[mod.politics.arms-d] Arms-Discussion Digest V6 #105

ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (06/11/86)

Arms-Discussion Digest                Wednesday, June 11, 1986 10:32AM
Volume 6, Issue 105

Today's Topics:

                         What an Algorithm!!
                Sgt. York's Latrine, and other stories
                Sgt. York's Latrine, and other stories
                Sgt. York's Latrine, and other stories
                              SDIO plans
                              SDIO plans
                 In Flight Missile Control (ERCS/MX)
                        comment on debate tone
                       Strength and Nonviolence
                       Re: Crummer's commentary
                        Persuasive Negotiation
                         SDI countermeasures
                       Estell's defense of SDI
                  SDI as defense against terrorists

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Friday, 6 June 1986  17:37-EDT
From: Brian Bishop <BISHOP at USC-ECL.ARPA>
To:   RISKS-LIST:, risks at SRI-CSL.ARPA, arms-d@xx.lcs.mit.edu
Re:   What an Algorithm!!

>->   	Maybe what SDI should really be is a big perimeter around our
>-> borders to stop such things.  Now if someone can just get the algorithm
>-> to distinguish heroin, aliens, and plutonium...

   I don't know about you, but I would be much more afraid of that algorithm 
than I would be of a Soviet nuclear attack. 

BfB

------------------------------

Date: Friday, 6 June 1986  16:27-EDT
From: mikemcl at nrl-csr (Mike McLaughlin)
To:   RISKS-LIST:, Risks at SRI-CSL.ARPA, arms-d@xx.lcs.mit.edu
Re:   Sgt. York's Latrine, and other stories

The latrine fan story keeps going around and around.  The radar never saw a
latrine, much less one with a fan.  The Doppler return of a hypothetical fan
on a hypothetical latrine would differ significantly from the fans on a
helicopter.  The story is full of the same stuff as the latrine.  Let's not
fall into it again.

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 10 Jun 1986  09:04 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Sgt. York's Latrine, and other stories

    From: mikemcl at nrl-csr (Mike McLaughlin)

    The Doppler return of a hypothetical fan
    on a hypothetical latrine would differ significantly from the fans on a
    helicopter.

Also, while I agree that the Doppler return from a fan would be
different than that from a helicopter rotor, the real question is
whether or not the software contained algorithms to distinguish
between them.  I can well imagine software that would simply look for
any Doppler shift indicating a rotating object.

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 10 Jun 1986  09:20 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: SDIO plans

    From: Gary Chapman <chapman at su-russell.arpa>

    ...  He keeps retreating to less and
    less exotic, and more and more "off the shelf" technologies..
    The shift now seems to be toward a commitment to electomagnnetic
    rail guns and two-tier ABM systems... There is almost
    no more talk about x-ray lasers, "pop-up" systems and giant mirrors in
    space.

Electromagnetic railguns?  I was under the impression that these were
not going to be available for MANY years to come; Harold Brown in his
recent Foreign Affairs article says this too.  SDIO architectures I
have seen emphasize space-based interceptors (like the High Frontier
phase I stuff), ground-based lasers, and space mirrors, with lots of
terminal defense (though those viewgraphs are from November 85 -- a
long time ago).  X-ray lasers may have submerged, but I think that is
because the DOE has decided to lower its profile, essentially ordering
Livermore Lab people to shut up to the media about it.

    The faction supporting the "restrictive" version generally favors the
    arms control process and wants the ABM Treaty reaffirmed, with new
    language clarifying the research issue, in exchange for deep cuts in
    offensive weapons by the Soviets.

I do not think that offensive cuts would be only by the Soviets; the
cuts would be mutual.  If they really ARE proposing cuts only by the
Soviets, then they really are in a never-never land.

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 10 Jun 86 08:53:20 pdt
From: Gary Chapman <chapman@su-russell.arpa>
Subject: Re:  SDIO plans

I know that elemagnetic railguns are considered exotic by most people,
but apparently not by the SDIO.  They are investing heavily in them,
and there is an accelerated research and development program under way
at the University of Texas at Austin, and at a private defense
contractor in San Diego (the name of which I can't remember; featured
in the PBS series on the SDI).  The SDIO has also bought into an
Israeli company's work.  The KEW components of the budget have
generally increased over the directed energy components.

