ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU.UUCP (06/29/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Sunday, June 29, 1986 9:39AM
Volume 6, Issue 115
Today's Topics:
administrivia
Treaty Compliance
Inquiry / Effect of Counterforce Strike
Having an influence from "within the system"
possible failures of BMD software
A Personal View on SDI from Harlan Mills (msg+commentary)
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Date: Sat, 28 Jun 1986 17:19 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: administrivia
To: ARMS-D moderator at NRL-CSS
My mailer no longer recognizes NRL-CSR or NRL-CSS. Please send
another address. In the meantime, NRL-CSR and CSS are off the list.
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Date: Sat, 28 Jun 1986 17:27 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Treaty Compliance
From: DonSmith.PA at Xerox.COM
Regarding Lin's query, namely, how do you get the other side to comply
with a treaty and what do you do if they don't, I would say this. Any
treaty will be broken as soon as its compliance is viewed by either
party as no longer being in their own best interest.
But treaties contain many provisions. What if they only break some
but abide by others?
.. If both sides are sure that the
other would detect any significant violation, both would be foolish to
cheat.
I used to think so, but I'm no longer so sure. What do you do about
nibbling around the edges? For example, SALT II limits throw weight
of modernized missiles to 5% of the old throw weight. Leaving aside
the question of what the US official position is (I think a good case
can be made that the Soviets are probably in technical compliance with
this provision), what should the US do if our measurement of the SS-25
says its throwweight is 10% more with 80% confidence and 5% with 10%
confidence. (Numbers have been made up)
Should we abrogate the treaty, leaving the more important quantitative
limits on launchers aside? If not, how should we proceed?
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Date: Sat, 28 Jun 1986 17:36 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Inquiry / Effect of Counterforce Strike
Are *all* missile sites in extremely isolated areas?
1 M people live within the 1016 36 km squares centered on each
missile silo.
What damage would an all-out counterforce attack on US
land-based missiles, with no accompanying countervalue attack,
do to populations and the economy?
Recall that a counterforce attack would include attacks on things
other than missiles. With that caveat, the answer to your question
is:
silo attacks alone 2.4-15 M dead
full-scale counterforce 13-34 M
on all US strategic nuclear
targets
From International Security, Spring 86: Consequences of "Limited"
Nuclear Attacks on the US, page 35, 36
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Date: Sat, 28 Jun 1986 17:52 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Having an influence from "within the system"
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN>
You have here touched upon what I believe is -- more often than not -- a
delusion: that it is more effective to work within the system to change
it than to protest it from without.
Without addressing the specific merits of doing SDI work at this time,
I think this statement needs qualification.
There is a role for people outside the system. There is also one for
people inside the system. Activists are necessary to bring political
pressure. But they have to have some technical credibility. As bad
as things are in government now (with people believing in the Tooth
Fairy,.. excuse me, I meant perfect ballistic missile defense), there
is only minimal support for other things that other people would also
like to have -- teaching creationism in the schools for one. The
reason is that there is NO serious scientific opinion that creationism
has any literal validity at all. I can assure you that if there were,
the battle to keep creationism out of the textbooks would be a lot
more difficult to fight.
Technical credibility is not the same thing as being "inside the
system". But "the system" does many things, some of which are
probably right, and others wrong. But should that mean that people
should give up on the whole thing? Some of the most effective critics
of the system are those who have extensive experience in it -- Richard
Garwin comes to mind as a prime example. His effectiveness comes
about because he knows what he is talking about, and it is hard to
imagine that he could have developed his expertise had he remained
forever outside the system. By contrast, Kosta Tsipis -- while he has
made a rather significant name for himself in the public domain -- has
been identified in most of the public debate that I have heard as a
flake who instinctively knee-jerks against US defense; Tsipis has
never been part of "the system". (This is not to make a judgement
about the quality of Tsipis' work.)
Then why doesn't the system stop doing silly things? I guess the
answer has to take the form -- if you think things are bad now, just
imagine how much worse they would be without the likes of Garwin.
While being technically right doesn't necessarily mean that your
position will win, being technically wrong is often the kiss of death.
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Date: Sat, 28 Jun 1986 22:01 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: possible failures of BMD software
I'm writing a paper on potential software-induced difficulties and
problems that might accompany the deployment of a BMD system. I'd
like to enlist the collective imagination of the list on examples
apropos to this paper.
