ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (06/09/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Monday, June 9, 1986 3:35PM
Volume 6, Issue 103
Today's Topics:
Re: A Star Wars Query
survival/annihilation?
Yet more on SDI countermeasures.
peace movement vs. crisis control
SDI Countermeasures
Crisis control centers - a high priority for the "peace movement"?
Missle control -- who writes the script?
Terrorists/ICBM's
SDI as a defense against terrorists?
SDI as a defense against terrorists?
SDI as a defense against terrorists?
DIVAD software
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Date: Thu 5 Jun 1986 15:30:33 EST
From: Paul Dietz <dietz%slb-doll.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: Re: A Star Wars Query
Another point about mirrors: they can focus lasers beams to points
much smaller than the mirror diameter, so the power density at the
target could potentially be much higher than at the mirror's surface.
------------------------------
Date: Thu 5 Jun 1986 16:00:14 EST
From: Paul Dietz <dietz%slb-doll.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: survival/annihilation?
Your concerns about human extinction from nuclear war are, I think,
unwarranted. Even using all nuclear weapons there would be insufficient
radioactivity released into the environment to cause an "On the Beach"
type scenario (and no credible nuclear war scenario has all weapons
being used: military folks learn very early to ALWAYS keep a reserve).
The TTAPS 100 MT nuclear winter scenario had, I believe, biased
parameters. Additional information on the environmental impact of
major explosive events may be gleaned from the effects of asteroid
impacts. A 10,000 megaton asteroid strike will occur once every
100,000 years or so, so humans or our immediate predecessors have
likely already survived several of these events. Meteorites generate
considerable NOx (especially if they disintegrate in the air); old
records seem to show a noticable increase in UV after the Tunguska
event in 1908 (a 12 megaton blast).
It should be noted that a *mild* nuclear winter might not be all that bad.
An article in a recent Nature shows results of an ecological simulation
of a grassland ecology. Mild cooling after a nuclear war might
actually *raise* yields in these ecosystems, because they are water
limited, not sunlight limited, and cooling reduces transpiration loses.
(They also note that in their simulation the transition to greatly
reduced yields from increased yields is abrupt. They also do not
include the effects of chemicals in smog from fires or fallout.)
Finally, space colonies: for the cost of one space colony (about $100
billion to hold perhaps 20,000 people) one could stockpile enough
food to feed every person in the US for months, or build and stock
enough blast and fallout shelters to protect millions of people
for years. The space colony idea only makes sense (from a protecting
against extinction perspective) if one expects a nuclear war serious
enough to end life on earth; but then the space colonies have to be
self sufficient (a tall order, probably requiring millions of people
in space). Space colonies will also always be vulnerable; your
suggestion aside, they will be very massive and not very maneuverable
(similarly, lunar mines and powersats will be very vulnerable).
------------------------------
Date: Fri 6 Jun 86 11:29:31-EDT
From: Marc Vilain <MVILAIN@G.BBN.COM>
Subject: Yet more on SDI countermeasures.
A lot has been said already about SDI countermeasures, but I think
this item may be of interest (despite redundacy), if only for
sociological reasons.
The recent Nova/Frontline special "Visions of Star Wars" had an
interview with one researcher from Lawrence Livermore Labs (sorry, I
don't remember the fellow's name). He demonstrated a computer
simulation of a strategic defense intercepting a missile attack. On the
first run through the demo, the system was parameterized to reflect the
current Soviet arsenal (no countermeasures) and an optimistic strategic
defense. The results were similar to those you always hear about:
70-90% intercept in each phase ==> almost no warheads reach the U.S.
The guy then added Soviet countermeasures to the simulation. In the
final pass through the simulation, with dense clustering and
simultaneous launch of hardened Soviet ICBMs (among other
countermeasures), none (or almost none) of the warheads were intercepted
in the boost phase.
These coutermeasure results are not especially new or surprising.
What was interesting, however, was the origin of the simulation: namely,
the same lab that boasts Lowell Wood and his colleagues!
marc vilain
PS: As I recall, the program was aired in the Boston area on April 22,
by WGBH-TV.
