ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) (01/08/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Tuesday, January 7, 1986 5:50PM Volume 6, Issue 12.4 Today's Topics: See #12.1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 6 Jan 86 21:11:10 PST From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.berkeley.edu Subject: international law Clifford Johnson comments: > ...My LOWC suit > alleges that a BINDING U.N. Charter provision is violated, namely > the obligation to settle peacetime disputes "in such a manner that > international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered" > (Article 2, Part 3). Article 51 provides the only exception - after > armed attack on territory has occurred... And then comments, roughly, that nobody seems to take international law very seriously any more except when it raises national constitutional issues. Jerry Pournelle has suggested that this is not an accident, and that the content of the above quote accounts for a lot of it. When the *only* cause for armed action is invasion -- when a country's citizens can be slaughtered, their property and possessions pillaged, embassies burned, ships sunk, laws and constitution mocked by crime and terrorism sponsored from outside, and so forth, and this is *not* a valid cause for military action under international law -- is it any wonder that nobody takes international law seriously any more? It was not always so. I'm not sure I agree with Pournelle 100% (and let us *not* get off into the matter of Pournelle's other opinions, please!), but it's thought-provoking. Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 6 Jan 86 13:25:52 EST From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TEI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1> Subject: More on Soviet Defense KGB military forces - one reason the KGB is so powerful in the Soviet triad. The Chief Border Guards Directorate contains conservatively 250,000-300,000 men. Their chief function is the defense of the frontiers, enabling regular forces to be commited elsewhere. Their role is not 100% defensive, units operate in Afghanistan providing military muscle to internal security operations. They have their own armored, artillery, AD, tacair and rotorwing assets. They also are responsible for coastal defense. Needless to say their defense functions are significantly overlapped by their internal security functions- more people get shot trying to leave than trying to sneak in. When you see guards of honor, ceremonial guards etc. in Moscow around the Party leadership, they are KGB troops wearing the Red Army uniform. When you see the May Day and October Revolution parades, all those impressive guys marching and riding by have empty weapons- they are real Red Army soldiers. If you look carefully along the parade route youll see more guys in Army uniforms- they're KGB and they have bullets. Its all a question of political reliability. ( Similarly, the KGB likes to present people dressed up as "Prof. So-and-so-sky of The Academy of Peaceloving Scientists" to tell us in the West how peaceful they are.) I would raise again the question of defining defense. The USSR admittedly gears its policies in terms of defense, defense of its basic imperialist encroachment, which is in its turn a defensive reaction. I know the world is now inured to associating the term "imperialistic" with the US, ( and the term "peace-loving" with the USSR) but the fact of the matter is that only one of the great empires survives the 20th century. That is Russia. It has not granted independence top any of the territories or nationalities acquired under the Czars; it has in fact added onto them. The cange in nature of regime in 1917 has not changed the imperialistic policies. What difference does it make that the Soviet leadership considers its military outlays purely defensive if their defensiveness is based on a paranoia that requires them to look upon the world from behind militarized borders and bands of buffer states which never seem to totally satisfy? No informed person believes that they have held the East Europeans in thralldom as part of their "world-wide ideological conspiracy" It is their buffer zone against the West in general and against Germany in particular, the specter of whose re- unification strikes more fear into the Russian soul than six Ronald Reagans. J.Miller ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 7 Jan 86 8:44:06 EST From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TEI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1> Subject: Soviet Defense > My point was that our techniques of command and control and of logistics, which, like numerous other factors, increase combat potential, are probably not so great that they would significantly offset the Soviets capabilities in the same areas, which would, of course, bring us back to square one in the bean counting. * Also it is quite incorrect to state that the