ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (08/28/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Wednesday, August 27, 1986 11:28PM
Volume 7, Issue 8
Today's Topics:
different strokes
Nuclear disarmament -- the aftermath
Words, words, words...
Words, words, words...
Duel Phenomenology: Computers + Computers = Computers
Re: Nuclear disarmament -- the aftermath
Nuclear disarmament -- the aftermath
Why Stockpile?
Re: Nuclear disarmament -- the aftermath
dual phenomenology
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Date: 26 Aug 86 13:30:00 PST
From: "143B::ESTELL" <estell%143b.decnet@nwc-143b.ARPA>
Subject: different strokes
Reply-To: "143B::ESTELL" <estell%143b.decnet@nwc-143b.ARPA>
Several years ago, I found a magazine article about R&D, which
introduced the concept of three distinct classes of researchers:
The Mad Bomber, The Archivist, and The Prince Machiavelli.
[I regret that I have lost the article; thus cannot give credit to
either the author or the publisher. Both deserve a lot.]
The author defined The Archivist as a typical "professor" who
accumulates knowledge for its own sake, and to share with others.
The Mad Bomber was pictured as the free thinking, high risk taker
who fails much more often than he succeeds; but whose rare successes
easily compensate for all the failures, and more. Finally, the Prince
Machiavelli was depicted as the professional manager who "gets things
done, on schedule, to specs, for cost, etc."
The author's major theme, other than just pointing out that R&D folks
are NOT homogeneous, was that each type has a special domain in
which he is most effective. The Archivist flourishes in a university;
the Prince, in industry; and the Bomber, in some organization which
can afford the frequent serious financial losses that both precede and
follow the breakthroughs. The article claimed that the natural habi-
tat of the Bomber should be the US government lab, because Uncle Sam
can "print money" if necessary to defray the risks.
[NOTE that (1) Some other very rich organizations can and do take
lots of risks; e.g., IBM, AT&T, and GM.; and (2) These "classes" are
not necessarily exclusive; clearly there are some "hybrids" who have
some of the characteristics of two or more of these types.]
Drucker has argued that profits are the proper return on risk of
doing business; some hold that it follows that aerospace companies
[et al] that take high risks for DOD [et al] SHOULD make megabucks.
By comparison, "non profit" organizations that are federally funded
need only survive, not prosper; thus some argue that the costs CAN
be lower. Whether they really are, or not, is not guaranteed - except
that the answer will vary with the task, and the organization.
I'd really enjoy a discussion in this forum on the proper MIX of roles
of industry, academia, and government labs. Rumor has it that some
in Washington would like to get the Navy Labs out of the design and
development business; the argument is that "industry can do it better."
I won't dispute that industry often DOES do it better vis-a-vis average
government sites; but history shows clearly that China Lake is NOT
average. If some of the rest of you feel impacted by a philosophy
that might restrict your activities, or limit those of colleagues else-
where with whom you'd like to collaborate, then maybe there's the
motive for a good discussion. I feel that literally billions of
dollars are at stake.
Bob
P.S. Remember that these opinions are MINE; they do not necessarily
reflect those of any other person or organization, real or imagined.
P.P.S. I'm NOT looking for a quarrel with DOD management. I've
never worked in private industry, except as a house painter, while
going to school; nor in a university, except as a student dorm floor
director/counselor. Thus I've not "walked a mile in those moccasins"
to paraphrase the Indian proverb. I realize that some DOD managers
HAVE had those other experiences. So in addition to wanting to get
to the best policy, I'm also wanting to understand it better.
RGE
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Date: Wed, 27 Aug 1986 14:41 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Nuclear disarmament -- the aftermath
... we simply
could not beat the Soviets in a conventional war while still maintaining
our traditional free socio-political system. (*) To fight a conventional
war against an enemy with the physical and personnel resources of the
Soviets, who have a governmental system that lets them completely
control their economy and population to devote them single-mindedly to
the war effort, would require us to do the same.
The industrial power of NATO+Japan is much larger than that of the
Warsaw Pact. The West has outspent the WP by many tens of billions of
dollars over the last 15 years. We field roughly the same numbers of
men under arms (not as much as a 2X differential). We have made
decisions about force structure on the basis of our beliefs about how
to win wars, but these decisions aren't reflected in bean counts.
It's a red herring.
