ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (09/26/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Thursday, September 25, 1986 10:57PM
Volume 7, Issue 21
Today's Topics:
Looking for Arms Control Information
F-16 software
indiscriminate weapons
Comment on an editorial comment
editorial comments
Minor point of info: re: rail guns for drilling tunnels
Re: Nova/Frontline program
Administrivia
MIT Symposium on economic impact of military spending
Re: Re: Phil and SDI
Book recommendation
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Date: Thu, 25 Sep 86 9:02:00 EDT
From: Nancy Breen <njbreen@cch.bbn.com>
Subject: Looking for Arms Control Information
Hi,
Does anyone know of a good book or series of articles dealing with
recent arms control issues. I am particularly interested in
articles concerning the U.S./Soviet negotiations in Geneva. I would
be interested in factual articles that tell what arms negotiation
is all about and explain something about what is being negotiated and
why. Also, is there a list of the U.S. personnel currently
on the negotiating teams?
Thanks,
-Nancy
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Date: Tuesday, 23 September 1986 19:12-EDT
From: rti-sel!dg_rtp!throopw%mcnc.csnet at CSNET-RELAY.ARPA
To: RISKS-LIST, arms-d
Re: F-16 software
> I spoke to an F-16 flight instructor about this business concerning bomb
> release when the plane is upside down. He said the software OUGHT to
> prevent such an occurrence. When the plane is not at the right angle of
> attack into the air stream, toss-bombing can result in the bomb being
> thrown back into the airplane.
Hmpf. *I* spoke to an ex Air-Force pilot. He said if *any* restriction on
bomb release is incorporated it should be to prevent it when the plane (or
more specificially, the bomb itself... there *is* a difference, and you had
better realize it!) is pulling negative G's. This was my original point...
"upside down" or "inverted" isn't the correct thing to worry about, it is
the wrong mindset entirely, too simple a notion.
He went on to back up this assertion by pointing out that there is a
common (well... well-known anyhow) bombing technique, called "over the
shoulder" bombing, that requires release while inverted. Consider the
following diagram. (Note that the trajectory shapes are unrealistic and
the scales are exagerated. Limitations of the terminal, don't y'know.)
_
/ \
/ \
________________________ |
< / \r
/ \
| |
v /
B >___________________________________/
T
Now, we have bomber B, release of bomb r, and target T. The bomber makes a
fast, low-level run over the target (to avoid radar, and to let the
bombsight get a good look). Then, soon after the overfly, pulls sharply up
and over, and *while* *inverted* releases the bomb. The bomb lofts high
into the air over the target whilst the plane scoots for home (rolling out
of the inversion, presumably but not necessarily), and the bomb eventually
lands splat on the target.
Basically, if you want the flight computer to wet-nurse the pilot at all in
this regard, it ought to have a sensor to detect strain on the bomb
restraints, and refuse to release them if the bomb isn't currently "trying"
to "fall" away from the aircraft. (Even this isn't foolproof, of course,
but it comes close.) Tying this into the *attitude* of the *aircraft*
*itself* is *WRONG* *WRONG* *WRONG*, and is, as I said before, an
architypical computer risk, in that it is an overly simple and misleading
model of the situation.
The conversation I had with my friend makes a lot of sense to me, and the
above somewhat vague stuff about the angle of attack does not. It could be
I'm just missing something obvious, but I stand by my earlier position.
The desire for safety stands against every great and noble enterprise.
--- Tacitus
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Date: Thu, 25 Sep 1986 09:46 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: indiscriminate weapons
From: S.WILSON%UK.AC.EDINBURGH at ac.uk
I don't remember what the current situation with regard to the deployment
of the neutron bomb (sorry, enhanced radiation weapon) is, but doesn't that
'automatically' discriminate against human beings rather than hardware?
No. The neutron bomb has less blast (so it is less lethal to
structures) and more radiation (so it is more lethal to people). No
discrimination involved.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 25 Sep 1986 09:49 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Comment on an editorial comment
From: Eugene miya <eugene at ames-aurora.arpa>
Some physicists and generals argue that we should demonstrate the
"amesome destructive power" of nuclear weapons by publicly exploding
one every few years, for politicans, and that the amount of released
radiation (has to be a surface shot) would be worth avoiding nuclear war.
I personally think it will have an opposite effect for some. Foot stepping
on nail.
I agree with the pro-demonstration sentiments. In the aftermath of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there was a proposal to not rebuild Hiroshima,
and to hold all future international talks on the prevention of war
amidst its ruins. The idea was rejected, because it would "make
leaders feel too uncomfortable."