Sovs strategy specifically omits power projection (somebody argued this- I think). Permanently "stationing" nuclear missile subs off your opponent's shores as a demonstration is a projection device we've long practiced. They, of course reciprocate. ** For power projection in the sense of third world intervention, I am right. For PP in the sense of strategic PP, you are right; I meant the former. > I disagree as to your rigtness. At the present time we can see an example. Our government threatens possible military retaliation against Libya. The Soviets say they will use their Mediterranean fleet to break any type of blockade. That is extreme hard cheese and definitely impacts on development of options. That is power projection. Nothing of the sort was possible in the heyday of Ike or JFK, when we could intervene at will in the third world. The Soviets, with their long range ships and increased bases (like Cienfuegos) could very well do the same thing to stymy similar US actions against Nicar- agua, which reminds me; * The steaming of battle groups through the Carribean surely counts. ** Why? Against what land targets would their BG's be directed? > For third world intervention, Nicaragua as stated above. Demonstrations against our presence in Honduras and El Salvador is possible, and to generally screen any adventures carried out by the Cubans. For strategic PP, the mere fact that they can freely operate there is power projection. In most cases, PP is a matter of demonstration. ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 7 Jan 86 9:17:13 EST From: Bruce Nevin <bnevin@bbncch.ARPA> Subject: request for hostile reviewer ----BEGINNING OF FORWARDED MESSAGES---- Received: from SU-SUSHI.ARPA by BBNCCH ; 4 Jan 86 23:24:19 EST Received: from EPIC by Sushi with Pup; Sat 4 Jan 86 20:18:12-PST Date: Sat 4 Jan 86 20:22:05-PST From: Jim McGrath <J.JPM@Epic> Subject: Your offer of a hostile reviewer (in Arms-d, issue 3) To: "bnevin@bbncch"@Sushi cc: "mcgrath%oz@mc"@Sushi Reply-to: mcgrath%mit-oz@mit-mc.arpa Message-ID: <12172704350.7.J.JPM@Epic> Sure, I'll take you up. Jim ------- ----END OF FORWARDED MESSAGES---- I didn't make the request, I only seconded it. Haven't scanned recent issues for the right name--will the person who made the offer (foy@aero?) please follow through? Thanks. And thank you, Jim. We'll look forward to your reportage and commentary. Bruce ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 6 Jan 86 22:52:48 pst From: ucdavis!lll-crg!amdcad!cae780!weitek!mmm@ucbvax.berkeley.edu (Mark Thorson) Subject: Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V6 #10.2 Here's an idea for a Soviet response to almost any advanced U.S. weapon like SDI: 1. Dig bomb shelters for all their people. 2. Put food, water, and air filters for three weeks in each one. 3. Put a ton of silver in each missile warhead. 4. When the time comes, launch the missiles. They'll be too heavy to make it into space, where the SDI would get them anyway. 5. Detonate them in the upper atmosphere. 6. The short-lived radio-isotopes of silver kill everybody who doesn't have a well-stocked hole in the ground. So why wouldn't it work? Silver might not be the best choice, its radio-isotopes are awfully short- lived -- what would be the element of choice? It sure would be a cheap way to deal with a "perfect" defense system. Mark Thorson (...!cae780!weitek!mmm) ------------------------------ End of Arms-Discussion Digest *****************************
ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (07/23/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Tuesday, July 22, 1986 11:23PM
Volume 6, Issue 124
Today's Topics:
Administrivia
Stopping SDI
Farm Subsidies
Secret government vaults
Arms verification
deformed children
preparing for war
Eastport panel study
MEECN
SDI Politics
Primers on the arms race
deformed children
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 1986 23:16 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Administrivia
My mailer is throwing up on these two people. Pls advise.
Message undeliverable and dequeued after 3 days:
mtxinu!sybase!marcy@DOC.CC.UTEXAS.EDU.#Internet: Cannot connect to host
august@JPL-VLSI.ARPA.#Internet: Cannot connect to host
carwardi@gossett.wisc.edu No such host
------------------------------
Date: 21 Jul 86 10:15:25 EDT
From: Hank.Walker@unh.cs.cmu.edu
Subject: Stopping SDI
I think 143C::ESTELL distorts the points of many contributors. The
statement "stop SDI" can mean a lot of things. It can mean stop development
of strategic defenses, stop research, focus only on hard-target defense,
etc. I think that most of those who oppose the current SDI program are in
favor of a research program into strategic defenses. The controversy is
over what constitutes research. Many opponents would say $2-3B per year is
an adequate funding level for research. SDI program managers need a lot
more money because they want to build big pieces of hardware for their
"research."
