ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) (01/08/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Tuesday, January 7, 1986 5:50PM
Volume 6, Issue 12.3
Today's Topics:
See #12.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 86 22:34:15 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Politicians
From: Jim McGrath <J.JPM at Epic>
Besides, complaints that politicians are lying do not sit well
with me. Of course they are lying. WE WANT THEM TO LIE.
Politicians who tell the truth get kicked out of office....
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
So you condone lying to the public as a tool of public policy?
How would you like to acknowledge that publically in a letter to
the NY Times? Don't forget to add that you support SDI, and that
truth doesn't matter when you try to justify a weapon system --
never mind what it actually does. We can say that we will spend
millions of dollars on AIDS research since that will save lives,
and spend the money instead on nerve gas, which will also help to
eliminate AIDS (by killing homosexual soldiers).
You are arguing from emotion (almost hysterically), not reason, which
I do not expect of you. I stated a fact: public officials must lie on
many (not all) issues in order to retain office...
This is one thing that everyone,
no matter what their policy perspective, agrees on (this comes from
several graduate seminars, and personal experience).
You are evading my AIDS research analogy. Maybe you want to comment
on my last msg about immortality too. These examples aren't made
faceitously -- rather, they do reflect in my view valid analogies. I
do expect a certain amount of misleading the public, but not at the
level that is happening now.
Sorry; I believe that elected leaders have a responsibility to
tell the truth to the public, and to educate them away from fairy
tales. I would rather see precious defense dollars go to create
good anti-tank weapons; that would have some chance of improving
extended deterrence.
Come on now. Leaders can only lead where people are, ultimately,
willing to go.
Leaders have a responsibility to educate; they are paid to take the
heat, and they should do so.
Just look at the nuclear freeze movement. This is the
level at which the public thinks of nuclear war when it is forced to
think.
Some of us believe the freeze was serious arms control, for which a
good case could be made. I agree that many feeezeniks didn't know
what they were talking about, but that doesn't reduce the utility of a
freeze. Moreover, the Administration never engaged the arguments the
freeze made.
Finally, your last sentence shows that you missed my entire point.
Congress (i.e. the people) will not budget for the necessary increases
in conventional weapons (let alone the Europeans). Ultimately it does
not matter what you or I like, it is what the people will accept.
Nonsense. Most people also believe that the defense budget is mostly
nuclear. You can't really make a persuasive case that the "people"
understand why we need 15 attack carriers, to take the most expensive
single example. There is no particular reason that the "people" would
even notice one carrier battle group more or less. Yet that would
mean $18 B more for military R&D.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 86 22:34:34 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Aversion to Nuclear War
From: Jim McGrath <J.JPM at Epic>
Great. Uncertainties reduce the incentive to launch a first strike.
That is exactly what we want. It is only when one side KNOWS that it
is better to strike first that it rationally will do so.
Yet you quoted Hawks/Doves/Owls, whose primary point is that rational
action often plays little role in escalation dynamics.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 86 22:41:24 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Soviet Defense
From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TEI 4675 <jmiller at apg-1>
However, I still don't accept any description of the Soviet armed
forces as being purely defensive.
I don't either. My question to you is "how are they not defensive?"
I notice that no one addressed my point about GRU interest in the road
infrastructure of W. Europe.
I'd expect them to be interested in it. Are you suggesting that
Western intelligence doesn't care about the road infrastructure in E.
Eurpoe? I can think of good reasons for each to have it, such as
wanting to disrupt second echelons/reinforcements.
ONE discussion on Soviet strength in Europe vs NATO drew a response
that NATO forces' numerical inferiority was deceptive because of US
efforts in C3I and logistics. I can only say that, although our
systems are better, these are not anything new to the Red Army, which
is not the antiquarian dinosaur many believe.
This was mine, and my point said nothing about Soviet forces. Why
don't we take credit for C3 and logistics if we think we will they
will help? Why isn't there a comparison between our C3 and theirs in
terms of increasing combat effectiveness?
Another point was that
we shouldn't really count such non- combat troops as construction
engineers. A couple of points: Any soldier with a rifle is light
infantry.
