ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (11/02/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Saturday, November 1, 1986 6:03PM
Volume 7, Issue 44
Today's Topics:
SDI:: boost phase or bust
SDI assumptions
SDI assumptions
RE: killing someone if we had to look them in the eye
The nondelegation of the subdelegation of *first* use
Boost phase interceptions
Soviet SDI
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Date: Fri, 31 Oct 1986 16:03 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: SDI:: boost phase or bust
From: Peter O. Mikes <pom at s1-c.arpa>
At this point in time (just based on common sense) it seems to me that the
boost phase would be the least suitable one..
The general argument is that if you don't get them in boost, you will
have too big a load to handle when the boosters deploy all their decoys.
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Date: Thursday, 30 October 1986 19:34-EST
From: prairie!dan at rsch.wisc.edu
To: lin@xx.lcs.mit.edu
Re: SDI assumptions
Do you think there are scenarios where the defense will fail
absolutely? That's quite an assumption! Even assuming that there
are, however, will the Soviets be confident that they have chosen
the magic 3%? The whole nuclear game is about what the other side
thinks you can and will do. If we can't figure out the fatal flaws
in our system, it is highly unlikely that the Soviets can! And,
if they guess wrong, the game's up. 3% is very poor odds indeed,
for as cautious a bunch of adventurists as the Soviets are.
-- Dan
p.s. Why are they so scared?
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Date: Fri, 31 Oct 1986 16:21 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: SDI assumptions
From: prairie!dan at rsch.wisc.edu
Do you think there are scenarios where the defense will fail
absolutely? That's quite an assumption!
I don't make that assumption. My claim is much more limited -- you
can't rule such an eventuality out.
Even assuming that there
are, however, will the Soviets be confident that they have chosen
the magic 3%? The whole nuclear game is about what the other side
thinks you can and will do.
But under those circumstances, you don't need SDI at all. You are
saying that SDI is for deterrence. Then evaluate it on that basis,
and compare it to other ways of decreasing Soviet confidence.
Moreover, people should not sell it as the "more moral way" of
defending ourselves, since if it is for deterrence, we will still rely
on retaliation to deter Soviet attack (as you acknowledge when you say
that "if they [the Soviets] guess wrong, the game's up.")
If we can't figure out the fatal flaws
in our system, it is highly unlikely that the Soviets can!
Not clear; they may find them out entirely by accident!
p.s. Why are they so scared?
Why does this matter?
They are likely scared for the reason they give -- they fear that the
U.S. will attack them first, and that a defense is what will defense
against their retaliatory strike.
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Date: Thu, 30 Oct 86 13:13 CDT
From: Mike Linnig <LINNIG%ti-eg.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: RE: killing someone if we had to look them in the eye
Of course we'd kill them. Modern (and not so modern) armies are desensitized
to the violence they commit.
See Gwen Dyers book "War" for an excellent description of how this is
done (the chapter entitled "Anyones son will do").
-- Mike Linnig
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Date: Sat, 1 Nov 86 12:15:17 PST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ@forsythe.stanford.edu>
Subject: The nondelegation of the subdelegation of *first* use
REM> I see a problem here. If killing the President and delaying
REM> confirmation of the kill long enough to prevent rapid replacement by
REM> the VP et al is sufficient to totally eliminate our ability to
REM> retaliate, we are in trouble.
There may be a problem, but the framers had good leave determination
of this matter to Congress, rather than in the hands of one man.
If indeed we should subdelegate a la LOW, then let us properly
implement it. In this context, believe that an amendment
to the War Powers Act proposed by Stennis would have included a
clause delegating to the President responsibility to protect against
the nuclear threat. The clause was scrubbed.
REM> For example, perhaps only the President can issue rules
REM> like "if we are under massive Soviet nuclear attack then you should
REM> retaliate with our nuclear arsenal, where massive means more than
REM> three warheads detonating in different locations", but the joint
REM> chiefs of staff or NORAD can carry out such orders in the event the
REM> President can't be reached for confirmation of the attack, but no
REM> computer can carry out such orders under any circumstances without
REM> live action by President or JCS or NORAD. I would find that compromise
REM> reasonable, but a total prohitibion of use of nukes without live
REM> Presidential order to be absurd. What does Atomic Energy Act or
REM> Subdelegation Act say about this distinction if anything?
I agree that the President can order "Fire back if they fire first!"
but he cannot order "Fire back if they *might* have fired first!"