On the other point, I of course meant that cuts in offensive weapons
would be mutual. . .

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 10 Jun 86 11:17:07 PDT
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ@SU-Forsythe.ARPA>
Subject:  In Flight Missile Control (ERCS/MX)

(From Eugene Miya):

> Will Martin asked about destruct after launch.  I would like to
> emphasize that this is one of the last things that the US military
> would put into their launch vehicles.

So - perhaps it *is* the last thing they're putting into their
launch vehicles, by which I mean the MX.  I agree that the record
supports what you say, but I haven't seen anything definitive on MX.
An additional and important question is, what about the
Emergency Rocket Communications Systems?  Surely these can receive
in-flight signals since all they've got is C3 gear?

> Again, it is the policy to neither confirm nor deny the existence
> of destruct mechanisms.

If so (do you have a reference?), it's a change in policy because
I read congressional testimony from some years back confirming
the points you make, and firmly stating Minuteman had no in-flight
destruct.

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 10 Jun 86 16:09:38 EDT
From: Bruce Nevin <bnevin@cch.bbn.com>
Subject: comment on debate tone

Extract from: Arms-Discussion Digest V6 #100

> Date: Thu, 5 Jun 1986  01:31 EDT
> From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Debate style debate
> 
>                If you look back on his manner of presentation, you
> will find that it was his messages that set the tone of the debate.
> Not responding to that tone is in effect to give credence not just to
> the substance of his message, but to the suggestion thereby implied
> that "anyone with an opposing point of view is just plain silly and
> misguided."  

Hmm . . . One may appropriately respond *to* a tone without merely
adopting it and mirroring it back.  Naming it and discussing its
inappropriateness can be real effective.  I take this as the intent of
the critique here.

Opinionated language--language that shoots the messenger, that rejects
as incompetent or defective those who disagree with one's beliefs or
agree with one's disbeliefs--kills intelligent debate.  It is always an
expression of weakness, and deserves compassionate response, not
response in kind.

Or so I believe.

	Bruce

Reference:  Milton Rokeach, _The_Open_and_Closed_Mind, Basic Books Inc.
1960, and subsequent reportage of work on belief-disbelief systems.

------------------------------

Subject: Strength and Nonviolence
Date: 10 Jun 86 18:39:41 PDT (Tue)
From: crummer@aerospace.ARPA


From: WAnderson.wbst@Xerox.COM

Re: High-Tech vs. Persuasive Negotiation, From: crummer@aerospace.ARPA

                   ...

  Nonviolent struggle can be very effective as a deterrent to
aggressive behavior.  Not that it doesn't take courage -- it may take
more than simply picking up a rock or a rifle.  But his point is that we
should elaborate the methods of nonviolent struggle, and show their
strong points and weak points, with regard to common objectives of
political groups.
  CAC:  Would you elaborate on some of these methods?  I gather from
        what little I know about the uprisings led by Ghandi in India
        that he recognized that a successful tyranny requires the
        consent of the oppressed.  Remove this and the tyrant cannot
        stand.  I don't see how non-violent means can *deter*
        agression though.  How does this theory relate to the
        relationship of the U.S. to the rest of the world?  In many
        cases I think you have alluded to policies some of our 3rd
        world "client states" should adopt.

                   ...

Currently we all buy into the fact that violence and weapons are the
most powerful arbiters of dispute.  We could be surprised to find out
that this is not true.  And then we would be more likely to avoid
violence.
   CAC: Violence and weapons have not settled the Mafia disputes nor
        have they settled the question of terrorism.  The ultimate
        weapon, the machine gun didn't prevent WW I.  If war is to be
        the arbiter of last recourse, then either disputes must remain
        unsettled or all of civilization is in real danger.
        Non-violent resistance and civil disobedience have sometimes
        forced states to find other recourses.

I fear that most of the readers of this list will think this simply
naive.  I feel a bit of that myself.

   CAC: I think the naivete is exhibited by those who have the
        childish dream that violence, weapons, or technology in any
        form can alone "make it all better".

