ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (07/29/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Tuesday, July 29, 1986 12:01AM
Volume 6, Issue 127
Today's Topics:
stopping 20% of warheads not useful, anyone disagree?
Civil Disobedience
obsessive military spending ==> collapse of the civilian economy.
seriousness and how to tell
clarifications
Soviet Strategic View (SDI)
radiation and health
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Date: Sun, 27 Jul 1986 10:43 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: stopping 20% of warheads not useful, anyone disagree?
The argument is that 20% defense would complicate a Soviet first
strike against our nuclear forces, thereby giving them incentive to
not do it. No one believes that 20% would significantly reduce
casualties given a determined Soviet attack on U.S. cities.
------------------------------
Date: 27 Jul 1986 12:49 EDT (Sun)
From: "Leonard N. Foner" <FONER%OZ.AI.MIT.EDU@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Civil Disobedience
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 86 15:09 EDT
From: Jong@HIS-BILLERICA-MULTICS.ARPA
Subject: Re: Civil Disobedience
[ . . . ]
For an institution such as MIT to disobey the government by
refusing to bid on or accept funding for Star Wars research
requires considerable courage.
[ . . . ]
Pardon me if I've taken this too far out of context, but I don't think
it's a matter of MIT "disobeying" the government unless we're more of
a police state than I thought. No one forces anyone to bid on
contracts. On the other hand, political realities being what they
are, yes, MIT would be (perhaps uncharacteristically) brave in
declaring that it will not accept SDI monies.
As for the current state of affairs: I cannot remember whether
President Gray has stated whether or not the Institute as a whole will
accept SDI money or bid on contracts, but I sincerely doubt he has
come out and said this. I strongly suspect it is essentially up to
the individual labs and researchers, because I think I recall hearing
about at least some labs here already using SDI funding. What MIT is
unwilling to do is to serve as an *advertising vehicle* for the SDIO,
whereby SDIO offers money to researchers so that it can then turn
around and say, "Professor X from MIT thinks SDI is a good idea
because X will work on it." Gray has come out strongly against this
stand, in public.
I do know that tremendous numbers of faculty, research staff, and
students have signed petitions vowing not to accept SDI funding in
their research. If we can assume that they intend to back this up,
then a large percentage of MIT will never bid on or accept SDI
funding, which may indeed have a significant effect on SDIO's
thinking.
If anyone around here has a better handle on Institute policy (or lack
thereof) as it relates to SDI, or remembers what the percentage was of
the MIT research community that signed the SDI petitions, please let
me know.
<LNF>
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 27 Jul 86 13:38:36 pdt
From: <ucsbcsl!uncle@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>
Subject: obsessive military spending ==> collapse of the civilian economy.
Quite a few analyses have pointed to the relatively obvious
fact that obsessive military spending is ultimately a much
greater threat to "national security" (pick your own interpretation
of this phrase) than is "failure" to elaborate a defensive technology
FOR EVERY conceivable military eventuality. While we are
busy squandering scarce capital on military boondoggles
in an era of net-indebtedness and wide-scale de-industrialization,
nations such as Japan are designing better mouse traps.
Even if you believe it is proper for a few massively wealthy
interests to accrete power without limit, it is obvious that
economic stability , growth etc. are better served by a plan
for massive redirection of american investment away from
useless military products and toward a new-industrialization
to produce housing, food, and healthcare advances for
many billions of anxious "customers".
Sensible arms-control is no pie-in the sky; it is feasible
now and should be advanced now. That the reaganauts consistently
denounce arms-control is evidence of their obsessive commitment
to doing exactly what they denounce the soviets for: viz.:
dominating the world by brute force. Barbarism is the creed
of ALL who have excessive power, east or west.
------------------------------
Date: Sunday, 27 July 1986 12:02-EDT
From: Walter Hamscher <hamscher at ht.ai.mit.edu>
To: LIN at XX, arms-d@xx.lcs.mit.edu
Re: seriousness and how to tell
A government that avoids doing things that push the boundaries of
interpretation is serious about arms control. For example if the SU
had stuck their big radar on the true geographic `periphery' of their
country, instead of on the periphery of the populated area, that would
support a claim of `seriousness'. For example if the US would scrap
old SSBN's when it commissions new ones (I forget now whether Reagan's
doing that or not, I seem to recall there was some flip-flopping on
it), that would support `seriousness.' But that's all pretty obvious;
it's a lot easier to come up with thees _sufficient_ criteria than
_necessary_ criteria, which is what you seem to be after.
