ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (10/12/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Sunday, October 12, 1986 12:50PM
Volume 7, Issue 31
Today's Topics:
"We have only begun to research the ICBM defense problem"??!!
too much security not a good thing?
Defenses against weapons other than ICBMs
Strategic Deception
Bias
too much security not a good thing?
"Superman complex" -- devoiding war of troops is dangerous
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Date: Sat, 11 Oct 1986 15:43 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: "We have only begun to research the ICBM defense problem"??!!
From: jon at june.cs.washington.edu (Jon Jacky)
Re: "We have only begun to research the ICBM defense problem"??!!
> (You say) By the calender we have not just begun, but intellectually we
> have (if that!)
No, I can't believe this either. FOr one thing, its incomplete - by the
BANK BOOK we haven't just begun. A Safeguard site was actually built
and was at least nominally in operation for a couple of years.
Sorry; I should have been more precise. We don't know much about how
to build survivable and cost-effective population defenses, but you
are of course correct when you say we know about terminal defenses.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 11 Oct 1986 15:45 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: too much security not a good thing?
From: ESTELL ROBERT G <estell at nwc-143b.ARPA>
For instance, it has always confused me that we are
developing something called "MX" at some risk and some expense; and at the
same time de-commissioning older Trident subs.
Trident subs are the new ones, being built now. Poseidon subs are the
ones being put away, and turned into other uses.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 11 Oct 86 12:54:24 pdt
From: Gary Chapman <chapman@russell.stanford.edu>
Subject: Defenses against weapons other than ICBMs
Steve Jong asked a few questions regarding the potential for defending the
United States against warheads delivered by means other than ICBM such as cruise
missile, depressed trajectory SLBM, etc.
Conservative military analysts are saying that it is possible to build a defensse
against cruise missiles, primarily because the air-breathing cruise missiles are
relatively slow flying. The problem is finding them. So the task is to develop
radars that can trk such low-flying, contour-flying objects, which is probably
not an insurmountable technical problem.
The more serious obstacle to developing such a defense would be the cost. It
would essentially be an additional $50-$100 billion on top of any costs for a
space-based defensive system directed against ICBMs.Critics of such a proposed
air defense system for the entire continental U.S. point out that cruise miss-
siles usually have to be launched from platforms such as ships or bombers, and
it's cheaper and easier to intercept the platforms before they get within
launch range than to get the cruise missiles once they're in flight.
As for SLBMs, the main defense against these is anti-submarine warfare. Navy
Secretary Lehman remarked a few months ago that he wished all the Soviet subs
would station themselves off the mid-Atlantic coast (as one had done at the
time) because then we'd know exactly where they all were. Of course if one
decided to let fly with a battery of missiles, there wouldn't be much we could
do about it without a terminal defense at the target or a very fast and very
accurate interceptor missile, but then the same missiles used for cruise missile
defense might be used against these (as some say the new Soviet missiles in th
their air defense system are capable of).
As Marc Vilain noted, the Air Force is also confident it can track with abso-
lute accuracy all aircraft approaching the U.S. (with Teal Ruby), and these
would be intercepted either by interceptor aircraft or air defense missiles.
Finally, I heard Robert Jastrow speak in person in San Francisco and he was
asked how the U.S. could make itself safe from nuclear weapons if they could
be smuggled across the border like drug shipments. Jastrow said that the
President has wisely decided to defend the U.S. against the most dangerous
threat we face--Soviet ICBMs--but that once this threat had been eliminated by
SDI, "we could spend a couple more billion and close our borders tighter than a
drum!"
This gives you some idea of the long-range plans of the most ardent supporters
of the SDI.
-- Gary Chapman
------------------------------
Date: 11 Oct 1986 16:41 EDT (Sat)
From: Wayne McGuire <Wayne%OZ.AI.MIT.EDU@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Strategic Deception
Date: Thu, 9 Oct 86 19:31:34 pdt
From: weemba@brahms.Berkeley.EDU (Matthew P Wiener)
(4) James Bamford, author of _The Puzzle Palace_, a
popular study of the National Security Agency, recently commented
in _The Boston Globe_ that the Administration seriously
compromised intelligence methods by providing details about how
communications were intercepted pertaining to the terrorist
bombing of a discotheque in Germany, the proximate cause of our
bombing of Tripoli, but failed to release the content of those
communications so that objective analysts could determine whether
they did indeed implicate without a doubt the Libyan government
in this terrorist incident.
I am very puzzled by the above paragraph. Are you asking for even further
intelligence compromising?
