ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (10/31/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Friday, October 31, 1986 3:03PM
Volume 7, Issue 43
Today's Topics:
SDI Goals
SDI: boost phase or bust
Subdelegation of what? (rule-making or rule-following?)
The purpose of SDI (Response to Phil Moyer)
Warheads at Sandia/Albuquerque
SDI assumptions
MX choo-choo
Hitting cruise missiles in flight isn't as easy
SDI assumptions
Strategy/SDI: enhancements and clarifications
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Date: 29 Oct 1986 17:46:21-EST
From: Hank.Walker@gauss.ECE.CMU.EDU
Subject: SDI Goals
The idea of the SDI making a first strike more uncertain suffers from
several problems.
1) The statements about first strikes reflect a pre-nuclear winter
view of the world. It's time we flush these views. In addition, why
do people always ignore the fact that the majority of warheads aren't
on targetable delivery vehicles?
2) It may be true that the Soviet Union cannot afford to double their
arsenal. What makes you think that the US can afford to field an SDI
system that injects significant uncertainty into an attack? This
issue of being cheaper at the margin is critical. Despite idiotic
statements by Jack Kemp, I do not for a minute believe that the US has
any idea of how to reliably knock out warheads cheaper than the
Russians can build them. Remember that there's the additional
overhead of figuring out what's a warhead first.
3) If we want to introduce a lot of uncertainty into a hard-target
attack, why not just de-MIRV? Surely this will make a first strike
relatively unattractive, and is obviously much cheaper than any SDI
system. Or why not get rid of ICBMs and SLBMs and just have a simple
endoatmospheric ABM system based on current technology? The real
solutions are political, not technological.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 30 Oct 86 08:20:28 PST
From: Peter O. Mikes <pom@s1-c.arpa>
Re: SDI:: boost phase or bust
>From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ@forsythe.stanford.edu>
>Subject: Boost-phase Star Wars
> people I know that are knowledgeable on the subject know that
> boost phase is about our only chance at the deal.
Hey, Cliff
I am really impressed by those 'knowledgable friends of yours'
who KNOW at which phase the 'ball game' would be decided.
Until now I thought that 'nobody knows if the thing is going to work'
at whichever strategy.
So-
firstly (to paraphrase Herb) : Are those experts ABSOLUTELY SURE that
they did not ommited any factor in their analysis? ( after all, NOBODY
has experience with nuclear war.) I think that to really prove their
thesis, they would have to start an experimental nuclear war
( and I DO object to THAT on ethical grounds).
secondly: Could you please summarise for us their argument or analysis.
I am even willing to read/study a technical report on that
( and if anybody would be interested ) than post how much I got convinced.
At this point in time (just based on common sense) it seems to me that the
boost phase would be the least suitable one: At that distance, in that amount
of time, you run risk of releasing half of your arsenal to fight flares and
fireworks...
The cost is associated with lifting a mass to the orbit,
(Herb, can I assume that that would still be the case under the 'nuclear
conditions'? Can I assume that even when 'the other side' refuses to cooperate?)
( : Would THEY really be capable of such a perfidy? To stop cooperating
with US, just when they (or we) start the war?? How evil can you get??? : )
and so, it seems to me that it is safe to assume, that when a cloud
(of unaccounted for, funny looking objects) starts converging on my location,
something is up.
Wouldn't you start to worry, at that moment?
Am I missing something?
pom
Re: Subject: US bases in Britain
reality1!james@sally.utexas.edu James R. Van Artsdalen says:
But this doesn't necessarily imply coercion
pom: I think that we are being ridiculous here. May be I should leave this
issue to somebody from UK, but on the odd chance that they do not
want to offend their guests, I will correct this usual
self-justification of 'powers which are': This is not a YES/NO issue.
The relation with 'client states' or 'satellites' is rarely an
open threat , it depends on the on-going dialog. The question is
what would US do if UK would ask us to leave. Would we apply pressure
on them? What kind? What if Turkey would ask , or New Zeland?
( what if they did ?)
I would really like to know -- what rules, laws govern US actions?
Do we still recognize international law, or do we do as we please?
Lets see:
1) Another logical way to view the question would be from the perspective of
history, specifically WW II. Britian clearly needed every US
GI they could get their hands on to avoid disaster
BOO!! that does not sound very ethical to me ( By that argument
SU would own Eastern Europe!)
