ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (08/25/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Monday, August 25, 1986 3:10PM
Volume 7, Issue 5
Today's Topics:
Apologies for this issue!!
Could computers launch a nuclear attack?
CAD, Simulation, Armored Combat Earthmover, and Stinger
Simulation, Armored Combat Earthmover, and Stinger
comments on paper desired...
Words, words, words...
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From: Lin@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
re: Apologies
This issue is entirely composed by me or messages I forwarded to the
list. I apologize for using the list in this way, but I do feel an
obligation to keep some things flowing, as any discussion group
moderator would. You can help -- by sending comments in; the in-box
has been silent for many days now.
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Date: Thursday, 21 August 1986 10:41-EDT
From: Jeff Myers <myers at unix.macc.wisc.edu>
To: risks at sri-csl.arpa, arms-d
Re: Could computers launch a nuclear attack?
[Summary of material on recent ARMS-D -- Cliff: is this article
roughly correct?]
[from the August 20 *Guardian*, p. 9]
By Dave Kadlecek, *Guardian* Bureau
SAN FRANCISCO -- A Stanford University computer professional has sued
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, claiming that government plans
allowing computers to automatically launch a nuclear attack are
unconstitutional.
Clifford Johnson, a manager in Stanford's Information Technology Services,
filed the suit in federal district court in San Francisco June 17. He
charged that the US government has a policy of operating a launch-on-warning
capability, under which the US would launch a retaliatory nuclear attack
against the USSR on the basis of a warning that Soviet missiles are on the
way, before unequivocal confirmation that an attack actually occurred. Due
to the short times involved, such a launch capability relies upon
computerized warning systems which are prone to error and cannot allow for
meaningful human intervention in a launch decision.
This automatic decision illegally usurps congressional powers and delegates
presidential powers. Thus, Johnson's suit argues, the resulting
``likelihood of a nuclear counterstrike and global environmental damage''
would deprive Johnson of life and property without due process of law,
giving him standing to sue now, since it would not be possible to do so
after a nuclear war. He asked that the court declare that the secretary of
defense's oath of office ``obligates him to forthwith cease and desist from
operating his launch-on-warning capability.''
Under a cautious assumption that launch-on-warning is in continuous use only
during crisis situations, a number of studies have predicted that an
accidental nuclear war is statistically likely within the next 30 years.
Johnson maintains, however, that US policy already does continuously use
launch-on-warning capability by any normal interpretation of the word
``policy,'' but this denial means only that a formal decision will not be
made until a button is pushed when the warning occurs. Indeed, a highly
sophisticated set of procedures and programs for a launch-on-warning is in
continuous operation, guarding against a feared ``bolt-from-the-blue''
attack by short-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The Single
Integrated Operational Plan consists of a menu of nuclear ``attack options''
-- lists of targets with assignments of weapons to hit them. The plan
contains launch-on-warning options, and procedures now in operation permit
the selection of a launch-on-warning option in response to a surprise
attack.
In support of Johnson's suit, Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility (CPSR) emphasize the inevitability of some computer error in
a system as complex as a launch-on-warning system. The most dangerous
computer errors are not failures of the device itself (hardware errors), but
of the programming (software errors), stemming ``not from inadequacies in
the technology, but rather from the inability of human beings to formulate
totally adequate plans (programs) for dealing with complicated, poorly
understood situations,'' says CPSR. CPSR is ``concerned that the government
is pursuing a launch-on-warning capability, in the mistaken belief that
computer technology can safely be entrusted with important decisions
regarding the release of nuclear weapons. If this course is allowed to
continue unchecked, it is only a matter of time before a catastrophic error
occurs.''
GROUPS IN SUPPORT
Though not an attorney, Johnson filed suit on his own behalf, and will argue
his own case through the resolution of government motions to dismiss the
suit, on which hearings are expected this fall. However, he will need to
hire a lawyer if the case goes to trial, and the Lawyer's Alliance for
Nuclear Arms Control (LANAC) and the Center for Constitutional Rights have
agreed to help at the appellate level.
