ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (10/21/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Tuesday, October 21, 1986 11:36AM
Volume 7, Issue 37
Today's Topics:
Stealth Technology
Sandia National Lab Livermore
Stealth
Subdelegation of authority to use nuclear weapons
compromise of unintelligence
Oh Canada!
Predelegation and the Atomic Energy Act
Sandia/Livermore and Stealth
Subdelegation of authority to use nuclear weapons
Subdelegation of authority to use nuclear weapons
Stealth model
SDI System effectiveness is non-linear
Stealth vs Air Traffic Control
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Date: Mon, 20 Oct 86 08:31:21 PDT
From: Steve Walton <ametek!walton@csvax.caltech.edu>
Subject: Stealth Technology
In ARMS-D V7 #34, Marc Vilain writes that an article in the Boston
Globe "cast doubt on the effectiveness of so-called stealth
technology," because much of it depends on small front and side radar
cross-sections, thus increasing the required lateral dimensions of the
plane so much that it is a huge target from bottom or top.
An article with essentially the same information was the cover
story of an issue Discover magazine early this year, perhaps in
January or February. I don't normally recommend this magazine, and
I've not read the article in question, but I thought interested
parties might find this magazine more easily than back issues of the
Globe.
Steve Walton
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 86 11:15 PDT
From: "Morton Jim"@LLL-MFE.ARPA
Subject: Sandia National Lab Livermore
ATX3
> Date: 16 Oct 86 2:15-EST
> From: sam mccracken <oth104%BOSTONU.bitnet@WISCVM.arpa>
> Subject: Sandia
>
> -----
> Jim Morton says that the Livermore lab is next to Sandia. Isn't Livermore in
> California? I've never been to Livwrmore, but the last time I went to Sandia
> it was in Albuquerque.
>
> ------------------------------
Sandia has a Lab in Livermore as well as Albuquerque. It is
called " Sandia National Lab Livermore ( S.N.L.L. ) "
Jim Morton
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 1986 15:07 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Stealth
From: decvax!utzoo!henry at ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
.. the effectiveness of stealth
techniques falls off considerably at long wavelengths.
Quite true. Note also that old air defense radars tend to use long
wavelengths, and that the Soviets never throw away anything. (This
was reportedly one of Teller's major objections to stealth.)
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 1986 15:13 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Subdelegation of authority to use nuclear weapons
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
Second, it's not just whether there's machines involved that is the
issue, but also whether the Pres. is involved. The 1946 (&1954)
Atomic Energy Act was enacted to ensure civilian control of nuclear
weapons. It said the Pres., and only the Pres., could order the use
of nucs. It still says the same thing. Therefore, if authority has
been delegated to the military, that in itself is an impermissible
subdelegation. Technically speaking, such delegation violates the
Subdelegation Act (1951) rather the Atomic Energy Act.
If you have the text of the subdelegation act on line, could you pls
forward it to me, or place it on the list? It is widely accepted that
the President has authority ot delegate his authority to do most
things, so what you are saying is that the sub-delegation act
expressly forbids delegation of this authority.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 86 14:01:41 PDT
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ@forsythe.stanford.edu>
Subject: compromise of unintelligence
> >What difference would it make to have seen the original
> >arabic (Berber) for this particular message? It could have been typed out
> >on ordinary paper, couldn't it? Am I missing something?
>
> But what was the "message"?
> Also, what if a text had been released, claimed to be our experts'
> reading of the transmitted code/cipher?
The matter raises these interesting questions, I agree. Clearly,
British experts commonsensically decided that the U.S. could release
at least some subset of the information without further compromise of
intelligence - what was it's *bones* in terms of facts specific to
the West German disco? The U.S. responded with the easy argument re
further security leakage, though I believe the British offered to
keep the text secret if warranted for some reason. In the
circumstances of there not being an original interception
substantiating U.S. representations, it would be much, much easier
not to make one up, which would require difficult creativity given
the Isreali and other European intelligence banks.