Bill Anderson

WAnderson.wbst@Xerox

------------------------------

Subject: Re: Crummer's commentary
Date: 10 Jun 86 20:45:43 PDT (Tue)
From: crummer@aerospace.ARPA

Thanks for the encouragement.  That diatribe of mine is a rewrite of a letter
I wrote to answer the following op-ed piece in The San Gabriel Valley Tribune
of May 13, 1986.  I am including the article here as an example of a cartoon
of the thinking of the right-wing.  My original reply follows.


            	Methodist Bishops on the Left

It does not surprise me that the Methodist bishops condemn nuclear
weapons.  The hierarchy fo the Methodist Church has been way left of
the average American for decades.

I stopped setting foot in Methodist churches, even to visit, a long
time ago.  I don't support, with my money or my presence,
organizations that I think are working against the interests of my
country.

The question of nuclear weapons naturally is a secular subject so when
the bishops or any other religious persons choose to inject themselves
into secular political debate, as I believe they have a right to do,
they should not expect any special treatment nor claim any special
expertise. 

The Methodist bishops know less about nuclear weapons and geopolitical
stratecy then [sic] I do about the dead language of Aramaic.  If they
think moralizing will protect them from making fools out of
themselves, they are mistaken.

The bishops have the same problem all the anti-nuclear people have:
They think all they have to do is say that nuclear weapons are a bad
thing.

Well, I agree.  Cancer and leprosy are bad things, too.  It is not a
question of being for or against nuclear weapons.  The question is,
how do we and our children survive in freedom?

Given the fact that a very hostile Soviet Union possesses nuclear
weapons, there simply is no alternative to a nuclear deterrent.  If
that concept is too difficult for the bishops to grasp, they might
talk to a few Japanese.  They have had direct experience.

If you don't like a nuclear deterrent, then you have an obligation to
spell out your alternative.  The only one I can think of is the same
one the Japanese thought of: surrender.

Now if the bishops, allegedly out of their Christian consciences, are
suggesting that Americans surrender their freedom to the Soviet Union,
which is an avowed enemy of religion, they ought to say so plainly.
If they do, I predict that they will empty a great many Methodist
church pews.

Their claim that nuclear weapons violate the just war criteria by
killing too many civilians is hogwash.  Apparently they do not know
that World War II, which killed 55 million people, the vast majority
of them civilians, with very old-fashioned chemical explosives,
bullets, bayonets, gas, and rifle butts.

I am not suggesting that the bishops are disloyal.  I don't know
whether they are or not.  But it is an obvious fact that the clergy is
no more proof against stupidity than any other vocation.  Liberals who
love to castigate conservative preachers will understand that.

There is a biblical suggestion to the effect that by their works, you
can know them, and this practical suggestion applies to churchmen and
non-churchmen alike.

If the bishops want to trust the Soviets, I suggest they move to the
Soviet Union or Afganistan.  As for me, I will trust the Lord and the
nuclear weapons our God-given intelligence developed to protect our
children from evil men.

   --Charley Reese

    --------------------------------------------------------------
Next my reply:
    --------------------------------------------------------------

In the interest of Truth and Reason I humbly submit this letter in
response to Charley Reese's column of May 13.  I just could not
stomach any more right-wing pap without doing so.

Though I am a Presbyterian I agree with the Methodist
bishops' stand condemning nuclear weapons.  I feel in good company
with the Quakers, Catholics, and many other thoughtful folks.  It's
too bad that Mr. Reese doesn't set foot in a Methodist (or
Presbyterian) church occasionally; he might learn why the question of
nuclear weapons, in addition to being a political issue, is a moral,
ethical, and profoundly religious issue.  The churches rightly have chosen
this as an issue especially since no political administration,
especially the Reagan administration, has ever evidenced the slightest
understanding of the effective political use or even the horror
of the military use of nuclear weapons.  In fact the serious religious
community is on 
the frontier of the investigation of the meaning and use of nuclear
weapons.

