ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) (01/07/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Monday, January 6, 1986 5:46PM
Volume 6, Issue 11.2
Today's Topics:
Soviet Defense
reluctance to shoot
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Date: Mon, 6 Jan 86 12:10:38 EST
From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TEI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1>
Subject: Soviet Defense
I'm glad I could get to my computer in time to acknowledge my mistaken views
on the Soviet railroads before it gets written about some more. I swear I'll
never talk about railroads again!
However, I still don't accept any description of the Soviet armed forces
as being purely defensive. I notice that no one addressed my point about GRU
interest in the road infrastructure of W. Europe.
-I made a too-cursory scan of the digests this morning, and apologize for
not taking timeg to properly quote messages-
One discussion on Soviet strength in Europe vs NATO drew a response that
NATO forces' numerical inferiority was deceptive because of US efforts in C3I
and logistics. I can only say that, although our systems are better, these
are not anything new to the Red Army, which is not the antiquarian dinosaur
many believe. Another point was that we shouldn't really count such non-
combat troops as construction engineers. A couple of points: Any soldier
with a rifle is light infantry. The US Army has a higher "tail-to-teeth"
ratio than the Red Army ( the price one pays for those superior logistics and
c3i assets ). If your purpose is to argue Soviet weakness, the support-vs-
combat strength argument is ill-advised.
Comment on Gary Chapman's description of our "dangerous" doctrine of deep
strike, follow-on forces, etc. ( AirLand Battle 2000 ) A study of Soviet
doctrine will reveal that they have espoused the very same doctrine for quite
a few years. ( Exploitive penetrations by Operational Maneuver Groups [OMGs])
Again, if that ( one of the most ageless of tactical principles ) is somehow
"dangerous", point your finger at the Ruskies for doing it first.
Comment on the continuing "good-vs-evil" debates viz the Soviets. My
neo-conservative acquaintances who deplore my agnosticism will probably disown
me, but I don't consider the Soviets the primary focus of evil in the world
today, or however it goes. I believe in Machiavelli. I believe in
Morganthau. I'm a cynic. There's no such thing as a good man (sorry,
Aristotle) and there's no such thing as an evil man. Environment determines
to what extent these qualities are displayed in individuals and groups. The
nature of the Soviet regime and society allow that regime to "get away" with
vastly more than can be done in democratic societies. Talk of "evil empires"
or sqeaky clean democracies where officials could be expected to never lie is
naive, oversimplistic and counterproductive.
Comments on the discussions, now far afield, with regard to the defensive
character of the Soviet navy: It is quite true that the Soviets, lacking
sufficient carriers, are hard-put to compete with us in power projection.
Remember that power projection is a peacetime concept. The writings of
Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, architect of the modern Soviet navy, indicate the
need to utilise the fleet, with its strong mix of submarine, surface combat-
ants and ASW assets in support of land operations against NATO in Europe. In
other words, principle expansion is forseen on the Eurasian land mass, and
naval strategy leans more towards interdiction of US efforts to stop such
expansion than, say, landing the Naval Infantry on Coney Island. Also it is
quite incorrect to state that the Sovs strategy specifically omits power
projection (somebody argued this- I think). Permanently "stationing" nuclear
missile subs off your opponent's shores as a demonstration is a projection
device we've long practiced. They, of course reciprocate. The steaming of
battle groups through the Carribean surely counts. Increased long range/long
duration exercises in the Indian, Pacific and South Atlantic oceans,
demonstrating advanced techniques in supply, refuel and repair are designed to
pointedly demonstrate the Soviets' capabilities in global projection. Forget
not their tri-service demonstations in the very real and hot wars in Ethiopia
and Angola.
J.Miller
P.S. Gorshkov was just recently fired for opposing the removal of operational
control of nuclear missile subs from the navy to the new Strategic Nuclear
Forces (SNF). Since it was he who transformed the Soviet navy from a
self-defense force to a global force, maybe this signals a reversion away from
the Blue-water navy ??? ( I doubt it. His successessor, Adm V.N. Chernavin
is a gung-ho nuke submariner. )
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Date: Mon, 6 Jan 86 08:57:00 EST
From: Michael_Joseph_Edelman%Wayne-MTS%UMich-MTS.Mailnet@MIT-MULTICS.ARPA
Re: reluctance to shoot
>
> Date: Sat, 4 Jan 86 20:13:14 PST
> From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.berkeley.edu
> Subject: reluctance to shoot
>
> > ...something like 50% of the combantants in WWII did not fire their rifles.
>
> This is correct and well-known.
>
> > Most of us have a strong built in mechanism that prevents us from killing
> > one of our own species...
>
> It should be noted that this is not necessarily the reason for the reluctance
> to shoot. Another relevant fact is that soldiers running squad automatic
> weapons (BARs, Brens, etc.) were much more willing to open fire, and firing
> tended to spread outward from them. This suggests that the underlying factor
> is perception of individual rifle shots as ineffective, rather than evil.
> That was a major reason for the interest in providing all soldiers with
> fully-automatic rifles...