Sorry; I was unclear. I didn't mean engineers, and I don't think I
said that. Rather, Soviet construction troops are analagous to the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, those wonderful fellows who build dams
here in the US. You are right about construction engineers.
Also it is quite incorrect to state that the Sovs strategy
specifically omits power projection (somebody argued this- I think).
Permanently "stationing" nuclear missile subs off your opponent's
shores as a demonstration is a projection device we've long practiced.
They, of course reciprocate.
For power projection in the sense of third world intervention, I am
right. For PP in the sense of strategic PP, you are right; I meant
the former.
The steaming of battle groups through
the Carribean surely counts.
Why? Against what land targets would their BG's be directed?
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 86 22:44:55 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: more carriers in action
From: ihnp4!ihuxl!dcn at ucbvax.berkeley.edu
Carriers are made to do more than protect themselves.
Good reasons have already been mentioned, although minor arguments
picked them to death.
The argument are hardly minor.
Their major role now is force
projection, which they do almost too well (can be very threatening to
see a nuke carrier off your coast).
Against the Sovs, hardly.
Fleet defense means more than
protecting the carrier, although that is implied. It also includes all
the smaller ships that can't defend themselves against large missile
attacks, subs or aircraft, such as supply ships, tankers, troop
carriers, etc. A shipping escort is a similar role, such as convoy
protection across the Atlantic.
CVBG's are not assigned to convoy escort, nor would the Navy ever
allow them to be used that way.
------------------------------
End of Arms-Discussion Digest
*****************************ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU.UUCP (07/21/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Sunday, July 20, 1986 10:25PM
Volume 6, Issue 123
Today's Topics:
SDI performance requirments - who said what?
SDI and the ICBM threat
propaganda query
Reducing the managerial risks in SDI
Secret government vaults
SDI and defense
Deformed children
abhorrence of war not necessary to avoid war
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Sat, 19 Jul 1986 11:11 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: SDI performance requirments - who said what?
From: jon at uw-june.arpa (Jon Jacky)
... How effective does it [SDI]
have to be? Complete this sentence: "SDI won't be worth building unless
it can stop at least X percent of the Soviet missile force."
Danny Graham has said that SDI would be worth building if it could
stop 20% of incoming missiles. SDIO has said that its definition of
"thoroughly reliable" is in the high 90's (or so an unclassified
briefing chart suggests).
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 19 Jul 1986 11:25 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: SDI and the ICBM threat
From: decvax!utzoo!henry at ucbvax.berkeley.edu
... Battleships were
primarily designed to fight other battleships, but they had a major
shore-bombardment role too. (In fact, most of the shots fired in anger
by US battleships in WW2 were against shore targets.)
But not against civilian targets.
> The difference between most
> conventional weaponry and strategic nuclear missiles is that the
> former are aimed at each other, while the latter are aimed at people.
My recollection is that a lot of the current strategic nuclear missiles
are at least supposedly aimed at each other. And conventional weapons
do/did a lot of civilian-bashing too.
Sorry; I was imprecise. I meant that nuclear missiles cannot be used
to defeat other nuclear missiles (except in the sense of a pre-emptive
strike). With conventional weapons, you can have a real battle
between forces; not so with strategic nuclear ones. That is the major
change of nuclear wars now -- you don't need to defeat the other guy's
military forces in order to kill his people.
> It is tolerable to have less than perfect defense against other
> weapons, if you are trying to protect weapons. It isn't if you're
> trying to protect people.
Considering that virtually every defense system in history -- for an
example, take British air defences circa 1940 -- has been imperfect, I
see not the slightest shred of justification for this.
The context of the discussion is nuclear weapons. You don't kill
millions of people in a short time with conventional weapons. In that
context, I stand by my statement.
... An imperfect
defence is intolerable only if you yourself happen to be on the receiving
end of that part of the attack that it didn't stop. The vast majority
of the population, i.e. the ones who got missed, will agree that it is
very valuable and not at all intolerable.
I think you might ask the Japanese survivors of WWII what they think
of nuclear weapons.
> I think it was McGeorge Bundy that said that 10 warheads on a modern
> city would be a catastrophe beyond human comprehension, and even one
> warhead would be a political blunder never before seen in human
> history.