To: ARMS-D@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 86 13:32:12 pdt
From: weemba@brahms.berkeley.edu (Matthew P Wiener)
Subject: Oh Canada!
Henry Spencer (henry@utzoo) writes:
>(Sigh... That one cuts the other way. There are, effectively, German
>bases in Canada, because Canada is host to a lot of NATO training facilities.
>The *embarrassing* part is that there are usually more German tanks in
>Canada than there are *Canadian* tanks in Canada!)
The above is typical Canadian oversensitivity. Consider the facts:
The population of West Germany is more than double Canada's. There's
lots of room up there, far from civilians, just perfect if you want to
practice your frozen tundra exercises. (Rhetorical question of the
year: now why on earth would we want to do THAT?) We can't do that
too well in the middle of Europe. And all that land is comparatively
cheap for the Canadian government to provide.
Besides, public perception of Canada in the States is pretty minimal
to begin with, so one more detail can't matter that much. We haven't
even warmed ourselves up to Canadian jokes, so count yourself lucky.
ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 1986 17:40 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Predelegation and the Atomic Energy Act
From: lin
> For me, what is relevant to the defense debate is what would happen in a
> war, which I believe was the spirit of the original poster.
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
Yes, and the question is, would civilians take the nuclear release
decision in the event? Would anybody?
I don't know, but I'm not sure it matters. At least, you have not yet
described a scenario in which it does.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 86 18:25:15 pdt
From: Eugene miya <eugene@ames-aurora.arpa>
Subject: Sandia/Livermore and Stealth
Two points: The Sandia National Labs are located both at Kirkland AFB
in NM, and across the street from LLNL in Livermore. Before the break
up of the telephone company, Sandia was part of AT&T. I suspect there
are probably smaller Sandia offices around in Washington DC, Nevada,
and near LANL, but I can't be certain.
On Stealth, the SR-71 is not a very narrow plane, but the sloping sides
reduce the radar return (just make surfaces non-normal to beam travel
direction. The gentleman from Caltech (where I just returned today from)
gave a fairly complete description. For more information, the best
book on radar is the book by Skolnick which I just saw in 2nd edition
at Computer Literacy Bookstore in Sunnyvale. The SR-71 has a large
infared and sonic (not in the sense of sonic booms) signature.
Oh, sorry, added note: I received two announcements for Technology Training
Corp. seminars:
Tactical Electronic Warfare
and
Smart Munitions Technology
A quick scan has smart mines, countermeasures, and so forth. Maybe they
came define autonomous weapons.
--eugene miya
------------------------------
Date: Monday, 20 October 1986 18:14-EDT
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
To: LIN
Re: Subdelegation of authority to use nuclear weapons
> Yes, and the question is, would civilians take the nuclear release
> decision in the event? Would anybody?
>
> I don't know, but I'm not sure it matters. At least, you have not yet
> described a scenario in which it does.
One scenario would be the launch on warning response to a submarine
launched decapitation strike. Another would be a U.S. submarine's
"retaliation" due to a fail-deadly mode induced by the military's
accidentally firing off an ERCS indicating imminent decapitation.
In addition, the more fundamental issue of whether the Congress
can delegate de facto war declaration to the President is raised,
and whether first-use of nucs should be or is in any event constitutionally
reserved for Congress.
> Defendant has not published in the Federal Register a list of
> those military commanders to whom authority for a nuclear launch has
> been so delegated.
>
> But I'll bet that a list of generals and admirals has been published
> there. Furthermore, flag rank officers are subjecet to Senate
> confirmation. Do you know that the President has not published
> something to the effect that these guys can assume all functions
> related to the national defense subject to the orders of the
> President/C-in-C?
The delegation must be specific, and *cite the statute* at issue.
There's a bunch of delegations to Weinberger listed for various
other statutes, but *not* for the Atomic Energy Act. Nope, the
violation is *prima facie*, if such delegations exist. We agree
they reasonable can be assumed to exist.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 1986 21:41 EDT
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Subdelegation of authority to use nuclear weapons
> Yes, and the question is, would civilians take the nuclear release
> decision in the event? Would anybody?
