ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU.UUCP (07/09/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Wednesday, July 9, 1986 11:42AM
Volume 6, Issue 120
Today's Topics:
The Minimum Emergency-Essential Communications System
Sensor technology
Civil disobedience
Treaty Compliance (5 msgs)
Preparing for war
Sensor technology and disinformation
Re: SDI and the ICBM threat
The Minimum Emergency-Essential Communications Network
The Minimum Emergency-Essential Communications Network
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Date: Sat, 5 Jul 1986 16:30 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: The Minimum Emergency-Essential Communications System
From: Kurt F. Sauer <ks%a.cs.okstate.edu at CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Today, much of the backbone of MEECN has shifted back
to High-Frequency (HF) systems, because of its ability to
work in a nuclear environment.
HF is subject to nuclear blackout; that can last up to several hours.
I think the statement is incorrect for other reasons as well.
And what is the relationship of
strategic nuclear forces (the so-called SIOP forces), and
non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF)? Do NSNF stay in
reserve only for post-SIOP use, and do they use the same
loop of connectivity that SIOP forces use?
SIOP forces are centrally controlled and directed; targets are
selected directly by the NCA. NSNF are under the control of the
theater commander. The NCA must authorize the theater commander to
fire nukes, but it is unlikely that the NCA would select specific
targets for the NSNF.
NSNF would most likely be used BEFORE the SIOP forces were used. The
connectivity to them is must more tenuous, because NSNF are integrated
with other, non-nuclear forces, and C2 to them is much more difficult.
------------------------------
Date: Sat 5 Jul 1986 17:42:28 EST
From: Paul Dietz <dietz%slb-doll.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: Sensor technology
CCD's are used in ground based astronomy, too. They have a much
higher quantum efficiency than photographic plates, are more linear,
and can detect IR.
Kodak has just produced a CCD detector with over 1 million pixels.
The Japanese are also furiously working on these detectors for use in
electronic cameras. These are visual light detectors and use silicon,
but they show how dense such arrays can be made.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 7 Jul 86 10:22:17 PDT
From: wild@SUN.COM (Will Doherty)
Subject: Civil disobedience
From:Jong@HIS-BILLERICA-MULTICS.ARPA
I seem to recall Martin Luther King scoring significant successes
by working within the system (civil disobedience) rather than
outside the system (violence).
Civil disobedience involves breaking the law.
Since when is that working within the system?
(Or are we talking about some other system?)
Will Doherty
sun!oscar!wild
------------------------------
Date: Monday, 7 July 1986 13:52-EDT
From: DonSmith.PA at Xerox.COM
To: LIN, arms-d
Re: Treaty Compliance
If one responds to incremental violations by making a lot of bad press
for the violator, there will be incentive for them to desist. If
violations continue to accumulate, then maybe the treaty isn't really
worth having and it's time to threaten abrogation. But it's hard to
generalize; each incident has to be dealt with in its own context.
Nevertheless, pursuing treaties may save us, whereas I am firmly
convinced that building arsenals will ultimately do us in. -Don
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 7 Jul 1986 14:20 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Treaty Compliance
From: DonSmith.PA at Xerox.COM
If one responds to incremental violations by making a lot of bad press
for the violator, there will be incentive for them to desist. If
violations continue to accumulate, then maybe the treaty isn't really
worth having and it's time to threaten abrogation.
I think that the current Administration would argue that the paragraph
above describes exactly what it has been doing. Do you disagree with
the Administration's actions on SALT II and the ABM Treaty?
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 8 Jul 86 13:26 PDT
From: DonSmith.PA@Xerox.COM
Subject: Re: Treaty Compliance
I'm sure that's what the Administration would argue. However, aside
from the Siberian radar, I am wary of the credibility of the laundry
list of violations that have been cited over recent years. From the
Soviet perspective, our SDI hardware demonstrations must look like
violations of ABM rather than "research". What disturbs me is the
Administration's apparent lack of interest in the negotiating process.