2) The cost of such a base to Britain would be too great
NO! I am still not convinced. The economics is 'influenced'
by the controlling powers. Remember the Nasser's nationalisation of UK and
french property and US reaction (of course you don't)
3)There are probably more than a few Czecks aand Hungarians who wish there had been US bases in their countries after WW II
WITHOUT DOUBT! So we are not as bad the 'other side',
thanks God. But are we 'good'?. How many Nicaraguans do want our
'employees' in their country - and how many would (perhaps irrationally)
prefer SU bases, after X% of population gets 'defeated'?
So: Are there any rules, any limits on what is 'proper' pressure
to assure a compliance? I would really like to know. ( Herb said
that these are proper topics for arms-d)
Quote: " Military definition: To defeat enemy means to force him to
be dead " ( Karel Capek - aphorisms 1930)
------------------------------
Date: 1986 October 30 09:32:05 PST (=GMT-8hr)
From: Robert Elton Maas <REM%IMSSS@SU-AI.ARPA>
Subject:Subdelegation of what? (rule-making or rule-following?)
CJ> Date: Mon, 20 Oct 86 04:39:48 PDT
CJ> From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ@forsythe.stanford.edu>
CJ> Subject: Subdelegation of authority to use nuclear weapons
CJ> ..., it's not just whether there's machines involved that is the
CJ> issue, but also whether the Pres. is involved. The 1946 (&1954)
CJ> Atomic Energy Act was enacted to ensure civilian control of nuclear
CJ> weapons. It said the Pres., and only the Pres., could order the use
CJ> of nucs. It still says the same thing. Therefore, if authority has
CJ> been delegated to the military, that in itself is an impermissible
CJ> subdelegation. Technically speaking, such delegation violates the
CJ> Subdelegation Act (1951) rather the Atomic Energy Act.
I see a problem here. If killing the President and delaying
confirmation of the kill long enough to prevent rapid replacement by
the VP et al is sufficient to totally eliminate our ability to
retaliate, we are in trouble. I see a distinction between the
authority to make rules of engagement and the authority to determine
that the antecedent of the rules are true and thus apply the
consequent. For example, perhaps only the President can issue rules
like "if we are under massive Soviet nuclear attack then you should
retaliate with our nuclear arsenal, where massive means more than
three warheads detonating in different locations", but the joint
chiefs of staff or NORAD can carry out such orders in the event the
President can't be reached for confirmation of the attack, but no
computer can carry out such orders under any circumstances without
live action by President or JCS or NORAD. I would find that compromise
reasonable, but a total prohitibion of use of nukes without live
Presidential order to be absurd. What does Atomic Energy Act or
Subdelegation Act say about this distinction if anything?
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 86 16:51:22 pst
From: Dave Benson <benson%wsu.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: The purpose of SDI (Response to Phil Moyer)
pm>The point is not to create some
pm>marvelous handed-down-from-the-gods system that will make nuclear
pm>weapons obsolete.
You are mistaken. I take as authority no less of a personage than the
President of the United States of America. "...make nuclear weapons
impotent and obsolete."
pm>Hardened Minuteman III silos can withstand 2500 psi.
Proof of this? How about writing instead: "...silos ARE DESIGNED TO
withstand 2500 psi." The proof of the pudding is in the eating. The
proof of the ability of an engineered artifact to meet certain criteria
is in the practice. There is a considerable difference between designing
an artifact to meet particular goals and in fact meeting those goals.
------------------------------
Date: Thursday, 30 October 1986 14:08-EST
From: allegra!pitt!cisunx!io311170 at seismo.CSS.GOV
To: ARMS-D
Re: Warheads at Sandia/Albuquerque
Sam McCracken writes
>Aha! I still think there are weapons stored near Sandia-Albuqueuque which is
>the issue which got us into this trivial pursuit.
According to "International Combat Arms": March 1986
"Retiement completes the lifecycle of one warhead/weapon and may lead
to the recycling of nuclear materials for the next generation. The
largest nuclear storage facility in the U.S. is the Manzano
Mountain "dead storage" base, at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. Our
retired warheads await their fate here protected by an awesome
security apparatus."
Being a former Albuquerque resident , I offer a little description of
the complex. It is a small mountain located at the eastern base of
the much larger Manzano Moutain range. It is about 300 meters high
and is guarded extremely vigalantly.