In addition to CPSR, support has come from peace groups and from former
aerospace engineer Robert Aldridge, coauthor of ``First Strike'' and
co-editor of ``The Nuclear Time Bomb,'' and constitutional scholar Arthur
Miller.
Johnson had filed a similar suit in 1984. He lost in district court when
the judge ruled that it was a political matter, not for the judiciary to
decide. His appeal was rejected, not by upholding the lower court's
reasoning, but by ruling that since he then claimed only that the government
had a launch-on-warning capability, not necessarily a launch-on-warning
policy, the unused capability was not a threat over which he could sue.
Johnson's current suit includes sensitive information he had deliberately
excluded from his earlier suit, such as evidence that the Strategic Air
Command possesses the authorization codes needed to launch a nuclear attack.
``I've gone back, I've done my homework, I say we've got launch-on-warning
now and I'm prepared to prove it,'' said Johnson. ``We're at peace, so why
risk my neck?''
------------------------------
Date: Thursday, 21 August 1986 10:26-EDT
From: Mary C. Akers <makers at cct.bbn.com>
To: risks at csl.sri.com, arms-d
Re: CAD, Simulation, Armored Combat Earthmover, and Stinger
Recently the Risks list had a short discussion on the excessive use of CAD
systems. The September 1986 issue of Discover Magazine has an article by
Wayne Biddle on the use and abuse of computer modeling and simulation. It
is entitled "How Much Bang for the Buck?" Here are a few interesting quotes:
"I want to replace sterile computers simulations with more
realistic testing under combat conditions," says Representative
Charles Bennett of Florida, [...]"Weapons testing should ensure
that our weapons work in combat, not just in the laboratory." With
that statement, Bennett zeroes in on the main bone of contention
among those concerned with weapons design and testing: whether
computer simulation and modeling can take the place of live
trails with real equipment."
"The thing we worry about most is validating our simulations (that
is, proving they're realistic), and validation is lagging, for sure.
Without test data, an unvalidated simulation is all we have."
"Simulated Flying is so different from real flying that the Navy
finds that working in a simulator can be a detriment to safe
operation of an airplane."
Some of the examples used in the article include:
The Army's Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE) - "...which underwent
18,000 hours of testing without ever being operated under field
conditions. [When it finally under went live trails at Fort Hood]
...the tests revealed that the ACE's transmission cracked, that is
muffler caught fire, that the driver's hatch lid was too heavy to lift,
and that doing certain maintenance work "could endanger the operator's
life."
"The Stinger, a 'man-portable' ground-to-air missile, proved too heavy
for soldiers to carry on long marches; gunners must hold their breath
after firing to avoid noxious fumes."
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Date: Fri, 22 Aug 1986 08:53 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Simulation, Armored Combat Earthmover, and Stinger
From: Mary C. Akers <makers at cct.bbn.com>
the main bone of contention
among those concerned with weapons design and testing [is] whether
computer simulation and modeling can take the place of live
trials with real equipment.
The reason people want to do simulation testing is that they then
don't have to do real testing, for whatever reason. Real testing is
expensive and time-consuming, and the very people who say that they
want real testing are often those who say that the weapons development
process is too slow.
No one would argue that simulation testing is a bad thing in and of
itself. It is when you REPLACE real testing with simulation, rather
than SUPPLEMENT real testing, that you run into problems with
validity.
The Army's Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE) - "...which underwent
18,000 hours of testing without ever being operated under field
conditions. [When it finally under went live trails at Fort Hood]
...the tests revealed that the ACE's transmission cracked, that is
muffler caught fire, that the driver's hatch lid was too
heavy to lift,
and that doing certain maintenance work "could endanger the operator's
life."
It strengthens the point of the article to note that the 10,000 hours
of testing described was probably not simulation testing, but rather
developmental testing. But that is the point of operational testing
(OT) -- to place it into a real life operational environment and see what
problems there are. You EXPECT things to go wrong in OT.
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Date: Mon, 25 Aug 1986 14:59 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: comments on paper desired...
