ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (08/16/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Saturday, August 16, 1986 2:21AM
Volume 7, Issue 3
Today's Topics:
Indisputable Logic
StarWars: How much is it worth?
How to tell if a negotiator is serious.
On objectivity & bias
Re: No first use
arms control and technology
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Date: Thu, 14 Aug 86 10:21:09 EDT
From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TEI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1.ARPA>
Subject: Indisputable Logic
Regarding a recent posting on the "Why the Soviets Shot Down KAL 007 vs.
Should the Soviets Shoot Down Unarmed Planes?" debate:
It is incredible that "less than conclusive evidence exists even
today," because of the wealth of data witheld by the United States
et alia -- the fact that this tragedy uniquely has not been publicly
investigated in the United States tends to prove that completely
conclusive evidence is so abundant that an inquiry would reveal it.
There is something a bit disturbing about arguing that, in effect;
"Those that possess the facts won't release them, therefore there are abundant
facts, therefore (implied in some fuzzy way) these unknown facts prove that my
theory is correct."
Seems to be rather a rather spurious argument, even for this digest.
J.Miller
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Date: 14 Aug 86 11:00 PDT
From: bloomberg.pa@Xerox.COM
Subject: StarWars: How much is it worth?
The Soviet response to our attempt to make a StarWars shield is
definitely part of the cost of our system!
Suppose a 20% effective StarWars shield were free (a ridiculous
proposition). Suppose, additionally, that its existence caused the
Soviets to double the number of their offensive warheads (a reasonable
reaction, especially with the perceived threat of combining the leaky
shield with a first-strike counterforce attack by the US). The net
result would be a 60% INCREASE in the number of missiles that can get
through the shield (who cares if it's 10000 or 16000 H-bombs, anyway).
All this only reinforces the stupidity of the StarWars program. A 100%
shield is unobtainable, and anything less is worse than useless.
Dan
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Date: 14 Aug 86 12:50:00 PST
From: "143B::ESTELL" <estell%143b.decnet@nwc-143b.ARPA>
Subject: How to tell if a negotiator is serious.
Reply-To: "143B::ESTELL" <estell%143b.decnet@nwc-143b.ARPA>
HOW CAN YOU TELL IF THE OTHER SIDE IS SERIOUS?
At the risk of pushing an analogy too far, I will conjecture that you can
compare this problem to the "tracking" problem in air traffic control, in
particular to what's known as "turn calling." [The goal is to predict as
quickly as possible when a bogey is turning, and as accurately as possible
its new heading.]
For instance, if the USSR announced unilateral arms reductions, opened
its borders and bases to inspection teams from NATO, reprogrammed its
budget to give less to defense and more to agriculture, commerce, and the
arts, and kept doing that for a decade, then we'd have to conclude that
they were serious. That's easy. What's hard is picking up the early
signals of a change.
For example, if Mr. Kruschev were still in power, or even Mr. Brezhnev,
then the present "words" might be just rhetoric; I'd wait for more signs.
But Mr. Gorbachev is the first leader of the USSR too young to have lived
through the revolution [in 1917] and WWI; that means that, unlike his
predecessors, he cannot remember having lost a close relative or friend
in those terrible fights. ALL the others did; Russia lost 25% of its
adult male population in those years; and before the wounds healed, WWII
broke out, and Hitler invaded. Small wonder then that they have formed
a "buffer" of satellite countries. [We're furtunate to have two oceans
and two good friends, Canada and Mexico, protecting our borders.]
My heart says, "Believe him." [As you may recall, I believe in the basic
decency of the Russians, indeed ALL peoples - except "criminals." And I
believe that every nation, every race, every society has its share of
criminals - aka terrorists.] How can anyone listen to Tchaikovsky's
music, or read Tolstoy's prayers, and not want to believe?
But my head says, "Be careful. Wait for more signs."
What can we do in the meantime? Well, we can offer some things that can't
hurt, and might help. For instance, we can pursue a student exchange
program; and joint research in space, in medicine, in computer science;
we can promote tourist traffic between our two countries; we can promote
cultural exchanges - opera, ballet, etc. We can quit saying in the press
- especially the electronic press - that "we're so great" and "you're so
bad." [Any reasonable Russian or third world visitor who watches our
network TV knows without a doubt that we publish lots of "propaganda."
Madison Ave. and Hollywood notwithstanding, the "average American" just
does NOT buy a new car each year, or solve a murder each week, or never
have problems with the spouse and kids; but that's what we see, night
after night.
It's a wonder that they believe anything we say after all that nonsense.
Bob
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Date: Thursday, 14 August 1986 16:03-EDT
From: 143B::ESTELL <estell%143b.decnet at nwc-143b.ARPA>
Reply-To: 143B::ESTELL <estell%143b.decnet at nwc-143b.ARPA>
To: arms-d@xx.lcs.mit.edu
Re: for ARMS-D: On objectivity & bias.
Objectivity, subjectivity, fact, opinion, fiction, et al are, as Wm.
Shakespeare noted long ago about beauty, "in the eye of the beholder."
That statement will probably insult many scientists at first. But
before you disagree, consider this: I see with my eyes, not yours. My
perception is a function of my sight, including my astigmatism; moreover,
some scientists [psychologists] assure us that our expereinces and our
expectations significantly influence what we do in fact see; e.g., a
minor case is that after a time, our eyes/brains filter out the image
of our own nose in our field of view.
