just about anything he wants, including --
Who is right, Herres or Latham? A clue is provided by Herres
providing the 580/488 launch detection counts. Latham thought this
material was classified, and a breach of security. Clearly Latham
is over-zealously secretive. Incidentally, the testimony revealed
that the DOD had just begun denying even the Presidentially
appointed GAO Comptroller (Bowsher) from glimpsing the SIOP, a
degree of secrecy that Brooks called "hocum":
BROOKS: I think it is really an insult both to the GAO and to
Congress that they (DOD) would even start this kind of hocum, and it
is not over with.
The DOD claimed also an executive privilege over an OTA decapitation
report by Blair (which even he was not cleared to read), and the
hearing materials contain a lengthy legal refutation founded on the
oversight responsibilities of Congress (Article I, Section 8, Clause
12), which gives Congress power "to raise and support Armies, but no
Appropriation shall be for a longer Term than two Years." The
particular secrecy concerned--
LATHAM: --not procurement of weapons systems or how weapons systems
operate or the command and control system operates; it has to do
with operations and it has to do with how the decision process works
and it has to do with details of messages, none of which we believe
is important to the assessment of how good our system is or isn't.
BROOKS: And you deny that to me today?
LATHAM: Yes, sir; I can't release the report to you today.
BROOKS: You deny it?
LATHAM: Yes, sir. Mr. Weinberger and I discussed this yesterday
morning.
BROOKS: ... You can't live with the precedent, Latham ... we are
going to have a right to look at it or a good lawsuit will see ...
LATHAM: Then we will make a lot of lawyers rich over this one.
BROOKS: No, we are not. We are going to try to make you change
your mind; get a court to order you to do it. We have worked on
you before.
LATHAM: Yes, sir.
BROOKS: It is always a pleasure.
LATHAM: Yes, sir, always is.
To: ARMS-D@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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