ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) (01/07/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Monday, January 6, 1986 5:46PM
Volume 6, Issue 11.3
Today's Topics:
KAL007
Deep Strike
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Date: Mon, 6 Jan 86 09:52:54 EST
From: Michael_Joseph_Edelman%Wayne-MTS%UMich-MTS.Mailnet@MIT-MULTICS.ARPA
Re: KAL007
> Date: Fri, 3 Jan 86 14:47:30 PST
> From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe>
> To: LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA
> Re: Government secrecy and KAL007
>
> ...In summary: (1) I am not claiming PROOF that KAL007 was a spy
> flight, merely that substantial conflicting evidence exists, and US
> government secrecy inevitably gives rise to the conclusion that
> US/USSR roles in the matter =Tweedledum/Tweedledee; (2) nowhere does
> anyone illuminate the secret Congressional inquiry into KAL007
> precipitated in Sept. 1985 by testimony that the flight was
> intentional;
And no one can- the inquiry was secret, right? All we have is
hearsay evidence of what was reported to have been discussed, with
no sources, documents, etc.
> First and foremost, the supposedly definitive American Spectator
> (October, 1985) article on KAL007 does not rebut ANY of the specific
> - the Defense Electronics (March, 1984) article I quoted received no
> attention whatsoever from Oberg in his supposedly exhaustive review
> of the literature...
Fair enough. Let's look at those points:
1) KAL007 was delayed for 40 minutes for an equipment check that
revealed no malfunction. But this is a very common occurence in
commercial aircraft, and Sayle notes that the craft in question
had a previous history of minor navigation equipment problems.
2) The delay synchronized KAL007 with the pass overhead of a ferret
satellite. This seems to be a mis-quoting of the "P.Q. Mann" article
(by Defense Electronics) in which the supposed use of a ferret satellite
in 1964 was invoked to prove complicity of the space shuttle in the
KAL007 incident. It hasn't been quoted anywhere else.
3) "The mission required KAL's top pilot and co-pilot..."(this is
again affirming the consequent) "...both having known US Intelligence
connections...(proof by assertion- well known to whom? What source
can you quote?) "...and a flight crew of 29 instead of the normal 18..."
I assume this refers to the RC-135 crew. As noted by Oberg, Pearson's
sources for RC-135 operations procedure were two crew members who flew
on very different missions on a different RC-135 fifteen years ago.
4) "The steady course of KAL007 required several inflight checks..."
But as Sayle notes, KAL007 flew a steady magnetic heading of 246
throughout its flight. An airline on autopilot requires no such
checks. The filed flight plan would have required the crew to have
reset the inertial guidance system waypoints twice during the
flight, true; but if the autopilot was on a magnetic heading the
crew would never have been alerted to reset waypoints- until they
either noted that they seemed to have been on course for too long,
or were alerted by some other means.
>
> Here is the news story I referred to re the Congressional inquiry:
>
> Am American lawyer involved in a damages suit on
> behalf of the victims of the crash says the pilot's widow told him
> and three other lawyers that the pilot and co-pilot were paid extra
> to fly over Soviet territory. There has also been evidence that the
> airliner's course was known and that an air traffic controller said
> 'We should warn him'. The sub-committee is also expected to
> investigate the destruction of a tape by the US Air Force."
>
None of this has been instantiated as of this writing. Was the pilot paid
extra to "fly over Soviet territory" or to fly a potentially hazardous
route? I suppose the eventual trial may provide answers.
> ...I read a wire story I think probably true, which
> quoted an unnamed Air Force official who stated that the US Air
> Force recurrently fitted commercial passenger planes of friendly
> foreign nations with spying equipment at a base in New Mexico. The
> fitting was formally at the friendly nations' request, and I believe
> certain African nations were example customers. There was a hint
> that such activity would be performed in future outside of the US on
> account of the Korean incident. That's my memory of the article.
I'd like to see more on this. We suspect, but do not know, that the
USSR does this regularly. A few times every month Aeroflot airliners
are are intercepted and diverted by the USAF after the airliners make
unauthorized low-level passes over military bases on the east coast;
this may be a common practice around the world. John Le Carre
aludes to it in one of his novels. But what is usually claimed is that
such missions are photo recon, not electronic ferreting, which require
far more equipment than can be stuffed in the nose of a 747 and a crew
to operate the equipment.
What it boils down to, for me, is that there is no concievable mission
that KAL007 could have accomplished that could not have been accomplished
better by other craft.
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Date: Mon, 6 Jan 86 10:35:08 EST
From: Michael_Joseph_Edelman%Wayne-MTS%UMich-MTS.Mailnet@MIT-MULTICS.ARPA
re: Deep Strike
>
> From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
>
> From: Gary Chapman <PARC-CSLI!chapman at glacier>
> This is why we have moved to the dangerous doctrine of deep strike,
> "follow-on-forces-attack," and an increased offensive capability.