This is rhetoric, not reasoning.
I agree. But it is quite illuminating, and should serve to remind you
what the implications are.
... By
several reasonable criteria, the First World War was a far worse
political blunder than a few warheads on one North American city would
be.
Please state the criteria.
... The later stages of World War II levelled virtually every German
and Japanese city almost as thoroughly as a warhead or two would; today
those two nations are among the world's greatest industrial powers.
Japan and Germany got help from the outside. In a nuclear war, there
will be no outside to help.
Ten warheads would be a disaster, yes... but it would be neither beyond
human comprehension nor beyond our ability to cope....
"Do not let the difference between `good' and `bad' blind you to the
difference between `bad' and `worse'."
I think this is the nub of the disagreement. The fundamental question
is whether or not the "badness" of nuclear war directed against
populations comes in different degrees. That's a value judgment. You
think it does; I think it does not. On questions of value, I don't
see any way of one of use converting the other.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 19 Jul 86 20:26:52 EDT
From: primer%h-ma1@harvard.HARVARD.EDU
Subject: propaganda query
A query: I am interested in any books or articles on nuclear weapons,
nuclear politics or nuclear strategy which meet the following
criteria:
1. Not particularly anti-nuclear.
2. Understandable to lay folk with only a high school education.
3. Written in the 1980's
I know of some books that meet one or another of these criteria; for
example, the Harvard Study Group's *Living with Nuclear Weapons* meets
criteria 1 and 3 but not 2, and the Ground Zero project's *Nuclear
War: What's in it for You?* meets 3 and probably 2, but I have doubts
about it meeting 1. The latter book is anti-nuclear because it omits
the many peace-time benefits of nuclear weapons which the Harvard
group chose to emphasize.
Scholarly books and articles in the foreign affairs journals I can
locate on my own, but that's not what this query is about. If in
doubt about this or my other criteria: send it along.
Please e-mail responses to primer@harvma1.BITNET or
primer@h-ma1.harvard.EDU.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 19 Jul 1986 23:29 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Reducing the managerial risks in SDI
[Forwarded from RISKS. Apologies if it has already appeared.]
From: 143C::ESTELL 16-JUN-1986 09:07
I offered some thoughts to RISKS which were reprinted in ARMS-D. I have
gotten some interesting feedback to those thoughts, which I would share.
First, let me thank you one and all for the character of your replies; they
have been cogent, courteous, and convincing. No hints whatsoever about
doubts of my intelligence or integrity - even by those adamantly opposed to
my point of view.
Let me summarize (and restate) my principle points:
1. SDI will roll on, at least until '89; i.e., the Reagan Admin. is firmly
committed to it. "Nature abhors a vacuum." Americans demand adequate
defense, while complaining of its cost [which is usually excessive].
Most groups [e.g., Common Cause] who have tried to stop MX et al have
offered no alternative; by default, that leaves us stockpiling weapons;
we already know that doesn't work; for it costs too much, raises the
balance of terror, and besides the USSR is getting ahead of us now.
2. You and I don't have the wherewithal to stop SDI; but perhaps we can
glean some benefits from it, especially if we work within the system;
e.g., to pursue compatible overall goals, BUT doing valuable things.
3. Bringing our traditional ["non SDI?"] defenses up to reasonable state-
of-technology is probably a good idea; e.g., using computers that
encourage good software practices, run efficiently, etc.
4. SDI does NOT equate to "ICBM defense."
You will search my earlier messages in vain for the term "ICBM."
I made it plain - or tried to - that ICBM's from the USSR [or wherever]
are [in MY opinion] less of a threat than less exotic weapons in the
hands of criminals/terrorists, of whatever race, religion, nationality.
Now to add some new points:
5. SDI need not cost as much as some fear it might. For example,
going to the moon in the '60's cost the USA nothing!
Miniaturization of electronics, and encapsulation for space led directly
to domestic products like the now common "pacemaker."
The DIFFERENCE between tax dollars paid by those wearing pacemakers, and
the "aid to their families" that would have been paid had those heart
patients died or been disabled, is more than $25 billion.
[Data from a CPA friend of mine.]
6. An adequate defense MUST be one that we can afford; and I don't mean by
ignoring the deficit, and spending billions just because that's do-able.