You say that the anti-nuclear people have no alternative to nuclear
weapons other than surrender.  Here is an alternative; perhaps the way
we and our children
can survive in freedom. (That is if you fearful bretheren on the right
can be pursuaded not to surrender when your nuclear weapons are gone
or out of vogue.  Besides, who is asking anyone to surrender?  We are
not even at war!)  Perhaps the problem is this administration's lack of serious
intention and resolve to achieve a mutually beneficial, verifiable
agreement with the Soviets.  Prior to the last summit all we heard
from the administration was that we shouldn't expect anything to come
out of it.  Sure enough, nothing did!  After Nitze's "walk in the
woods" with Kvitsinsky, his Soviet counterpart, a mere lieutenant by
the name of Richard Perle was able to torpedo the process they had
begun.  This is a clear indication that no one is in charge and
therefore the Geneva talks are not taken seriously by this
administration.  It appears that Ronald Reagan is afraid to go "toe to
toe with the Russkies" and hammer out a mutually beneficial and
verifiable agreement.

Here is where you right-wing tough guys turn to oatmeal.  "The Soviets
are intransigent, besides, you can't trust them anyway!"  If you would
use that organ between your ears for something besides keeping your
skulls from collapsing it might occur to you that when you call the
Soviets "intransigent" what you are really saying is that you can't
handle them.  Of course they want us to think they're intransigent!
That is what negotiation is all about.  What do you expect them to do?
Do you think that some day they will call up and say, "OK, we're
ready to negotiate.  You just tell us what you want and we'll do it!"?
And as for trust, if we could trust them we wouldn't need a treaty in the
first place, and we do need a treaty and so do they.  

If you don't buy that last assumption see if you agree with this
reasoning:  1. The Soviet Union is not going to go away or change it's
form of government to suit our wishes.
2. We want the Soviets to stop threatening us and our
allies; get out of Afganistan, out of Nicaragua, out of the third
world, etc.  3. They will only stop if somehow they decide to; no
matter what we do it cannot in itself be a substitute for that
decision on their part.  4. When we had a first-strike capability in
1945 they did not stop their activities.  (This point is for those who
hold the childlish but fashionable trust that Star Wars will make
everything all better.)  and 5. The Soviets can only be trusted to act
in what @i(they) perceive to be their own self-interest.  The only
rational conclusion that can be drawn from this is that we have to
show the Soviets that it @i(really is) in their own self-interest to
stop threatening us and the rest of the world.  This means pursuasion;
bargaining, yea 
@i(negotiating) with them @i(until an agreement acceptable to both sides
is achieved.)

Think about this.  If George Hormel hired a negotiator to negotiate an
agreement with the meat packers union and all this person could do was
talk about the intransigence of the union and how they can't be
trusted, what do you think Mr. Hormel would do?  After the third or fourth time
he heard that story he would fire that negotiator and hire someone who
could get the job done!  

A comment here to Ronald Reagan and anyone else who says we
must negotiate "from strength": The United States is already the strongest
country in the world.  Screw up your courage, little man, and
negotiate!  Stop longing for more of the fearful strong-arm "strength" of a
militaristic state like the USSR.  This is the United States and that
doesn't go here.  If you don't like our free press and democratic form
of government, go to some other country that uses a strength you might
be able to understand! 

Sincerely,


Charles A. Crummer

------------------------------

Subject: Persuasive Negotiation
Date: 10 Jun 86 21:17:55 PDT (Tue)
From: crummer@aerospace.ARPA



 comment by POM  on "What to do" by crummer@aerospace.ARPA   

..nuclear weapons, in addition to being a political issue, is a moral,
ethical, and profoundly religious issue.  The churches rightly have chosen
this as an issue especially since no political administration,
especially the Reagan administration, has ever evidenced the slightest
understanding of the effective long-term political use or even the horror
of the military use of nuclear weapons.  In fact the serious religious
community is on the frontier of the investigation of the meaning and
use of nuclear weapons.
         POM: I do not discount the effort. However, global peace is not
        a religious issue for all. It is for people who derive their morality
        from religion. There are other, just as moral. In Soviet Union, e.g.
        there is a lot of influential people who are not religious. By putting
        the issue under a banner of any particular ideology, you are already
        setting yourself up for a failure -- or limits on spiritual freedom.
- - -----------------------------------------------------------------------POM
            By calling this a religious issue I do not mean to isolate
            and confine it to religion.  I am just saying that
            attempts by the administration or anyone else to exclude
            people from discussion or advocacy on this subject should
            be taken merely as another sales pitch.  In fact I believe
            that anyone's considered opinion is valuable, even a child's.
               --CAC