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 25 Sep 86 9:45:12 EDT
From: Bruce Nevin <bnevin@cch.bbn.com>
Subject: editorial comments
The editorial comments in the resubmission of Lynn Gazis's piece
were mine. I should have labelled them with my initials--sorry
if I have caused confusion.
Bruce
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 25 Sep 86 10:26:15 pdt
From: Eugene miya <eugene@ames-aurora.arpa>
Subject: Minor point of info: re: rail guns for drilling tunnels
The major problem of drilling a tunnel is not the drilling, but
maintaining the structure after drilling. Drilling, exposives, impact
rail guns all weaken crust structure. Drilling technology is working
away from explosives. References will probably be more available as
English Channel tunnel plans firm up (maybe Science 86 had an article
already).
From the Rock of Ages Home for Retired Hackers:
--eugene miya
NASA Ames Research Center
eugene@ames-aurora.ARPA
"You trust the `reply' command with all those different mailers out there?"
{hplabs,hao,nike,ihnp4,decwrl,allegra,tektronix,menlo70}!ames!aurora!eugene
------------------------------
Date: 25 Sep 86 15:47:25 EDT (Thursday)
From: MJackson.Wbst@Xerox.COM
Subject: Re: Nova/Frontline program
In V7 #19 Robert Elton Maas writes:
". . . .[Reagan] wants to stop ICBMs now, and later move ahead against
other delivery methods. That seems to me quite reasonable (assuming the
whole idea works at all and isn't destabilizing of course). I think it
would be a straw man for us to say that Reagan plans to stop ICBMs only.
We should admit that stopping ICBMs is only stage one of Reagan's plan."
Fair point. Conversely, those arguing the case against SDI can fairly
insist on disclosure of plans and expense estimates for what Reagan has
in mind to do the rest of the job of rendering thermonuclear weapons
"impotent and obsolete." The problem of effective population defense
against SLBMs and cruise missiles might even make SDI look cheap and
easy...
Mark
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 25 Sep 1986 17:11 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Administrivia
==>> Someone please note this item.
Date: Thursday, 25 September 1986 13:06-EDT
From: harvard!MAILER-DAEMON at tezcatlipoca.CSS.GOV
To: <XX.LCS.MIT.EDU!ARMS-D-Request at tezcatlipoca.CSS.GOV>
Re: Returned mail: unknown mailer error 255
----- Transcript of session follows -----
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----- Unsent message follows -----
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Date: Thu 25 Sep 86 17:42:50-EDT
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: MIT Symposium on economic impact of military spending
The following seminar, sponsored by MIT, should also be of interest
to Risks and Arms-D Readers. Note that both John Kenneth Galbraith
and Seymour Melman are on the program.
November Symposium: "What are the effects of military spending?"
MIT Technology and Culture Seminar
Saturday, November 1, 1986
9am-3pm, MIT Room 26-100
Topics:
Bernard O'Keefe
--Chairman of the Executive Committee, EG&G, Inc.
"Are we focusing on the military confrontation with the USSR
while ignoring the trade war with the Japanese?"
Seymour Melman,
--Professor of Industrial Engineering, Columbia University
"Do present rates of military spending make capital effectively
available for civilian industry?"
Alice Tepper-Martin,
--Executive Director, Council on Economic Priorities
"If military spending is "only" about six or seven percent of the
GNP, why worry?"
Frederick Salvucci
--Secretary of Transportation and Construction for Massachusetts
"Where will the funds for our national infrastructure come from?"
Barry Bluestone
--Professor of Economics, Boston University
"The arms race and unemployment."
John Kenneth Galbraith
--Professor of Economics, Harvard University
"Does the military-industrial complex really exist, and what is its impact?"
------------------------------
Date: Thu 25 Sep 86 19:06:05-EDT
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Re: Phil and SDI
Dale Amon said in digest #392 that his decision on SDI has been
; based on researching and studying the topic over several years, and it
; is unlikely anyone here will come up with something I haven't heard and
; discounted three years ago.
However, I don't see how he can arrive at a decision unless he knows
what the goals of the program are -- which he never mentions.
1) If the goal is to develop a perfect shield against
nuclear weapons, then even the director of the SDI program, General
Abrahamson, has said in several speeches that "A perfect astrodome
defense is an unrealistic thing." It is clear that the right-wingers
don't really care about a perfect shield anyway; Newsweek reported a
few weeks ago that neoconservative senators are pushing for a partial
deployment real soon, apparently to milk some money out of the program
before the rising tide of criticism kills it.
2) I assume that Dale's goal is to develop a partially effective defense
against ICBM's. I agree with him on his criticism of scientists, but he
assumes that SDI is an engineering problem:
; we may not have the equations for anti-missile defense down
; yet, but my engineering sense tells me it can be done, and that it
; is worth doing.
