ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU.UUCP (07/31/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Thursday, July 31, 1986 12:46AM
Volume 6, Issue 129
Today's Topics:
Seriousness and how to tell
constructive criticism of the Reagan Administration arms control policy
Interactive Midcourse Discrimination via Particle Beams
KAL007 = 21*MX = LOWC ?
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Date: Wed, 30 Jul 86 10:46:57 PDT
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ@Forsythe.Stanford.Edu>
Subject: Seriousness and how to tell
One way to tell whether the other side is serious would be to reduce
your own arsenal unilaterally and substantially, and see if there
was any real reciprocation thereafter. There's no doubt that such a
reduction would not destroy either superpower's deterrent threat, so
it's a reasonable act, indeed so reasonable that the failure of
either superpowers to do so indicates lack of seriousness on both
sides, at this time.
To: ARMS-D@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
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Date: Wednesday, 30 July 1986 11:20-EDT
From: cfccs at HAWAII-EMH
To: ARMS-D
Re: constructive criticism of the Reagan Administration arms control policy
I am new to the ARMS-D discussions, but I notice there is something missing in
the criticisms on President Reagan's arms policies and nuclear energy as a
whole. The criticism is not constructive!
I would like to hear the solutions to replace our current status and the
repercussions that would follow.
In what SPECIFIC ways should President Reagan change his policy on arms
control? What will be the logical response from the Soviet Union (based on
PAST ACTIONS, not personal opinion)? How will it affect our relationship with
other countries, both friend and foe? How will it affect our ability to
defend against the unknown in the future?
What working alternative do we, as a nation, have to using and developing
nuclear energy? How will it affect our current economic conditions? How will
the changes be accepted by the people (based on past records, please)?
I believe criticism is necessary and can be a helpful tool when it includes
viable alternatives. However, it is a depressant and detrimental when it
lacks hope of a better way.
Gary Holt
CFCCSawaii-emh
(CFCCS@HAWAII-EMH)
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Date: Fri 25 Jul 1986 08:28:49 EST
From: Paul Dietz <dietz%slb-doll.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: Interactive Midcourse Discrimination via Particle Beams
I've read that SDI is looking into using particle beams for doing
midcourse discrimination of decoys from warheads. The idea is
that high energy particles (neutral hydrogen atoms, say) will
generate gamma rays when they hit mass, and heavy RV's will generate
more gamma rays than light decoys.
Thinking about this, I don't understand how it could be made to work
in practice. The problem is simple: the particle beam will cause
an RV to emit perhaps several tens of joules of gamma radiation.
But the debris from a one megaton explosion will be radiating 7 billion
watts of gamma radiation 1000 seconds after the explosion (and 20
trillion watts (!) 1 second after the explosion). Large nuclear
explosions in the upper atmosphere should generate enough background to
saturate the radiation detectors. Granted, the detector can ignore
all gamma radiation except that detected in a short window (perhaps
ten nanoseconds long?) but that doesn't seem to be enough.
Shooting a gamma ray beam at the detector from an orbiting linear
accelerator would also seem to be a good countermeasure.
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Date: Wed, 30 Jul 86 18:14:40 PDT
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ@Forsythe.Stanford.Edu>
Subject: KAL007 = 21*MX = LOWC ?
> my expression of skepticism about conspiracy theories with the
> US Government as villain has led Clifford Johnson to state that
> the government is hiding information which shows that KAL 007 was
> on a spy mission
Incorrect. I stated that the government was hiding information
that would enable the public to determine whether KAL 007 was a
spy flight; but I would assert that the evidence now before the
public is overwhelmingly in favor of this "hypothesis." Here's
a portion of a booklet I'm writing on the United States' launch on
warning policy (criticism welcome, apologies for length):
YESTERDAY'S UNFAIRLY SECRETIVE MX PRODUCTION DECISION
A year before the crucial September 1983 votes to deploy the first
MX missiles, Senator Tower observed that "TO MAKE SUCH DECISIONS
WITHOUT SUFFICIENT INFORMATION AND DEBATE IS UNFAIR TO THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE."[1] Was the decision to deploy the MX missiles, which
especially contributes to the ongoing reliance upon a
Launch-On-Warning Capability (LOWC), taken with the public properly
informed? It is pertinent to note that, at the time of the crucial
MX production vote, an opinion poll jointly sponsored by CBS and the
New York Times (Sep 16, 1983) found that 61% of Americans believed
that the government was "holding back information that people ought
to know" regarding the overriding issue which decided the production
vote. Moreover, subsequent evidence has revealed that the Congress
was badly deceived on this very issue.