Of your points, I think 1) is not quite correct, as you probably know.
Strategic defense research has been going on for a long time, partly to
pacify the Army with their own strategic program. In that sense, strategic
defense will keep rolling on. Point 2) also seems to be incorrect. We do
not have the ability to stop strategic defense research, but it has already
been demonstrated that we can influence Congress to put the program on a
more rational funding level. If done rationally, then there won't be a
problem getting some of the best and the brightest to work on the program.
------------------------------
Subject: Farm Subsidies
Date: 21 Jul 86 09:05:50 PDT (Mon)
From: crummer@aerospace.ARPA
This country's ability to produce food is truly great. Without subsidies, i.e.
payments NOT to grow food, our farmers can produce so much food that food
prices would go through the floor thus putting the farmers out of business.
Without subsidies, the only way a farmer can increase his gross income
to sell more food. Sometimes if too many farmers do this the prices
can drop to the point that they can't recoup their investment in
growing it in the first place. Even if she plans ahead which crop to
grow and how much to plant, an unusually good year will cause a farmer to
overproduce. If instead of concentrating on the export of arms, this
country would concentrate on helping underdeveloped nations to develop
their economies to the point that they could afford to buy our food we
would all be better off. (It would also help if they didn't value
arms over food; this would mean reducing the level of fear in the
world.
--Charlie
[Editorial comment -- please conduct further farm subsidy discussions
privately. Moderator..]
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 21 Jul 86 09:44:44 PDT
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ@Forsythe.Stanford.Edu>
Subject: Secret government vaults
> Do we really believe that the government which couldn't keep the Pentagon
> Papers out of the NY Times has squirreled away files documenting deaths of
> babies due to government-approved releases of radiation into the atmosphere?
Sure, I'd believe this, but more likely "they" would destroy the
documents. They destroyed crucial KAL007 radar tapes, and lied
through their teeth about the incident, and there were babies killed
in the shootdown, and the New York Times stopped reporting the
steady trickle of incriminating evidence that has been accumulating.
See especially "Shootdown," Viking Press (1986) by R.W.Johnson.
To: ARMS-D@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
------------------------------
Date: Mon 21 Jul 86 14:47:59-ADT
From: Don Chiasson <CHIASSON@DREA-XX.ARPA>
Subject: Arms verification
A few days ago I received the July 1986 issue of the IEEE magazine
"Spectrum". It features a special report on arms verification. The
articles are:
p. 42 "Verification: Peacekeeping by Technical Means"
Verification of compliance with arms-control agreements sometimes
resembles a game of hide-and-seek.
p. 46 Part 1 - "Counting the Weapons"
How many top-secret `eyes in the skies' keep vigil over Soviet
weaponry; just how sharp are they.
p. 57 Part 2 - "Monitoring the Tests"
Missile flights and test explosions are watched closely to determine
whether an adversary's new weapons might upset the strategic balance.
p. 67 Part 3 - "The Soviet `spy gaps' "
Any lag there may be in the USSR's technical systems for monitoring is
offset by Soviet access to U. S. military intelligence.
p. 70 Part 4 - "The Politics of Peace Pacts"
Technical monitoring capabilities are but part of the solution for
arms control; attitudes of the superpowers are becoming more crucial.
These make very interesting reading: they are at a good technical
level and present a balanced viewpoint. Spectrum has had other special
reports on topics relevant to ARMS-D, see for example September 1985 on
SDI, and October 1982 on Technology in War and Peace.
Don
------------------------------
Subject: deformed children
Date: 21 Jul 86 14:57:19 EDT (Mon)
From: dm@bfly-vax.bbn.com
>Please name one American woman who has children born malformed due to
>the VietNam war.
