ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (10/10/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Friday, October 10, 1986 11:40AM
Volume 7, Issue 29
Today's Topics:
Re: defenses against nuclear weapons
Phil and SDI
"We have only begun to research the ICBM defense problem"??!!
Hazards of lost nuclear weapons
How dangerous are autonomous weapons?
Bias
Re: Strategic Deception
Trump cards Vs. Broad brushes (several messages)
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Date: 09-Oct-1986 1247
From: jong%derep.DEC@decwrl.DEC.COM (Steve Jong/NaC Pubs)
Subject: Re: defenses against nuclear weapons
In ARMS-D V7 #28, Gary Chapman mentions "R&D programs
investigating the interdiction of cruise missiles, depressed
trajectory SLBMs, tactical missiles, etc." In the same issue, Marc
Vilain reported that General Abrahamson suggested (in the
Ford Hall Forum) that such defenses would be much easier than
defense against strategic missiles.
What about that? While the U.S. and the Soviet Union have been
actively defending themselves against airborne attack for over
forty years, I thought the U.S., at least, wasn't too serious
about it. I would have thought that applying the rigorous
Star Wars limit of "rendering nuclear weapons impotent and
obsolete" is just about impossible, even against manned bombers.
Adding cruise missiles to the calculations, with their relative
abundance and tricky flight paths, I'd have thought the problem
to be on a par with ICBM defense for sheer difficulty.
Further, would the appropriations for ICBM defense carry over
at all to this new layer of the SDI? I've always thought that
Star Wars, bad as it was, would be even worse if it started
a new arms race in bombers/fighters and then subs/destroyers.
Will we loose not one but several military-industrial mouths
to feed? (You know -- a trillion for Star Wars, half a trillion
for Air Wars, another few hundred billion for Sea Wars, and
pretty soon the government starts bouncing checks...)
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 9 Oct 1986 13:28 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Phil and SDI
; ; There are also quite a large number of people who think [SDI] is the
; ; only morally and ethically concievable way of defending ourselves.
;
; From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN>
; There is quite a large number of people who will make a lot of money if
; SDI funding continues. It is only human nature for these people to
; justify what they do by claiming it will defend "us."
;
; From: Herb Lin <LIN>
; These two aren't inconsistent. It's a red herring to claim that the
; only ones who think the U.S. should buy weapons are those who will
; profit from it.
.. I do not claim that the ONLY
people who think the US should buy weapons are the ones that profit
from it.
I don't think I am "wildly exaggerating" your argument. Certainly the
way your response reads suggests that the two sets of people are
roughly equivalent. I agree that my conclusion is not formally
correct, but you certainly give that impression, and I believe you did
so knowingly.
On non-SDI systems, which do you believe has received significant
academic support? This is an informational question, not a challenge.
; ; There has got to be a better way to protect our right to be left
; ; alone, and it is worth trying to make it real.
;
; Finally, the idea that the US is merely trying to be "left alone" and is
; leaving the affairs of other countries alone is also absurd.
; ... There is a better way to
; protect our right to be left alone, and that is to leave others alone!
;
; These two statements are not inconsistent. We do need military force
; to protect our right to be left alone, and we also should not use
; military force to the extent that we do to bother others. Force
; should be the option of last resort, not the option of first resort
; and not an unacceptable option.
Again, you are characterizing me as absolutely opposed to any military
force.
I did not make any such statement about you. In fact, I agreed with
you (in spirit) when you say we should leave others alone.
That is not so; I agree that there are situations for which
the US military serves a legitimate defensive purpose.
Good. What would you characterize as a legitimate defensive purpose?
I should
mention that it is not just the USE of military force that I was
talking about, but also the THREAT of its use, which has bothered
others by enabling the US to enter
into agreements with those countries that are more favorable to us
than would be the case without our military edge.
Please describe a couple.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 9 Oct 1986 13:31 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: "We have only begun to research the ICBM defense problem"??!!
From: jon at june.cs.washington.edu (Jon Jacky)
> (Maas writes) It may be too early for anyone to make plans or
> solid cost estimates, considering we have only begun to research the ICBM
> defense problem
We have NOT "only begun" to research ICBM and other strategic
defense. The US has been doing ICBM defense research since the
mid-1950's.
By the calendar, we have not just begun the ICBM defense problem, but
intellectually we have (if that!).
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 9 Oct 1986 13:41 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Hazards of lost nuclear weapons
From: Doug Urner <dlu%tektools.tek.csnet at CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
... the penguins had
probably died due to radiation poisoning from radioactive materials
(weapons) that were aboard one or more of the British that were lost
in the Falklands war. The weapons were probably nuclear depth charges
according to the report.