This decisive issue was not launch on warning or survivability
considerations, but the August 31, 1983 downing of the Korean
airlines flight 007 (Ke 007, commonly called KAL007) over the Soviet
Union. In a major speech on September 5, 1983, President Reagan
condemned the shootdown, and urged Congress to respond by voting for
MX production:
>My fellow Americans, I'm coming before you tonight about the Korean
>Air Line massacre... This crime against humanity must never be
>forgotten, here or throughout the world... Commercial aircraft
>from the Soviet Union and Cuba on a number of occasions
>have overflown sensitive United States military installations.
>They weren't shot down... [T]he Soviets still refuse to
>tell the truth... with charges that it was a spy plane sent
>by us and that their planes fired tracer bullets
>past the plane as a warning that it was in Soviet airspace.
>Let me recap for a moment and present the incontrovertible evidence
>that we have.
>The Korean airliner... was for a brief time in the vicinity of one
>of our reconnaissance planes, an RC-135 on a routine mission...
>The Korean airliner flew on ... into Soviet airspace.
>The Soviets tracked this plane for two and a half hours while it
>flew a straight-line course at 30-to-35,000 feet.
>Only civilian airliners fly in such a manner...
>The Soviets scrambled jet interceptors... We have only the voices
>from the pilots.
>The Soviet ground-to-air transmissions were not recorded...
>[The pilot] pulls up to within about a mile of the Korean plane,
>mentions its flashing strobe light and that its navigation lights
>are on... Let me point out here ... his close-up view of the
>airliner on what we know was a clear night with a half-moon.
>The 747 has a unique and distinctive silhouette, unlike any other
>plane in the world.
>There is no way a pilot could mistake this for anything other than
>a civilian airliner...
>It was an act of barbarism born of a society which wantonly
>disregards individual rights and the value of human life... yes,
>shooting down a plane, even one with hundreds of innocent men,
>women, children, and babies, is part of their normal procedure...
>Among the rest of us there is one protective measure: an
>international radio wavelength on which pilots can communicate
>with planes of other nations if they are in trouble or lost.
>Soviet military planes are not so equipped because that would make
>it easier for pilots who might want to defect...
>With our horror and our sorrow, there is righteous and terrible
>anger... Since my return to Washington, we've held long meetings,
>the most recent yesterday with Congressional leadership.
>There was a feeling of unity in the room... We will continue to
>work with the Congress regarding our response to this massacre.
>As you know, we immediately made known to the world the shocking
>facts as honestly and completely as they came to us...
>I am asking the Congress to pass a joint resolution of condemnation
>of this Soviet crime...
>There's something I've always believed in which now seems more
>important than ever: the Congress will be facing key national
>security issues when it returns from recess.
>There has been legitimate difference of opinion on this matter,
>I know, but I urge the members of that distinguished body to
>ponder long and hard the Soviets' aggression...
>Senator Jackson said, "If America maintains a strong deterrent -
>and only if it does - this nation will continue to be a leader in
>the crucial quest for enduring peace between nations."
>The late Senator Jackson made those statements in July on the
>Senate floor, speaking in behalf of the MX missile program...
>(New York Times, Sep 6, 1983, at 15.)
Congress was convinced by the White House that the Soviets had
knowingly downed a civilian aircraft, as reported on the same page
under the headline "Congressional Leaders Discount Significance Of
The U.S. Spy Plane":
>"I'm sorry it [the RC-135 reconnaissance plane] was even
>mentioned," said Senator Robert C. Byrd of
>West Virginia, the minority leader.
>"It is not pertinent at all to this situation.
>It has confused the situation, and it need not.
>The Soviets cannot hide behind it."
>Congressional leaders of both parties, after White House briefings
>and conversations with Reagan administration officials, played down
>the possibility that the Soviets could have confused the two
>aircraft.
>"That's pure nonsense," and aide to Senator Howard H. Baker Jr.
>of Tennessee, the majority leader, quoted him as saying.
>"I don't see any excuse for the Russians whatsoever," added
>Speaker of the House Thomas P. O'Neill...
>Representative Robert H. Michel of Illinois, the House minority
>leader, said the presence of the reconnaissance plane had little
>importance... "I just don't think it was all that significant.
>There is a striking difference between a commercial airliner that
>keeps the same speed and altitude for two and a half hours
>and a reconnaissance plane that moves around a lot."
>Representative Jim Wright, the House majority leader, said the
>presence of the reconnaissance plane did not weaken the case
>against the Soviet Union.