There is an interesting study reported in the SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN READER,
Simon & Schuster, NY, 1953, pp. 576 et al, "Experiments in Perception."
It details an experiment involving a "crooked room" - slanted floor, uneven
windows, etc. Also lines and cubes cleverly placed to "appear" to be the
same size, or the same distance from the observer. Subjets were asked to
touch [with a long wand] the objects they saw; with some practice, they
learned to correlate their different senses; i.e., to "see" objectively.
It's also true, infrequently, I hope, that one branch of science will make
a general statement, that collides with another branch; e.g., in MODERN
UNIVERSITY PHYSICS [Addison-Wesley, 1960] on p. 343, the authors, all
competent physicists, make a generalization about "irreversible processes
of nature" according to the second law of thermodynamics: "Rocks weather
and crumble ..." Well, that's true; but geologists knew even back then
that new rocks also form from sediment, and are transformed into other
rock types by heat and pressure. Of course it takes millions of years;
and if the Sun burned out, the process might stop; no doubt, the second
law does apply and is valid. Nevertheless, it's just such flat general-
izations that confuse laymen. POLITICIANS ARE LAYMEN.
So are computer scientists, military officers, medical doctors -
when you get them [us] far enough away from our own specialties.
What's all this got to do with ARMS-D? Aside from shedding some light on
a continuing discussion that may need some to complement the heat [Steve
and Rich, whose exchanges are growing less interesting as it is clear that
neither will persuade the other], it goes to the heart of a question:
"How much defense is enough?"
If we have Trident, do we also need MX? B-1? SDI? how many of each?
Well, I submit that the answers depend on the bias of the individuals.
If you really fear the enemy [whoever it may be], and you really want to
be sure, then you want more, better, faster, bigger, stronger, smarter ...
Otherwise, if you have confidence in your own ability, and some faith
in the humanity of others outside your family, community, nation ...
then maybe some sort of "parity" is sufficient.
Some folks have several locks on the door, a gun, and mean dog.
Others get by with one good lock, a baseball bat, and a friendly mutt.
It's as much a question of fear, faith, and naivete as of science.
Bob
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Date: Fri Aug 15 15:00:12 1986
From: mcb%lll-tis-b.ARPA@lll-tis-gw.arpa (Michael C. Berch)
Subject: Re: No first use
Larry Campbell <campbell%maynard.UUCP@harvisr.harvard.edu> writes:
> . . .
> So why don't we make such a declaration? There are four possible cases:
>
> 1. Truthfully declare "no first use"
> 2. Falsely declare "no first use"
> 3. Truthfully threaten first use
> 4. Falsely threaten first use
>
> The USSR has chosen either 1 or 2 (we can't know which). We've chosen,
> I believe, 3 (4 doesn't make much sense). Now, imagine yourself as a
> reasonably objective observer (India, say, or some similarly non-aligned
> nation). Which positions look like those of a nation seriously interested
> in arms control? Position 1, of course. If the US were serious about
> nuclear disarmament we'd choose 1. If we just wanted to APPEAR serious,
> we'd choose 2. Since we've chosen 3, we're not only not serious about
> arms control, we don't even want to APPEAR serious about it. I can't help
> but draw the conclusion that the US wishes to achieve nuclear superiority
> and that the Geneva talks are nothing but a sham, a sideshow.
This logic seems flawed to me. If we can't know whether the UUSR has
chosen 1 or 2, then observers cannot tell whether the US has chosen 3 or 4.
By the way, it has been stated that 4 is an illogical position; I
disagree. Since a potential enemy cannot differentiate between 3 and 4
until the time of committment, 4 may have signficant deterrent effect
against conventional forces aggression. I would also like to draw the
distinction between arms control per se (force control and reduction)
and weapons use policy; the two are obviously closely related but are,
I think, subject to rather different analyses.
Michael C. Berch
ARPA: mcb@lll-tis-b.ARPA
UUCP: {ihnp4,dual,sun}!lll-lcc!styx!mcb
The opinions above are solely those of the author, and should not be
attributed to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, to whom the author
is a non-employee consultant.
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Date: Sat, 16 Aug 1986 02:20 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: arms control and technology
I'm currently exploring the following question, and I would like
comments on it.
What are the circumstances under which it is possible to regulate
military technology by negotiated agreement (as in an arms control
treaty)? Some people say that the evolution of technology will
eventually vitiate any arms control agreement; others say that arms
control can be a useful tool for restraining or limiting technology or
making it more predictable.
Note too that there are at least 3 types of arms control. The
performance characteristics of weapons can be limited; their
deployments can be limited; their use can be limited.
The ABM Treaty is an example of this discussion. Some argue that the
evolution of BMD technology since 1972 has rendered the Treaty
obsolete. In other words, the Treaty no longer has the justification
that it once had, nor does it apply to new technologies upon which
regulations have not been agreed. Others argue that the Treaty is not
obsolete, and has meaningful utility in a world of lasers and particle
beams. In other words, the Treaty still has justification, and
prevents worst-case planning on the other side by making the strategic
environment more predictable. New technologies should be incorporated
into the Treaty regime as they come on line.
What are the technological characteristics of the ABM Treaty regime
that make either point of view valid?
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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