ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (09/16/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Monday, September 15, 1986 11:51PM
Volume 7, Issue 11
Today's Topics:
Overkill
Role of government organizations
Overkill and Testing
Re: F-16 software
One student's view of SDI
Nuclear disarmament -- the aftermath
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Mon, 1 Sep 86 16:15:38 pdt
From: weemba@brahms.Berkeley.EDU (Matthew P Wiener)
To: ARMS-D@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Overkill
>>[...] The number of warheads posessed
>>by both sides is, you should pardon the expression, extreme overkill.
>>[...] [Rob Austein]
William Swan then asked why. Part of it is to provide a second strike
reserve, as William suggested, but that would only account for a factor
of ten or so. The actual justifications for the extreme excess bring
in many more factors. For example, it is presumed that a certain frac-
tion of silos will have been destroyed, and that of the remainder a cer-
tain fraction will not get the launch orders, and that of what's left
a fraction will not actually carry out the order, and that of those that
will, a fraction will malfunction on launch, and so on and so on. One
has to account for the fraction that will fail to penetrate enemy defens-
es, reach the wrong target, reenter the atmosphere incorrectly, and any-
thing else that can go wrong. None of these factors are really known,
although a few can be estimated. I assume that the Pentagon is generous
and relentlessly efficient.
So the overkill is merely a safety feature, ensuring the credibility of
our deterrence to evil mongers everywhere. Either that, or an awful lot
of money has been wasted.
ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
------------------------------
Date: 3 Sep 86 08:51:00 EST
From: "CLSTR1::BECK" <beck@clstr1.decnet>
Subject: Role of government organizations
Reply-To: "CLSTR1::BECK" <beck@clstr1.decnet>
I would like to have a discussion on defining a unique role for the
government organization, and hopefully its employees, in the military
industrial university triad. But first there are some preliminary
items I want to get off my chest. 1) I think it is parochial to say
that China Lake is NOT average when it is obvious that the evaluation
criteria are not obvious. It should be noted that DoD is beginning to
use overseas sourcing, ie, buy military equipment overseas, eg F-16
components from korea. Why can't it also buy R&D like other USA
businesses, but this is another discussion, 2) Profit is overrated and
not well understood. Some think it is a panacea for all the issues we
don't want to do the work necessary to understand. I refer you to the
31 AUG 86 NY TIMES BUSINESS SECTION, PG2 LESSONS IN MANAGEMENT ARTICLE
where a book "Management in small doses" by Russel Ackoff, professor
emeritus of management science at the University of Pennsylvania's
Wharton School, published by Wiley & Sons was excerpted. > PROFIT AS
A MEANS > Profit is necessary for the survival of a business
enterprise, but not the > reason for it. [Its how we sometimes keep
score]. Profit is a > requirement, not an objective; a means, not an
end. ... > Efforts to maximize profit are efforts to obtain money to
use for > something else. What should this something else be? Growth?
No. > Growth is also a means, not and end. This is apparent when we
consider > how undesireable growth is when it is accompanied by
reduced profit. > But what should profit be used for and why growth?
...
>... I am convinced that those who amange corporations do so primarily to
> provide THEMSELVES with the quality of work life and standard of living
> they desire. I believe their behavoir can be better understood by assuming
this than by asuming that their objective is to maximize profit.
> [For the sockholders].
As I previously said I think the real issue is does the Government member of the
defense triad have a unique justiable role, ie, Does the government have
particular standards and obligations, such as public accountability and the
problem of sovereignty, which private sector employees never face.[ From
"PUBLIC EMPLOYEEE UNIONS - a study of the crisis in public sector labor
relations published by the institute for contemporary studies]. Are government
employees the BOMBER type or is the government organization the BOMBER? The
base I work on seems to think that diversity of opinion, approach down to the
individual employee level is best. Therefore we have maximum diversity of
opinion but can never get behind an agreed upon positon to work at collectivly.
But this maybe correct if the goal is to survive an unforeseen, unpredicted
cataclysm. Peacetime stability and/or optimization is a trivial problem and is
always based on fighting the last war over again.
If anybody out there is interested in continuing this conversation speak up.
pete beck <beck@ardec-lcss.arpa>
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 3 Sep 86 08:41 PDT
From: "Morton Jim"@LLL-MFE.ARPA
Subject: Overkill and Testing
I will
discuss my views on why we have such overkill capability. I will also
state some of the reasons for continued nuclear testing.
If we consider the requirement for second strike capability, particularly
second strike against France, U.K., China, India and Israel which are
all either known or purported nuclear weapons possesing nations, we can
divide our ICBMS in half. The first strike capability is one half and
the second ( also third etc. ) strike capability is the other half.
Let us consider why the halfs need to be so large. If we consider a
major strike against the U.S.S.R., we can come up with many primary
targets - Industrial complexes Military centers Radars Dams Etc.
