ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (06/12/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Thursday, June 12, 1986 12:55AM
Volume 6, Issue 107
Today's Topics:
ERCS = "fail-safe" LOW?
SDI satire
SDI alternatives
save only 5% of population? how about decommissionning cities?
comment on debate tone
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Date: Wed, 11 Jun 86 15:56:48 PDT
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ@SU-Forsythe.ARPA>
Subject: ERCS = "fail-safe" LOW?
> ERCS has a tape in it that broadcasts. They stay in flight for a
> relatively short time (OOM 1/2 hour) and it would be unrealistic to
> assume that they could function as relays for the NCA.
Wouldn't it be reasonable to think that ERCS could receive a
single signal, so that the taped message could cancelled? This is
important re LOW, as advertised: "Some modified MINUTEMANs can
launch an Emergency Rockets Communications System (ERCS) to
provide alternative communications with the nuclear force under
*surprise attack* conditions." (House hrgs. DOD Approp. FY 1984,
p.334 an official AF report.)
This certainly would seem to imply two-way traffic, but what you're
saying is that ERCS is strictly a one-way system for issuing an
Emergency Action Message, right? Testimony on ERCS is scant. What
I've come up with is Sen. Armed Serv.Cmmtt. DOD Approp. FY 1980 at
p.3295+ , where it's stated that ERCS "have a UHF transmit
capability," and a big fuss is made over how secret the particular
ERCS silos are. Amid deletions it was made pretty clear that
the silo crews had to know. It was also made clear that the ERCS
would be first priority targets, and are for launch on warning:
Gen Schuter: "The requirement is to get the missile out in a hurry,
anyway to ensure survivability."
Gen Doubleday: "I would say, though, that we *depend* on getting the
missile out."
The "definitive" statement as to the ERCS mission is then given by
Dr. Dineen: "The Emergency Rocket Communications System consists of
missiles equipped with UHF transmitters capable of broadcasting
pre-recorded voice messages. These missiles are located at Whiteman
Air Force Base and their planned trajectories will take them over
open ocean areas in both the Atlantic and Pacific where their
signals will be received by TACAMO for VLF relay to submarines or
can be received by submarines directly. The ERCS system is designed
for wartime Emergency Action Message delivery."
It is significant that Whiteman is the missile base furthest from
Soviet ICBM attack.
Gen Herres testified last year, in response to the criticism that
the Soviets can listen in on all U.S. decisions, and would know
about them before the U.S. forces: "There are some messages whose
sensitivity is perishable, and we would carry communications in a
crisis whose sensitivity would not matter at certain stages in a
crisis. We would not use those kinds of communications unless we
absolutely would have to." Is he talking about "perishable" ERCS?
Blair makes much of the U.S. dependence on ERCS -- even for
Minuteman launch. For missiles that are the Soviets first targets,
and first to be launched by the U.S., and with the U.S. *depending*
on getting the missiles out ... no wonder there's hardly any
information on them whatsoever. If ERCS are for launch on warning,
could they be configured so as to guarrantee Minuteman/sub./etc.
retaliation in the event of the warning being real, and not unless?
This would offer the temptation of "fail-safe" LOW, and it would be
even safer if they could receive just the simplest in-flight message.
Since it has been suggested that nuclear Minuteman launch on warning
would be OK if there was an in-flight disarm capability, the same
would apply to making ERCS a "safe" launch on warning system, and
have the advantage of permitting launch by the military without
Presidential order, since they aren't themselves nucs.
Any one know any more about ERCS and the ERCS mission?
To: ARMS-D@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
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Date: Wed, 11 Jun 86 16:50:14 pdt
From: weemba@brahms.berkeley.edu (Matthew P. Wiener)
Subject: SDI satire
The following article appeared in _Nature_ vol 321, 22 May 1986, p 373:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
ABOUNDING HYPOTHESES FLOATED
Washington
To students at the California Institute of Technology, satire has seemed
the best way to express opposition to ... SDI. Last month they held a
competition for the most "destabilizing, unworkable or incredibly expen-
sive" proposal to achieve SDI's goals.
The winner is planetary science graduate Greg Ojakangas. His proposal,
estimated to cost $457 million, involves developing a genetically engin-
eered strain of pygmy hippopotamus. Hippos would be fed on a diet en-
riched with suitable radioactive materials and kept in cages with cathodes
embedded in the walls. A continuous flow of electrons neutralizes the
alpha particles emitted by the hippos' radioactive diet, forming helium
and making the hippos lighter than air.
In the event of missile attack, an "optically thick cascade of buoyant
hippos" rises to form a shield. Upon reaching the "hippopause", the height
at which the mean hippo density (MHD) equals the atmospheric density, the
hippos would fan out, forming a protective ROOPH (Readily Operative Over-
head Protection by Hippos). In his proposal, Ojakangas reckons the hippos
will remain buoyant for two days. After that, they will float gently to
earth where they can be collected.
Second prize went to physics graduate student David Palmer, whose proposal
calls for splitting the Earth into hemispheres at the Equator. A large
bearing allows the two hemispheres to be rotated. When radar detects a
flight of missiles heading over the pole, large motors rotate the two hemi-
spheres 180 degrees in opposite directions.