On the next page, the text of the official White House statement on
the RC-135 spy plane stresses that the "pilots whose voices are on
the tape ... never refer to the Korean aircraft as an RC-135, only
as the 'target.' They made no serious effort to identify the
aircraft or to warn it. They did not appear to care what it was.
Instead, they were intent on killing it." This rhetoric manifestly
and directly resulted in the decision to fund production of the MX
missile:
>On 18 September the President returned to the theme that the 007
>tragedy was a powerful argument for the MX.
>Referring to the Russians as "brutal," "savage," and "cruel,"
>Reagan ... announced "This nation is through with hand-wringing
>and apologising"...
>The ever-sensitive barometer of Wall Street quickly reflected the
>new mood as the 007 affair touched off a major boom in defence
>stocks, notably Avco Corporation (with a big stake in the MX)...
>As Wolfgang H. Demisch, First Boston Corporation's aerospace
>analyst put it, "The Korean jetliner incident provided a spark for
>a more positive reappraisal of the defence industry.
>But as Philip Brannon, Merrill Lynch's vice-president for defence
>electronics research added, "More important is that politically it
>has firmed up Reagan's position in calling for a stronger defence."
>Wall Street had got it right.
>Caspar Weinberger, the Defence Secretary, was not a man to miss
>an opportunity such as this... slapping down a new $322.5 billion
>defence budget - a whole 22 per cent up...
>Even by the time Congress reassembled on 12 September, it was clear
>that 007 would dominate proceedings.
>As Representative Mike Synar, an Oklahoma Democrat, put it, in his
>district, as in others, "that's all people are talking about."
>Representative Joseph Addabo (New York - Democrat), the
>subcommittee chairman in charge of defence appropriations and a
>leading opponent of the MX, had to concede almost immediately that
>his cause was in tatters: "These things give people a big visible
>vote to say 'Well, I got back at the Russians'."
>Representative Les Aspin (Wisconsin - Democrat) of the House Armed
>Services agreed: "What do the MX, nerve gas ... have to do with the
>Soviets shooting down a commercial jet?
>In a rational world there is no obvious connection.
>But in the political world these things do have a connection.
>Our attitude towards the Soviet Union and defence issues is driven
>by events."
>The expectation that the House Speaker, Tip O'Neill, would lead the
>opposition to the MX died quickly, while in the Senate the
>proponents of a nuclear freeze decided not to push things to a
>vote. O'Neill more or less conceded defeat in advance: "the MX
>would have been in deep trouble" before 007, he averred, but now
>would probably go through...
>Congress voted 416-0 to denounce the "brutal massacre" of 007, the
>result of a "cold-blooded barbarous attack" and "one of the most
>infamous and reprehensible acts in history."
>The same motion was passed 95-0 in the Senate ... the defence
>budget sailed through.
>Not only did the MX pass but the House voted by the astonishing
>margin of 266-152 to authorise production of the Bigeye nerve gas
>[which reversed a June vote by the House],
>thus ending President Nixon's 1969 pledge to halt all chemical
>weapons production... as the New York Times
>commented, all discussion of these weapons as such was "overcome
>by arguments that centered on sending a message to the Russians."
>[Citations; Shootdown, Viking Press, 1986, by R.W.Johnson 121,2,6.]