We have received many recent proposals from the Soviets, in stark
contrast to their past posture, yet we have for the most part ignored
them or ridiculed them. Are they sincere or just propeganda ploys?
There's only one way to find out, and that is to take them up and test
them. Why don't we?
------------------------------
Subject: Treaty Compliance
Date: Tue, 08 Jul 86 12:17:35 -0800
From: "Karen E. Wieckert" <wieckert@ICSE.UCI.EDU>
This is in response to the recent submissions by Don Smith and Herb Lin. In
particular, questions of how to proceed when suspected treaty violations
have occured.
I recently attended a talk by Raymond L. Garthoff, a negotiator on SALT I.
In the talk, he gave the USSR's compliance record a 9 on a scale of 10,
where 10 is full compliance, and the US's record a 9 on a scale of 10, which
he amends to a 5 with SDI. (As an aside, he pointed out that in US courts,
the Reagan Administration's announcement of SDI can be taken as intent to
break a contract - in this case the ABM Treaty.)
Regarding violations by the USSR, although Garthoff agreed that the
Krasnoyarsk radar is a violation, he gave a justification for it. In
particular, he noted that given a map of the USSR and it's existing radar
systems, one will see a large gaping hole on the eastern side. Garthoff
submits that we have known all along that they would need to plug up this
hole. To comply with the 150 mile border limit, which is approximately the
borders permitted now under the ABM, would probably require two radars,
including one in the tundra in Siberia. He also noted that the Soviets have
already built radars in the tundra and it was terribly difficult. The
Krasnoyarsk radar has 120 degree span to the east, so he suggests that they
are trying to plug up the hole in the easiest way.
Regarding the SS-25, another point that I am not sure has ever been brought
up on this list - I apologize if it has. The Soviets, after nine years of
not testing the missile, conducted an SS-13 test, supposedly so we could
calibrate more accurately the throwweight of an SS-13. Very little has been
said by the administration about this test.
However, the important point he stressed is the use of the Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC) to deal with issues such as ``nibbling around
the edges'', misinterpretation, differing needs, partial non-compliance,
etc. He gave the above interpretation of the need for the Krasnoyarsk radar
as an example of something that we could acknowledge and subsequently iron
out in the SCC, if the administration was interested in ironing these things
out. I believe there are many in the current administration who seem
uninterested in agreements, discussions, negotiations, etc with the USSR,
and view the SCC as a waste of time.
It is unfortunate that the ``method'' of the current administration seems to
be one of making accusations against the USSR - some fictional, some with
substance - while ignoring our own ``violations'' accompanied by basically
refusing to talk with the USSR. There seems to be limited abilities to put
themselves in the other guy's shoes.
ka:ren
------------------------------
Subject: Treaty Violations
Date: 08 Jul 86 12:13:10 PDT (Tue)
From: foy@aerospace.ARPA
There has been discussion on what to do when the USSR violates peripheral
parts of treaties. There is a formal mechanism for dealing with these issues
which has been used in the past, (prior to this administration), to the
satisfaction of all concerned. There is a Standing Cunsultive Commision which
was established as a result of one of the treaties. When one party claims
that the other party has violated the treaty it is sreferred to this committee.
The committee works the problem.
In the past when there have been issues, the committee has quietly got the
issues resolved. Most of the isssues arise because of ambiguities in the
treaty or interpretation. Some times the issues have been resolved by getting
the offending party to cease and desist what they were doing. Sometimes it has
been resolved by clarification of the situation.
The opinions expressed are my own and do not reflect the opinion of my
employer.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 7 Jul 86 12:34 PDT
From: DonSmith.PA@Xerox.COM
Subject: Preparing for war
I recently stated "When you prepare for war, war is what you will get.",
and Henry Spencer complained "Historically this is not necessarily true,
and I wish people would stop citing it as a fundamental axiom." Perhaps
he would feel better if I had said "... are LIKELY to get." The point
is, we have limited resources, and we can put them into stockpiling
weapons or into learning how to understand each other. To the extent
that we do the former, we reduce both the will and the resources to do
the latter; and to the extent that we do the latter, we reduce the need
to do the former. I contend that we now spend about 90% on weapons and
10% on understanding (DoD vs. State Department, Peace Corps, and all
that) and that our chances of global survival would be dramatically
increased if the proportions were reversed.
