ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) (01/08/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Tuesday, January 7, 1986 5:50PM
Volume 6, Issue 12.1
Today's Topics:
McGrath on politicians
Soviet offensive strategy
Re: Book Review
Automatic weapons
Re: Testing SDI
Re: Another SDI Problem
"deltufo%d"@lll-mfe.arpa
Re: Re: KAL007
Putting a Man into the Loop
The Goal of SDI
Politicians
Aversion to Nuclear War
Soviet Defense
more carriers in action
international law
More on Soviet Defense
Soviet Defense
request for hostile reviewer
Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V6 #10.2
cybernetic process
Congressional lying
KAL007 Mission
cybernetic process
WWI,WWII & Beyond War
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Date: 6 Jan 1986 18:46-EST
From: Nicholas.Spies@H.CS.CMU.EDU
Subject: McGrath on politicians
Jim McGrath writes: "... Rather, the fault lies with the
voters. Unlike many of my friends in the social sciences, I do
not concentrate on the "oughts" of the world. I focus on the
empirical evidence. Perhaps it is the scientist in me."
Perhaps the fault (for the less-than-ingenuous quality of
politicians) should also be laid on the shoulders of those
scientists who feel that because of the "fact" that the
political system "...punishes frank and honest talk about some
issues..." that it is not worth the bother to "...waste time
decrying it" because of not being able to "... change human
nature".
Why are so many scientists able to offer their "objective
views" while losing sight of the political implications of
their views or even acknowledge that the latter exist? C'on
Faust, WHY did you sell your soul to the Devil anyway? (And
why is the rest of the world's population hanging on your
every word as we travel down the road to a high-tech death?)
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 86 17:11:26 pst
From: Gary Chapman <PARC-CSLI!chapman@glacier>
Subject: Soviet offensive strategy
Re Jeff Miller's note that the Soviet Union started a deep-strike, offensive
force structure before NATO: I am aware of the OMG's; they came into existence
about 1976, just about the same time the United States started reevaluating its
strategic doctrine in Western Europe. But Soviet OMG's are not, to my knowledge
part of a full strategic realignment. They are tactical units that are assigned
a particular mission that corresponds roughly to the deep-strike missions now
assigned to NATO units. When Airland Battle came on line (and it's not Airland
Battle 2000, by the way--that's a different bird altogether; the original name
for FM 100-5 was Airland Battle, now changed to Army 20), the military started
a top-to-bottom rethinking of its strategic concepts. Now the U.S. Army trains
specifically in deep-strike tactics in the periodic Reforger exercises in
Western Europe. Again, to my knowledge, there is no comparable change in Soviet
strategic thinking.
------------------------------
Date: Mon 6 Jan 86 17:36:39-PST
From: Jim McGrath <J.JPM@LOTS-B>
Subject: Re: Book Review
From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.berkeley.edu
Jim McGrath quotes the following as part of the conclusions from "Hawks,
Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War":
> 10 Reduce reliance on nuclear deterrence over the long term.
> DO assume that nuclear deterrence will last forever.
> DON'T intensify the search for alternatives to deterrence.
Did those sub-points get reversed, or am I missing something subtle?
Of course, you are right - the sense should be reversed. (They listed
all of the other nine recommendations in the DO then DON'T order, and
reversed on the last one - and I was too tired to catch it at the
time).
Jim
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 86 17:30:18 pst
From: Gary Chapman <PARC-CSLI!chapman@glacier>
Subject: Automatic weapons
I'm not as fluent in military history as some people here are, but I always
thought we started giving every soldier a fully automatic weapon because they
would do a job semi-automatics don't do. Fully automatic weapons are more
effective in the jungle, for example, and it was in the South Pacific during
World War II that the use of Thompson submachine guns became widespread. During
Korea, there was little need for fully automatic weapons, and a greater need for
the accuracy of semi-automatics; consequently, few troops in Korea had full
automatics. In Vietnam, we returned to the full automatic because of the
presence of jungle--but the use of "rock n' roll," as we called the full auto
position, was highly discouraged. It was terribly inaccurate and wasted ammu-
nition like crazy.
In Vietnam there was for some people a thing about carrying exotic automatic
weapons like Swedish K's, Uzis and even Thompsons. But for people who wanted to
come home in one piece, there was a very-unexotic weapon of choice: the M-14.