------------------------------
Date: 28 Jul 86 08:33:00 PST
From: "143B::ESTELL" <estell%143b.decnet@nwc-143b.ARPA>
Subject: clarifications
Reply-To: "143B::ESTELL" <estell%143b.decnet@nwc-143b.ARPA>
I'm the author of the comment that "going to the moon cost nothing."
Yes, I understand about "out of pocket costs." [I pay taxes, and have
two teenage consumers under my roof.] But ANALOGY:
In the '60's shortly after I graduated from college, someone estimated that
the expected lifetime earnings of a college grad exceeded those of others
by about $100K; the estimated numbers were $350K for grads, and $250K for
others - even though the others worked 4 years longer. In the '50's, my
college cost $5K out of pocket. Now, did college really cost me $5K?
OR did it benefit me $95K?
I wholeheartedly agree that IF we would aim R&D directly at problems,
instead of working for spinoffs, we would be better off. BUT, we get the
money we do have by the IRS' prying it out of our [own] pockets. The way
to get taxes spent on programs is to elect Congressmen et al who support
what we want; e.g., vote this November for candidates who favor arms con-
trol, oppose MX, etc. etc. - WHATEVER the individual's convictions are.
All too often, we [in general, no specific individuals like you and me]
vote for the incumbent, or along party lines; or having not been active
before November, are faced with a choice of two candidates, neither very
compatible with our convictions.
---
In ARMS-D vol. 6, No. 126, the question was asked, "Does anyone think that
a system that stops 20% of the warheads is worth having?"
Well, I've previously said [a qualified] "yes."
The QUALIFICATION is that such a system would be holistically designed to
thwart ALL threats, including terrorists - not specifically just ICBM's.
My earlier comment was that a system good enough to stop 20% of an all-
out attack might stop 95% of terrorists attacks [IF it were designed to do
that from scratch]; that would be worthwhile. Another ANALOGY:
A football defense good enough to sack the quarterback 20% of the time is
fantastic; but IF that means the other team is completing 80% of its pass
attempts, then it's not so good. The "sack" statistic must be part of the
overall competent defense.
Bob
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Date: Thu, 24 Jul 86 22:39:38 pdt
From: Dave Benson <benson%wsu.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: Soviet Strategic View (SDI)
The following are quotations from:
Leon Goure, "The Soviet Strategic View", STRATEGIC REVIEW, Vol.XIV,
Spring 1986, p.73ff
The excerpts below are from the introduction by Academician Ye. P.
Velikhov to a book, "The Night After: Climatic and Biological
Consequences of a Nuclear War" (Moscow: Mir Publishing House, 1985)...
In his introduction, Velikhov discusses these issues, but also uses
them to criticize the American concepts of strategic defense (SDI)
which he characterizes, on the one hand, as not technically feasible
and, on the other hand, as leading to an arms race in space weapon
systems. It is noteworthy that the Department of Defense 1985 report,
"Soviet Strategic Defense Program", identifies Velikhov as having
played an important role in the delevopment of the Soviet
anti-ballisitc missle defense program.
Some Americians probably believe that weapons development in
outer space could provide them with some tangible strategic superiority
over the Soviet Union. I can sssure them that they are mistaken.
As we have stated on so many occasions, our country, based on the
powerful scientific, technilogical and economic potential, is
perfectly capable of making a proper response. No less futile
are the hopes that, by speeding up the arms race, it is possible
to subvert the Soviet economy; the whole postwar history bears evidence
to the contrary. That the SDI assessments by the Soviet and American
scientists have so closely coincided is significant but not in the
least surprisisng: the laws of physics apply in the USSR much the
same way they do in the United States. ...
...The SDI is indeed an illusion, but a high-risk one. The risk arises
precisely because the concept of the space-based BMD is being sold as
a realistic alternative to nuclear disarmament. In actual fact,
the attempts at implementing the SDI plans do little to diminish
the risk of a nuclear exchange -- rather, they substantially increase it.
...
