ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (10/19/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Saturday, October 18, 1986 6:00PM
Volume 7, Issue 35
Today's Topics:
Stealth technology
air defenses
delegating authority to use H-bombs to humans or computers?
Teller - person of week
Stealth vs Boston Globe
Fuller & Liddell Hart references
[mmdf: Failed mail (msg.a022410)]
U.S. bases in England (Lin)
administrivia
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Date: Fri, 17 Oct 1986 18:19 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Stealth technology
From: Marc Vilain <MVILAIN at G.BBN.COM>
PPS: I suspect that there must be other tricks hidden up the stealth
sleeve than narrow cross-sections (fancy radar jamming perhaps?).
Absorbing paint, modified engine intakes and exhausts, curved surfaces
are some.
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Date: Fri, 17 Oct 1986 18:21 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: air defenses
From: jong%delni.DEC at decwrl.DEC.COM (Steve Jong/NaC Pubs)
[Gary Chapman, Arms-D v7 #31:] "... the Air Force (is)
confident it can track with absolute accuracy all aircraft
approaching the U.S. (with Teal Ruby), and these would be
intercepted either by interceptor aircraft or air defense
missiles."
This statement implies we're safe from Soviet air attack. I guess
I'd like to hear some informed estimates as to the kill rate the
Air Force expects to achieve.
US expects 90% of cruise missiles to penetrate, and in 1977 about 75%
of its B-52's. Expect U.S. air defense to let more through on a
fractional basis at the current time, since we don't have much.
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Date: 1986 October 13 08:13:06 PST (=GMT-8hr)
From: Robert Elton Maas <REM%IMSSS@SU-AI.ARPA>
Subject:delegating authority to use H-bombs to humans or computers?
CJ> Date: Thursday, 9 October 1986 19:09-EDT
CJ> From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe.Stanford.Edu>
CJ> To: LIN
CJ> Re: Trump cards Vs. Broad brushes
CJ> That CINCSAC possesses nuclear release codes is supposed to be a
CJ> secret, but it is a fact not doubted by experts. Note also the
CJ> report "At the headquarters of Strategic Air Command in Omaha,
CJ> Nebraska, we were shown the red metal boxes, secured with padlocks,
CJ> where the war codes and plans are kept." (SIOP, Arkin & Pringle,
CJ> 1983, p.13.) Further, how else construe then Secretary of Defense
CJ> Schlesinger's remark that a first strike on Washington by the Soviets
CJ> could "leave them at the tender mercies of CINCSAC"?
I think most of us (except the public spokesmen of the government) agree that
the President has delegated authority to initiate thermonuclear retaliation in
the event the President cannot be reached for consultation, and that this
delegation is necessary and desirable to have a credible deterrent. We
disagree about how much the dishonesty by the public spokesmen is undesirable
(or desirable). But the crucial question is to what extent this delegation of
authority is to machines. Do machines merely enhance the perceptive abilities
of the generals and other staff, allowing them to communicate over large
distances and to see radar blips of incoming missiles and of detonations, whle
the generals&staff make the actual decisions? Or do machines actually make
major decisions of perception and response, with humans merely following rigid
orders such as "If you see a message come over the emergency channel (from the
computer or a human, you don't know or care), you open the red box and pull
out the envelop and open the envelop. If the code number in the envelop
matches the code number on the emergency channel display you initiate launch."
That is, are humans making the ultimate decisions (good) or are humans merely
rubber-stamping decisions made by software (bad)? We don't know because the
government doesn't tell us and the leaks don't have enough info.
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Date: 1986 October 17 18:02:45 PST (=GMT-8hr)
From: Robert Elton Maas <REM%IMSSS@SU-AI.ARPA>
Subject:Teller - person of week
ABC picked Edward Teller "Father of H-Bomb" as person of week today. The
opening quote was about how SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) was effective
and desirable because it introduced uncertainty in a Soviet first strike,
deterring them from attempting it under most circumstances.
I would like to rebut that view: SDI also introduces uncertainty in
deterrence. With SDI, the Soviets may be uncertain whether their deterrence
will work, so they have to build up their weaponry so their assured level of
deterrence is acceptable. Remember, we already have much more deterrence than
we probably need, because assured destruction is much less than expected
destruction and we have to have assured destruction to make deterrence work.