It's full automatic mode wasn't very impressive, and it was heavy, but it was
10 times more accurate than the M-16, unbelievably reliable, and it could fire
the same rounds as an AK-47, which meant if you found enemy ammo caches you
could use theirs.
Also, about firing: a good friend of mine, a company commander in Vietnam,
told me that his best achievement in the war was that he never drew his weapon.
And this guy was in the soup, believe it--he was a company commander in the
1st Expeditionary Force in the Marines, the first conventional line unit in
'Nam. Anyone who knows about command on the front line knows that NOT drawing
your weapon is something to be extraordinarily proud of. The WORST thing you
could have happen to you, what would've scared the bejeesus out of me, would be
to be in a trench with some pie-eyed slobbering FNG who was melting his barrel
with fully automatic fire. I would have immediately known he wasn't hitting
anything and he was only spraying the grass and trees out of pure fear. Not
something to instill confidence and keep you going...
------------------------------
Date: Mon 6 Jan 86 18:01:12-PST
From: Jim McGrath <J.JPM@LOTS-A>
Subject: Re: Testing SDI
From: Paul Dietz <dietz%slb-doll.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Actually, testing even the midcourse and terminal phases of a BMD
system is not likely to be fully practical... (Many points follow)
You are, of course, correct. It is NEVER possible to fully test ANY
system until it is actually used in battle (and even then it can fail
in future battles). My point was more that SDI (always excepting
boost phase) could be tested according to the same type of standards
we currently use to test other complex weapon systems (or computer
systems, etc...). That is, the SDI testing problem is indeed a
problem, but not one radically different from those that have already
been encountered (and "solved"), or those likely to be encountered in
the future. Thus attention should be focused on HOW to do the tests,
not on decrying that the testing problem is somehow inherently
impossible to solve.
Jim
------------------------------
End of Arms-Discussion Digest
*****************************ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (07/10/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Thursday, July 10, 1986 10:24AM
Volume 6, Issue 121
Today's Topics:
Administrivia
emotional non-factual poem by some random uncommon woman
specific people devoid of feeling and causing world destruction
Treaty Compliance
alternatives to "yet more hardware" for defense
Early US ASAT Projects
SDI and the ICBM threat
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 1986 10:23 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Administrivia
No Digest will follow for 10 days after this.. I'm out of town.
Also, my mailer will not recognize SUN.ARPA, and so at least
dirk%words is not getting the Digest.
------------------------------
Date: 1986 July 08 11:16:47 PST (=GMT-8hr)
From: Robert Elton Maas <REM%IMSSS@SU-AI.ARPA>
Subject:emotional non-factual poem by some random uncommon woman
>Date: Fri, 27 Jun 86 09:55:40 PDT
>From: wild@SUN.COM (Will Doherty)
>Subject: Let every woman
>One arms control perspective I don't see very often is that
>of most of the women I know. So I'm posting this poem, which
>was written soon after former President Jimmy Carter announced
>his intention to register women as well as men for the draft.
You seem to be implying this poem expresses the general opinion of
most women. I believe that is misleading, rather the poem is merely
one woman's opinion, and a rather radical uncommon womman to boot.
>Our children and the children of the Viet Namese women
>are born malformed.
Please name one American woman who has children born malformed due to
the VietNam war. Sure there are American women with malformed
children, but it is because they smoked or drank or had measles during
pregnancy, or because they were too old or unhealthy, etc. I doubt
that woman who wrote that poem suffered malformed children because of
any military act, much less "most women" having such experience.
Emotionalism is fine for firing up the emotions, but it shouldn't be
confused with reality. I therefore exercise my privilege of pointing
out the flaws in the poem and in your presentation. Your rebuttal on
my points welcome if I have made an error.
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 9 Jul 86 12:00:10 PDT
From: wild@SUN.COM (Will Doherty)
Subject: specific people devoid of feeling and causing world destruction
From: Robert Elton Maas <REM%IMSSS@SU-AI.ARPA>
Subject: emotional non-factual poem by some random uncommon woman
[From the poem:]
>Our children and the children of the Viet Namese women
>are born malformed.