Perhaps we would want to hit 200 targets with a very high probability of
hitting those targets. There are many discrete events that take place
during the launch and flight of an ICBM. Each of these events has a
certain probabiliy of failure. We can be certain of the possibility of
failure but not the probability. With the very large percentage of failure
in U.S. missile launches in the last year, including test launches of
minuteman ICBM that failed and launches of non-weapon titan missles
that failed, we know that there is this possibility. some of the failure
modes are listed below
1. silo door fails to open low probability 1%?
2. 1st stage failure low probability 1%?
3. staging failure low probability 2%?
4. 2nd stage failure low probability 2%?
5. staging failure low probability 2%?
6. Inertial guidance failure low probability 1%?
7. RV Buss control failure low probability 1%?
8. Bad weather causes RV miss low probability 3%?
9. Warhead malfunction due to failure low probability 1%?
10. Warhead malfunction due to ABM ? probability 5%?
11. Warhead malfunction due to fratricde ? probability 4%?
I indicated my percieved notions of the probability of the various
types of problems as well as what percentage of the strike they would
eliminate. It does add up. My numbers are probably lower than is real
as indicated by the high percentage of missile failures lately. Also,
I did not count off any missles for preventative maintenance and i did
not weight the effect of mirv missle failures taking out 3 (minuteman)
or 10 (MX) warheads .
Ballistic missle submarines are very profitable targets, where one
hit will deplete our cabability by 50-100 warheads. We must allow for
several of our subs to become incapacitated and have reserve capacity to
cover that instance.
Concerning Nuclear Testing
Nuclear explosives are complex systems using exotic materials, complex
electrical and mechanical devices as well as sophisticated manufacturing
tecniques. Older designs are not as safe as newer ones due to the
improvements in high explosive chemistry resulting in the use of
insensitive high explosive to detonate newer designs. Also newer safety
device designs such as the Mechanical Safe Arm Device (MSAD) are being
incorporated into newer explosive designs. Nuclear tests encompass both
stockpile verification of old warheads where the effects of materials
compatibility over a period of twenty or so years can be determined as
well as the verification of new design theory and proof of preformance
of newer safer explosive designs. I personally live near a Naval
magazine which i belive to hold war reserve nuclear weapons. I would
feel safer if I knew that the devices in those weapons were the newer
safer designs.
I am not certain of how i feel concerning new modes of weapons operation
such as the nuclear pumped X-RAY laser or insertable nuclear component
weapons designs. INC seems to blur the distinction between wether a
particular weapon is nuclear or conventional as well as posing a difficult
problem for verification. I do know that i want our designers to be
aware of what is possible in weapons design so that we are never surprised
by a large technological advance by some other nation.
Jim Morton
Disclamer - These are my personal views and opinions and do not represent
the views or policy of my employer, the University of California, The
Department of Energy or anyone else that might get upset if i said they
were.
------------------------------
From: caip!meccts!mecc!sewilco@seismo.CSS.GOV
Subject: Re: F-16 software
Date: Wed Sep 3 10:27:36 1986
>From: amdcad!phil at decwrl.DEC.COM (Phil Ngai)
>It sounds very funny that the software would let you drop a bomb on the wing
>while in inverted flight but is it really important to prevent this? Is it
[questions about introducing bugs during software changes omitted. SEW]
The mission might actually require releasing something at odd attitudes.
"Fundamentals of Aerospace Weapons Systems" (Air Force ROTC Air
University, 1961) describes three Low Altitude Bombing System methods
for nuclear weapons, all of which involve "tossing" a bomb by releasing
it at some point during a high-g pullup (so inertia carries bomb away from
plane). The "over-the-shoulder" delivery does consist of the bomb being
released after going past vertical. Inverted launch is an extreme
case of this delivery. The book was written before self-targeting and
TV-guided bombs, which would also work well after being lobbed several
miles toward a target.
> [The probability is clearly NONZERO. It is very dangerous to start
> making assumptions in programming about being able to leave out an
> exception condition simply because you think it cannot arise. Such
> assumptions have a nasty habit of interacting with other assumptions
> or propagating. PGN]
A fighter pilot in combat may have the choice of denting the wing or getting
killed. Perhaps the plane could be told when bombs, missiles, and fuel tanks
were loaded so it wouldn't release something in the wrong attitude for that
item (a locked-on missile might be able to be launched safely from any
attitude, but not a fuel tank). Then there'd have to be a "combat" switch
to disable the "normal" protective restrictions.
Scot E. Wilcoxon Minn Ed Comp Corp {quest,dicome,meccts}!mecc!sewilco
45 03 N 93 08 W (612)481-3507 {{caip!meccts},ihnp4,philabs}!mecc!sewilco
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 6 Sep 86 01:43 EDT
From: GROSS@BCVAX3.BITNET (Rob Gross)
Subject: One student's view of SDI
I'm forwarding the following message from a student to whom I've
been forwarding the digest; he asked me to pass this along, in the
hopes of stimulating some discussion.