------------------------------
From: Eugene miya <eugene@ames-aurora.arpa>
Date: 7 Jul 1986 1519-PDT (Monday)
Subject: Sensor technology and disinformation
As the person who started the SDI sensor technology question which
has had a couple of follow ons to Arms-d, permit me to make one comment
and raise one question which Charlie Crummer@aerospace only alludes.
[Peter you may edit this from RISKS]: IR technology despite advances
in sensor technology cannot get around the "3 body, hidden object"
problem. Given a sensor and a target, if an intervening "warmer object"
passes in between, the target disappears. This is an azimuth ambiguity.
It sound trivial, but it is not, especially when the intervening object
might be air (which does have temperature), or a mist, or other
non-massive-solid. My intent is only to point this out, not some IR remote
sensing.
Second, the Administration has stated a policy of disinformation with
regard to SDI and letters denouncing such have appeared in Aviation Week.
My question is: if we as scientists announce something as "disinformation"
as one of Charlie's comments, what are all of the consequences?
I can think of several including counter-announcements, the usual
financial thumbscrews to funding agencies, Ellsberg type operations,
and so forth. Problem is this is not a leak of information, and it's
not clear to me that the SDIO can persecute this like espionage cases.
Is Charlie irresponsible for revealing disinformation? Are we as
scientists expected to maintain disinformation? Also, disinformation
in the past has been known to backfire (another risk?).
Again the usual disclaimer that these are the opinions of the individual
and not my employer, and STAR WARS is a trademark of Lucasfilm, Ltd.
despite what courts say.
From the Rock of Ages Home for Retired Hackers:
--eugene miya
NASA Ames Research Center
eugene@ames-aurora.ARPA
"You trust the `reply' command with all those different mailers out there?"
{hplabs,hao,dual,ihnp4,decwrl,allegra,tektronix,menlo70}!ames!aurora!eugene
------------------------------
From: decvax!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.berkeley.edu
Date: Tue, 8 Jul 86 19:00:28 edt
Subject: Re: SDI and the ICBM threat
> The difference is that the residents of Atlantic City understood the
> imperfect nature of the defenses their tax dollars were buying. They
> were not promised that airplanes could provide an impenetrable shield
> against battleships. In comparison, consider Casper W. Weinbergers claims,
> as reported in the New York Times, July 2, 1986. In this article the
> secretary of defense claims that SDI will eventually protect 'the
> entire population of the United States against attack by nuclear
> missles'...
So when the Navy says it will protect us against battleships, this is
understood to be imperfect protection, but if DoD says it will protect
us against ICBMs, they mean it literally and we are to assume 100.0000%
effectiveness is being implicitly promised? Give it a rest. The only
fair way to evaluate SDI is to apply the same standards as are applied
to other forms of defense. That is, when somebody says "X protects us
against Y", that implies extensive protection but not perfection. Just
what constitutes "extensive protection" against ICBMs (personally I don't
mind 10 warheads getting through but would object to 1000) and just how
likely SDI is to achieve it is a different question. Far too much of the
anti-SDI rhetoric scores "crucial" points by assuming that SDI must be
held to far stricter standards than any other defence system, and in
particular that Reagan's comments about making nuclear weapons obsolete
must be taken ABSOLUTELY LITERALLY in any assessment of feasibility.