There is a fair amount of evidence that the use of Agent Orange in
Vietnam has led to deformed children born to the wives of veterans.
Like most effects of suspected environmental carcinogens, the evidence
is circumstantial and open to dispute.
There was a veterans group suing the Veterans' Administration for
benefits for exposure to Agent Orange, and one of the claimed effects
was birth defects. As I recall, the government settled out of court
for some tremendous sum, to be divided among the affected veterans'
families.
I always wondered why Agent Orange didn't violate the treaties about
chemical warfare. It was used as a defoliant, not explicitly as a
weapon against people, sure, but it was a known mutagen, dropped in
massive quantities in a country that gets its drinking water from
streams and wells.
On the other hand, we were also using it on ourselves (it was a
popular chemical to spray on road-sides to keep weeds down in the late
60s and early seventies -- Congress banned its use in warfare before
the EPA banned its domestic use).
------------------------------
Date: 21 Jul 86 (Mon) 10:39:56 EDT
From: Robert Goldman <rpg%brown.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: preparing for war
Henry Spencer makes a valuable point about the "when you prepare for
war, you get war" argument by citing the case of Switzerland. Perhaps
unnecessarily, I'd like to point out the essential UNapplicability of
the Swiss example. It is probably unnecessary to draw arms-d's
readers attention to the Swiss terrain (the English Channel didn't
hurt England's position, by comparison with that of the French, vis a
vis the Nazis), the fact that it was to Nazi Germany's interest to
have a neutral doorway to the rest of the world (Sweden wasn't invaded
either, but that was because they sold raw materials to the Germans
and didn't interfere with the invasion of Norway). To carry the
parallel to the present day, the Swiss do not maintain a trade network
at all like that of the United States, nor do they intervene
militarily in the third world.
Please note that my discussion of the differences between Swiss
society and that of the U.S. does not imply endorsement of either's
policy.
Best wishes,
Robert Goldman
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 21 Jul 1986 20:35 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Eastport panel study
A few months ago there was a report in Science on the debate over SDI
software, specifically focusing on the Eastport panel report.
Enclosed is the text of a letter to the editor that will appear soon.
Comments are welcomed.
By identifying the strengthening of deterrence as the
primary goal of Star Wars, the Eastport panel has dodged the
question of whether or not a defense against ballistic
missiles must actually shoot down ballistic missiles. If
the goal is to develop a ballistic missile defense system
that need only have a chance of working, the engineering
problem is simplified enormously. However, the desirability
of a defense whose goal is to create uncertainty must then
be weighed against other means to create uncertainty. For
example, the Reagan Administration has noted its belief that
a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would create uncertainty in
the reliability of nuclear weapons. If this is indeed true,
it would seem that a Comprehensive Test Ban would be a
cheaper way of creating uncertainty in a shorter time, at
lower cost and less technical risk than the pursuit of
ballistic missile defenses.
The Eastport study overlooks a number of important
points. For example, the report does not describe how to
insure that a Soviet attack conforms to a case that has been
anticipated by the system designers. A "97% reliability"
sounds very good, until one realizes it might refer a
defense that shoots down 100% of incoming warheads under 97%
of all possible attack scenarios, and fails entirely under
3% of attack scenarios. The solid rocket boosters of the
Challenger were estimated to have a catastrophic failure
rate of 1 in 35; is it sound public policy to rely on a
defense that is as reliable as the space shuttle?
The Eastport study places a great emphasis on simulation
as a technique for validating BMD software. While
simulation is a valuable tool, it is fundamentally limited.
Richard Wagner (Assistant to the Secretary of Defense on
Nuclear Weapons Programs) testified on September 18, 1985 to
the Special Panel on Arms Control and Disarmament of the
House Armed Services Committee that while some people feel
that "computer simulations and component testing" are
adequate to determine the actual performance of nuclear
weapons, "calculations do not suffice. There is no way to
experimentally simulate the total performance of a nuclear
weapon. Thus, [actual] nuclear testing contributes directly
to our confidence in the reliability and operability of our
nuclear deterrent by exploring the complex effects of
nuclear weapons so as to insure that our systems and their
basing modes do not have unanticipated or hidden flaws."
