ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (08/03/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Sunday, August 3, 1986 7:37AM
Volume 6, Issue 132
Today's Topics:
administrivia
orbital defensive weaponry
Constructive criticism of Administration arms control
Interactive Midcourse Discrimination via Particle Beams
Ionizing radiation health hazards
New Approach to Disarmament
KAL007 and the muddied sky
No first use
The Hanford N-reactor is a military plutonium making reactor
Chinese background ionizing radiation study
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Date: Sat, 2 Aug 1986 09:14 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: administrivia
I am getting an error msg for the following: help would be appreciated.
Message failed for the following reason:
(BHST) Unknown host/domain name in "guthery@ascvx5%slb-test.csnet"
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Date: Sat, 2 Aug 1986 00:09 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: orbital defensive weaponry
From: Jerry Mungle <JMUNGLE at ADA20.ISI.EDU>
...Are there treaties that prevent such actions? (i.e., shooting down
objects in space)
No.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 2 Aug 1986 00:16 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Constructive criticism of Administration arms control
From: Sam McCracken <oth104%BOSTONU.bitnet at WISCVM.ARPA>
... are there any allegations that we
have violated Salt I or II comparable to the allegations of violations by
the Soviets?
Absolutely. The U.S. "upgrade" of the BMEWS radar at Fylingsdale will
install a phased-array radar with 360 degree coverage. The U.S.
justifies this action under the argument that the ABM Treaty allows
modernization. But the radar at present there has much smaller
coverage, and I believe it is not a a phased array radar. The alleged
"upgrade" is essentially a brand new radar installed at the same site.
This is a matter for Treaty lawyers. The point is that this
modernization by the U.S. is not necessarily straightforward and in
accord with the Treaty.
------------------------------
Date: Fri 1 Aug 1986 21:44:34 EST
From: Paul Dietz <dietz%slb-doll.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: Interactive Midcourse Discrimination via Particle Beams
> That said, the radiation spectrum emitted from a tickled RV is
> different from what you'd get from an explosion, in both neutrons and
> gamma rays. Detectors could in principle be made to distinguish.
"In principle" means "not really", I think. Any detector I know of
sensitive enough to detect the few photons per square meter returned
from an RV would be royally fried by a nuclear explosion or swamped
by the residual radiation.
>> Shooting a gamma ray beam at the detector from an orbiting linear
>> accelerator would also seem to be a good countermeasure.
>But why should the linac be there? Why wouldn't the defense just
>destroy that too after a launch has been initiated?
Well, if we're going to have a satellite-against-satellite slugfest,
the offense will just destroy the discriminator outright. I made the
usual SDI assumption that satellites were invulnerable.
------------------------------
Date: Fri 1 Aug 1986 22:45:46 EST
From: Paul Dietz <dietz%slb-doll.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: Ionizing radiation health hazards
> The nuclear power reactors used in this country provide a source
> of Plutonium, via reprocessing at Rocky Flats., etc. This system continues
> despite the fact the US has a stockpile of about 100 metric tons of
> this (highly toxic) substance, as well as all the old bombs which
> can also be reprocessed. Indeed one of the reasons currently being
> given by Washington Congressmen for keeping the Hanford N-reactor
> running (you know, the one claimed to be like the Chernobyl reactor...)
> is that it continues to provide raw material for the Hanford PUREX
> (Plutonium and Uranium Extraction) plant. That's your tax money
> by the way...
I don't think this is right. As far as I know, no commericial fuel is
being reprocessed in the US at this time. Even if it were, the
plutonium in it is sufficiently polluted with higher isotopes (due to
the long neutron soaking it undergoes) to be worthless for military
purposes. The military plutonium making reactors use short exposures
and make primarily Pu-239. The old bombs are being reprocessed, I
believe.
------------------------------
Date: Sat 2 Aug 86 16:09:39-EDT
From: Herb Lin <LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: New Approach to Disarmament: for your amusement
Reuters, Saturday 2 August 1986
CRANE BREAKS OFF A NUCLEAR WARHEAD
Bonn -- The tail end of a revolving crane accidentally knocked the nuclear
warhead off a Pershing missile at a rocket site in southern Germany, West
Germany's air force said yesterday.
Gen. Has-Heinz Feldhoff told reporters that the accident occurred Wednesday
during routine maintenance. He added that there was never any danger of an
explosion.