>
> I don't know, but I'm not sure it matters. At least, you have not yet
> described a scenario in which it does.
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
One scenario would be the launch on warning response to a submarine
launched decapitation strike.
How does this matter? For analytical purposes, I would *assume* that
provisions have been made along logically (if not legally) sensible
lines. For example, I would say that the President *would* make the
LOW decision before he is killed. Alternatively, I would assume that
CINCSAC or LOOKING GLASS would take over if all of the DC people were
killed (though he wouldn't have time to make an LOW decision per se --
maybe an LUA decision, though.)
Another would be a U.S. submarine's
"retaliation" due to a fail-deadly mode induced by the military's
accidentally firing off an ERCS indicating imminent decapitation.
[ERCS = Emergency Rocket Communications System based in silos]
If an attack has not landed, then you don't need ERCS to do an LOW,
and it wouldn't, since other systems are more reliable. If it has,
then ERCS is dead. I don't think ERCS would be used at all.
In addition, the more fundamental issue of whether the Congress
can delegate de facto war declaration to the President is raised,
and whether first-use of nucs should be or is in any event constitutionally
reserved for Congress.
That is a legal question, not an operational one. It is important,
but not relevant to the challenge I posed originally.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 86 23:29:22 PDT
From: mse%Phobos.Caltech.Edu@DEImos.Caltech.Edu (Martin Ewing)
Subject: Stealth model
Well, I sent in my earlier note a little too soon. The Sunday Los Angeles
Times Magazine had a great piece yesterday: "Tempest in a Toy Box" by Paul
Ciotti, subtitled "The Defense Department won't even admit the stealth fighter
exists. So how did John Andrews design a plastic model of it that you can
buy in a hobby shop for less than $10?"
Apparently, the model is based entirely on unclassified literature plus a
bit of deduction. The plane would be subsonic (no afterburners), and had to
fit into a C-5 (I didn't know that!) The basic shape is a cross between the
SR-71 and the "CIA's Mach 3.5 D-21 photo reconnaissance drone [seen] in an
aircraft 'boneyard'".
The model is made by Testor Corp., not Revell, and sales are booming.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 86 16:00:36 pdt
From: Dave Benson <benson%wsu.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: System effectiveness is non-linear
I agree with Anon that overall system effectiveness is non-linear:
>If 1000 missiles strains the system to the point that it can only
>stop 800, why would anyone think it could stop more when the number of
>missiles and decoys is doubled, straining the system's ability to
>identify, track, and destroy missiles at least twice as much?
The more reasonable (and conservative) assumption is that the SDI system
would stop ZERO missles when faced with, say, 2000 targets. Case in
point is revision n of the US Navy Aegis system -- seems that being
designed to track a maximum of (17) targets, when there are (18)
targets the computer software crashed.
Any engineered artifact has design limits. When stressed beyond those
limits, it fails. We understand this for civil engineering artifacts,
such as bridges. Clearly this is not well understood for software
engineering artifacts.
------------------------------
Date: 21 Oct 86 07:39:47 PDT (Tuesday)
From: Schuster.Pasa@Xerox.COM
Subject: Stealth vs Air Traffic Control
After reading the recent ARMS-D on the Stealth subject, particularly the
interesting message from Bryan Fugate where he says that "stealth
fighters and bombers have already gone into production", and in light of
some of the recent aircraft collisions, I couldn't help but wonder if
anyone has adequately considered the air traffic control consequences of
not being able to get a radar fix on a large, rapidly moving aircraft in
a high density air traffic area?
For that matter, what about ground-radar-assisted-landing in poor
visibility at a military base?
Sometimes you want an aircraft to present a GOOD radar target. As I was
writing this I thought of the answer, I guess. The stealth aircraft
would have to have a strong beacon turned on in these circumstances. I
guess it's easy to recreate a good target this way. All I can say is
that the beacon had better be working in the circumstances I described.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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