------------------------------
From: decwrl!decvax!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Sun, 8 Jun 86 00:07:02 edt
Subject: peace movement vs. crisis control
> Incidentally, I don't think the peace movement (multi-faceted as it
> is) is at all in disfavor of the crisis control proposals. This at
> least is my impression from my contacts within the Freeze organizations...
> My impression is that a crisis control center is viewed as a positive
> step towards better bilateral understanding, negotiation, freezes,
> reductions, etc.
I don't have such contacts, so my information isn't as reliable. But my
impression is that it's not so much a matter of open opposition as of
quiet neglect. They *should* be pushing the idea hard, since it would
be a major positive step and is not subject to most of the criticisms of
their other proposals. It is likely to succeed if it gets solid and
persistent backing, since it's hard to make much of a case against it.
Being seen as major contributors to the success of an obviously good idea
would improve their credibility on more contentious matters. I suspect
they aren't pushing it because they are not really comfortable with it.
(Yes, I realize that characterizing the "peace" movement as a single
entity is oversimplification.)
Crisis control deserves better than "well, yeah, if that were to happen,
on the whole we think it would indirectly help to achieve things we care
about". Better bilateral understanding, etc., are useful side effects,
but only side effects. The primary goal is to reduce the short-term
probability of uncertainty and confusion leading to war.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
From: decwrl!decvax!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Sun, 8 Jun 86 00:07:13 edt
Re: SDI Countermeasures
Don Smith writes, in part:
> I have heard others mention spinning mirrors on warheads as an SDI
> countermeasure, and I don't see why they wouldn't work either.
It would make warhead destruction by a specific class of weapons more
difficult. Whether this is worth the added complexity and weight is not
at all clear. Spinning mirrors will not stop an interceptor missile,
or an X-ray laser, or a particle beam. Beware of equating one particular
antimissile weapon with missile defence as a whole.
> ...there are so many weaknesses of this sort in the SDI systems proposed
> thus far (What about cruise missile interception?) that one can't help
> but wonder...
What *about* cruise missile interception? SDI will not provide
defences against tanks or torpedos either, but that is not an argument
against ballistic-missile defence. We *have* defences that could stop
cruise missiles, although there aren't enough of them and it's not
clear that they can be made effective enough. Criticizing SDI on such
grounds is like criticizing "Los Angeles"-class attack subs because
they can't stop an infantry attack. One does not have to support SDI
(personally, I have a lot of reservations about the current program
although I support strategic defence in general) to call such
arguments silly.
Actually, I agree with much of what Don says about SDI motives. But...
Abraham Lincoln almost certainly had ulterior motives for the Emancipation
Proclamation. The presence of such motives has little to do with the
intrinsic merits (or lack thereof) of the actions.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 7 Jun 86 23:08:01 PDT
From: jon@uw-june.arpa (Jon Jacky)
Subject: Crisis control centers - a high priority for the "peace movement"?
> (Henry Spencer explains the joint crisis center idea:) ... the basic notion
> is to upgrade the Hotline. ... And the "peace" movement is largely ignoring
> it, because it smacks of living with nuclear weapons rather than abolishing
> them. Never mind that it might save our lives; it doesn't fit their
> ideology.
There was a recent meeting in Seattle dealing with this idea, a big media
event attended by both Senators and several Congressman. I attended; my
perceptions may be of interest to readers of ARMS-D, although they deal
more with domestic politics than anything else. Be warned that I regard
myself a member of the "soi-disant peace movement" and tune your filters
accordingly.
The event was called "Preventing the Last Mistake," it was organized by the
local YMCA and the featured speaker was William Ury of Harvard, author of
GETTING TO YES ( a book about negotiation ) and BEYOND THE HOTLINE, the most
complete exposition of the crisis center idea. Other speakers included
(Republican) senators Daniel Evans and Slade Gorton and congressmen Don Bonker
(D) and John Miller (R).