Please name one American woman who has children born malformed due to
the VietNam war. Sure there are American women with malformed
children, but it is because they smoked or drank or had measles during
pregnancy, or because they were too old or unhealthy, etc. I doubt
that woman who wrote that poem suffered malformed children because of
any military act, much less "most women" having such experience.
First of all, I'm quoting a poem written by someone else, therefore
I don't claim to know the sources of the information of the writer.
But in any case, I believe the writer is referring to the possible
genetic deformities caused by the good ol' USA dropping Agent Orange
"defoliant" on the Vietnamese and on our own troops and support
personnel.
>Date: Fri, 27 Jun 86 09:55:40 PDT
>From: wild@SUN.COM (Will Doherty)
>Subject: Let every woman
>One arms control perspective I don't see very often is that
>of most of the women I know. So I'm posting this poem, which
>was written soon after former President Jimmy Carter announced
>his intention to register women as well as men for the draft.
You seem to be implying this poem expresses the general opinion of
most women. I believe that is misleading, rather the poem is merely
one woman's opinion, and a rather radical uncommon womman to boot.
I said specifically "most of the women I know," making no claims on
the majority of women, although I would bet that the majority of women
worldwide have a more emotional outlook on war than the majority of
men, probably because most cultures permit and encourage more emotion
on the part of women.
To remove emotion from the dialogue of arms control is to remove any reason
for stopping war. For war means death of loved ones. When people get
removed from the *fact* that war means death of loved ones, and from the
*emotion* that the death of loved ones, or anyone for that matter, is
something reprehensible, then they (or should I say we) go off and do the
things that cause the wars and the death to happen.
Emotionalism is fine for firing up the emotions, but it shouldn't be
confused with reality. I therefore exercise my privilege of pointing
out the flaws in the poem and in your presentation. Your rebuttal on
my points welcome if I have made an error.
In my opinion, emotions are a necessary and vital part of reality.
Consider yourself rebutted.
Will Doherty
"oscar!wild"@sun.com
...!sun!oscar!wild
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 9 Jul 1986 15:33 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Treaty Compliance
I grant the skepticism about the Administration's list of violations.
But assume that some charges of violations were true, just for the
sake of argument. What would the U.S. do under those circumstances,
and what should it do?
------------------------------
Date: 9 Jul 86 14:36:00 PST
From: "143C::ESTELL" <estell%143c.decnet@nwc-143b.ARPA>
Subject: alternatives to "yet more hardware" for defense
Reply-To: "143C::ESTELL" <estell%143c.decnet@nwc-143b.ARPA>
I would like to pose the following problem:
You are assigned the task of arranging personal security for a number of
internationally known people, each of whom will separately tour several
major cities - New York, London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, Moscow, Cairo,
Tripoli, Johannesburg, Bagdad, Tokyo, Bombay, Sidney, Buenos Aires, and
Mexico City, among others.
The list of dignitaries you must guard includes The Pope, Billy Graham,
Mother Theresa, Dr. Jonas Salk, Dr. Edward Teller, Mr. Reagan, and last
but not least, Mr. Gorbachev.
I would conjecture that you would have to be more concerned with those near
the end of that list, than those nearer the beginning. For whatever reason,
I believe there are more people - rational or not - who would mean harm to
our President and his USSR counterpart, than to the "healers" of the world.
This opens a discussion of "non physical defenses" as one [of several]
possible augmentations - or even alternatives - to "yet more hardware."
I have often wondered in my non-professional way WHY we pay American farmers
to NOT grow foods, when it seems that much of the world needs food. [I say
"non professional" because perhaps if I were an economist or such I would
know the answer.]
But it seems to me that America could spend more of its R&D budget towards
making other lands more productive of grains, and towards "farming" oceans;
and that we could encourage our farmers to grow all they can; and sell that
to whomever. I believe, at least optimistically, if not naively, that only
madmen "bit the hand that feeds them." And I claim that there is little
rational defense that one can devise against madmen; eternal vigilence -
and reasonable force - are the price of liberty from madmen. [That's why
we can never TOTALLY disarm; and we have our fair share of them in the USA
(some criminals are madmen).] [We DO spend some R&D on farming; maybe it
should be more, and SDI, as presently touted, less?]