That said, I agree with your comments about the unfeasibility of
complete nuclear disarmament, for the reason that you can't un-invent
nuclear weapons. No liberal arms controller type says that complete
nuclear disarmament would be even desirable.
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 1986 14:49 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Words, words, words...
From: mikemcl at nrl-csr (Mike McLaughlin)
I do not know that "NO ONE in the scientific community believes that it is
possible to frustrate a deliberate Soviet attack on the U.S. population..."
If there is a PhD in a science who believes that, is that person de facto
excluded from the scientific community?
I should have been more precise. No person with technical credentials
has stated that it is possible to deny the Soviet Union the capability
to wreak significant damage on the U.S. population and industry.
I do not know what "frustrat(ing) a deliberate... attack" means.
If it means
deterring the attack by reducing the cost/benefit ratio to an unacceptable
level, I believe that is possible (but I am not in the scientific community
and never have been).
If it means saving a significant number of civilian lives from an
inevitable
attack, I believe that is possible (but... ).
I think the benchmark that Ashton Carter used in his Office of
Technology Assessment background paper on BMD was pretty good, and it
will serve as a starting point for discussion. "Frustrate a
deliberate attack..." is taken to mean "preventing the Soviet Union
from delivering by ballistic missile 100 megatons of nuclear warhead
on U.S. cities and industry." (Note well: WW II was a 5 MT war.)
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 1986 15:05 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Words, words, words...
From: mikemcl at nrl-csr (Mike McLaughlin)
I do not know that "NO ONE in the scientific community believes that it is
possible to frustrate a deliberate Soviet attack on the U.S. population..."
If there is a PhD in a science who believes that, is that person de facto
excluded from the scientific community?
I should have been more precise. No person with technical credentials
has stated that it is possible to deny the Soviet Union the capability
to wreak significant damage on the U.S. population and industry.
I do not know what "frustrat(ing) a deliberate... attack" means.
If it means
deterring the attack by reducing the cost/benefit ratio to an unacceptable
level, I believe that is possible (but I am not in the scientific community
and never have been).
If it means saving a significant number of civilian lives from an
inevitable
attack, I believe that is possible (but... ).
I think the benchmark that Ashton Carter used in his Office of
Technology Assessment background paper on BMD was pretty good, and it
will serve as a starting point for discussion. "Frustrate a
deliberate attack..." is taken to mean "preventing the Soviet Union
from delivering by ballistic missile 100 megatons of nuclear warhead
on U.S. cities and industry." (Note well: WW II was a 5 MT war.)
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 1986 15:23 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Duel Phenomenology: Computers + Computers = Computers
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe.Stanford.Edu>
Replacing x by the phrase "satellite warning," and y by the
phrase "radar warning," the above logical computation could read
if satellite warning or radar warning, then attack warning
Although the the DOD is careful to affirm that only an UNAMBIGUOUS
warning can generate an attack condition, this assurance loses
meaning once it is realised that the DOD's warning assessment
computer programs automatically resolve ambiguities. Indeed,
"disambiguation" is a program goal defined as "Selecting from
alternative interpretations the one most appropriate in the given
context... One approach is to use general heuristics for
transforming incorrect expressions into well-formed ones."[5]
The disambiguation concept is directly applied to sensor fusion in
Future Military Applications For Knowledge Engineering,
RAND N-2102-1-AF (1985), at 28-31:
What evidence do you have that these heuristics (that you describe) are
indeed used in NORAD attack assessment programs?
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 86 14:59:01 CDT
From: Will Martin -- AMXAL-RI <wmartin@ALMSA-1.ARPA>
Subject: Re: Nuclear disarmament -- the aftermath
I suppose it all comes down to defining "beat". (I had thought about
adding yet another aside about that to that already too-long message,
but decided against it.)
I define "beat" as "completely suppress and conquer and occupy the
territory". I contend that we just can't do that to the USSR,
unless we had substantial help from inside rebellion and trusted
allies in rebelling subject peoples, and still continue our
present lifestyle here at home. We would require so many men under arms,
so much of our industrial base devoted to war production, and have
to devote so much of our economy to support a vast occupation force
to cover the huge territory of the USSR, that we would end up in a
semi-permanent war-type economy, with rationing and government control
of resources. Thus, as I said, we would no longer have the freedoms
here we would have been fighting to defend. And this is a
"best-possible-case" scenario! It would be true if we won handily,
with minimal casualties, and quickly! Things would be much worse in
the far-likelier case of a longer and more bitter war, where we would
have expended much of our resources by the time we won, and then would
have less to carry us through a long period of occupation (especially
if we had to contend with a resistant and unpacified population in
the conquered territories).