Please constrain your imagination by the limits of the possible (e.g.,
it is impossible for an X-ray laser to shoot x-rays at ground targets,
but it is not impossible that the firing of an X-ray laser creates an
electromagnetic pulse that has unanticipated effects). Be as
detailed as you can be. I am not specifying a system architecture, so
please tell me the one(s) you have in mind in your scenario(s). Also
remember that BMD has significant capability against satellites.
Thanks.
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Date: Friday, 27 June 1986 16:35-EDT
From: Peter G. Neumann <Neumann at SRI-CSL.ARPA>
To: RISKS at SRI-CSL.ARPA, arms-d
Re: A Personal View on SDI from Harlan Mills
Really-From: Harlan Mills (IBM Federal Systems, no net address)
[The following note has been circulated privately by Harlan Mills,
noted practitioner of structured programming and other software
engineering techniques. It appeared on Risks and I forwarded it to
ARMS-D. Herb]
Two of my friends, whose intelligence and integrity I respect and
admire greatly, namely David Parnas and James Horning, have stated their
belief that the SDI concept is impractical. At the same time other groups
of scientists and engineers, from dozens to hundreds to thousands are
declaring their opposition to SDI on various grounds from infeasibility to
conscience. Yet, we do not seem to find comparable groups of scientists
and engineers on the pro side of SDI in public forums. Is it because there
is no pro side? Or is there some other reason? I think there is another
reason.
First, there are many scientists and engineers actively working on
SDI research. Does that mean they are for SDI or are simply hypocrites?
I think for most of them that neither is the case. There is another
reason possible. I believe it is the case with me.
I personally do not know enough to be for or against SDI.
But I do know enough to want our country to be strong in technology.
As a citizen, I depend on our system of government, and particularly
our Congress, to decide about SDI.
I regard SDI as a political question that will be ultimately
settled in our political system by the 525 members of our Congress.
I trust them to make the wisest disposition possible of this question.
It seems too complex a qustion to settle on a simple up or down vote.
It will take time, experience, and reflection to progressively deal with it.
Much of that experience and reflection will be political and diplomatic;
some of it will be military and technical in nature. I believe the intent
of most scientists and engineers working on SDI is to explore the technical
side intelligently enough to provide the widest range of options possible
for the political and diplomatic side.
In order to pursue the SDI question, the administration,
particularly the military, must organize a substantial and serious effort
that itself involves a narrower form of political effort. It must
advocate a position and lobby Congress for the opportunity to pursue SDI
military and technical research in a responsible way. But I do, indeed,
believe that members of Congress, with the facts, the checks and balances
of our political system, and constitutional guarantees (e.g., a free
press) will resolve the question of SDI intelligently in due course and
process.
So I regard the positions of my friends Parnas and Horning, and of
many other scientists and engineers, as thoughtful and courageous acts of
technical or political conviction. In particular, Parnas and Horning are
expert witnesses in computer science and software engineering. People in
the administration and members of Congress should and do listen to them.
In matters of theory in computer science or software engineering, I have
never had an occasion to differ or disagree with either of them. But I do
not always agree with their extrapolations into engineering expectations
in large systems such as required by SDI.
In the first place, I believe it is somewhat misleading to convert
the problem of SDI feasibility into the question of software perfection.
The problem is deeper than software. The recent shuttle tragedy reminds
us that any man-made system can fail for many reasons beside software.
So the problem is even worse than simply software. The best man can do in
any physical system is to reduce the probability of failure to low levels,
not to zero. If the hardware fails more often then the software, it is
wiser to improve the hardware even though the software is not perfect.
In the second place, I believe that engineering expectations and
achievements in large systems depend as much on the checks and balances
of good management processes as on engineering theory. We never get away
from the fallibility of people, but we can reduce the fallibility of
organizations of people below the fallibilities of their individuals.
And with sound engineering theory, there is no real limit to that reduction
in fallibility of organizations. For me, they key is the combination of
sound engineering theory and good management process -- both are necessary
and neither is sufficient.
So my extrapolations into what is possible for SDI software are
more open ended than those of Parnas or Horning. But, as Parnas and
Horning both suggest, we surely will not get there doing business as usual
in the DoD software acquisition process. Thus, as with the Congress, I
expect DoD to rise to the occasion as the needs arise. After all, it's
our DoD, as well as our Congress.