It is sometimes said that the anti-nuclear people have no alternative
to nuclear weapons other than surrender.  Here is an alternative;
perhaps the way we and our children can survive in freedom. 
     POM:  What is your alternative? To survive in freedom is the goal.
           How are you, or the Religious Group proposing to achieve it?
     CAC:  I am not proposing to speak for a religious group.  This is
           not a partisan issue.  The alternative I meant to propose
           is the process of serious negotiation and the achievement
           of verifiable, enforceable treaties with the Soviets or
           any other "threatening" power.

Perhaps the problem is this administration's lack of serious
intention and resolve to achieve a mutually beneficial, verifiable
agreement with the Soviets. 
     POM: Sure, there is a lack of motivation, and it is not limited
          to this administration. National governments have a job of
          protecting selfish interests of the nations, (and disregarding
          the $70 ashtrays, for the moment) they do it efficiently.
     CAC:  I agree.  There are any number reasons why this bureaucracy
           functions like it does but, as NASA is finding out, reasons and
           excuses are no substitute for results, namely true national
           security.
 

I think these points are self-evident:   

  1. The Soviet Union is not going to go away or change it's form of
     government to suit our wishes. 
              POM: there is some some space for mutual acomodation.
              CAC: There is no serious alternative to mutual accomodation!

  2. We want the Soviets to stop threatening us and our allies; get
     out of Afganistan, out of Nicaragua, out of the third world, etc.  
        POM: And they want the exactly same things from us; that is
             the problem. 
        CAC: Yes, and as long as we espouse freedom and the rights of
             man and then prop up repressive regimes we will have
             no leg to stand on to demand that the Soviets make good
             their claims that they are the champions of truth and justice.
 
  3. They will only stop if somehow they decide to; no matter what we
     do it cannot in itself be a substitute for that decision on their
     part.  
        POM: what we do, will affect their decisions.
        CAC: Of course it will but THEY must make the decisions as to
             what their actions and policies will be.

  4. When we had a first-strike capability in 1945 they did not stop
     their activities.  
                         POM - they did not stop all their activities,
               such as growing corn; but military balance surely has an
               effect on what they (and we) percieve as to be in their(our)
               selfinterest. See your point 5.
         CAC:  They did not "go away" as a threat (perceived by the
               U.S.).  I'm just saying that there is no indication
               from history that weapons will solve the problem of
               the coexistence of nations.

  5. The Soviets can only be trusted to act in what THEY perceive to
     be their own self-interest.  

The only rational conclusion that can be drawn from this is that we have to
show the Soviets that it REALLY IS in their own self-interest to
stop threatening us and the rest of the world.  This means pursuasion;
bargaining, yea NEGOTIATING with them until an agreement acceptable to
both sides is achieved.
                     POM: But what if it IS NOT in their interest to
stop, wielding the sword, under present global system? There is a limit
on what you can acheive by propaganda, particularly when you do not
have a physical control of the 'brainwashee'.
   CAC:  Then someone (nation) has to see to it that the present
         global system is changed.  If by propaganda you mean words
         meant to pursuade people of the veracity of a lie, then there
         is a problem.  In the New Testament the gospel is propaganda
         meant to pursuade people of the veracity and relevance of
         certain truths.  In this case physical control of the
         brainwashee is not required.  The U.S. has a "gospel" and
         shouldn't be using the first kind of propaganda.  This
         "gospel" is what we purport to believe are the rights of men
         and the power of a democratic political system.

(I hope the readers will forgive the perhaps polemic nature of the
 above.  I really would like comments on these ideas.)
          POM: and I would really appreciate your reaction to
          my comments. I am not trying to be flippant - just realistic.  
          The issue you raised is relevant - I  would like to understand
          what are you proposing. To double the size of the SALT team?