In my opinion the most interesting speaker was Lt. Gen. Bruce K. Brown, USAF
(ret.) former vice-commander of NORAD. He was chief of operations at Cheyenne
Mountain during the false alerts of 1979 and 1980 that attracted so much press
attention. He said the crisis center idea was OK, but we should be careful
not to invest it with too much importance. He noted that unlike the
Warden in COOL HAND LUKE, he did not believe that our problems derived
from a "failure to communicate." In fact, the Soviets and Americans
talk all the time through
many formal and informal channels, there is just a lot they don't agree on.
He noted that the present hotline had hardly ever been used, and had not
played a significant role in US-Soviet relations for the last 23 years, and
that this was a good thing. It meant that conventional diplomatic channels
were working adequately. If the hotline or crisis centers were ever needed,
it would mean that the diplomats and military leaders were not doing their
jobs.
The Senators and Representatives were interesting for another reason.
They said that virtually everyone supported the crisis center idea. Sen.
Gorton said the U.S. Senate had in fact passed a resolution favoring the idea,
92 to 0. He expected that a similar result would obtain in the House, were
the issue raised. He and Senator Evans also said that an agreement to
proceed with such centers were a likely outcome of any summit meeting,
particularly if they couldn't agree on any arms limitations, since
Reagan and Gorbachev felt under some pressure to return with some results.
Yet, all the Senators and Representatives urged the people at the meeting to
be active to push the crisis control idea. Write letters to the editor,
etc., etc. They said there was little chance of making this a big issue in
Washington DC without a lot of hoopla from the folks at home and a big splash
in the media.
I found this rather strange, and as a so-called (thats what "soi-disant"
means) peace activist this is the part I have trouble with. Why should
activists devote their necessarily limited energies to an idea that
enjoys universal approval? Pardon my cynicism, but it seems to me that the
politicians were urging us to make a big deal out of asking them to provide
us with what they have already decided they can deliver at little political
cost to themselves. Then we can be grateful and they can take credit for
being "responsive."
I agree with Gen. Brown that crisis control centers are mostly cosmetic.
Several people in the audience raised the issues I consider central: what's
the use of setting up crisis control centers when the missiles fly so fast
there is barely time to say "hello?" If we are concerned about accidental
war or terrorists, shouldn't we get rid of some of the thousands of tactical
nukes scattered about Europe, Korea, and elsewhere? To these concerns,
Senator Gorton replied (I paraphrase), "Well those are two completely
separate issues. Disarmament is one thing, and crisis control is something
else. We can make progress on that independent of disarmament."
A friend termed this opinion the "Jackson-Warner Orthogonalization," after
the two militant senators who originally proposed the crisis center idea,
during a break from working for missiles with "prompt hard-target kill
capability."
I hope this helps explain why "peace movement" activists have not made
crisis control centers a high priority, though I have never met anyone
who thinks they would be a bad thing. It is true they do not fit well
into our agenda. As another friend commented about proposals to replace
the present Hotline (a teletype) with voice and computer graphics: "Can
you imagine crowds out in the streets chanting, "MORE BANDWIDTH!"
-Jonathan Jacky,
University of Washinton
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 8 Jun 86 12:28:50 PDT
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ@SU-Forsythe.ARPA>
Subject: Missle control -- who writes the script?
I think Steinbrunner's article "Launch Under Attack" (International
Security, Winter 1979) should be read with great caution. It was
before the events recounted in the October 1980 Hart-Goldwater
report (false alerts of massive attacks).
Regarding disarming missiles in flight, Steinbrunner said the signal
could be kept secure electronically, but did he address the
espionage problem?
"...it can be made entirely impossible for any individual or nation
to mimic the arming or disarming signal without actually capturing
that signal."
Could the signal be "captured" through espionage? It would seem so.
But -- it would seem hard for the military to resist adding some
such high-tech capability to the MX. Does anyone have definitive
knowledge on whether MX can receive signals after launch?