I claim that SDI is only partly an engineering problem, and that THE
ENGINEERING PART IS IRRELEVANT! Basically, the Soviets exist. Therefore,
they will respond to SDI to preserve their ability to deter if we build an
SDI. The Soviet engineering necessary to avoid or destroy a U.S. SDI is
trivial -- a bucket of sand in retrograde orbit will do. If you want SDI,
first explain to me how to solve THE POLITICAL PROBLEM: the Soviets exist
and will act in their own best interests to stop SDI deployment.
3) If the goal is to protect against a Soviet breakout from the ABM
treaty (which either side may do with 6 months notice), then I say he
does not have ENOUGH confidence in American Technology. I have enough
confidence to assert that a $50 million research program in a skunk works
(like MIT's Lincoln Lab) is all that is needed to counter any
conceivable Soviet threat. I base this not on my own estimates of the
Soviet SDI program, but of the US government's estimates. [See
Congressional Record, Senate, August 4-5, 1986 for 50 pages of SDI debate
which include the estimates of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.]
----
Three other rebuttals:
; There are also quite a large number of people who think [SDI] is the
; only morally and ethically concievable way of defending ourselves.
There is quite a large number of people who will make a lot of money if
SDI funding continues. It is only human nature for these people to
justify what they do by claiming it will defend "us." (Substitute "the
military industry" for "ourselves")
; I can't accept a world in which defense means threatening to immolate
; millions of Russian men, women and children who have little say in the
; aggressive policies of 'their' government.
But American people also have little say. They have a say through elected
representatives, but they have no say in the Council on Foreign Relations,
the Defense Science Board, the Institute for Defense Analysis, and other
groups which act as a conduit for policy decisions based on economic
considerations which are LARGELY REMOVED FROM THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. The
US system may be more democratic, but the US population is also controlled,
when you consider how the mass media (especially television!) narrows the
debate and ratifies the existing distribution of power by trying hard to
avoid giving credence to "controversial" positions. [see Deadline,
September 1986 -- a new magazine on the media and the arms race, reprinted
in the back of the October 1986 "Nuclear Times"]
; There has got to be a better way to protect our right to be left
; alone, and it is worth trying to make it real.
Finally, the idea that the US is merely trying to be "left alone" and is
leaving the affairs of other countries alone is also absurd. The United
States spends the majority of its military budget overseas because we have
many economic interests abroad, threatened not just by Soviet imperialism
but also by the prospect that popular, democratic revolution will reduce
our return on investments (in Haiti, for example). There is a better way to
protect our right to be left alone, and that is to leave others alone!
-rich
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 25 Sep 86 16:48:06 PDT
From: jon@june.cs.washington.edu (Jon Jacky)
Subject: Book recommendation
Many subscribers to this digest would be interested in reading a fine book,
THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SPACE AGE by Walter
A. McDougall, Basic Books, Inc., 1985. This book won the 1986 Pulitzer
Prize for history and has just appeared in paperback (at $11.95; not cheap,
but it is 555 large pages).
The book most intensively covers the early space age, from the allies discovery
of German rocket technology in 1945, through Sputnik, up to the American
decision to go to the moon in the early 1960's. However, the scope is much
larger than that, and touches on many matters relevant to this digest. There
is a lot about Soviet science from the time of the czars through the entire
Soviet era. There is a lot about the development of US and Soviet strategic
weapons, both technology and policy, ever since WWII. It is dense with informa
tion, but a pleasure to read.
The author's theme is that the Soviet Union was the world's first technocracy.
Not that the scientists ran the country, but that the state assumed total
control of all scientific and technologic effort to accomplish political goals.
Sputnik and Vostok were the most spectacular successes of Soviet technocracy;
the author argues that they were anomalous and are unlikely to be repeated.
The author argues that rivalry with the Soviets has largely turned the US
into a technocracy too; here, as well, the Federal government directs science
and engineering to accomplish political goals, on a scale undreamt before WWII.
The author argues that Sputnik and the space race which followed played a very
important role in legitimizing federal management of science, technology, and
pretty much everything else, in the eyes of almost all political factions in
the US. He is very admiring of Eisenhower, portraying him rather poignantly
as the skeptic who kept his wits while the press and the Democrats (particularly
Lyndon Johnson) outdid Kruschev in whipping the American public into a frenzy
over Sputnik.
Whether or not you find this thesis convincing, you will find the book a
valuable source of information, and enjoyable as well.
-Jonathan Jacky
University of Washington
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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