The winning thesis in the goverment's argument for production of the
MX was thus that (a) the Soviets knowingly destroyed a commercial
airliner, and (b) this airliner had accidentally strayed over Soviet
territory and had given no other cause for suspicion. The absolute
conviction of every single member of both houses as to the truth of
these White House assertions is indisputably proved by the unanimous
Proclamation, signed into law by President Reagan (opposite his
declaration of National Sewing Month, at Public Law 98-98, 97 STAT
715): "this cold-blooded, barbarous attack on a commercial airliner
straying off course is one of the most infamous and reprehensible
acts in history." Unfortunately, it was not until after the MX
decision[2] that Congress learned that the White House had
misrepresented the incident in several major respects. In
particular, albeit a year later, the State Department officially
conceded that the Soviets had been unaware that the flight was a
commercial jet;[3] and strong - even overwhelming - evidence has
surfaced favoring the hypothesis that the flight intentionally
overflew Soviet territory as part of a preplanned espionage mission,
and that this was a mission in which the aforesaid RC-135
participated, and that the DOD engaged in an extensive cover-up of
the matter.[4]
Clearly, had the Congress known that KAL007 was possibly engaged on
a preplanned espionage mission, or merely that the Soviets had
misidentified the flight after attempting to warn it of its
predicament, the MX production decision could well have gone the
other way. For the shootdown of a vastly less off-course commercial
Libyan jet by Israel in 1973 drew no extreme congressional
condemnation. Besides, the KAL007 incident would, in view of said
later-learned facts, have highlighted the potentially fatal
consequences of military adventurism in peacetime. It would be
off-point to review this evidence in full herein, for proof of the
underlying issue is not critical to this argument. THE POINTS
PROVEN ARE THAT THE CONGRESS, DESPITE ITS BICAMERAL UNANIMITY IN
PROCLAIMING THE HISTORIC BARBARITY OF THE SHOOTDOWN, (A) WAS
MISINFORMED AS TO THE SOVIETS' AWARENESS THAT KAL007 WAS A
COMMERCIAL FLIGHT, AND (B) NOW RECOGNIZES THAT THE FLIGHT WAS
POSSIBLY A PREPLANNED ESPIONAGE MISSION, BUT WHETHER THIS IS SO WILL
REMAIN SECRET:
>A sub-committee of the US Congress is to hold an investigation in
>secret to try to get at the truth of what happened before the
>Korean airliner KAL007 was shot down by a Soviet fighter two years
>ago with a loss of 269 lives, writes Ian Mather. Officials of a
>sub-committee of the House Public Works and Transportation
>Committee say new allegations cast doubt on the official Washington
>claim that the airliner was over Soviet territory by accident and
>that nobody was aware of this. An American lawyer involved in a
>damages suit on behalf of the victims of the crash says the pilot's
>widow told him and three other lawyers that the pilot and
>co-pilot were paid extra to fly over Soviet territory.
>There has also been evidence that the
>airliner's course was known and that an air traffic controller said
>'We should warn him'. The sub-committee is also expected to
>investigate the destruction of a tape by the US Air Force.[5]
>[London Observer, Sept. 29, 1985, p.2.]
Despite new awareness that the Soviets had misidentified KAL007,
subsequent MX funding decisions do not
validate the initial production decision.
After all, the Proclamation of cold-blooded Soviet culpability
remains unrepealed, for a congressional admission of error,
where every single Representative and every single Senator
reached an over-hasty decision,[6] would seem
too embarrassing to countenance, regardless of the President's
September 17, 1983 admonition lest the: "crime and cover-up
will soon be forgotten and we'll soon get back to business as
usual... This case is far from closed. Good and decent people
everywhere are coming together and the world's outrage has not
diminished." (New York Times, Sep 19, 1983.)
Likewise, having committed to the MX program, there is a prejudicial
economic momentum and procedural intertia acting towards its
completion. Certainly, the initial reason for production has never
resurfaced in debate on the MX, which is understandable, since the
relevance of KAL007 to MX deployment seems now ridiculous. Yet, the
production of the missiles was authorized primarily because of
KAL007. The unresolved question as to whether KAL007 was indeed a
United States espionage flight, and the concealment from the public
of evidence which would normally be made available in the loss of a
civil aircraft, clearly prevents the public from obtaining
information essential to the proper evaluation of the merits of the
MX deployment. Shall the United States conceal from the public
facts vital to the appreciation of a decision potentially
threatening mankind? The author aruges that the public right to
know why the ultra-costly and ultra-threatening MX is being deployed
has been trampled by the infantile contradiction between public
proclamation of Soviet guilt and obstructive secrecy as to whether
the United States shares the guilt.
Appallingly, the chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services,
Rep. Les Aspin, frankly admitted that Congress had lost control of
the nation's nuclear policies, especially concerning the MX missile:
>"Some guys have always just wanted the MX... you got these
>loons over there in the Pentagon trying to cashier the
>Midgetman."
>"Why?"
>"Hey, I don't know. Who knows? ... I mean, who's in charge of
>that damn place over there at the Pentagon?
>I don't know what their Strategic Program is any more.
>What we never do is set a policy or question a policy.
>Hell, we don't even question the policy when there isn't a
>policy, like in this administration."
>[Interview in Armed Forces Journal, May 1986, at 40,42,46.]
A fortiori, no responsible nation could take a potentially
end-of-the-world decision blindly, fail to address enlightening
facts thereafter, and joke that "loons" manage the ongoing strategic
ramifications under a blanket of secrecy. The fabric of republican
government, both moral and physical, would thereby be utterly
surrendered. Plainly, the people of the United States have yet to
learn all the facts behind the rationale for the MX production and
deployment. Vital to the production, and much more so than the
distracting downing of KAL007, is the risk of catastrophic accident
implied by DOD's LOWC. At least in general terms, the public has a
right to know the character of DOD's LOWC, and the nature of the
consequent risk of accidental Armaggedon.