I am currently writing a paper entitled COMPTER SOFTWARE and STRATEGIC
DEFENSE, which should be available in preliminary draft form on August
29, Friday. Comments are solicited by September 15. It is too big to
mail, so FTP is the solution. If you want to see a copy (in exchange
for a promise to make comments on it), please drop me a note. A brief
abstract follows:
Computer software will be an integral part of any strategic defense
system (defined here to include BMD, ASAT, and air defense). Several
issues are addressed: The reliability of SDI software, the problem of
system architecture, the problems that very short defensive time lines
may introduce, the risk for accidental nuclear war, mechanisms for
escalation control.
Thanks.
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Date: Saturday, 3 May 1986 13:06-EDT
From: mikemcl at nrl-csr (Mike McLaughlin)
To: risks at sri-csl.ARPA, arms-d
Re: Words, words, words...
Many words have appeared here and in the press on topics such as SDI,
Chernobyl, and other matters. At least in this forum, we should be careful
of what we say, and what we think others mean when they say something. To
quote my favorite source, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language:
deceit - Misrepresentation; deception. A strategem; trick; wile.
deceitful - Given to cheating or deceiving. Misleading, deceptive.
deceive - To delude; mislead. _Archaic:_ To catch by guile; ensnare.
Synonyms: deceive, betray, mislead, beguile, delude, dupe, hoodwink,
bamaboozle, outwit, double-cross. These verbs mean to victimize
persons, for the most part by underhand means.
error - An act, assertion, or belief that unintentionally deviates from what
is correct, right, or true. The condition of having incorrect or false
knowledge. A mistake. The difference between a computed or measured value
and a correct value.
Synonyms: error, mistake, oversight. These nouns refer to what is
not in accordance with truth, accuracy, right, or propriety. Error
is clearly preferable to indicate belief in untruth or departure from
what is morally or ethically right or proper. Mistake often implies
misunderstanding, misinterpretation, and resultant poor judgement...
Oversight refers to an omission or a faulty act that results from...
lack of attention.
lie - A false statement or piece of information deliberately presented as
being true; a falsehood. Anything meant to deceive or give a wrong
impression. To present false information with the intent of deceiving. To
convey a false impression. To put in a specific condition through deceit.
mislead - To lead or guide in the wrong direction. To lead into error or
wrongdoing in action or thought; influence badly; deceive.
See synonyms at deceive. Misleading, deceptive, delusive. Mis-
leading is the most nonspecific... it makes no clear implication
regarding intent. Deceptive applies... to surface appearance, and
may imply deliberate misrepresentation. Delusive stresses calcu-
lated misrepresentation or sham.
mistake - An error or fault. A misconception or misunderstanding. To under-
stand wrongly; misinterpret. To recognize or identify incorrectly.
Wrong or incorrect in opinion, understanding, or perception. Based
on error; wrong...
See synonyms at _error_.
I have condensed the definitions and discussions somewhat. The point is that
a person who believes something, however erroneously, and espouses and publi-
cly supports that belief, is *not* lying. These are complex times. There
are many matters about which reasonable persons, even reasonable scientists,
may differ. There is no point in saying that a person lied when that person
was doing the best work possible based on the knowledge and belief available
at the time. It significantly interferes with rational discussion - it
not only interferes with cooperative searches for the truth, it nearly
eliminates any chance that the truth, when found, will be accepted.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 25 Aug 1986 15:08 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Words, words, words...
The point is that a person who believes something, however
erroneously, and espouses and publicly supports that belief, is *not*
lying. These are complex times. There are many matters about which
reasonable persons, even reasonable scientists, may differ. There is
no point in saying that a person lied when that person was doing the
best work possible based on the knowledge and belief available at the
time.
I'd like to believe this, but I think you leave out a major category
-- how are we to classify what could be called "deliberate ignorance"?
That is probably the most charitable label that one could give to the
call for SDI -- a system that will eliminate the threat of nuclear
ballistic missiles. Some people (some of them on RISKS) have called
such statements merely "political rhetoric". But when the call is for
defense of the entire population, and NO ONE in the scientific
community believes that it is possible to frustrate a deliberate
Soviet attack on the U.S. population, isn't that either lying (at
worst) or deliberate dumbness at best?
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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