It wasn't like that after WWII because the territory we occupied was
so much smaller, and we had the capacity to do it, plus the duties
were shared among the Allies. The task of an effective occupation
force controlling the entire USSR would make the post-WWII efforts
pale in comparison!
If the USSR really was the seething mass of resentment and of peoples
held in check only by ruthless internal security and secret police,
ready to revolt the instant an opportunity is offered and eager to
adopt Western-style government, that is depicted by some, then this
would not be the case. However, I don't believe that is the way things
are now. While some individuals may have this attitude, the majority of
the population do not.
Will
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Date: Wed, 27 Aug 1986 17:51 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Nuclear disarmament -- the aftermath
From: Will Martin -- AMXAL-RI <wmartin at ALMSA-1.ARPA>
I suppose it all comes down to defining "beat". (I had thought about
adding yet another aside about that to that already too-long message,
but decided against it.)
I define "beat" as "completely suppress and conquer and occupy the
territory". I contend that we just can't do that to the USSR...
I agree entirely.
------------------------------
Subject: Why Stockpile?
Date: 27 Aug 86 18:04:51 EDT (Wed)
From: dm@bfly-vax.bbn.com
From: Rob Austein <SRA@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Why Stockpile?
For some time I have wondered why it is that we stockpile so many of
the destructive toys we invent (I am thinking primarily of ICBMs and
SLBMs here, although the argument might apply in other cases).
You've missed the point. We aren't stockpiling these weapons.
They're positioned for use (for the most part).
We build so many so we'll be confident (more precisely, so the Soviets
will be confident) that we'll be able to retailiate after most of our
weapons have been destroyed by a Soviet first-strike, thus hopefully
deterring a first strike. That's also why
they have so many weapons too, maybe.
Or, if you prefer the less charitable view, both sides are striving to
get a first-strike capability. That would explain the requirement for
silo-busting accuracy in the MX, and the Soviet emphasis on land-based
missles (land-based missles, since you know precisely where you launch
them from, are more accurate -- and thus might be able to kill our
retaliatory missles in their silos -- than mobile missles (e.g.,
SLBMs), since you won't know exactly where the platform is when you
launch it). On the other hand, what good for retaliation are 100 MX
missles in ``vulnerable'' Minuteman silos? Maybe they're put there to
be tempting targets, so the Soviet first-strikers would waste more
warheads on them.
Bombers are no good for first strike, cruise missles aren't much
better.
From: Will Martin -- AMXAL-RI <wmartin@ALMSA-1.ARPA>
Subject: Nuclear disarmament -- the aftermath
When I read things like the comments on Dyson's book, I am mystified
by trying to imagine what the proponents of nuclear disarmament expect
is going to happen after their desired actions take place.
There's a difference between ``nuclear disarmament'' (the term you
used) and ``total nuclear disarmament'' (the situation you described).
Leaving aside Helen Caldicott, for the moment, I don't know of many
people who think total disarmament is a realistic goal, for many of
the reasons you (and Dyson) described: the nuclear genie is out of the
bottle, and you can't verify that someone hasn't retained a couple of
nuclear weapons ``just in case''.
However, both sides could back down from the current position where we
both have tens of thousands of warheads aimed at the other side, to a
verifiable position of having a few hundred. That situation is much
to be preferred, since it reduces the potential destruction of an
accidental launch.
I don't think you can make much of an argument that nuclear weapons
have restrained ``Soviet Expansion'' much outside of Europe (the Cuban
missle crisis excepted). Don't forget the Soviets had ``expanded'' into
Egypt in the early seventies. Sadat didn't use any nuclear weapons to
make them leave. Somalia and Ethiopia also switched sides during the
1970s.
Inside Europe, I think we are being foolish to depend on nuclear
weapons to deter war there. Much better to beef up conventional
military, in order to raise the nuclear threshhold.
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 86 14:44:49 pdt
From: Steve Walton <ametek!walton@csvax.caltech.edu>
Subject: Re: Nuclear disarmament -- the aftermath
Will, in the last month, I seem to have managed to convince you that I
am a "proponent of nuclear disarmament" and convince a few other
people that I am a raging right-winger. However, I don't think you
and I actually disagree over Dyson's plan and what it would imply, as
I hope to show.