If it had been, say, Richard Garwin talking about some conventional
weapons system, everybody would agree that "A makes B obsolete" was a
vague statement *not* promising that all concerns about B would vanish.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 9 Jul 86 1:22:37 CDT
From: "Kurt F. Sauer" <ks%a.cs.okstate.edu@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: The Minimum Emergency-Essential Communications Network
>>Today, much of the backbone of MEECN has shifted back
>>to High-Frequency (HF) systems, because of its ability to
>>work in a nuclear environment.
>HF is subject to nuclear blackout; that can last up to several hours.
>I think the statement is incorrect for other reasons as well.
The phenomenon of "nuclear blackout" is a transient phenomenon and is not
uniform among source regions. To wit, once a system GEP is "destroyed," it
requires replacement before it becomes usable. E-layer disruption does not
necessitate equipment replacement. Chirpsounders and other pieces of equip-
ment can also help MEECN operators determine MUF, LUF, and FOT information.
What are the other reasons?
>>And what is the relationship of strategic nuclear forces (the so-called
>>SIOP forces), and non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF)? Do NSNF stay in
>>reserve only for post-SIOP use, and do they use the same loop of connect-
>>ivity that SIOP forces use?
>SIOP forces are centrally controlled and directed; targets are
>selected directly by the NCA. NSNF are under the control of the
>theater commander. The NCA must authorize the theater commander to
>fire nukes, but it is unlikely that the NCA would select specific
>targets for the NSNF.
>NSNF would most likely be used BEFORE the SIOP forces were used. The
>connectivity to them is must more tenuous, because NSNF are integrated
>with other, non-nuclear forces, and C2 to them is much more difficult.
Are there other types of NSNFs? In a SIOP-directed scenario the NCA can
authorize certain 'packages' of nuclear weapons for regional release. But
are certain (probably CONUS-located, but not necessarily so) weapons held
in a 'post-strategic' reserve for post-SIOP use? That seems to be the jist
of PD-59, what with the idea of protracted warfighting and all.
If this is the case, is there a term for NSNFs to differentiate ones which
can be SELREL and ones which are 'held back'?
Kurt F. Sauer
Tulsa, Oklahoma
Internet: ks@a.cs.okstate.edu
UUCP: ks@svo.uucp
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 9 Jul 1986 11:34 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: The Minimum Emergency-Essential Communications Network
From: Kurt F. Sauer <ks%a.cs.okstate.edu at CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
>>Today, much of the backbone of MEECN has shifted back
>>to High-Frequency (HF) systems, because of its ability to
>>work in a nuclear environment.
>HF is subject to nuclear blackout; that can last up to several hours.
>I think the statement is incorrect for other reasons as well.
The phenomenon of "nuclear blackout" is a transient phenomenon and is not
uniform among source regions.
True. But MEECN is intended to provide reliable communications, and
MEECN is shifting AWAY from HF, as the central role of the EHF MILSTAR
in the strategic C3 network will illustrate when it is deployed.
(MILSTAR is also my "other reason".)
Are there other types of NSNFs?
I don't quite understand the question. NSNF are theater nuclear
weapons. SNF (strategic nuclear forces) are by definition the bombers
(and air-launched cruise missiles), ICBM, SLBM; all other nukes are
NSNF.
In a SIOP-directed scenario the NCA can
authorize certain 'packages' of nuclear weapons for regional release.
False. The NCA can order the SNF to attack a certain region, but they
are under central control. There are SIOP options for that, but they
involve the SNF only. Indeed, the NATO Nuclear Operations Plan is
coordinated with the SIOP, so that conflicts in targeting don't occur.
..But
are certain (probably CONUS-located, but not necessarily so) weapons held
in a 'post-strategic' reserve for post-SIOP use?
Post-SIOP use is not the same thing as "after the initial exchange".
The nuclear SLCMs are regarded as a strategic reserve, as are the
SSBNs (in some ways).
... is there a term for NSNFs to differentiate ones which
can be SELREL and ones which are 'held back'?
Not to my knowledge. There are forces designated as a strategic
reserve, and there are those forces that might be used selectively,
both during initial and follow-on exchanges.
------------------------------
End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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