Finally, is it any more safe for a missile to be able to receive
in-flight signals? If, as Steinbrunner suggests, about 150 Minuteman
missiles are launched on warning (I do wish people would stop saying
launch under attack when they mean launch on warning) in the belief
that it's a fail-safe procedure, how is the Soviet Union likely to
respond? With their own batch 150 unarmed missiles? Who gets to
write the script?
I agree with Steinbrunner that:
"the (LOW) judgment is to be made on estimates of the reduction of
the probability of attack, versus the additional probability of
accidental launch due to launch under attack."
Since the probability of accident *introduces* a probability of
nuclear winter, even of human extinction (for launch on warning
target sets are quite massive in the first place), it introduces
a probability of infinite damage. Therefore, however low the
probability, it introduces an *expectation* of infinite damages. One
percent of infinity is infinity. Thus, even according to
Steinbrunner's, and the DOD's, "utility" analyses, first-use is an
arithmetically precluded option.
I'd go so far as to allege that DOD escalation models are *fudged* in
that they *force* escalation over the nuclear threshold by
ignoring the real damages, because if the real damages were
modeled, the U.S. coercive first-use policy would be seen for
the threat to mankind which it is.
To: ARMS-D@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
------------------------------
Date: Mon 9 Jun 86 09:42:31-ADT
From: Don Chiasson <CHIASSON@DREA-XX.ARPA>
Subject: Terrorists/ICBM's
It is most unlikely that a terrorist organization let alone a small
nation could build a ballistic missile of any sort. There are other
possibilities:
-- A terrorist group could take over a missile control facility.
They would have to figure out how to launch and target the missile,
which requires code words. They would also have to activate the
warhead as the permissive action link, PAL, requires a code word.
(Do the ICBM's/SLBM's have PALs or is it only tactical nukes?)
-- There could be an accidental missile launch in either direction. If
the U.S. found that it accidentally launched at the USSR, it would want
to shoot down its own missile.
-- A Soviet missile or submarine crew could decide that they had the
solution to capitalism. (Anybody remember the movie "Doctor
Strangelove"?)
-- Lower down the scale is the possibility that a U.S., or British
or Chinese or French missile crew could turn their weapons 180 degrees
and launch at the U.S., though I doubt that anyone at an operational
level could do this sort of re-targeting.
If you are looking for rationalizations, these are threats against
which a comprehensive SDI system might work. I feel they are unlikely
scenarios. The nuclear powers have been very cautious about control over
their weapons. Much more likely would be the theft of a warhead or two,
though the PAL's complicate this route.
Disclaimer: I am not an employee of DREA, and these statements are not
presented as the opinions of DREA or my employer.
------------------------------
Date: Thursday, 5 June 1986 11:58-EDT
From: unmvax!wampler at ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU (Bruce Wampler)
To: RISKS-LIST:, ucbvax!SRI-CSL.ARPA!RISKS at ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU, arms-d@xx
Re: SDI as a defense against terrorists?
Offense is much easier than defense. The mention of terrorists
brings to mind an obvious BIG hole in the whole SDI concept. If I were a
terrorist (or even the USSR after some SDI was in place), I'd take a serious
look at the wide open U.S. society, the thousands of miles of shoreline and
the leaky borders with Mexico and Canada. Why bother trying to get through
a massive defense system (as unreliable as it might be) when you can land a
boat or drive a pickup across the border with a nuclear device and plant it
under City Hall in Anytown, USA? And if anyone has any doubts, just take a
look at the unstoppable influx of drugs and illegal aliens.
Maybe what SDI should really be is a big perimeter around our
borders to stop such things. Now if someone can just get the algorithm
to distinguish heroin, aliens, and plutonium...
Dr. Bruce E. Wampler
University of New Mexico
Department of Computer Science
Albuquerque, NM 87131
..{ucbvax | seismo!gatech | ihnp4!lanl}!unmvax!wampler
------------------------------
Date: 6 Jun 86 08:25:00 CDT [Hooray. A Date Appears!]