Dave
at
311170@pittvms.BITnet
or
seismo!caip!princeton!allegra! | pitt!cisunx!io311170
psuvax1!princeton!allegra! |
harvard!caip!princeton!allegra! |
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 30 Oct 1986 17:52 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: SDI assumptions
From: prairie!dan at rsch.wisc.edu
What do you mean, "things you didn't anticipate"? Strategic Defense
doesn't exist in a vacuum. You don't build them, and put them on
autopilot, and go away to live your life. You are constantly anticipating
new threats, because of research and espionage, and your evaluation
of these threats goes into training the machines, and people who operate
them.
This is necessary, but not sufficient. You cannot have any assurance
that you leav out an attack scenario (for example) that the Soviets
could use and that would result in zero missiles being destroyed. A
97% effetciveness is not very good if it means perfect success in 97%
of attack scenarios and total failure in 3% of scenarios, and the
Soviets choose one of those 3%.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 30 Oct 86 19:24:46 PST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ@forsythe.stanford.edu>
Subject: MX choo-choo
Dave Benson wrote, re SDI:
> As opposed to building a perpetual motion machine. The
> physicists all come down on one side, there is no debate,
> and there is no US government project funded to try to build one.
Others (e.g. Tom Athanasiou) pointed to the importance of attending
to the oft-irrational role of political processes in determining the
shape of US forces. The immobile-mobile MX missile is a prime
example, researched and developed expressly to relieve silo
vulnerability, designed too big for good mobility because of Air
Force/ Navy rivalry (widely believed), produced because of
misinformation on KAL007's shootdown, deployed concurrently with
testing (normal for nucs), and routed into silos by a House
committee which had no direct strategic responsibility, yet
overruled everybody else expressly on strategic security issues.
Any one know of other anomalies in the MX decisional processes?
Does anyone know anything of a reported $250,000 Air Force project
to find out if psychics could guess which structures, in the MX
Multiple Protective Structures scheme, actually housed missiles?
This "racetrack" scheme was scrapped because "Even the completed
4,600 shelter MPS system would be vulnerable." This is from a
peculiar report Basing the MX Missile, Aug 1981, which sounded the
death knell for Carter's ordered MPS deployment of MX. The report
firmly made all the strategic recommendations since implemented,
including MX-in-Minuteman plus Midgetman development, beginning its
listed priorities thus:
"1. Improve warning and control systems... This is probably the
quickest and most effective way to improve the U.S. strategic posture
in the world. This conveys to the Soviet Union that the United
States will take the steps necessary to defend itself by enhancing
its capability to 'launch under confirmed attack' (LUCA) if that is
necessary. Making signiificant improvements in C3I can apparently be
accomplished in a relatively short time frame using available
technology...
2. Base MX in silos. Replace some of the Minuteman missiles with
the MX... Only launch under confirmed attack (LUCA) can make
Minuteman undeniably survivable in the near term. MX could be
deployed in silos by 1987, relying on LUCA for survivability."
"LUCA" is a collecter's-item acronym briefly substituted for the
taboo "launch on warning" (LOW) option, but it did not catch on
because the difference between "launch under attack" (LUA) and
"launch under confirmed attack" revealed the inappropriateness of
the word "confirmed." Thenceforth, "confirmed" was dropped, LOW
simply being merged with LUA.
Back to the future, Gen. Chain was this week reported (NY Times,
10/27) to be asking for a second 50 MX's to be on rails:
"Two of the new missiles have been deployed at F. E. Warren Air
Force Base in Wyoming, with another eight to be deployed there by
the end of the year. All 50 missiles are scheduled to be
operational by the end of 1989. General Chain is seeking to get
Congress to approve financing of 50 more of the missiles... The
missiles, perhaps two to a train, would be kept on military bases...
Anticipating that critics would argue that the missiles would be
vulnerable to surprise attack while they were inside a base, General
Chain said he could fire the missiles 'from a standing start just
like I can the Minuteman'."
To: ARMS-D@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
------------------------------
Date: 1986 October 30 09:44:21 PST (=GMT-8hr)
From: Robert Elton Maas <REM%IMSSS@SU-AI.ARPA>
Subject:Hitting cruise missiles in flight isn't as easy
AF> Date: Tuesday, 21 October 1986 17:40-EDT
AF> From: Andy Freeman <ANDY at Sushi.Stanford.EDU>
AF> If you can kill missiles in silos and attack
AF> cities, cruise missiles are easy.