If it is impossible to simulate with confidence the total
performance of a technology that is forty years old, whose
fundamental physics is well-understood, and with which the
U.S. has already conducted several hundred actual tests, how
will it be possible to simulate the operation of a
yet-to-be-developed technology in which the U.S. has zero
operational experience?
The Eastport study notes that BMD software should be
evolvable, fault-tolerant, testable, and so on; very few
people would argue otherwise. But it makes few specific
suggestions for system architecture. Those that it does
make are based on unrealistic assumptions.
For example, the study notes that a 20% inefficiency
results from a strategy of allocating weapons to targets on
a random basis, as compared to a perfect allocation in which
one and only one shot is allocated per target. This result
is valid only for a leakage rate of about 70%. For a
permitted leakage rate of 20%, this inefficiency jumps by a
factor of five.
[Note to readers: A derivation of this result is available on request.]
The study suggests that a centralized track file
containing information about all objects (both threatening
re-entry vehicles and non-threatening decoys) is
unnecessary. To the extent that information about which
objects are decoys is made unavailable, every object in view
must be re-discriminated each time a platform is ready to
fire at it. For threat clouds containing many more decoys
than re-entry vehicles, this seems likely to be an
enormously time-consuming enterprise, and time is the one
commodity in short supply during a large-scale missile
attack.
Finally, the Eastport study took to task the critics of
SDI software, alleging that their arguments rested on the
infeasibility of developing huge amounts of perfect computer
code. The critics never made such arguments. Rather, such
claims came from proponents such as James Fletcher, who
wrote that "Battle management for a multi-layered defense is
clearly one of the largest software problems ever tackled,
requiring an enormous and error-free program, perhaps 10
million lines long." (See James Fletcher, "The Technologies
for Ballistic Missile Defense", Issues in Science and
Technology, Fall 1984.)
Derivation of Easport panel result of 20% inefficiency.
Random shooting of targets results in wasted shots because of possible
double (and triple etc) killing, as compared to perfect allocation of
weapons to targets. The amount of wastage depends on the allowed
leakage: if the leakage allowed is zero, it takes an infinite number
of shots fo kill all targets with probability unity, using a random
allocation strategy. As the allowable leakage increases, a smaller
fraction of shots are wasted.
Let P = probability that a given interceptor destroys
a target once that target is acquired.
IF you have perfect weapons allocation,
leakage = 1-P
For random allocation and M targets, an interceptor has a
probability of destroying a given target of
probability that interceptor x probability that
is aimed at the given target interceptor kills target
^
|
1/M (1 interceptor among M targets) x P = P/M
Then probability that a given target SURVIVES that interceptor is 1-P/M.
Probability that a given target survives N interceptors randomly
allocated to it is
N
(1-P/M)
This probability is also the leakage.
Let
a = the number of interceptors per target.
N(0) = total number of interceptors = a M.
N(0) a M
Leakage = (1-P/M) = (1-P/M)
-a P
For many targets, M is large, thus leakage ~ e
Compare:
For perfect allocation (M interceptors against M targets):
Leakage = 1-P
For random allocation (N(0) interceptors against M targets):
- P N(0)/M - P a
Leakage = e = e
To see relative wastage, set leakage rates equal, and compute
N(0)/M = a for a given P. Here is a table solving the equation
-P a
1-P = e
(recall that 1-P is the leakage)
P leakage a
---------------------------
0.1 0.9 1.05
0.2 0.8 1.12
0.3 0.7 1.19 **
0.4 0.6 1.28
0.5 0.5 1.39
0.6 0.4 1.53
0.7 0.3 1.72
0.8 0.2 2.00
0.9 0.1 2.56
0.95 0.05 3.15
0.99 0.01 4.65
** is the result cited by the Eastport panel -- Given 119 interceptors
for every 100 targets, each interceptor with a P(kill) of 0.3, random
allocation results in a leakage of 0.7. However, using perfect
allocation of 100 interceptors against 100 targets, you also get a
leakage of 0.7.