West German and US troops were on duty at the NATO site, the location of which
was not disclosed, when the tail end of a mobile crane used to unload the
34-foot, 4.5 ton Pershing slammed into the nose cone of the two-stage rocket
and broke it off.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 2 Aug 86 14:51:20 PDT
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ@Forsythe.Stanford.Edu>
Subject: KAL007 and the muddied sky
I had only intended to notify Arms-D readers of the "Shootdown"
book, in reaction to an argument that the US was too moral to hide
potentially embarrassing data in the event of innocent fatalities.
To defend this stand, I introduced a summary of evidence. The only
challenges to that evidence have been on two minor points, and are
reasonably rebutted. The points I'm trying to make are that the US
public is being prevented from discovering the facts of the matter,
despite very grave evidential questions; an overly hasty reaction
to partial evidence caused the MX production and nerve-gas decisions
to be summarily taken; I'm suggesting the silence is unconscionable
in this context, and wondering whether anybody
(1) disagrees that the intentionality of KAL007's route is an open
question?
(2) disgarees that this fact could be revealed by a public
congressional inquiry?
(3) agrees the fact should be so discovered?
As for the weight of evidence, here's a final response:
> >The night was not clear, but was heavily overcast, ....
>
> Overcast at 30,000 feet??????
"There was extensive coverage of low, medium, and high level clouds
over Kamchatka [while over Southern Sakahlin there was] a condition
of mostly overcast low cloud with scattered and medium high clouds."
(ICAO Report.) Also winds were scudding clouds towards KAL007 at a
speed of 40-67 knots. The fatal intercept was accomplished without
substantial visibility problems, which is obvious from the tapes;
but the Soviets did not have the opportunity of prolonged, steady
sight implied by the phrase "clear night."
A couple of Arms-D readers wrote to me that even if KAL007 were
unidentified, it would be a horrendous crime to shoot it down
anyway. I agree, but it must be noted this runs counter to American
law, which permits cops to shoot even kids in the back if they run
away from them - it's a judgment call, subject only to a general
standard of "reasonableness." (Can someone correct me on this, if
wrong?) In legal terms, the crucial issue is, did KAL007 take
evasive action which gave cause for the shootdown? The tapes of the
shootdown (KAL007/Tokyo tapes, pilot's last minutes of conversation,
and Japanese radar not revealed until May 1985, well after the ICAO
inquiry, which noted that its 'radar track information is based on
memories of radar observers rather than on recorded radar data')
demonstrate that in the moments before shootdown: (a) KAL007 veered
north, to cut over Sakhalin more deeply; (b) a minute after
Major Kasim first said "I see it - I am locked on target," and
after over an hour's radio silence, KAL007 requested permission to
ascend to 35,000 feet; (c) instead, KAL007 actually (Japan radar)
dove to 29,000 feet, and accelerated; (d) Kasim fired his tracers;
(e) KAL007 decreased speed, causing Kasim to overshoot, and climbed
to 33,000 feet, but broadcast that it had attained 35,000 feet;
(f) this information was seemingly relayed to Kasim, who would not
believe the height ("Say again."); (g) Kasim pulled back and fired
his rockets, with KAL007 a minute from international air space:
"Roger. Repeat heading... To the left surely. Not to the right...
Affirmative, it has turned... I have enough time... I am firing
cannon bursts [tracers]... The target isn't responding to the
call... Must get closer to it... I'm going in closer... The
target's light is blinking [first report]. I have already
approached the target to a distance of about two kilometers. The
target is decreasing speed... No. It is decreasing speed... It
should have been earlier. How can I chase it? I'm already abeam of
the target... Now I have to fall back... Say again... The target's
altitude is 10,000 meters. From me it's located 70 degress to the
left. I'm dropping back. Now I will try rockets."
Did the Soviets contact KAL007 too late to give it proper time to
respond? Was KAL007 so close to freedom that the temptation to
evade for another minute won out? Whatever the details of the last
moments, it would seem that the embracing question regarding
the intentionality of KAL007's intrusion could, and should, be
determined.
To: ARMS-D@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 2 Aug 86 22:56:35 EDT
From: campbell%maynard.UUCP@harvisr.harvard.edu
Subject: No first use
Reply-To: campbell%maynard.UUCP@harvisr.HARVARD.EDU (Larry Campbell)
In article <8608020504.AA05019@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> ARMS-D@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU writes:
>Date: 1 Aug 86 9:37-EST
>From: Sam McCracken <oth104%BOSTONU.bitnet@WISCVM.ARPA>
>Subject: Re: Constructive criticism of Administration arms control
>
>"No first use" seems to me to be a meaningless concession. The ultimate in
>the unverifiable policy...