Example: Why are we dismantling Trident subs, while still more funds
go to "MX?" Trident IS MX - demonstrated, workable, paid for. If a
particular sub becomes obsolete [like some old computers I mentioned],
then replace it; but what's the need for "mobile silos on rails?"
Common sense tells me that there IS a good reason; security regs probably
tell WHY I don't know that reason; but Murphy's Law suggest that maybe,
just maybe, it's the "military-industrial complex" going after profit.
That's NOT necessarily bad; it's "free enterprise." But that choice is
not necessarily optimum, either. That's why our debate is valuable.
7. Advances in computer technology made in pursuit of SDI can be applied to
other problems; e.g., crime prevention. I'm arguing that reliable real-
time networks, intelligent "signature recognition" systems, and other
digital "tools" can help us intercept dope traffic, as well as ICBM's.
8. Last, but certainly not least, if this work is to be done, it can either
be done by the "best and the brightest" or by technocrats and bureaucrats
in government, industry, and academia. If that happens, if the best do
not rise to the challenge, then I guarantee that the costs will be much
higher than necessary, and the results much lower than deisrable.
But if we do take the opportunity, then we can use the managers' short
term interests to an advantage; i.e., we can honestly say that "Star
Wars" [R2D2 et al] is not possible today; and then diligently work to
produce what is reasonable. Many managers [in government and elsewhere]
will go along with that incremental progress, because it IS a "bird in
the hand." Indeed, Mr. Reagan is reputed to lead by concept rather than
in detail; so let's supply him the details, rather than abandon that
task to the technocrats - of whatever stripe.
This argument is all the more relevant in light of recent observations
that Challenger failed for managerial reasons, not [just] technical ones.
If the best managers neglect SDI to bureaucrats, then decisions will be
less than optimum; if the best scientists neglect SDI to technocrats,
then even the best decision makers will be hamstrung by second-rate sys-
tems. Our only hope is to marshall our best minds, then evolve SDI.
Finally, to state a position. Some readers have [tried to] guess which side
of SDI I'm on; most have been wrong. That's because I won't take a side, as
the question is presently posed; viz., am I for or against the President's
SDI program? That's too close to "have I stopped beating my wife?" A complex
question defies a simple answer. I'm FOR adequate, affordable, ethical
defense; I don't believe that SDI, as presented in the popular press, is THE
answer. Unlike some readers, I have no direct source of information about
what Mr. Reagan and Mr. Weinberger REALLY think; I only have the press
summary of their summary of closed sessions in the Pentagon and White House.
That's third-hand information. And, I assert again, we must begin with a
land-based system; that minimizes the costs, reduces the technical risks,
and causes the least threat because such a system could not be used
offensively.
Bob Estell
p.s. The opinions above are not necessarily shared by any other person or
any organization, real or imaginary.
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 20 Jul 86 01:16:45 pdt
From: Steve Walton <ametek!walton@csvax.caltech.edu>
Subject: Secret government vaults
Jan Steinman writes:
>>Please name one American woman who has children born malformed due to
>>the VietNam war.
>
>
>These things are not easy to come by, and are routinely supressed by
>the government. Although not pertaining to the Viet Nam War, see
>"Killing Our Own" for documentary evidence collected by responsible
>journalists about the damage done to many Americans of all ages by
>radioactivity, including deformed babies in Utah downwind of nuclear
>weapons tests, and an estimated 260 excess infant deaths in the
>Harrisburg area during the TMI accident. I would not be suprised if
>the VA has deep in its vaults complaints from mothers of deformed
>children. Of course, each file is stamped "TOP SECRET".
Do we really believe that the government which couldn't keep the Pentagon
Papers out of the NY Times has squirreled away files documenting deaths of
babies due to government-approved releases of radiation into the atmosphere?
Personally, I think aliens stored in a freezer at Wright Patterson AFB is
more probable. Seriously, the amount of radiation which Harrisburg was
exposed to as a result of the TMI release was much less than the residents
of Denver are exposed to due to their altitude and the natural radioactives
in the local granite. I doubt very much that even 1, let alone 260 baby
deaths can be attributed to TMI. Remember that in the Middle Ages every
stillbirth, malformation, and disease which coincided with the appearance
of a comet was blamed on said comet.