>
> I concur that these are destabilizing. Given my position that the
> conventional military situation in Europe isn't as bleak as people
> usually claim, the recommendations that follow can safely get rid of
> deep strike etc. Given the position that the conventional situation
> is as bleak as is believed, then there really aren't many alternatives
> to deep strike.
>
"Follow on" and "deep strike" are a consequence of NATO's politically
(rather than militarily) motivated notion of "forward defense". Rather
than allowing an attacking enemy to overextend themselves before
counterattaking, NATO prefers a replay of Normandy, stopping the
expected Soviet attack at the German border. The alternative is to
junk forward defense in favor of a more flexible doctrine, but
Germany would never stand for a policy that would have the entire
of WWIII fought on German soil.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
*****************************ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU.UUCP (06/22/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Sunday, June 22, 1986 11:35AM
Volume 6, Issue 113
Today's Topics:
Space Shuttle Militarism
CIA truth = DoD false
Informing the Senate about SDI
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Date: Fri, 20 Jun 1986 13:19 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Space Shuttle Militarism
From: decwrl!decvax!utzoo!henry at ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
> ... Establishing
> space colonies or homesteading on some heretofore unknown hospitable
> planet, would require giant leaps in scientific understanding...
Nonsense. Most of what is required is straightforward engineering
development. That, plus.. money.
By far the most serious problem, which is NOT a straightforward
engineering problem, is how to maintain a closed sefl-sustaining
environment over many years. That is NOT well-understood by ANYONE.
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Date: Friday, 20 June 1986 20:35-EDT
From: michael%ucbiris at BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Slone [(415)486-5954])
To: arms-d
Re: CIA truth = DoD false
A program to actively create disinformation regarding military
equipment was made more than 2 years ago. The program is to be
primarily coordinated by the CIA.
"The disinformation effort covers 15-20 programs, 6 or 7 of
which are DoD projects. Programs likely to be covered by the DoD's
disinformation policy include the Air Force's special mission aircraft
flying in Nevada, the Air Force's Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB), the
Navy's Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) and SDI, one government
official said.
The official went on to say, "If some of the results of the
disinformation activity on a particular program get passed to Congress
through hearings or other means, there are channels on the Hill that
can be used to get the correct information to the people who need to
know. Program budget amounts sent to Congress are correct." [from
Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 17, 1986]
The ultimate honesty of the CIA/DoD is suspect. In recent
times, they have made no effort to keep Congress informed of crucial
CIA and DoD activity in Central America which has lead to dangerous and
unauthorized violations of international law and national boarders. It
is in fact in their best interests to disinform Congress, so as to
inflate their budgets.
Furthermore, it is the CIA/DoD's intent, direct or not, to
disinform the American public. This is a very dangerous intent,
especially when it concerns major military systems, such as SDI.
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Date: Wednesday, 18 June 1986 15:21-EDT
From: horning at src.DEC.COM (Jim Horning)
To: ARMS-D
Re: Informing the Senate about SDI
[ from RISKS@SRI-CSL.ARPA -- Moderator ]
The information in this message is political, not technical. However,
it concerns the process of supplying technical information to those
who must make political judgements, so I believe that it is germane to
Risks. [and ARMS-D]
Recent news accounts have indicated that the outcome in the Senate of
requests for increased SDI funding is very unclear. Senators are having
to take positions on a matter they don't fully understand, and many of
them would like to be better informed.
I was contacted by an aide to Senator Proxmire for information about how
David Parnas's criticisms of SDI software are viewed in the professional
community. General Abramson and the SDIO have had some success in
spreading the message that David Parnas is an isolated crank who is not
taken seriously by those who actually build software.
I was able to express my own opinion and concerns, but cannot speak
credibly for the entire professional community. Pound-for-pound, Risks
probably contains more people qualified to make an informed judgement on
this issue than any other group I know how to reach. Whatever your views,
I would urge you to take the time to write a letter expressing them to
Mr. Douglas Waller
Office of Senator William Proxmire
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510
Based on my experience, you can expect your letter to receive personal
attention, and to carry weight according to your credentials and the
cogency of your arguments. (This is in sharp contrast to my experience
writing to my own senators and congressman.)
In addition to stating your own views clearly, it would probably help to
indicate how they relate to Parnas's criticisms and (if you have read it)
to the Eastport Report. In my own letter, I also devoted a paragraph to
sketching my credentials; I don't much care for such self-advertisement,
but thought I should give a starting point for any checking they cared to
do, and the reasons why I felt qualified to comment on reliability and on
aerospace software.
Jim H.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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