Our decision to rely on nuclear deterrence in Europe was made at
a time when our NATO allies' shattered post-war economies could not
support sufficient conventional strength AND when we believed our
monopoly on nuclear weapons would last decades instead of a few years.
Neither argument applies today. The combined GNP of the European NATO
members is larger than the US GNP, but their combined defense budgets
are only some $80 billion compared to our $300 billion. There is
clearly room for growth here even if the US spends no more money.
(Note that nowhere did I claim that we would save money by following
this plan.) Many Western defense analysts today do not think that we
could realistically use nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe, both
because of political considerations ("We had to destroy Bavaria in
order to save it") and because it is not at all clear how one can stop
a nuclear exchange in Europe from escalating into a strategic nuclear
conflict. This fact is eroding support for NATO even as we speak.
I am certainly not naive enough to expect a change in Soviet
behavior before, during, or after such nuclear disarmament. As Dyson
explicitly states, it is not even clear that the risk of a war would
be less in a nuclear-free world. However, I think the events of the
last few years, such as our recent disagreement with New Zealand,
clearly show that our reliance on nuclear weapons is undermining
support for defense of all types. Our alliances may not survive AT
ALL if we do not move to non-nuclear deterrence.
However, I believe that you over-estimate the size and capability
of the forces required to deter the Soviets from conventional attacks.
The Europeans could afford to spend more in Europe, as pointed out
above. Technological advantage counts for much, as well, and in World
War II's early years that advantage lay with Germany. In Dyson's
book, he quotes a German general (not Guderian, but a high-ranking
tank commander) to the effect that they were able to defeat
numerically superior French tank forces by virtue of radio
communication between tanks, which allowed rapid battle-wide shifts of
tactics by the Germans. Today that technological advantage lies with
us.
I believe you are somewhat guilty of the "Russians are 10 feet
tall" argument when you argue that we would have to become a
totalitarian government on a total war footing in order to defeat
them. If their system was so far superior to ours that this was true,
they would have fought and won the final East-West war long ago. They
certainly would have met Kruschev's 1960 goal of surpassing the West's
GNP by 1975. (Combined Soviet/Warsaw Pact GNP is considerably less
than half the combined US/Western Europe GNP). In fact, I think we
have precisely the opposite problem; we rely too heavily on our
superior ability to produce and thus waste lives fighting battles of
attrition rather than being smart. This happened several times during
WW II.
The Dyson plan cannot preclude the stashing of a few nuclear
weapons; that is why an SDI is necessary as part of this"
nuclear-free" world. While a few nuclear weapons would have a
horrible effect if used, I don't believe that the few which would
survive in an *effectively verified* nuclear disarmament disagreement
would be militarily significant. Japan would not have surrendered
after Hiroshima and Nagasaki had they known that it would be at least
another year before we could manufacture enough fissionables for more
A-bombs. (Dyson talks at some length about the decision to bomb Japan
and its effects on our attitudes about nuclear weapons; I can
summarize his views here if anyone is interested.)
Finally, we agree that a world free of nuclear weapons would be
just that--a world just like the one we live in now, minus nukes. I
believe that the population of the US and Europe, when given the
choice between the status quo and a world with more expensive, but
entirely conventional, forces, would choose the latter, and that that
is in fact the correct choice.
------------------------------
Date: Wednesday, 27 August 1986 22:39-EDT
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe.Stanford.Edu>
To: LIN, arms-d
re: dual phenomenology
> What evidence do you have that these heuristics (that you describe) are
> indeed used in NORAD attack assessment programs?
>
General Herres statement (included in my essay); decision trees
and discussions re LOW in RAND memos (and RAND walks hand-in-glove
with the DOD re LOW); the OTA/LUA report I cited (1981, not 1984),
which asserts the expectation of loss of some warning in the event
of an attack; and the logic that necessitates such flexibility if
a LOWC is to be credible. This is not conclusive, obviously, but
my opinion is that in tense circumstances, dual would become mono-
or mono-plus a half phenomenology. Besides, the Defense Electronic
C3I handbook makes it clear that dual phenomenology is a data fusion
application, and the whole thrust of data fusion is probabilistic.
A point that concerns me is whether USSR space mines already
threaten US goesynchronous warning satellites. At least re
satellites over the USSR, I would expect this to be the case.
So, there's one warning that the US must expect to be kaput without
warning.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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