It makes little sense to me [a country boy] for America to try to supply
arms to the world; it makes even less sense to me [a lover, not a fighter
- except when cornered!] for America to try to "police" the world;
e.g., by "exporting democracy" by military means. [It's worth remembering
that our Founding Fathers developed a kind of plutocracy, in that only
landed men could vote; and most wealth then was associated with control of
land. Only as we developed an educated middle class did our present
democracy flourish; and even now that leads to lots of votes for "handouts"
(of many kinds, the more expensive, sometimes the less obvious) that at
bottom assume that "the government" can give us something for nothing.]
However, it does make sense for America to be a major supplier of RENEWABLE
consumables to the world; e.g., food grains, and knowledge. If we repro-
grammed much of our national R&D in those directions, while still not
neglecting R&D for defense, would we be an "enemy" to very many nations?
I think not. Individuals, probably; but peoples, probably not.
That's why I believe that SDI R&D should emphazise systems fit only for
defense, not useful for attack. To use ancient terms, build a better
shield, not a better sword. I don't think this philosophy is contrary to
DOD goals; after all, in '47 we renamed it the "Defense Department."
[Before that, it was called the "War Department."]
Bob
The foregoing opinions are mine,
and may not reflect the opinions of my employer.
------------------------------
From: ucdavis!lll-crg!seismo!ihuxl!dcn@ucbvax.berkeley.edu
Date: Wed, 9 Jul 86 23:48:50 EDT
Subject: Early US ASAT Projects
Calsphere: launch vehicle Thor/Burner 2, October 1964
The Calsphere program is reported to have been a series of at least five
small spacecraft developed jointly by the US Air Force and US Navy to be
used to destroy enemy satellites. Though details remain classified, at
least one successful test is reported to have taken place.
Squanto Terror: launch vehicle Thor, March 1964
With its particulary fearsome code name, the Squanto Terror program (Air
Force project 437) was the first known serious attempt by the US Air Force
to develop a practical antisatellite capability. The system involved Thor
launched spacecraft carrying nuclear explosives that could knock out enemy
spacecraft by direct contact or concussion. They were losely based on an
October 1962 USAF/AEC test, code named Starfish, in which a nuclear weapon
test was conducted in outer space. In the Starfish test, it was noted that
high energy particles, driven at high speed by the nuclear explosion, damaged
or destoyed the systems of many satellites in the vicinity. The early Squanto
Terror tests were extremely successful, with dummy warheads coming within a
mile of their targets. By 1965, after only three tests, Squanto Terror was
declared operational. A total of 16 test launches, all from Johnston Island
in the Pacific, were conducted by the time the test concluded in 1968.
Meanwhile a 1967 treaty was signed that banned nuclear weapons from space,
and by 1975 the Johnston Island launch facility had been put out of service.
[From the Encyclopedia of US Spacecraft, 1985]
Dave Newkirk, ihnp4!ihuxl!dcn
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 1986 10:22 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: SDI and the ICBM threat
From: decvax!utzoo!henry at ucbvax.berkeley.edu
So when the Navy says it will protect us against battleships, this is
understood to be imperfect protection, but if DoD says it will protect
us against ICBMs, they mean it literally and we are to assume 100.0000%
effectiveness is being implicitly promised?
I beg to differ, but the Navy never said it would protect the
population against battleships. The difference between most
conventional weaponry and strategic nuclear missiles is that the
former are aimed at each other, while the latter are aimed at people.
It is tolerable to have less than perfect defense against other
weapons, if you are trying to protect weapons. It isn't if you're
trying to protect people.
... Far too much of the
anti-SDI rhetoric scores "crucial" points by assuming that SDI must be
held to far stricter standards than any other defence system..
If DoD said the goal of SDI were only to protect missiles, none of
this nonsense about perfect defense would be relevant. But they are
the ones who started it, and are trying to sneak their real goals in
under that cover.
...personally I don't
mind 10 warheads getting through but would object to 1000...
I think it was McGeorge Bundy that said that 10 warheads on a modern
city would be a catastrophe beyond human comprehension, and even one
warhead would be a political blunder never before seen in human
history.
I think 10 warheads would be utterly intolerable.
------------------------------
End of Arms-Discussion Digest
*****************************