After this manoeuvre, the eastern and western hemispheres have changed
places, and the missiles will land on the country from which they were
originally launched.
Other less serious scenarios suggested putting everyone in the US aboard
dirigibles (since "no dirigible has been shot down in 20 years"); erecting
a cardboard shield as the final layer of a multilayer defence (cardboard
is lighter than plexiglass); and using a series of lenses to focus the
ability of the Bermuda Triangle to make things disappear.
The Caltech competition was inspired by a similar effort at Cornell Univ-
ersity last fall. The winning entry at Cornell proposed using a particle
beam of tachyons, the particles arising in certain superstring theories
which travel backwards in time. This would provide a pre-launch destruc-
tion capability even after an attack had been initiated.
Joseph Palca
--
ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
"Ya know, a billion here ... a billion there ... gosh ...
pretty soon yer talkin' real money." -Bloom County
------------------------------
Date: 11 Jun 86 16:47:00 PST
From: "143C::ESTELL" <estell%143c.decnet@nwc-143b.ARPA>
Subject: SDI alternatives
Reply-To: "143C::ESTELL" <estell%143c.decnet@nwc-143b.ARPA>
[Moderator note to ESTELL -- I cannot get my mailer to accept a
legitimate address for you to place you on the ARMS-D list. I will do
so when I get an address my mailer can handle.]
I offered some thoughts to RISKS which were reprinted in ARMS-D. I
have gotten some interesting feedback to those thoughts, which I would
share. First, let me thank you one and all for the character of your
replies; they have been cogent, courteous, and convincing. No hints
whatsoever about doubts of my intelligence or integrity - even by
those adamantly opposed to my point of view. Second, I doubt that
either of us will persuade the other to change in fundamental ways;
but the exchange is valuable to me, and, I hope, to the USA generally.
You probably already know that there are at least two kinds of players:
those who believe it is important to play well, hard but fair; and those
who want only to win, at any price. We seem to be the first kind;
Murphy's Law guarantees that some SDI supporters, and some SDI opponents
alike, belong to the second group. They will exploit any opportunity we
give them. More on that later.
Let me summarize (and restate) my principle points:
1. SDI will roll on, at least until '89; i.e., the Reagan Admin. is firmly
committed to it. "Nature abhors a vacuum." Americans demand adequate
defense, while complaining of its cost [which is usually excessive].
Most groups [e.g., Common Cause] who have tried to stop MX et al have
offered no alternative; by default, that leaves us stockpiling weapons;
we already know that doesn't work; for it costs too much, raises the
balance of terror, and besides the USSR is getting ahead of us now.
2. You and I don't have the wherewithal to stop SDI; but perhaps we can
glean some benefits from it, especially if we work within the system;
e.g., to pursue compatible overall goals, BUT doing valuable things.
3. Bringing our traditional ["non SDI?"] defenses up to reasonable state-
of-technology is probably a good idea; e.g., using computers that
encourage good software practices, run efficiently, etc.
4. SDI does NOT equate to "ICBM defense."
You will search my earlier messages in vain for the term "ICBM."
I made it plain - or tried to - that ICBM's from the USSR [or wherever]
are [in MY opinion] less of a threat than less exotic weapons in the
hands of criminals/terrorists, of whatever race, religion, nationality.
5. We sell weapons now; if SDI works at all well, we can sell it; and
not only reduce the level of fear in the world, but also get some
return on our investment.
Now to add some new points:
6. Going to the moon in the '60's cost the USA nothing!
Miniaturization of electronics, and encapsulation for space led directly
to domestic products like the now common "pacemaker."
The DIFFERENCE between tax dollars paid by those wearing pacemakers, and
the "aid to their families" that would have been paid had those heart
patients died or been disabled, is more than $25 billion.
[Data from a CPA friend of mine.]
7. To the extent that we jump to conclusions about each others' points, we
give excuses to those other players [win!] to jump to similar points,
and use our credibility to aid their cause.
8. An adequate defense MUST be one that we can afford; and I don't mean by
ignoring the deficit, and spending billions just because that's do-able.
Example: Why are we dismantling Trident subs, while still more funds
go to "MX?" Trident IS MX - demonstrated, workable, paid for. If a
particular sub becomes obsolete [like some old computers I mentioned],
then replace it; but what's the need for "mobile silos on rails?"
Common sense tells me that there IS a good reason; security regs probably
tell WHY I don't know that reason; but Murphy's Law suggest that maybe,
just maybe, it's the "military-industrial complex" going after profit.
9. Advances in computer technology to facilitate really good real-time
border patrol inspections [e.g., identity checks based on license plates
or Social Security numbers, or eventually finger prints] are do-able;
and offer a degree of protection different in kind, but equal in value
to "detecting re-entry warheads" etc. [Of course this is MY OPINION!]
10. Last, but certainly not least, if this work is to be done, it can either
be done by the "best and the brightest" or by technocrats and bureaucrats
in government, industry, and academia. If that happens, if the best do
not rise to the challenge, then I guarantee that the costs will be much
higher than necessary, and the results much lower than deisrable.