I should have been more clear about Bamford's point. I don't have his essay
before me, but as I recall his argument was that the grievous injury to
intelligence methods and sources in this case (and this is only one of a number
of cases like this, in which the Administration has compromised sensitive
information to score a political point in the ideological heat of the moment)
was the consequence of exposing specific information channels and
communications we were able to monitor and decrypt. Armed with this knowledge,
it was then a trivial matter for the Libyan government to tighten its security
and upgrade its codes, and remove from our view a valuable window on their
secret planning and activities. Revealing the actual content of the
intercepted communication would have added not at all to this initial damage,
and would have to put to rest the widespread skepticism in this country and in
Western Europe about the credibility of the Administration on this issue. Why,
then, hasn't the Administration released the content of the intercept, when
they were far more reckless in revealing its _source_? Could it be that the
intercept is not the ironclad evidence the Administration claims it is, and was
used as part of an on-going disinformation campaign that may have begun years
ago?
But the Libyan bombing raid is clearly distinct from the other
three [examples]. First, our reaction was not limited to
rhetoric and propaganda. And more significantly, our
intelligence was shared with our European allies, who agreed with
our evaluation.... In this situation, I consider our allies'
concurrence a sufficient substitute for "objective analysts".
But according to accounts I read in a number of major newspapers, there was
considerable dissension among European security specialists about the
significance of this intercept. By no means was there unanimity about this
evidence in European capitals.
... what American citizens during the last decade have been
the targets of terrorist attacks by the Libyan government or its
surrogates? Names and particulars, please.
The German discotheque!
The proof that this is so appears to be rather flimsy, but you are missing the
bigger picture. Isn't it rather extraordinary, after years of witnessing
elements of the American mass media whip up hysteria about the terrorist threat
which Khadafy presented to the U.S., that this is the only terrorist incident
you can point to? And that this recent event, if it was indeed masterminded by
Khadafy, occurred only _after_ the Administration engaged in a deliberate and
sustained campaign to goad and provoke the Libyan government into violent
action?
Something smells fishy in all this, particularly after the disinformation
revelations of Seymour Hersh and Bob Woodward. One possible explanation: the
neoconservative faction in the Administration has made an enormous investment
in promoting the proposition that "the West" (Israel and the U.S. for the most
part) is locked in an apocalyptic war to the death with a monolithic
international terrorist network whose chief representatives are usually defined
as Arabs and Moslems. Neoconservatives often go so far as to argue that we
should attack (in self-defense, of course) Syria and Iran, as well as Libya.
One must begin to wonder whether getting on with this war has become such an
urgent concern for the neocons and their traditional conservative allies that
they are--as in the case of false reports about Libyan "hit teams" in the
U.S.--willing to use disinformation--including the _manufacture_ of
evidence--to push us over the brink into a military confrontation which could
rapidly escalate into a world war. I am surprised that more searching
questions are not being asked about what could prove to be such a fateful
policy.
------------------------------
From: decvax!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Sat, 11 Oct 86 23:48:50 edt
Subject: Bias
> I find that 'US population is ALSO controlled' a little too symetrical.
The situation isn't particularly symmetrical, but it is not completely
lopsided either. There are genuine systematic biases in the major news
media, which cannot really be adequately countered by the existence of
opposite biases in much less conspicuous media.
> ... Freedom of the Press...
As the Soviets would undoubtedly be delighted to point out, "Freedom of
the Press" really means that whoever pays for the printing press, prints
what he pleases. The ability to hand out or mail leaflets does not give
Joe Doakes anywhere near the audience and influence possessed by, say,
Walter Cronkite. On almost any issue, the public will give Cronkite's
views more weight.
> ...You indeed can xerox your own message and pass it in the
> shoping center...
If you try this in your local shopping center, you will rapidly make the
acquaintance of the center's security people. Shopping centers are private
property, and activities there are subject to the consent of the owners.
Even if you use a street corner instead, it's possible that you will find
out the hard way that you need a city license.
The Land Of The Free is a lot less free than it used to be.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
PS: Just so people don't think I'm being anti-American, I should observe
that Canada has always preferred order to freedom.
------------------------------
From: decvax!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Sat, 11 Oct 86 23:48:56 edt
Subject: too much security not a good thing?
> You wonder if maybe other countries have similar inter-service problems?
> Maybe, yes; maybe, no. For instance, it has always confused me that we are
> developing something called "MX" at some risk and some expense; and at the
> same time de-commissioning older Trident subs. In my naive way, I sorta
> thought Trident was "mx."...
The USAF was very insistent that MX be the biggest missile permitted by
the SALT limitations. The official reason is maximum throw weight, but it
is widely believed that a more important unofficial reason was to make the
USAF requirement incompatible with Trident. MX is too big to fit in the
launch tubes of a submarine, and its spec could not be met by anything
which would. A less demanding spec would almost certainly have resulted
in the USAF being ordered to use Trident 2 as its heavy ICBM.
Actually, the decommissioning of older subs is partly to remain within
SALT limits, and partly because sub hulls have a limited fatigue life.