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 86 14:38:04 CDT
From: "Kurt F. Sauer" <ks%a.cs.okstate.edu@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: MEECN
>... But MEECN is intended to provide reliable communications, and
>MEECN is shifting AWAY from HF, as the central role of the EHF MILSTAR
>in the strategic C3 network will illustrate when it is deployed.
>(MILSTAR is also my "other reason".)
I suppose I can't question MILSTAR survivability much. It is a complicated
system with a lot of redundancy, and it is quite true that the MILSTAR GEPs
are truly backpack-mobile, so node survivability isn't quite such a problem
there. It just seems that it would be imprudent to put ones eggs all in one
basket (either MILSTAR, other EHF, HF, VLF, or any ONE of 'em).
I can say that I am currently involved in some planning which involves
the MEECN, and, unless they're throwing money at us to confuse us, HF
is alive as a MEECN link (and for all sorts of other connectivity things).
It's true that in the mid-70's, the MEECN did shift away from HF, almost
entirely, but there has been a early and mid-80's shift back; I suspect
that the 'shift back' is through, though, because of the budgetary process
(spell that as "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings" or "national debt," whichever you
prefer).
>>In a SIOP-directed scenario the NCA can authorize certain 'packages'
>>of nuclear weapons for regional release.
>False. The NCA can order the SNF to attack a certain region, but they
>are under central control. There are SIOP options for that, but they
>involve the SNF only. Indeed, the NATO Nuclear Operations Plan is
>coordinated with the SIOP, so that conflicts in targeting don't occur.
I stand partly corrected. I understand that not all of this is under
the control of the SIOP; parts are under the control of the CAO SOP which
is *coordinated* with the SIOP. But, you're right, it's not the same document.
I should have been more precise in my wording. There is a procedure called
'SELREL' which is part of the joint U.S.-NATO 'NUWEP' (Nuclear Weapons
Employment Policy). It permits the NCA to authorize packages of nuclear
weapons to be used on predetermined target areas (FM 100-5, Operations,
and FM 101-31-1, Nuclear Weapons Employment Doctrine and Procedures).
But, of course, the use of these packages must be approved by NCA to ensure
that their use on particular targets is consistent with warfighting goals.
>>But are certain (probably CONUS-located, but not necessarily so) weapons held
>>in a 'post-strategic' reserve for post-SIOP use?
>Post-SIOP use is not the same thing as "after the initial exchange".
>The nuclear SLCMs are regarded as a strategic reserve, as are the
>SSBNs (in some ways).
Well, I understand what post-SIOP means. I'm talking about a REALLY
protracted conflict. The SIOP was not originally designed to handle things
beyond certain options limits. (The normal caveat here is, of course, that
I do not have SIOP access, and therefore have no real way to see whether or
not it has changed much since PD-59).
Yes, I think that the SSBN fleet is probably the most survivable element in
the 'triad,' and I'd certainly keep some in reserve (to remain a superpower
after the war ended, if possible).
This is fun stuff.
Kurt F. Sauer
Tulsa, Oklahoma
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 86 13:03:56 pdt
From: Steve Walton <ametek!walton@csvax.caltech.edu>
Subject: SDI Politics
On the front page of the July 22 edition of the Wall Street Journal, there is
an article about the fate of SDI's budget in Congress which lays much of
the blame for the "cuts" in the program on those who promised too much
for the system. It quotes Richard Perle and Gerald Yonas to the effect
that the initial SDI system will only protect missles: Perle is quoted
as saying, "Who said anything about getting rid of deterrence?"