NOTES:
[1]
The MX Missile and Associated Basing Decision, GPO Dec.1982, at 2.
[2]
Congress sent the President legislation authorizing production of
the first 21 MX missiles in the third week of September, 1983.
[3]
Los Angeles Times, August 29, 1984, at 1; this comcession was made
at an official State Department briefing apparently not even
mentioned in the New York Times.
[4]
See Shootdown, by R. W. Johnson, 1986, for an exhaustive detailing
of evidence regarding this incident, and of the unprecedented
resistance to investigation by United States authorities, which
included, inter alia: the impounding by the State Department of the
passenger list, crew list, and other never-released documents; the
squelching of an investigation by the National Transportation Safety
Board, despite a statutory requirement therefor based on the plane
being U.S.-built, having U.S. passengers, and departing from a U.S.
airport (the government had free choice as to what evidence to
produce at the ICAO inquiry); the placement of gag orders on 50,000
Federal Aviation Administration employees; the refusal to permit
relatives of the deceased to sue the U.S. government on any ground
that postulated that the 365-mile off-course route was intentional,
followed by dismissal for insufficiency of allegations; the
confiscation of radar tapes and other real-time records of the
flight. Some of President Reagan's above claims are quickly treated
in this note:
(a)
The Soviet and Cuban overflights of sensitive U.S. installations
turned out to be two flights for which the Soviets had properly
requested permission from the Federal Aviation Administration,
which had been formally granted.
(b)
The tape of the Soviet pilots played
to the United Nations on September 6, 1983, prejudicially excluded
translation of the pilot's statement that six minutes before
attacking, he fired unmistakeable warning tracers, without result.
(c)
The assertion that KAL007 flew in a straight line was accompanied
by a map produced by the DOD. However, Japanese radar tapes proved
KAL007 veered over Soviet territory, and the tapes of the Soviet
pilots proved that KAL007 was not at the claimed altitude, and
manoevered evasively by measures including suddenly slowing and
diving at the last, while broadcasting the message that it was
ascending. Moreover, other tapes proved KAL007 gave false reports
of its location and altitude throughout its flight.
(d)
The Soviet ground-to-air transmissions were recorded,
by both the United States and Japan, but the US tapes have never
been released, and the Japanese tapes only in part.
(e)
The Soviet pilots did not state that KAL007's lights
were flashing, nor was there any mention of navigation lights.
(f)
The night was not clear, but was heavily overcast, and the attacking
pilot, situated below the flight and a couple of miles to the
rear, had no way to know that the flight was a commercial airliner,
or even a 747. Moreover, only on October 7, 1983, after the MX
production decision and aforesaid Proclamation, did intelligence
experts reveal that the supposedly non-existent tapes of ground
controllers contained an order SAM crews to attempt to shoot at the
"RC-135," all but proving the mistaken identification of the plane.
(g)
The Soviet planes did have the capability to transmit at the
emergency imternational wavelength.
(h)
It is incredible that the RC-135 spy plane could have failed to be
aware KAL007 was and of where it was headed, and it
certainly had every capability necessary for warning the plane that
it was heading directly over Soviet territory.
[5]
The wealth of circumstantial evidence favoring the espionage
hypothesis includes flight sheets amended in the captain's
handwriting to reflect the mission's fuel needs and the critical
times of entry into and departure from Soviet air space. The
flight, delayed 40 minutes and commencing at a slow pace, was
piloted by KAL's top two pilots, both having the strongest military
connections, and had some 29, as opposed to the usual 18, crew
members onboard. Although the flight was far from full, the pilot
inexplicably cancelled an 1800 pound cargo pick-up at Anchorage, but
intentionally took on more fuel than he signed for, which was one of
many procedural violations that night. Without good cause,
departure was delayed 40 minutes, and the only other nightly flight,
KAL015, scheduled for an hour later, by speeding so fast that it's
mach buzzer must have sounded or been shut off, virtually caught up
with KAL007, whereafter KAL015 relayed KAL007's consecutive flight
positions (falsely), despite orders from ground control for KAL007
to radio directly.
[6]
The Proclamation evidences the tendency to overreact to an
apparently unprovoked Soviet attack, thus adding weight to
concerns that proper political decisionmaking in the event of a
seeming attack requires time for reflection, whereas the MX's
reliance upon a LOWC requires instant response.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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