For example, it might be cloudy over most enemy cities, reducing effect of
flash from H-bomb incinerating remote parts of cities, so we need extra
H-bombs to physically knock down buildings in case remote incineration doesn't
wor. Some of our H-bombs might fail to reach their targets, so we need
redundancy. Etc. Etc. I think uncertainty is our main enemy not our friend. It
is because of uncertainty that we have so many more warheads than we probably
need. It is even because of uncertainty that we have a Cold War in the first
place. We are uncertain if the Soviets will ever dare to attack us. They have
never done so in recorded history, but we have thousands of warheads just
in case they might someday take that risk. I think we need to reduce
uncertainty, so we can have just the weapons we need instead of a whole lot
extra just in case. For that reason SDI is wrong, counterproductive, dangerous.
Some measures to reduce uncertainty have already been taken: hot line, spy
satellites, gamma-ray detector satellites and earthquake detectors, ABM
treaty, cultural exchange. I'd like to see more uncertainty-reduction in the
future.
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Date: Fri, 17 Oct 86 22:14:34 PDT
From: mse%Phobos.Caltech.Edu@DEImos.Caltech.Edu (Martin Ewing)
Subject: Stealth vs Boston Globe
Marc Vilain reports an article that claims that stealth is based
only on reduced forward crossection. Obviously, it has to be more
than reduced crossection as seen from one direction. Components
I've heard discussed:
-Reduced radar reflectivity, through using non-metallic materials,
e.g., carbon composites and microwave absorbing paint (ferro-
magnetic?).
-No regular geometry: long straight edges, flat surfaces, or circular
intakes that have distinctive radar returns. (See the Revell(?)
plastic model kit.)
-Hidden jet turbine blades to prevent high doppler shift returns.
The effective crossection of an object to radar is the product of
its geometric crossection and the surface reflectivity. It will be
a function of wavelength and the relative orientation of the object,
transmitter, and receiver. (The latter two don't have to be coloca-
ted, but they normally are.) It is not much use reducing your for-
ward crossection when you're flying transverse to the radar line of
sight! Aerodynamics pretty well guarantees your fore and aft
crossections will be small, apart from the peculiar geometry of jet
intakes, etc.
Are active radar countermeasures part of stealth? Jamming is no
good, as it tells the adversary something's up. You could do some-
thing to give a deceptive appearance, e.g., make yourself look like
a goose on the wing - flapping, etc., or maybe like a Korean air-
liner. (Now that's really black humor.) You can also trick the
radar operators into thinking their equipment is crook. Anyone have
any clues?
Apart from the interesting physics of stealth, I'd like to know
why this should be kept so secret or "black"? Is it a means of
keeping up skunk worker morale, adding a James Bond spirit, or is
there really some great novelty here that will immediately put the
Soviets on the right track once they see a picture in Aviation Week,
or a pricetag in the Federal Budget?
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Date: Sat, 18 Oct 86 00:58:35 PDT
From: tedrick@ernie.Berkeley.EDU (Tom Tedrick)
Subject: Fuller & Liddell Hart references
The books I had in mind were:
"Armament and History", by J.F.C. Fuller,
New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945
and
"Defence of the West", by B.H. Liddell-Hart,
Cassell and Company Ltd., 1950
But any of their books are enjoyable and worthwhile reading
(at least I have found them extremely rewarding ...)
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Date: 18 Oct 1986 11:21-EDT
From: Rick.Busdiecker@h.cs.cmu.edu
Subject: U.S. bases in England (Lin)
> Obviously,
> agreements to locate US military bases all over the world wouldn't
> exist unless we had a military edge over those countries.
>
>So you believe that U.S. bases in England are the result of U.S.
>military superiority over the British?
Are there British bases in the United States? While their existance
seems plausible, I have never heard of any. If none exist then it
seems reasonable to assume that the U.S. bases in England are, in fact,
the result of U.S. military superiority over the British.
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Date: Sat, 18 Oct 1986 12:27 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: administrivia
==>> Someone please help with these:
Date: Saturday, 18 October 1986 12:16-EDT
From: MAILER-DAEMON%rhea.DEC at decwrl.DEC.COM
To: ARMS-D-Request
Re: Unable to deliver mail to gva04::wachsmuth, gave up after many
attempts
==>>
Date: Friday, 17 October 1986 23:52-EDT
From: BRL Memo Service (MMDF 4/84) <mmdf at BRL.ARPA>
Sender: mmdf at BRL.ARPA
To: arms-d-request at BRL.ARPA
Re: Failed mail (msg.a022410)
Your message could not be delivered to
'Karlovic@radc-multics.arpa (host: radc-multics.arpa) (queue: smtp)'
for the following reason: ' The supplied name was not found in the
system mail table. Looking up mail table address'
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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