There is an editorial in the same edition comparing the arms control pro-
cess to a minuet with no purpose other than to look nice, and accusing
those who oppose SDI of being "disciples of MAD" who ignore the fact that
the president who started SDI carried 49 states.
"A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds."
Steve Walton, Ametek Computer Research Division
ametek!walton@csvax.caltech.edu
(affiliation for identification purposes only)
------------------------------
Date: Tuesday, 22 July 1986 16:27-EDT
From: Mark Stout <E.EDDY at LOTS-A.STANFORD.EDU>
To: arms-d, primer@h-ma1.harvard.edu.
Re: Primers on the arms race
An excellent book which covers all the topics you mentioned (as well as
others) is INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL: ISSUES AND AGREEMENTS, Coit D.
Blacker and Gloria Duffy, eds., 1982, Stanford Univ. Press (I think).
This is the second edition of the book. It was originally published in
1976 and edited by John Barton of the Stanford Law School. The second
edition is extensively reworked and rewritten by members of Stanford's
Center for International Security and Arms Control who are academics,
scientists, ex-businessmen and ex-government officials. This is the basic
text for the intro to Arms Control class taught every spring under the
auspices of the the Political Science, International Relations and Values,
Technology,Science and Society Departments but actually administered by
members of the Center. It is a very even handed account which is quite easy
to read. You will find that though its overall topic is arms control it
gives extensive background on the relevant history and conceptual material.
I recommend it highly.
--Mark Stout
(stout@lancelot.stanford.edu)
------------------------------
Date: Tuesday, 22 July 1986 12:21-EDT
From: Jan Steinman <hplabs!tektronix!stalker.GWD!jans at ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>
To: hplabs!XX.LCS.MIT.EDU!ARMS-D at ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
cc: seismo!FAS.RI.CMU!Michael.Peshkin at ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Re: deformed children
Newsgroups: mod.politics.arms-d
Organization: Tektronix, Inc., Wilsonville, OR
Steve Walton writes, quoting me:
>
>>>Please name one American woman who has children born malformed due to
>>>the VietNam war.
>>
>>
>>These things are not easy to come by, and are routinely supressed by
>>the government... see "Killing Our Own" (1) for documentary evidence
>>collected by responsible journalists about the... estimated 260 excess
>>infant deaths in the Harrisburg area during the TMI accident...
>
>Seriously, the amount of radiation which Harrisburg was exposed to as a
>result of the TMI release was much less than the residents of Denver are
>exposed to due to their altitude and the natural radioactives in the local
>granite. I doubt very much that even 1, let alone 260 baby deaths can be
>attributed to TMI.
Sources, please, or are you speaking from personal opinion? I listed mine
-- please don't bother to respond to documentary evidence without supplying
same. And please don't cloud the issue by comparing apples with oranges.
Denver's infant death rate is certainly different than Harrisburg's, and
would certainly rise if another Rocky Flats accident coincided with the
right atmospheric conditions.
I don't care how much cosmic/granite radiation people are exposed to in
Denver, we're talking *rate changes* not *rates* here. The State of
Pennsylvania's own infant death figures show a statistically significant
rise during the TMI accident.
My allusion to government cover-up was due to the way the State handled
that data. The raw data is a matter of public record, but the
interpretation of that data by the State revealed that there was no infant
death rate increase *after* the accident, as compared with before the
accident, slyly ignoring the data *during* the accident -- the very data
independent researchers say show 260 more infants died than would have been
considered normal. The State Secretary of Health was fired for supporting
the State's own data.
Many experts agree there is NO SAFE LEVEL of radiation -- every bit is
capable of causing statistically demonstrable damage, and granite and
cosmic rays certainly cause a certain number of problems. I don't expect
this bit of news to cause people to leave Denver in droves -- they choose
to live there for various reasons. Not one of over 5 billion human beings,
however, has a choice about living with the consequences of even a minor,
regional nuclear war.
(1) Killing Our Own, 1982, Harvey Wasserman and Norman Solomon, Dell
Publishing, New York.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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