In another era, in the late 40's I was involved in a losing cause
on the issue of "One World or None." As a student, I was convinced by the
arguments of my elders that atomic theory should be declassified and that
the U.S. should lead the way with an open science policy throughout the
world. The science world was split then -- Niehls Bohr on one side,
Edward Teller on the other (and Robert Oppenheimer, I think, caught in
the middle). But, of course, the cold war and Korea settled things
irreversibly. In spite of the excesses of a few individuals, I believe
our Congress and administration came through that period as well
as possible in steering a science policy course. I was personally
disappointed in a dream of open science and abundant peace, but I do not
see how it could have been pulled off if our government could not see how.
That is how I look at SDI. I would like to help my country be
strong in science and engineering. The adminstration and the military
are agents of the country in that endeavor. But, I depend on the Congress
to make the final, collective, decisions, in how to best reflect that
strength for peace in political, diplomatic, and military matters.
However, as events unfold and we all learn more, both about SDI
needs and engineering theory, if I come to the same belief as Parnas and
Horning, you can be sure that I will join them, and try to bring my
opinions to the administration and Congress, too. I want to be on the
right side, whether it loses or not!
Harlan Mills
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Date: Sun, 29 Jun 1986 06:12 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: A Personal View on SDI from Harlan Mills
On the whole, I am touched by Mills' remarks. But I am bothered by
two things. He says that
I [Mills] regard SDI as a political question that will be ultimately
settled in our political system by the 525 members of our Congress.
I trust them to make the *WISEST* disposition possible of this question.
... I depend on the Congress
to make the final, collective, decisions, in how to *BEST* reflect that
strength for peace in political, diplomatic, and military matters.
[Emphasis added by me]
These comments reflect a trust in a rational process of government
that I wish I could share; it almost sounds as though he believes that
whatever decision the Congress makes will be right *by definition*. I
have seen too many instances in which Congress manifestly did NOT do
the right thing to believe in their collective wisdom. The nature of
a democratic system forces me to *abide* by their decisions, but that
is not the same thing as approving of them or believing in their
wisdom. (On the other hand, I would not trade democracy for anything
else.)
At a somewhat more fundamental level, he states that
.. it is somewhat misleading to convert
the problem of SDI feasibility into the question of software perfection.
... The best man can do in
any physical system is to reduce the probability of failure to low levels,
not to zero.
The latter statement is a position with which all TECHNICAL analysts
agree: a perfect system is impossible. But the POLITICAL debate has
been cast in terms of "Do you want to defend yourself or not?",
"eliminating (NOT reducing) the threat of nuclear ballistic missiles"
and "the immorality of threats to kill innocent civilians".
The technical analysis of the political questions posed above is
absolutely clear, and is that it is impossible to develop technology
that will allow us to get rid of offensive nuclear weapons and shrug
off nuclear missiles should they happen to be launched our way).
Technical analysts then debate the technically more interesting
question of what CAN be done, in which case Mills' comment that
... the intent
of most scientists and engineers working on SDI is to explore the technical
side intelligently enough to provide the widest range of options possible
for the political and diplomatic side.
makes a great deal of sense.
But SDI supporters in the political arena find THIS question much less
interesting. The support that SDI garners from the population at
large, and indeed from those that push it arises from the fact that
defense against ballistic missiles is a truly revolutionary
possibility, that will result in a military posture that is
qualitatively different from that which exists at present. It won't,
as SDI supporters admit when pushed; they say defenses will enhance
deterrence, and that we will still have to accept societal
vulnerability and to rely on the threat of retaliation to deter Soviet
attack.
Looking at the question from another side, all technical analysts
agree that it is possible to build SOMETHING that sometimes does some
fraction of what you want it to do, and the interesting technical
questions are what is the nature of this something, what will it be
able to do, and how often can it do it. But the political debate is
cast against the backdrop of technology that is capable of meeting a
certain absolute level of performance, and a rather high one at that.
The technology to do THAT is much more demanding -- if the level of
performance is societal perfection, then it's not reachable at all.
The political proponents try to have it both ways; they want the
political support that comes from belief in the feasibility of this
very deanding technology, and they try to deflect technical criticism
of this political position by saying the question is one of
discovering what technology can do.
Thus, until the broader political debate can be recast in terms of the
desirability of IMPERFECT defenses, and SDI supporters concede
POLITICALLY that defenses will not do what is being claimed for it,
technical analysts, in my view, are fully justified in pointing out
that perfection is not possible. When SDI supporters make this
concession, the perfect defense issue will become a dead horse
politically as well as technically, and we can all go on to talk about
more interesting things.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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