I have heard from people who claim that they were in a position to
know that the British contemplated the use of nuclear depth charges
to kill an Argentine submarine, but were dissuaded from this by the
U.S., who pointed out that the use of a nuclear depth charge would be
known the world over.
I cannot substantiate these comments; place place my report in the
category of hearsay.
I have a hard time believing that the nuclear warheads dissolved away.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 9 Oct 86 11:08:49 PDT
From: ihnp4!ihuxl!dcn@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Subject: How dangerous are autonomous weapons?
Our list of autonomous weapons now includes mines and booby traps,
unexploded ordnance, and the new fire & forget missiles. Any of
these can indiscriminately kill civilians who enter the combat zone.
I am not sure of the threat that new `intelligent' autonomous weapons
might pose. Will they be humanoid predators like the Terminator, or
frontier guards that resemble pillboxes? I doubt that a replacement
for human troops can be implemented in the forseeable future, so the
Terminator is unlikely to become a reality. As Rob Horn stated,
the emotional response to advanced autonomous weapons will depend
on its design. People are killed by dangerous animals, but these risks
are accepted as natural, and some countermeasures are available.
A `un-natural' predator may create an irrational fear.
The autonomous weapon designs I know about are limited to the booby-trap
type which are dropped into the path of the enemy, which should not
be cause for much comment, even if they are smarter than a mine.
A more ambitious weapon, perhaps based on the autonomously piloted
vehicle, would be more threatening, especially if it wandered out of
the combat zone or stumbled across civilians trying to escape the battle.
The primary problem seems to be how to make the machine tell friend
from foe. Uniforms help, but if each side is in camouflage gear, they
would look almost identical, and civilians might be wearing anything.
Sometimes, all you know is that the enemy is within a certain area, and
you try to kill everything there.
So, do the new autonomous weapons increase the risk to the civilian in
or near the combat zone? Yes, I suppose the risk is slightly higher,
but insignificant compared to the risk of nuclear weapons. Will the
new weapons create an uproar about killing machines? Probably not, if
people accept mines and all the other weapons we already have.
Dave Newkirk, ihnp4!ihuxl!dcn
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 9 Oct 86 15:14:06 PDT
From: Peter O. Mikes <pom@s1-c.arpa>
Subject: Bias
> bias
>
> While on the subject of bias in media, an exchange I had with
> Herb Lin recently may be relevant:
>
> [cowan@xx]
> US system may be more democratic, but the US population is
> also controlled,.... when you consider how the mass media
>
> [lin@xx]
> were reluctant (but ultimately willing) to accept all of my
> qualifiers, looking instead for journalistic "punch".
>
> Comments?
>
I find that 'US population is ALSO controlled' a little too symetrical.
The originator of the message is always biased - either he is promoting
an issue or he is trying to sell the paper. The best anti-dote to that
is so called Freedom of the Press, which rather then prescribing to the
originator HOW TO AVOID THE BIAS allows anybody to originate his own
message with his own bias. This happens to be the difference between
US and SU. You indeed can xerox your own message and pass it in the
shoping center and/or mail it to anybody willing to pay your price.
You cannot do that in the Soviet Union. As a result, the level of the
public discussion and awarness of political issues is quite different
in SU and 'ALSO controlled' US.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 9 Oct 86 19:31:34 pdt
From: weemba@brahms.Berkeley.EDU (Matthew P Wiener)
Subject: Re: Strategic Deception
In reply to Wayne McGuire <Wayne%OZ.AI.MIT.EDU@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>:
Wayne lists three examples of false and/or sloppy intelligence by our
government, concerning the recent Khadafy disinformation campaign, KAL
007, and the Libyan "hit team", and then says:
> (4) James Bamford, author of _The Puzzle Palace_, a popular study of
>the National Security Agency, recently commented in _The Boston Globe_ that
>the Administration seriously compromised intelligence methods by providing
>details about how communications were intercepted pertaining to the
>terrorist bombing of a discotheque in Germany, the proximate cause of our
>bombing of Tripoli, but failed to release the content of those
>communications so that objective analysts could determine whether they did
>indeed implicate without a doubt the Libyan government in this terrorist
>incident.
I am very puzzled by the above paragraph. Are you asking for even further
intelligence compromising?
> Question 1: doesn't one begin to see a fairly consistent pattern of
>deception here, and doesn't it raise some serious questions about what is
>its purpose, who benefits, and what is a judicious use of intelligence
>information in policy-making?