I don't believe that except on a physical basis. Silos and cities are
sitting ducks whereas cruise missiles in flight are not only moving
but following a non-ballistic course, wandering all over the place
instead of following a nice predictable course. Reagan can program in
targets of silos and cities months ahead of a first strike and run
full simulations to be sure they can all be hit at the same time with
a given distribution (location-set) of SDI satellites. But hitting
moving targets precludes any such pre-planning of exact targeting,
requiring instead flexible "intelligence" in the software to handle
untested combinations of target locations.
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 86 08:07:30 EST
From: campbell%maynard.UUCP@harvisr.harvard.edu
Subject: SDI assumptions
Reply-To: campbell%maynard.UUCP@harvisr.HARVARD.EDU (Larry Campbell)
A couple of terse comments:
>------------------------------
>From: prairie!dan at rsch.wisc.edu
>Re: SDI assumptions
> ... No one ever said, though,
>that they should never build shuttle software because it had to be
>designed to deal with circumstances that would never happen except
>in the worst cases.
No, but a malfunctioning shuttle can't destroy civilization.
>------------------------------
>From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
>Subject: SDI assumptions
> ...
> People don't even say that about machine intelligence (at least
> publicly), and intelligence and consciousness are two mysteries
> far deeper than how to build real good, real huge systems.
>
>But these go far beyond technical considerations. Besides, that
>simply isn't true. Joe Weizenbaum stands out as a prime example.
Weizenbaum goes even further, and this is relevant to SDI as well.
Paraphrasing simplistically, he says "It can't be done; and even
if it could be done, doing it would be immoral."
--
Larry Campbell MCI: LCAMPBELL The Boston Software Works, Inc.
UUCP: {alliant,wjh12}!maynard!campbell 120 Fulton Street, Boston MA 02109
ARPA: campbell%maynard.uucp@harvisr.harvard.edu (617) 367-6846
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 1986 11:40 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: [prm: Strategy/SDI: enhancements and clarifications]
Date: Friday, 31 October 1986 11:07-EST
From: Phil R. Moyer <prm at j.cc.purdue.edu>
To: ARMS-D-Request
Re: Strategy/SDI: enhancements and clarifications
A few comments about this article, if I may.
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 1986 18:53 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Strategy of Nuclear War and SDI
From: Phil R. Moyer <prm at j.cc.purdue.edu>
The point of SDI is to make a nuclear war prohibitively expensive and
uncertain for the Soviets to wage.
If that is indeed the goal, then there are other ways to do it,
faster, with less techical risk, and more cheaply. A comprehensive
test ban and a missile flight test ban are two things that come to mind.
prm: Right. That would work. If you could get the Soviets to abide by
the treaties. I don't think trust is a very good basis for a treaty
of this importance. Let's be realistic; the Soviet Union cannot be
trusted to abide by such a treaty unless we provide them with some strong
disincentives (the economist comes out). Granted, such treaties would
be verifiable, but they would be unenforceable. What would we do if they
tested a few missiles? Stop selling grain to them? The Soviet Union
has starved whole regions just to keep people in line and make itself
look good. A grain embargo would hardly slow them down. The whole idea
is to keep them from doing something. So how are we to do this? Should
we rely on their being gentlemanly? I doubt it.
Besides, modern nuclear weapons have an expected lifespan of 13 years
before the cost of maintaining an outdated technology becomes too
expensive to justify. Modernizing our nuclear forces is a way to
keep overhead down. Your proposed test bans would leave us stuck
with outdated and unreliable technology (read, expensive). We should,
of course, be sure to remove the outdated technology once we have some-
thing to replace it with.
SDI
was never designed to eliminate nuclear war.
The President disagrees with you on this one.
prm: You are right. I was unclear in what I was saying. You have my
apology. What I meant was SDI was not designed to be a super-
defense that will eliminate all incoming nuclear weapons. It is
only another form of deterrence; one that has a good potential to be
effective. In being an effective defense, it will prevent a nuclear
war (eliminate was a poor choice of words on my part).
Regards,
Phil
prm@j.cc.purdue.edu
These opinions are mine; my employers do not always agree with me.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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