If it's meaningless and unverifiable, then it costs us nothing to make
a "no first use" declaration; either we mean it, which is wonderful; or
we're lying, in which case by the time the truth is out everyone will
have much more important things to worry about (like surviving).
So why don't we make such a declaration? There are four possible cases:
1. Truthfully declare "no first use"
2. Falsely declare "no first use"
3. Truthfully threaten first use
4. Falsely threaten first use
The USSR has chosen either 1 or 2 (we can't know which). We've chosen,
I believe, 3 (4 doesn't make much sense). Now, imagine yourself as a
reasonably objective observer (India, say, or some similarly non-aligned
nation). Which positions look like those of a nation seriously interested
in arms control? Position 1, of course. If the US were serious about
nuclear disarmament we'd choose 1. If we just wanted to APPEAR serious,
we'd choose 2. Since we've chosen 3, we're not only not serious about
arms control, we don't even want to APPEAR serious about it. I can't help
but draw the conclusion that the US wishes to achieve nuclear superiority
and that the Geneva talks are nothing but a sham, a sideshow.
> ... And as to our alleged "violation" of SALT treaties, Salt II has neve
>been ratified and has in fact expired. And are there any allegations that we
>have violated Salt I or II comparable to the allegations of violations by the
>Soviets?
I didn't say we had violated the SALT treaties; I said that Reagan has
publicly announced his intention to begin violating SALT II in the future
(this December, if I remember correctly).
--
"There are two kinds of science: physics, and stamp collecting."
Larry Campbell The Boston Software Works, Inc.
ARPA: campbell%maynard.uucp@harvard.ARPA 120 Fulton Street, Boston MA 02109
UUCP: {alliant,wjh12}!maynard!campbell (617) 367-6846
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 2 Aug 86 21:47:23 pdt
From: Dave Benson <benson%wsu.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: The Hanford N-reactor is a military plutonium making reactor
benson:
> The nuclear power reactors used in this country provide a source
> of Plutonium, via reprocessing at Rocky Flats., etc. This system continues
> despite the fact the US has a stockpile of about 100 metric tons of
> this (highly toxic) substance, as well as all the old bombs which
> can also be reprocessed. Indeed one of the reasons currently being
> given by Washington Congressmen for keeping the Hanford N-reactor
> running (you know, the one claimed to be like the Chernobyl reactor...)
> is that it continues to provide raw material for the Hanford PUREX
> (Plutonium and Uranium Extraction) plant. That's your tax money
> by the way...
dietz
I don't think this is right. As far as I know, no commericial fuel is
being reprocessed in the US at this time. Even if it were, the
plutonium in it is sufficiently polluted with higher isotopes (due to
the long neutron soaking it undergoes) to be worthless for military
purposes. The military plutonium making reactors use short exposures
and make primarily Pu-239. The old bombs are being reprocessed, I
believe.
benson's reply:
Oops! As far as I know no solely commercial nuclear fuels are being
reprocessed at all in the US. Don't agree about militarily worthless,
however, just VERY expensive to pull out the Pu-239. Anyway it is not
happening now, as far as I know, and may indeed never happen.
The Hanford N-reactor is an old graphite moderated reactor without a
containment building, thus superficially similar to the Chernobyl reactor.
It is about 28 years old. It was originally built to produce military
grade Pu-239 which was then refined in the Hanford PUREX plant. In this
way the US Government acquired its original stock of military plutonium.
(Some of the plutonium was made at the Savannah River plant.)
This process produced lots of waste heat, and rather than just dumping the
warm water into the Columbia River (the nation's most radioactive, by the
way), the N-reactor was attached to steam turbines to generate electricity.
Eventually the military had enough plutonium and there were proposals to
shut down the N-reactor, laying off about 2000 people. The Washington
congressional delegation then pork-barreled to keep the N-reactor running
using the reason that the Pacific Northwest needed the electricity
from the N-reactor. (I remind you that the Pacfic Northwest has the
majority of the hydro power in the nation, almost all of it from dams built
by taxpayers money and being repaid with about 2% interest. Thank all you
taxpayers out there for the lowest electric rates to be found anywhere
in North America.)