Incidently, some American researchers quite rightly view the
space-based BMD system, even at the early R&D stages, as an effective
ASAT capability that would, in a critical situation, be able to
"blind" the adversary by distruction of its command, communication,
control, and and reconnaissance satellites. ...
...
Although not feasible in its full scope, the SDI program is still
dangerous precisely because it marks the beginning of a new spiral
in the arms race -- this time in space-based weapons.
...
In itself, this undermines the 1972 ABM Treaty, one of the cornerstones
of all subsequent arms limitation accords. In 1972, everyone was
hoping to see this treaty followed up by many others bearing,
likewise, on arms reduction. Alas, this was not the case.
------------------------------
Date: Monday, 28 July 1986 17:54-EDT
From: Jan Steinman <hplabs!tektronix!tekecs.TEK.COM!jans at ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>
To: hplabs!XX.LCS.MIT.EDU!ARMS-D-Request at ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Re: radiation and health
Newsgroups: mod.politics.arms-d
Organization: Tektronix, Inc., Wilsonville, OR
Steve Walton writes, quotes:
>Jan Steinman writes in Arms-D V6 #124:
>
>>Sources, please, or are you speaking from personal opinion? I listed mine...
>
>I'm sorry, but I don't consider a Dell paperback "documentary evidence."
>Please cite an epidemiological study in a peer-reviewed research journal
>which substantiates your claim of 260 infant deaths as a result of TMI.
If you insist on looking down on such "studies of studies", this discussion
is over. If you truly intend to follow up this subject, it is only one
extra stop in the library to get the references out of the Dell book. (It
is quite well documented, with many pages of references and footnotes. The
actual TMI data comes from the State of Pennsylvania, the reasearcher who
discovered the excess infant death statistics is a Nobel Laurate, and I
refuse to do any more of your work for you: READ THE DAMN BOOK BEFORE YOU
ARGUE WITH IT!) I suspect that you don't really wish to believe such
things, and are not ready to be convinced by any studies at all.
>>Denver's infant death rate is certainly different than Harrisburg's, and
>>would certainly rise if another Rocky Flats accident coincided with the
>>right atmospheric conditions.
>
>My point was that if the TMI release was small compared to the amounts
>present naturally in places where people are living normal lives, this
>gives a strong presumption that said release was, in fact, harmless.
If there are normally 150 infant deaths per 10,000 in Denver, and 130 per
10,000 in Harrisburg, and suddenly the rate in Harrisburg jumps up to that
of Denver's during a nuclear accident, are you claiming that the accident
was "harmless"? (These numbers are for illustration only.) Let's take
this one step further -- if after a limited nuclear exchange, the average
life expectancy of human beings was reduced to what it was before the
invention of pennicillin, would that be "harmless" simply because it
compares with "places where people (were) living normal lives?" I think
there's a job in Washington writing doublespeak for you, Steve.
>>Many experts agree there is NO SAFE LEVEL of radiation...
>
>It is correct to say that there is no level of radiation which does not
>cause cell damage; however, I would say that a radiation level which causes
>so little damage that it doesn't have a statistical chance of causing
>cancer in, say 100 years of exposure is safe.
Finally, I agree with you. Now it's your turn to prove your point. A
forgotten principle of safety is "guilty until proven innocent". Will you
please cite verse and gospel of studies showing that TMI (or Rocky Flats,
or Hanford, or Nevada bomb tests, or a "limited" nuclear war) will not
cause cancer in a single human being in 100 years of exposure. I'll make
it even easier, make it 20 years, since the monitoring equipment, nor the
excess radiation, have been around for 100 years yet.
>How is TMI relevant to nuclear war?
TMI shows (to those with eyes to see) that the dangers of a "nuclear
exchange" of any kind are much greater than the government will admit. If
a "harmless" accident at a nuclear power plant can kill hundreds of
infants, how can we even be thinking about defending against a massive
nuclear attack, or of using "tactical" nuclear weapons in a "regional
confrontation"? When you're dealing with radiation, what goes around, comes
around.
--
:::::: Artificial Intelligence Machines --- Smalltalk Project ::::::
:::::: Jan Steinman Box 1000, MS 60-405 (w)503/685-2956 ::::::
:::::: tektronix!tekecs!jans Wilsonville, OR 97070 (h)503/657-7703 ::::::
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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