On the other subject, that of Agent Orange, the Wall Street Journal claimed
in an editorial on Friday June 18 that, after the out-of-court settlement
in the class action suit was reached, it came out that the judge who had
read the pretrial depositions of both sides didn't think that plaintiffs
had enough evidence to even warrant a jury trial, let alone prove harm.
Steve Walton, Ametek Computer Research Division
ametek!walton@csvax.caltech.edu
(affiliation for information only)
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 20 Jul 86 01:32:34 pdt
From: Steve Walton <ametek!walton@csvax.caltech.edu>
Subject: SDI and defense
Henry Spencer has been maintaining in the last few digests that SDI opponents
are making a very weak argument when they insist on holding SDI to much
stricter standards than other forms of defense. For example, in Arms-D
V6 #122 he says:
>Considering that virtually every defense system in history -- for an
>example, take British air defences circa 1940 -- has been imperfect, I
>see not the slightest shred of justification for this. An imperfect
>defence is intolerable only if you yourself happen to be on the receiving
>end of that part of the attack that it didn't stop. The vast majority
>of the population, i.e. the ones who got missed, will agree that it is
>very valuable and not at all intolerable.
A 90% effective defense would allow 3,000 warheads through, which I
think we all agree would effectively destroy the US as a functional
entity, although it might not kill absolutely everyone. This doesn't
count SLBMs, ALCMs, bombers, and so on, which the current SDI effort
ignores. Paul Nitze has made the case that SDI must be "cost
effective at the margin," meaning that it must cost us less to add new
defenses than it costs our opponent to add new offenses. This is a
sufficiently stringent criterion that the pro-SDI people are tryiung
to back away from it with statements like, "If we can afford it, we
should build it." (Weinberger, as quoted in the June issue of Time
magazine which featured SDI on the cover). In the case of
battleships, we can build a LOT of airplanes for what a battleship
would cost today, and so battleship defense meets Nitze's criterion.
We who oppose SDI insist on holding it to a stringent criterion because
its proponents do.
Steve Walton, Ametek Computer Research Division
ametek!walton@csvax.caltech.edu
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 20 Jul 86 11:50:59 PDT
From: falk@SUN.COM (Ed Falk)
Subject: Deformed children
>>Our children and the children of the Viet Namese women
>>are born malformed.
>
>Please name one American woman who has children born malformed due to
>the VietNam war.
That was poetic license. I think she meant emotionally/morally/whatever
rather than physically.
However, if you must nit-pick, so be it. Agent Orange causes birth defects
in the children of men (i.e. VN veterans) who were exposed to it.
-ed falk, sun microsystems
sun!falk
falk@sun.arpa
------------------------------
Date: 1986 July 20 12:35:39 PST (=GMT-8hr)
From: Robert Elton Maas <REM%IMSSS@SU-AI.ARPA>
Subject:abhorrence of war not necessary to avoid war
>Date: Wed, 9 Jul 86 12:00:10 PDT
>From: wild@SUN.COM (Will Doherty)
>To remove emotion from the dialogue of arms control is to remove any reason
>for stopping war. For war means death of loved ones.
(1) Even if you use emotion to establish your toplevel goals, you
shouldn't try to use emotion to figure out how to accomplish those
goals. Deciding we don't want our loved-ones to die is easy. Figuring
out how to prevent their deaths is much harder.
(2) But there are reasons for avoiding war besides emotion, like an
instinct for survival. Suppose you want to survive, and you reason
intellectually that thermonuclear war will exterminate the human race.
That gives you a non-emotional justification for avoiding
thermonuclear war. Suppose you reason intellectually that any major
conventional war will almost certainly cross the thermonuclear
threshold. That now gives you a non-emotional justification for
avoiding all major wars. Now you can perhaps say that the instinct to
survive is emotional. But having the emotional desire to survive isn't
the same as having the emotional abhorrance to war, and it's the
latter that I'm saying is unnecessary, the former is an alternative
starting point for being opposed to war.
------------------------------
End of Arms-Discussion Digest
*****************************