          CAC:  I have just finished reading a paper entitled "A New
                Inter-American Policy for the Eighties" by The
                Committee of Santa Fe of the Council for
                Inter-American Studies.  I suspect that this policy
                is basically that of the Reagan administration.
                The policy put forward by
                this group is based on fear of the Soviet Union.  This
                committee believes that we are already fighting WW III
                and also believes that the Monroe Doctrine in a narrow
                interpretation should be the basis of the U.S.'s
                inter-American policy; the propaganda of the
                Americas' need for U.S. protection even at the expense
                of the loss of freedoms in the "lesser" American
                nations versus the "gospel" as enunciated in our own
                Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights.  But
                this propaganda is exactly what the Soviet Union
                preaches to their people to pursuade them to continue
                to endure that repressive regime.  Doubling or
                tripling the SALT II (now all but defunct anyway) team
                won't make any difference as long as the U.S. pursues
                a hidden agenda that in not commensurate with the
                "legitimate" self-interest of the nations involved,
                i.e. that part of their self-interest not threatening
                to our REAL national security.

                I am proposing that the U.S. get SERIOUS about working
                the problems of its interaction with other nations.
                This means dropping the fear that makes us think we
                have to lie and manipulate other nations in order to
                survive.

------------------------------

Date:         Wed, 11 Jun 1986 04:14:43 EDT
From:         Kenneth Ng <KEN@NJITCCCC>
Subject:      SDI countermeasures

Marc Vilian (mvilain@g.bbn.com) mentioned a recent Nova show where
someone used a simple computer simulation to "show" that the Soviets
can easily counter the American SDI effort by simply clustering their
missiles close together.  The theory behind this is that the SDI
satallites would be too dispersed to knock down all the missiles in
the boost phase.  This method has a couple of holes in it.

First, if we find the soviets moving their missiles closer together,
we could move some (but not all) of the SDI satellites closer together.

Second, this simulation (if memory serves me correctly) only took into
account SDI efforts in the boost phase of the missiles.  The concentration
would not effect the terminal phase SDI efforts, since the bombs still
land as dispersed as before (although there would be more bombs coming
in).

------------------------------

Date: Tuesday, 10 June 1986  22:57-EDT
From: CS.PURVIS at R20.UTEXAS.EDU
To:   RISKS-LIST:, risks at SRI-CSL.ARPA, ARMS-D@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU

Re:   Estell's defense of SDI

Estell makes the following comment:
	
  The "complexity" and "historical" arguments even interact.  
  Peter Denning observed years ago that the difficulty of understanding a 
  program is a function of size (among other things).  He speculated that 
  difficulty is proportional to the SQUARE of the number of "units of under-
  standing" (about 100 lines of code).  Old tactical software, in assembly 
  language, tends to run into the hundreds of thousands of lines of code; 
  e.g., a 500,000 line program has 5000 units of understanding, with a diffi-
  culty  index of 25 million.  That same program, written in FORTRAN, might 
  shrink to 100,000 lines thus only 1000 units of understanding, thence a 
  difficulty index of one million.  That's worth doing!

I believe that the same program written in a "high level" language,
like Fortran, would probably have about the same number "units of
understanding" ~ 5000, in this case.  Assuming that the "units of
understanding" are understood to be higher level concepts, Fortran
would enable one to write those units with fewer lines of code.  But I
wouldn't expect the number of those units to decline with nearly the
same scale factor.

Of course the likelihood of a typographical error would be reduced by
such a scale factor, but that's not the major concern here.

--Martin Purvis

------------------------------

Date: Wednesday, 11 June 1986  07:51-EDT
From: Henry Thompson <hthompso%eusip.edinburgh.ac.uk at Cs.Ucl.AC.UK>
To:   ARMS-D
Re: SDI as defense against terrorists

One more time on the SDI-as-defense-against-terrorists argument.
Any SDI Battle Management System that is so sensative that it will
activate against a single missile outwith a time of 'heightened
international tension' is so sensative that it will almost certainly
trigger by accident.  The first line of defense against the accidental
activation of a fully automatic system has always been "It wouldn't be
enabled except in times of crisis, and even then would only respond
to a sufficiently massive attack as to guarantee that no mistake could
be made."  As far as I can see that means that Libya, Cuba, or probably
even the French, British or Chinese could get in without difficulty.

------------------------------

End of Arms-Discussion Digest
*****************************