From: <mooremj at eglin-vax>
To: RISKS-LIST:, risks <risks at sri-csl>
cc: arms-d@xx.lcs.mit.edu
Re: SDI as a defense against terrorists?
At the risk of beating a dead horse, I would like to take issue with this
statement by Bob Estell:
>That shield might save 75% of the population in a terrorist attack, launched
>by an irresponsible source; this is far more likely than a saturation attack
>by a well armed power like the USSR.
The risk of such an attack (a terrorist attack with an ICBM) is nearly
nonexistent. In the first place, it is a lot easier and cheaper to perform
a terrorist attack, even a big one, with nothing more exotic than conventional
explosives; consider, e.g., the destruction of the two main water conduits
serving New York City (I just read a mediocre novel with this as its premise.)
Secondly, even if the terrorists decide to go the exotic route, chemical or
biological weapons are much easier to produce (or otherwise obtain) and
deliver. Several years ago someone mailed packages of white powder to various
DoD sites. The powder was the crystalline form of Lance, a nerve gas; tasting
the powder would cause instant death and smelling it would cause permanent
brain damage.
Thirdly, even if the terrorists decide they just *have* to use an atomic bomb,
it is much more practical to either build it in place (see "Build Your Own
A-Bomb and Wake Up the Neighborhood" by George W. Harper in the April 1979
issue of _Analog_) or to deliver it by more conventional methods (probably
ship, but possibly airplane.) It is much harder to build an effective
ICBM than it is to build an effective A-bomb; a crude bomb will still do the
job, but a crude ICBM will most certainly miss your target, assuming that it
doesn't blow up in your face first.
Finally, even if the terrorists somehow managed to obtain a few missiles
with H-bombs attached, nowhere near 25% of the US population would be
endangered. At a guess, the smallest area containing 25% of the population
would be the entire Boston-Washington strip, with Los Angeles, Chicago, and
Atlanta (I've never liked Atlanta) thrown in for good measure. It would
take a *lot* of bombs accurately delivered to kill 25% of the population.
Furthermore, as Herb Lin pointed out, the technology is already there to
defend against limited attacks.
Martin Moore (mooremj@eglin-vax.arpa)
------------------------------
Date: Friday, 6 June 1986 10:47-EDT
From: mck-csc!bmg at EDDIE.MIT.EDU
To: RISKS-LIST:, mit-eddie!risks at SRI-CSL, arms-d@xx.lcs.mit.edu
Re: SDI as a defense against terrorists?
Libya will soon be able to buy an ICBM from Brazil. I read this in a
recent article in either Time magazine or the New York Times.
How about a single missle from Cuba?
Bernie Gunther
------------------------------
Date: Friday, 6 June 1986 09:23-EDT
From: LIN
To: RISKS-LIST@SRI-CSL, bcsaic!douglas at uw-june
cc: lin, arms-d@xx.lcs.mit.edu
re: DIVAD software
From: bcsaic!douglas at uw-june <Doug Schuler at uw-june> [...]
What is the story on the software for the Sargent York gun? Was a "high
level" language used? If so, and the complexity still defeated the project,
it bodes ill for SDI which consists of [the logical equivalent of?]
thousands (hundreds?) of Sargent York guns launched into space.
I don't think the Divad failed because of software, if software is
construed in the narrow sense of improperly written lines of code.
However, the problem WAS a system integration problem, and thus does
have some relevance to software issues. The stated reason for Divad's
failure was that it was unable to hit Soviet choppers at long enough
range.
Consider the time that Divad shot at a latrine fan during a test, looking
for the rotating blades of a helicopter. The Divad radar looked for a
particular Doppler shift in the return signal, and you can imagine how the
fan could mimic a helicopter blade. Is this a software problem? It seems
to me that you could argue it both ways, but in either case, I don't think
the presence of a high-level programming language would have helped.
Additional comments from Peter Neumann
[Flawed algorithms often appear as "undependable" software, although
they can of course equally well be embedded in hardware. We should
not try to make too much of the hardware-software distinction. The
"blame" usually rests on the shortcomings of the designers and
implementers... PGN]
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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