***** Forwarded message *****
A Computer Science Student's View of SDI:
I have read your digests for the last 9 months or so, and I cannot
understand why the debates over SDI discuss only the "it will work" or
"it won't work" position. I feel that the software can be written,
and can be made to work. But before you anti-SDI's ready your "guns"
so to speak, let me ask a simple question:
What is SDI's purpose?
Answer: SDI's purpose is to defend the U.S. from ICBMs that enter the
upper ionosphere by using laser or particle beam weapons that would
destroy the incoming missiles.
This all sounds great!! No more threat of Nuclear War!! But this is
not the fifties, where the vast majority of warheads were in
intercontinental ballistic missiles!!! I recall reading that less
than 25% of all nuclear weapons are now ICBMs. The real threat is in:
A) Polaris Missiles via submarines.
B) Cruise Missiles via planes and God knows what.
C) Bombs via stealth and older B-52 type aircraft.
D) other smaller nuclear type weapons e.g., ship to ship.
So why develop a system that defends us from no real threat? That
should be the debate regardless of whether or not the system will
work.
--Scott Bresnahan Class of '89
(BRESNAHA@BCVAX3 via bitnet)
Computer Science/
Biochemistry Major at
Boston College
------------------------------
Date: Wednesday, 3 September 1986 16:10-EDT
From: burl!clyde!masscomp!zymacom!lee at seismo.CSS.GOV
To: ARMS-D
Subject: Re: Nuclear disarmament -- the aftermath
I normally don't post to this group because I am not expert in the sort
of military and systems questions that are usually addressed here. But
I couldn't let Will Martin's posting in V7#7 go by.
>... I am mystified ... what the proponents of nuclear disarmament
>expect is going to happen after their desired actions take place. As I
>understand it, the West concentrated on nuclear deterrence basically
>because it was the most economic way to achieve the defense they
>desired.
Just what is the "desired" defense? What are we defending against what?
This is seldom discussed here (at least recently). This is not a
trivial question.
>... [After nuclear disarmament,] the West is still under pressure
>from Soviet or client-state expansionism, subversion under the guise of
>"liberation" movements, etc. Unless we also decide to not care about
>this, to no longer resist such pressure, and to simply let happen
>whatever might occur, we will need to increase our conventional forces
>to resist such Soviet agression.
1. Whether we "care" about this and whether we consider ourselves
responsible for checking it are two distinct questions entirely.
More to the point in this forum:
2. Strategic nuclear forces are not of the slightest use in such
limited theaters, while tactical nukes are hardly more useful. Does
*anyone* disagree with this?
>To me, this means that we would have to reinstate a draft, [etc.], and
>generally move to a wartime-type economy even though we remain
>officially at "peace".
Europe aside (see below), these things are simply not affected by
disarmament.
>If we still believe that there will be a Warsaw Pact threat against
>Western Europe, which could no longer be deterred by an explicit
>first-use policy of using nuclear weapons against a conventional
>attack...
Now we come to the crux of things. In my opinion, and that of a number
of critics of our current strategy, most of the objectionable things
about our nuclear policy -- stonewalling on disarmament negotiation and
building a first-strike and nuclear warfighting capability in particular
-- are driven by our insistence on being Elder Brother in the NATO
theater. Whether you believe, as I do, that we should not be in NATO at
all, or whether you see a military role for the U.S. in Europe, it is
clear that the defense of Western Europe should first and foremost be a
European problem. Even today, no one in Europe believes that the U.S.
would unleash its strategic capability in defense of NATO; our umbrella
is in tatters.
Disarmament or no, the United States *must* do two things now:
1. Renounce first use of strategic nuclear weapons.
2. Turn primary military responsibility for NATO over to Europe,
including command responsiblity for tactical nuclear weapons,
and get all of our troops out -- contribute technology first and
production capability last. No more trip wires.
If these things are done, strategic disarmament will be disconnected
from NATO vs. Warsaw.
We *ought* to do two more things:
1. Renounce first use of *all* nuclear weapons.
2. Withdraw from NATO and all alliances that do not directly aid in the
defense of U.S. territory and its naval forces on the high seas.
If we do this, all bilateral nuclear disarmament will be disconnected
from European problems, and any conventional arms race with the Soviet
Union will at least start at a very low level.
Will Martin is right that disarmament will not last forever, and that
how a war is fought does not make it not a war. But at least we will
have a breathing space in which to "build down" warlike motives on both
sides. At worst, we can just start the nuclear arms race up again. :-)
All of the above doesn't mean that I've seen any good ways to achieve
disarmament, of course.
Lee Webber
------------------------------
End of Arms-Discussion Digest
*****************************