The present administration decided the US needs still more military
plutonium so the N-reactor was readjusted to produce it -- please note
this is shortly after the collapse of WPPS (Woops, we just went bankrupt
in the largest utility bankrupcy ever to occur whilst trying to build about
5 big electric power nuclear reactors). The economy of the Pacific Northwest
didn't really need even the marginal electric output from the N-reactor.
The PUREX plant was restarted, with some of the Pu-239 to be extracted
coming from the N-reactor (or so I've been told.) Representatives Sid
Morrison and Thomas Foley have sent a joint news release to Washington
(State, of course -- When I mean that little piece of land called the
Distrint of Columbia I say so) newpapers stating that the N-reactor should
be kept running since it is producing military grade plutonium, which of
course we need more of.
The point is that pork-barrel politics like this make arms agreements and
arms reductions and arms control of any sort extremely hard to accomplish.
There are many people in the Tri-cities (Richland, Kennewick, and Pasco)
who depend upon Hanford operations for employment. I believe that all
2000 employed at the N-reactor certainly believe that what they are
doing is right, important, useful, helping to defend the country, and
besides it brings in a good paycheck. The Newsweek article on Hanford
suggests that most of the N-reactor personnell are an unreflective lot.
My own associations with so-called professionals in the Hanford operations
agrees with this assessment. I cannot help but beleive that part of the
reason for making yet more plutonium was just the make-work aspect of
opening the PUREX plant as the construction on the Fast Flux Test
Facility was completed.
N. B.:
I am under the impression that the old bombs are YET TO BE reprocessed.
Can anybody cite a reliable source regarding this topic?
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 2 Aug 86 22:33:20 pdt
From: Dave Benson <benson%wsu.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: Chinese background ionizing radiation study
Can Sam McCracken supply a reference to the Chinese study?
Even without the reference, lets suppose the study was indeed adequately
performed (I certainly mean no insult to the Chinese by this. Its just
that as I look deeper into the so-called research on the health hazards
of plutonium the more I doubt the adequacy of the fundamental work
upon which all the public health assessments are made.) What does this
data tell us?
First, there seems to be evidence that ionizing radiation
acts as a ageing agent at low dosages. The ionizing radiation helps to
age the human body as does exposure to sunlight, smoke, dust, certain
food preservation techniques, so-called unnatural chemicals and indeed
perhaps even the foods that we eat. All of these contribute to the
likelyhood (British spelling) of contracting a cancer.
From direct discussions with the many faculty from Washington State
Univeristy who travel regularly to China and the many Chinese
scholars who come to WSU -- all this through an extensive exchange
program -- I can assure you that life now in mainline China is hard.
It is dirty (by American standards), the public health is less (As
an ancidote, my second son, Nils, contracted hepititis while there,
probably from eating at a open-air fast-food type "establishment"),
the diet is less adequate (My youngest son, Kjell, aged 15 at the time,
stopped growing during his 5 months in Chungching, and resumed growing upon
return to the US). Before the current government established order
in 1949, the Chinese people suffered through 100 years of civil
strife, war, and many faminies. Since 1949, while no famine has occured,
there have been periods of severe food shortages. Under these circumstances
it is quite likely that any effect of the natural background ionizing
radiation would be completely swamped in the noise of really
stressful circumstances such as war and famine.
I recall from many years ago a datum about smoking: The poeple of
(some town in South Africa) were amoung the most prolific smokers
ever studied, and had among the lowest lung cancer rates. Surely
the conclusion that "Therefore, smoking has nothing to do with
lung cancer." is nonsense.
Irrespective of the Chinese study,
the health physics data to date establishes the irrefutible (by me
or by S. McCracken) fact that low level ionizing radiation does
pose a public heath risk. However, I apologize for the foolish
statement that no low level studies have been done on humans. As I
read further, I find that studies of the effects of living near
a nuclear power reactor have been done, and perhaps there are other
studies which attempt to estimate the public health impact on the
world population of the atmospheric testing program and of the
SNAP-8 plutonium release into the upper atmosphere, studies other
that those commissioned by the DOE and its predecessor, the AEC.
But so far I have found no indication of a controlled experiment
upon humans, nor do I ever expect to find such, as no ethical
medical practioner would take part in such experiments. (That, of
course, does not mean that such experiments never occured.)
The general tenor of what I read suggests that the risk to the
fetus and young infant near a nuclear power plant is quite a bit
higher than away from it. What I am unable to find is similar
studies regarding risks of living downwind from: coal power plants,
chemical refineries, etc. ad nausuem. Can anyone suggest a starting
place?
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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