Yes, if you restrict yourself to the first three examples. But the
Libyan bombing raid is clearly distinct from the other three. First,
our reaction was not limited to rhetoric and propaganda. And more
significantly, our intelligence was shared with our European allies,
who agreed with our evaluation. Their objections were limited to our
reaction. (They are not satraps, either. Consider, as another ex-
ample of deceptive intelligence by our government, the stupid "yellow
rain ?= bee feces" flap. The Canadians and British results were con-
trary to ours.)
In this situation, I consider our allies' concurrence a sufficient
substitute for "objective analysts".
> Question 2: [...]]
> what American citizens during the last decade have
>been the targets of terrorist attacks by the Libyan government or its
>surrogates? Names and particulars, please.
The German discotheque!
ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 9 Oct 1986 13:15 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Trump Cards vs. Broad Brushes
> The insiders always have that trump card in any argument: "Classified
> information that you haven't seen and I can't tell you about proves
> you're wrong."
From: Lin
> I disagree that this is always a trump card. Details are classified,
> but broad brush strokes are not. The really fundamental arguments
> turn on broad brush strokes.
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe.Stanford.Edu>
Then please tell me how I can find out whether the President has
contingency-predelegated the use of nuclear weapons, and, in
broad-brush terms, to whom and under what contingencies?
REASON dictates that the President must have delegated authority to
use nuclear weapons. To imagine otherwise is to assume that no
National Command Authority is concerned about the availability of an
authorized President-equivalent in the event of fast-breaking crisis.
Thus, I don't believe that this issue is fundamental, in the sense
that it is necessary to know, in microscopic detail, just who has
those powers.
------------------------------
Date: Thursday, 9 October 1986 15:28-EDT
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe.Stanford.Edu>
To: LIN
Re: Trump cards vs. Broad brushes
> REASON.... powers.
If this is so, why isn't the fact of predelegation conceded? Why
must we be left to *imagine* that predelegation exists? I agree
that it exists, but we know because of several leaks, not because of
reason. But last year, when confronted with this question, Donald
Latham, the head of the DOD's C3I programs, insisted that no
delegation had occurred, and the civil line of succession applied in
a crisis. He even inserted the Presidential succession
act in the congressional record:
"I can assure you that the hypothetical situation you mentioned
(President unavailable, SLBM attack on D.C.) where somehow the
President and Vice-President were incapacitated, that there is a
very well thought through program capability to track legal
successors and make sure that there is civilian authority in
control of the system..."
"The list you are talking about, is that classified?"
"No, sir, it is the public law."
(3 U.S.C. Section 19 inserted in record.)
(Latham quotes were from Our Nation's Nuclear Warning System,
House Gov't Operations Cmt., Sep 26, 1985, pp.109-113.)
So - they won't by hook or crook even admit predelegation. Yet,
I agree with you, that sense and leaks dictate its existence.
But, and this is the fundamental ignorance I complain of, we have
no broad-brush official descriptions of this predelegation. For
example, is there a launch on warning capability geared to the
SLBM decapitation scenario? Can ERCS be launched and preprogrammed
to robotically launch the ICBMs in the event that LCCs go dead?
Isn't the nature of such authorizations so vital that the public
should know enough to appreciate the level of risks accepted, which
of course the military insist to be zero (e.g. accidental launch
"impossible" - Latham last year).
------------------------------
Date: Thursday, 9 October 1986 17:41-EDT
From: LIN
To: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at FORSYTHE.STANFORD.EDU>
Re: Trump cards vs. Broad brushes
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe.Stanford.Edu>
If this is so, why isn't the fact of predelegation conceded? Why
must we be left to *imagine* that predelegation exists?
The U.S. government will not necessarily acknowledge everything
explicitly, especially when it would create a storm of public
controversey.
I agree
that it exists, but we know because of several leaks, not because of
reason.
If you were designing a system to insure retaliation, what would you
do? I can't imagine anything else!
But, and this is the fundamental ignorance I complain of, we have
no broad-brush official descriptions of this predelegation.
Why does it have to be official? If logic calls for it, either those
responsible have done it or they haven't. If they have, then logic
correctly predicts what has been done. If they haven't, then all the
usual public things they say apply, and you can make your inferences
from there. I think they have, since they aren't dumb.
For example, is there a launch on warning capability geared to the
SLBM decapitation scenario? Can ERCS be launched and preprogrammed
to robotically launch the ICBMs in the event that LCCs go dead?
These are questions of detail, and you have not yet proven your case
(at least, not to me) that detailed answers or knowledge will make a
difference in any fundamental way.
------------------------------
Date: Thursday, 9 October 1986 19:09-EDT
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe.Stanford.Edu>
To: LIN
Re: Trump cards Vs. Broad brushes
> The U.S. government will not necessarily acknowledge everything
> explicitly, especially when it would create a storm of public
> controversey.
That proves that it's a matter that should be debated, surely.