>
Historian S.L.A. Marshall did a study after WWII in which he noted
the points made above; similarly, the probability of a soldier's
firing his weapon was proportional to his proximity to the BAR man
in a squad. Individual soldiers do not (for the most part) like to
attract attention to themselves, unless they have the feeling that
they can "dominate" the situation. But a major reason that many
soldiers never fired their weapons in WWII was that they never saw
the enemy.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
*****************************ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU.UUCP (06/20/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Friday, June 20, 1986 10:25AM
Volume 6, Issue 112
Today's Topics:
Saving 5% (;-]
Cowan's comments on double standards
The nuclear decapitation study
Re: Space Shuttle Militarism
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Date: Wed, 18 Jun 1986 16:05 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Saving 5% (;-]
Without wanting to prejudge one way or another how many people would
or would not find life under the Soviets worth living, I would remind
the readership that most people can learn to tolerate the most amazing
things.
Despite that, maybe a personal note is appropriate here. I spent a
month in the People's Republic of China in 1975. I was truly
impressed by the extent to which they had set up an infrastructure to
care for human economic needs (e.g., food, shelter, etc); I wish our
own society placed more emphasis on such things. On the other hand, I
was quite convinced that I would have been very unhappy living there
-- the price that the PRC paid for that infrastructure is enormous,
consisting mostly of the sacrifice of political rights, both
institutionally and culturally. Specifically, the guiding philosphy
is one in which the individual subordinates himself to the community
(or the state, however you choose to put it). I could not live
happily under such conditions, and despite the wishes of some of my
relatives, I will never live in China.
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Date: Thu, 19 Jun 86 09:49:35 pdt
From: Steve Walton <ametek!walton@csvax.caltech.edu>
Re: Cowan's comments on double standards
Rich Cowan (cowan@xx.lcs.mit.edu) comments:
Perhaps I am wrong, but I suspect a double standard in the way you
define the "falling" of a government. When talking about the
governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, I suspect you mean the
overthrow of socialism and/or the removal of these countries from the
Soviet sphere of influence. When talking about the Phillipines and
Haiti, you definitely mean the transfer of power without any change
in social system or sphere of influence. The difference is crucial.
My major point was that no change *of any kind* in the government of a
totalitarian state has come about except by the application of external
force. Pol Pot was overthrown by the Vietnamese invasion and replaced by
another Communist regime. It is true that the result moved Cambodia from
the Chinese to the Soviet sphere of influence, but the country is still
Communist. I think we would all agree that any change in the leadership of
a totalitarian country which was not the result of internal Communist Party
decisions or of external force would be unprecedented, whether such change
resulted from popular revolt, military coup, or replacement of one
Communist Party by another. We did not send US tanks into the streets of
Rome when Communist members were elected to the Italian Parliament; try to
imagine members of the Capitalist Party being elected to the Supreme
Soviet.
What should US policy be? Should we stand firmly for the overthrow of all
Communist regimes? Should we expand contacts with them as much as possible
in the hope that exposure to external influence will eventually change
their government? Do we implicitly endorse their form of government by
carrying on trade and diplomatic relations? Should we enter into
arms-control agreements, however imperfect, or attempt to bankrupt them by
daring them to match our large defense budgets? Does our hostility
actually strengthen them by giving them something with which to distract
their citizens from internal problems? These are the fundamental questions
of US-SU relations, and in order to answer them on a sound basis, we must
harbor no illusions about the SU.
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Date: Wednesday, 18 June 1986 14:30-EDT
From: michael%ucbiris at BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Slone [(415)486-5954])
To: arms-d
Re: The nuclear decapitation study
According to the Wall Street Journal (Feb. 2, 1986), a Congressional
commission made a report regarding the vulnerability of the U.S.
strategic command and control system. The Pentagon considered it's
conclusion so dangerous that only four people (President, the Sec. of
Defense, the Deputy Sec. of Defense, and the Chair of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff) are allowed to read the report (excluding its authors!). The
U.S.'s military electronic communication system is apparently so
vulnerable that it could be rendered useless by a handful of nuclear
warheads. As a result of the report, the Pentagon and RCA have
embarked upon a $1 billion project called Ground Wave Emergency Network
(GWEN). GWEN would create hundreds of communication relay nodes, each
consisting of 300 foot towers connected to 600 foot underground copper
screens. In addition to these nodes would be 57 30 story towers
encircling the continental U.S. designed to withstand an
electromagnetic pulse.
------------------------------
From: decwrl!decvax!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Fri, 20 Jun 86 03:32:28 edt
Subject: Re: Space Shuttle Militarism
> ...With the installation of the Navy's head of space operations
> at the helm of NASA, and joint appeals from NASA and the AIR Force for
> a replacement shuttle, the real purpose is clear.
The author of this piece is presumably unaware that a military man as
head of a NASA program is nothing special or new. The director of
Project Apollo from 1964 to 1969 was an Air Force general. Not because
there was anything military about Apollo, but simply because the Air
Force had experience at running big complex aerospace projects. I would
assume that the Navy man being referred to is Dick Truly, who was an
astronaut long before he was head of Naval space operations.
As for the joint appeal for a replacement shuttle, wouldn't you expect
the shuttle's biggest customer to be concerned about a 25% loss in
capability?
> ... Establishing
> space colonies or homesteading on some heretofore unknown hospitable
> planet, would require giant leaps in scientific understanding...
Nonsense. Most of what is required is straightforward engineering
development. That, plus a firm long-term commitment to the project.
I.e., money.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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