But if we do take the opportunity, then we can use the managers' short
term interests to an advantage; i.e., we can honestly say that "Star
Wars" [R2D2 et al] is not possible today; and then diligently work to
produce what is reasonable. Many managers [in government and elsewhere]
will go along with that incremental progress, because it IS a "bird in
the hand." Indeed, Mr. Reagan is reputed to lead by concept rather than
in detail; so let's supply him the details, rather than abandon that
task to the technocrats - of whatever stripe.
Finally, to state a position. Some readers have guessed which side of SDI
I'm on; most have been wrong. That's because I won't take a side, as the
question is presently posed; viz., am I for or against the President's SDI
program? That too close to "have I stopped beating my wife?" A complex
question defies a simple answer.
I'm FOR adequate, affordable, ethical defense; I don't believe that SDI, as
presented in the popular press, is THE answer. Unlike some readers, I have
no direct source of information about what Mr. Reagan or Mr. Weinberger
REALLY think; I only have the press summary of their summary of closed ses-
sions in the Pentagon and White House. That's third hand information.
Bob Estell
p.s. The opinions above are not necessarily shared by any other person or
any organizatgion, real or imaginary.
p.p.s. Who is "Don" Estell?
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Date: 1986 June 11 16:23:02 PST (=GMT-8hr)
From: Robert Elton Maas <REM%IMSSS@SU-AI.ARPA>
Subject:save only 5% of population? how about decommissionning cities?
D> Date: Tuesday, 3 June 1986 10:56-EDT
D> From: bcsaic!douglas at uw-june <Doug Schuler at uw-june>
D> I have to question two statements that were made by Bob Estell in
D> relation to SDI software. The first one, "A missile defense is worth
D> having if it is good enough to save only 5% of the USA population in
D> an all-out nuclear attack" is oft-heard.
I agree with your disagreement with that quote for another reason:
If all you are planning is to save 5% of our populace, there may be a
cheaper andmore reliable method that doesn't rely on untested and
untestable new technology. Simply move most of the people out of the
large metropolitan areas such as New York, distributing them in
suburbs or rural areas. A single warhead can kill much of NYC but it
would take thousands of warheads to kill the same people if they were
thinly distributed. If we also distribute our government and other
control centers (communication, business, etc.) we can not only save
5% of our population but save our way of life. We might even consider
distributing our populace and control centers throughout the world
instead of just our nation. Instead of being connected together by
physically living together in cities, we can be connected together by
computer networks, being physically near only our immediate family and
some friends instead of our employers and other business/government
acquaintenances.
Has anybody compared the cost and reliability of population
distribution vs. SDI for saving 5% of our people and way of life?
As for how to get all those people to get out of GROUND ZERO cities,
we have to give some incentive, like we did for seatbelts and
immunization against diseases. Perhaps we should impose a tax for
anyone living or physically working in any place that has sufficient
population density to allow thermonuclear warheads to be
cost-effective in killing them en masse. How about requiring signing a
waiver of protection against enemy attack before anyone can enter a
large city, with long lines at the entry points? How about frequent
deliberate power failures in large cities to discourage businesses
from locating their computers and other business activities in cities?
How about frequent thermonuclear-attack drills where everybody is
required to get out of the city within 20 minutes of the surprise
announcement of the drill, and everyone who doesn't get out is
required to wear a sign on their forehead "I DIED IN THE LAST DRILL"
for a week afterward? To discourage cheating, noxious gas such as
chlorine could be released into the drill area 30 minutes after the
start of the drill (10 minutes after deadline to get out). We'd beat
the message into city dwellers that city dwelling is obsolete in an
age where thermonuclear weapons exist and are controlled by hostile powers.
Perhaps my proposed methods are too drastic, even for national
security. Perhaps somebody can find gentler methods equally effective
for getting rid of our concentration of populace and business in cities?
I'd like to see a brainstorm on:
(1) What alternatives to SDI could save 5% of populace, and maybe
also 5% of our way of life?
(2) What would be the details of implementing such an alternative,
how could we get a significant fraction of people to cooperate with
such a plan to save their lives?
(3) If we had a thermonuclear war right now, what fraction would
survive? (If more than 5%, then of course SDI can save 5% even if
it is totally ineffective.)
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Date: Wednesday, 11 June 1986 21:31-EDT
From: michael%ucbiris at BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Slone [(415)486-5954])
To: arms-d
Subject: Re: comment on debate tone
>Date: Wed, 11 Jun 1986 10:51 EDT
>From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
>An interesting game theory question arises. Is it better to cooperate
>or confront in the long run? An interesting piece in Scientific
>American some years ago suggestst that a strategy of always
>cooperating EXCEPT when you have been confronted (and then replying by
>confronting ONCE) -- a strategy called tit-for-tat retaliation -- was
>better than any other decision rule(s) determining when to cooperate
>or confront. Over the long run, tit-for-tat produced better ourcomes
>for both parties.
This is in fact what is known as the Prisoner's Dilemma. I believe
that the nuclear arms race is in fact the Prisoner's Dilemma.
Unfortunately, one or both sides do not seem to know the optimal
long-term strategy (cooperation).
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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