> For example, is there a launch on warning... that LCCs go dead?
>
> These are questions of detail...
> ... any fundamental way.
Here's what I've got together on predelegation - note I strongly
disagree that it's adequate public information. What you call
"details" are whether there's a 2-minute versus 6-minute decision
time in place, and whether robot launch on warning exists. These are
ball-games, not particular plays, we should know of.
That CINCSAC possesses nuclear release codes is supposed to be a
secret, but it is a fact not doubted by experts. Note also the
report "At the headquarters of Strategic Air Command in Omaha,
Nebraska, we were shown the red metal boxes, secured with padlocks,
where the war codes and plans are kept." (SIOP, Arkin & Pringle,
1983, p.13.) Further, how else construe then Secretary of Defense
Schlesinger's remark that a first strike on Washington by the Soviets
could "leave them at the tender mercies of CINCSAC"? (Treatment Of
Escalation In The RAND Strategy Assessment Center, RAND N-1969-DNA,
1983, at 35.) Likewise, in a 1980 Senate hearing, William Perry, the
number three man in the Defense Department, replied to Senator Gary
Hart's question "In other words, whether the President or Washington,
D.C. exists, the Soviets are still going to be hit?" with "That is
correct." (SIOP, supra, at 207.)
In-the-know experts uniformly assert that the public can be
reasonably assured that members of the JCS have the independent
physical capability to release nuclear weapons, and some have spoken
out; moreover, submarine crews may autonomously launch their missiles
if communications are cut, as can the so-called "Looking Glass"
permanently airborne command post, and as could Minuteman launch
control officers in the event of Strategic Air Command being
destroyed. (See, e.g., The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces,
Bracken, at 198-201,228-229; The Button, by Daniel Ford (1985), at
141-146,151-152; SIOP, supra, at 160-1,207-9,215; First Use, March
1976 House Int'l Security Subcmt congressional report at 37,49,79,92;
Our Nation's Nuclear Warning System, supra, at 24; note that the
latter citations make such delegation a matter of official public
record.)
For example, Ellsberg stated that authority to launch nuclear weapons
had been delegated to "six or seven three- and four-star generals,"
reporting that in 1961 he had uncovered in the White House signed
letters from the President to each of the unified and specified
commanders authorizing the use of nuclear weapons in specific
emergency conditions. (New York Times, Nov 4, 1977, at A9, and
Conservation Press, 1980, at 2.) Recognizing this, in talking of the
United States response to a decapitation attack, Senator Warner
observed: "I think the Soviets have a better idea than the Americans
as to how we would handle the question of command and control under
these circumstances. I guess they know somebody will survive who
will have the authority to execute the forces." (Senate Armed
Services Committee, DOD Appropriations FY 83, pt.7, at 4691.) Indeed,
the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff retained at least one copy of
the codes enabling launch of the United States' nuclear arsenal
became public knowledge after the assassination attempt on President
Reagan, as confirmed by Secretary Orr at that time:
Mr. YOUNG: (L)et's say that no civilian authority for whatever the
reason is able to respond, is there a military authority that could
function?
Sec ORR: I will leave that to the General, because that
would have to be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, if there is any
military authority entitled to function.
Gen. ALLEN: Only the President has the authority to make those
kinds of decisions (nuclear launch) and, there, the basic
answer is no.
Mr. YOUNG: The basic answer is no. What is the real answer?
Gen. ALLEN: Well, the real answer is no, unless one chooses to
imagine scenarios in which large numbers of nuclear weapons have
actually dropped on the United States...
Sec ORR: I don't think anybody ever gave the command at Pearl
Harbor that we were at war.
(House Armed Services Committee, DOD Appropriations FY 1982, at 254.)
After the assassination attempt, the FBI assumed custody of the
President's set of codes.
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 10 Oct 1986 11:38 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Trump cards Vs. Broad brushes
> The U.S. government will not necessarily acknowledge everything
> explicitly, especially when it would create a storm of public
> controversey.
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe.Stanford.Edu>
That proves that it's a matter that should be debated, surely.
I'm not sure where I stand on this one, but that wasn't the issue.
The point is that I claim that the details you are describing don't
matter in a fundamental way. You posed a rhetorical question -- if it
stands to reason, why don't they acknowlege it? I responded. Neither
is responsive to my original point.
> These are questions of detail, and you have not yet proven your case
> (at least, not to me) that detailed answers or knowledge will make a
> difference in any fundamental way.
Here's what I've got together on predelegation...
... not particular plays, we should know of.
My claim stands. You haven't said how detailed knowledge makes a
difference one way or another in a fundamental way. I agree it is
probably inadequate, and I would like to see more, but that is besides
the point.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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