The USN is hurting badly from "block obsolescence": the Polaris subs were
built in a single high-production-rate program, so they all went into
service at about the same time, and they are all wearing out at about the
same time.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: 1986 October 12 06:53:21 PST (=GMT-8hr)
From: Robert Elton Maas <REM%IMSSS@SU-AI.ARPA>
Subject:"Superman complex" -- devoiding war of troops is dangerous
The following message was what finally prompted my idea of relating the
"Superman complex" (let Superman do everything instead of doing it ourselves
by joint effort) to some current military ideas (see below; Note that JJ is
disturbed by these ideas too. Thus I am rebutting Lowell Wood et al,
concurring with and expanding upon JJ):
JJ> Date: Fri, 26 Sep 86 11:22:09 PDT
JJ> From: jon@june.cs.washington.edu (Jon Jacky)
JJ> Subject: Autonomous weapons - source material and observations
JJ> I think it is important to report some statements by current and former
JJ> US government officials regarding autonomous weapons. ... These statements
JJ> also show that that robot weapons are motivated not so much by military
JJ> needs as by domestic political pressures of various kinds.
...
JJ> Motivation: the nakedest statement appears in a very interesting 1981 paper
JJ> by Lowell Wood, titled "Conceptual basis for defense applications of super-
JJ> computers." In this paper, Wood proposes applying S-1 architecture
JJ> computers built with wafer-scale integration technology in various
JJ> battlefield weapons. He opens the paper with the provocative question,
JJ> "What if they gave a war and no American had to come?" He continues:
JJ> Not only does the political cost of large armed forces continue to
JJ> climb, but the political toll of deploying them in harm's way has
JJ> become almost unbearably high. The economic consequences of large
JJ> American armed forces are nearly as daunting... These considerations
JJ> suggest that the US move to alter its defense posture toward one
JJ> involving substantially fewer men under arms and far smaller casualty
JJ> rates and total casualties in the event of hostilities, while
JJ> simultaneously attaining sufficiently greater overall force
JJ> effectivenes ... Is this possible? It is suggested here that this is
JJ> possible by aggressive use of battlefield robotics.
JJ> This theme of using fewer troops runs throughout. It is being promulgated
JJ> to the naive public.
JJ> ... Echoing Wood, the exhibit included the quote from Carl Sandburg's
JJ> poem, "The People Yes," that says "Sometime they'll give a war and nobody
JJ> will come." This was labelled, "New meaning in the 1980's"
If people were needed to fight a war, as they once were, then if there were a
very unpopular war (such as VietNam only moreso) then perhaps not enough
people would come and the war effort would peter out and the war would stop.
This would give us a check on our leaders more immediate than simply waiting
until the next election. But with some superpower such as Superman
(fictitious) or automated warmaking (soon to be real) there is no check. One
small group of political leaders can gain control of the weapons (if we
haven't already given them control) and have a war without our consent or aid.
The ultimate would be where one person can singlehandedly conduct a war
without any aid nor even permission from any other person. When that is
possible, we have totally lost our freedom, we have given all control over our
lives to any single human who has the means to grab control over the war
machine (literally) and who is insane enough to go ahead and do it. Just think
of ten or so military leaders, each of whom could usurp the war machine, and
at some point one of them gets a "dream" like Adolf Hitler had for fixing the
world to be perfect. So that new-Hitler takes control, assassinates the other
nine or so, and proceeds to control the world using the computerized war
machine we've created and made available to the madman?
I'd rather we ordinary citizens avoid the delusion that fighting wars without
soldiers is good, and instead set up a system where efficient communication
allows each and every one of us to participate in the decision whether to make
war or not, so that it will be impossible for any small group (or any single
person in the extreme) to wage a war the rest of us don't want.
But how can we educate the average citizen to the danger, and how can we get
the research community moving in some other direction??
(Sorry for my delay in responding; I've been busy lately, falling behind in
net mail.)
%% (Superman complex)
L> Date: Sun, 28 Sep 1986 09:11 EDT
L> From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
L> Subject: Autonomous weapons - source material and observations
L> I'd like to understand why is it bad to imagine war using fewer troops
L> and more automation. I can think of two reasons. (1) More automation
L> means more chances for computer screwups, and therefore more losses
L> among innocent bystanders. (2) Fewer troops mean it is easier to
L> commit troops to war, giving the image of a "sanitized" battlefield.
Those are additional reasons, in addition to my "Superman complex" reason.
(1) may go away when computer science is good enough. (2) seems to be a
permanent worry. Combining the two, we have a war that one person can start
and manage even though nobody else wants the war, and a society that sees a
"sanitized" battlefield which looks so good they fail to realize the danger
they are getting into until it is too late.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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