ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (08/20/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Tuesday, August 19, 1986 6:09PM
Volume 7, Issue 4
Today's Topics:
KAL007: weighing the evidence
Administrivia
SDI - How much is it worth?
types of treaties (R&D, construction, deployment, use)
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Date: Sat, 16 Aug 86 12:33:18 PDT
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ@Forsythe.Stanford.Edu>
Subject: KAL007: weighing the evidence
> It is incredible that "less than conclusive evidence exists even
> today," because of the wealth of data witheld by the United States
> et alia -- the fact that this tragedy uniquely has not been publicly
> investigated in the United States tends to prove that completely
> conclusive evidence is so abundant that an inquiry would reveal it.
>
>
> Seems to be rather a rather spurious argument, even for this digest.
>
No. This inferential logic is not only commonsensical but is
expressly recognized in law. The failure of a party to produce
evidence it could have reasonably been expected to produce and which
should clear that party of blame if produced, by statute (Evidence
Code, can't recall exact #) is to be weighed by the trier of fact
as evidence against that party.
> There is something a bit disturbing about arguing that, in effect;
> "Those that possess the facts won't release them, therefore there are abundant
> facts, therefore (implied in some fuzzy way) these unknown facts prove that my
> theory is correct."
I said "*tends* to prove" U.S. culpability.
The point is that there are abundant sources of evidence, such as
the testimony of the pilot of KAL015 (who "relayed" KAL007's
consecutive false positions in the face of orders from the ground
that KAL007 was to communicate directly), and the U.S. has never
released even basic radar tapes of the flight, and unconscionably
destroyed U.A. Air Force tapes known to have existed. Et alia.
The point is, this information could clear accusations against the
U.S. - if the U.S. were innocent. The fact that such information
would be made available in a civilian accident, and the U.S.
normally failure to produce it or to hold *any* public
investigation, as a matter of law weighs against U.S. innocence.
Then again, a *lot* of information has already leaked out,
proving the U.S. originally lied about, for example, KAL007's
route. This was deliberate deception, because tapes later revealed
course changes which the U.S. then knew about. Perhaps most gross
was the prejudicial mistranslation of the pilot's tapes, which
were broadcast around the globe. This included not only omission
of the phrase "I am now firing cannon bursts (tracers)," but the
*insertion* of the phrase "It does not see me." In summary, not
only does failure to produce evidence weigh the U.S., but also there
is the fact that the U.S. told a bunch of lies about the flight
thereafter. (This doesn't mean I believe the Soviets.)
I think there should be a full, public, congressional inquiry into
the KAL007 shootdown, which killed more people than the Shuttle
(including babies) who had not consented to the risks of an
espionage mission. Until this happens, the United States is
tainted with culpability.
To: ARMS-D@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
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Date: Sun, 17 Aug 1986 07:48 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Administrivia
The following person has been temporarily removed from the ARMS-D
list, because CSNET-RELAY keeps throwing it back to me. Someone
please inform him.
Delivery attempts are still pending for the following address(es):
@a.cs.okstate.edu:ks@a.cs.okstate.edu (host: a.cs.okstate.edu) (queue: okstate)
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Date: Monday, 18 August 1986 14:44-EDT
From: ihnp4!ihuxl!dcn at ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
To: arms-d@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Re: SDI - How much is it worth?
> From: bloomberg.pa@Xerox.COM
> Subject: StarWars: How much is it worth?
>
> Suppose a 20% effective StarWars shield were free (a ridiculous
> proposition). Suppose, additionally, that its existence caused the
> Soviets to double the number of their offensive warheads (a reasonable
> reaction, especially with the perceived threat of combining the leaky
> shield with a first-strike counterforce attack by the US). The net
> result would be a 60% INCREASE in the number of missiles that can get
> through the shield (who cares if it's 10000 or 16000 H-bombs, anyway).
>
> Dan
If a 20% effective SDI system was in place (free in your assumption),
then the Soviets could double their missiles/warheads to compensate.
But this would be very costly to their economy, possibly taking many
years if it could be done at all. Meanwhile, we just send up some
additional satellites to cover the newly installed missiles. The
ratio of the costs is what is important. If it costs us $X to destroy
a warhead, and it costs the Soviets many times $X to install more
missiles, then SDI stays effective. A static defense is soon overcome,
so we must dynamically adjust it to meet new conditions. Let's discuss
more interesting subjects, like the SDI system design, handling bombers
or cruise missiles, or installation risks.
Dave Newkirk, ihnp4!ihuxl!dcn
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Date: 1986 August 18 06:31:00 PST (=GMT-8hr)
From: Robert Elton Maas <REM%IMSSS@SU-AI.ARPA>
Subject:types of treaties (R&D, construction, deployment, use) [V7 #3]
; Date: Sat, 16 Aug 1986 02:20 EDT
; From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
; Subject: arms control and technology
; ... there are at least 3 types of arms control. The
; performance characteristics of weapons can be limited; their
; deployments can be limited; their use can be limited.
Limiting use is insufficient. We need limit on deployment. Imagine a
treaty that allowed the USSR to station troops in all our cities and
to plant remote-control bombs in all our missile silos and submarines
and on each of our airplanes (military or commercial) and ships
(ditto). Do you think a treaty to prevent the use of these
already-deployed weapons and troops would last more than a week?
(Rhetorical question: of course not!) Likewise if we deployed troops
and weapons in Soviet cities etc. Even a world government wouldn't
help if somebody could deploy remote-control bombs in all the
world-government offices and vehicles etc.
With no limit on engineering, but limit on deployment, at least
deterrence has a chance of working. It takes time to deploy, so we can
fight back if they start violating the deployment treaty. But with
everything already deployed, there's no reason for anyone to abide by
a no-use treaty.
It takes even longer to build equipment. If we have limits not only on
use and deployment but on building up stockpiles of military
equipment, there's a lot more time to think if the other side breaks
the treaty to build up amaments. But it's difficult to limit
production of small items of equipment like bullets. Treaties limiting
production of equipment might be restricted to large items that can be
observed from space, such as battleships, submarines (during initial
launch), large aircraft and missile silos. If we can see it, we can
insist on inspecting it (if they refuse, it violates the treaty) to
determine if it is within performance specs. After they decide to
abrogate the treaty it takes a while to build up sufficient arms to
attack us.
It takes even longer to do new research&development, but a treaty to
restrict such inquiry is probably impossible and/or undesirable as it
would restrict scientific inquiry.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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