With the delegation implicit in today's LOWC, the stark choice would
de facto be, for the decisionmaker, to "verify OR respond." But,
after unequivocal confirmation of nuclear detonations (and that
doesn't just mean the code word "NUDET" appearing in message traffic),
then firing back is legal, albeit suicidal.
Wilson's words are apt: "The war powers were framed to make it
*certain* that nothing but our national interest can draw us into
war." (Federalist #41 p.258.)
To: ARMS-D@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
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Date: Sat, 1 Nov 86 12:03:34 PST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ@forsythe.stanford.edu>
Subject: Boost phase interceptions
> From: Peter O. Mikes <pom@s1-c.arpa>
> Re: SDI:: boost phase or bust
>
> >From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ@forsythe.stanford.edu>
> >Subject: Boost-phase Star Wars
> > people I know that are knowledgeable on the subject know that
> > boost phase is about our only chance at the deal.
>
> Hey, Cliff
> I am really impressed by those 'knowledgable friends of yours'
> who KNOW at which phase the 'ball game' would be decided.
Wrong person. I didn't write that, but to get to the merits, Reagan
defined the boost-phase in a White House pamphlet (The President's
Strategic Defense Initiative, Jan. 3, 1985):
"Some missiles could be destroyed shortly after they launch as they
burn their engines and boost their warheads into space. By
destroying a missile during this boost phase, we would
also destroy all of the nuclear warheads it carries at the
same time. In the case of ICBM's, they would probably be
destroyed before leaving the territory of the aggressor."
WITHOUT THE "BOOST PHASE" ELIMINATION OF MULTIPLE WARHEAD
MISSILES, THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE CAN PROVIDE NO
EFFECTIVE DEFENSE DUE TO THE SUBSEQUENT MULTIPLICATION OF
WARHEADS AMIDST A CLOUD OF CHEAP DECOYS. Thus the
Strategic Defense Initiative requires under three-minute
retaliatory response.
Now, I agree with you that no-one knows what's going to happen for
sure, were Star Wars developed, but I don't know of any scenarios
for it that flunk boost phase and get an acceptable shootdown rate
thereafter. Do you? If we're saying an 80% kill-rate is optimistic
WITH boost phase, without boost phase, after warhead multiplication,
the same absolute kill number after boost phase gives under a 10%
kill-rate.
To: ARMS-D@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
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Date: Saturday, 1 November 1986 13:02-EST
From: nike!rutgers!seismo!prometheus!root at cad.Berkeley.EDU
Sender: Super User <nike!rutgers!seismo!prometheus!root at cad.Berkeley.EDU> Date: Nov 1 02:01:33 1986 (est) Sat
To: arms-d
Re: Soviet SDI
>Date: Sat, 25 Oct 1986 10:08 EDT
>From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Soviet SDI
>
> >Date: Sun, 19 Oct 86 14:58:50 EDT
> >From: David_S._Allan%UB-MTS%UMich-MTS.Mailnet@MIT-MULTICS.ARPA
> >Subject: Soviet SDI--Some facts, please
> Soviet military R&D has to be separated into two components -- one
> designed for technology investigation and the other for actual
> incorporation into specific weapon systems.
I think this is the case BUT.. there is a problem with this simple
description, and that is that it masks the role of the "mastermind"
and politically and militarily powerful scientists like Velikov who
probably manipulate both components. This modifies the significance
of your following observation.
> The Soviet military R&D analysts I have spoken to believe that
> Soviet SDI-like activities (not traditional ABM activities) are
> much more the first than the second. One person characterized
> it as being able to put a laser from Edmund Scientific into orbit
> and having the U.S. say they have an "operational capability" .
Hmmmm, I find that "strange" since my experience is that Russians are
more like "Texans" in descriptions of their assets and accomplishments
(and throw weights).
The American reaction does have a certain ring of credibility, thinking
back over some of the wishful reactions I have observed even from our
SDIO. However, I don't think the Soviet SDI Research Program is, by
any stretch of the imagination, a paper tiger (either Edmund Scientific
or "Toys Ya Us").
> There's a big difference between a demonstrator and something that
> presents a real military threat.
That is quit correct. One of the problems is that we seem to have a
compulsion to "sell" the program by "demonstrating the technology.
Consequently, much of the effort goes into rigged "Dog and Pony
Shows". That still may work for the general public, but it is much
less effective on a number of members of Congress as well as their
staffers and advisors. NOT being a political scientist I find this
one a "tough one to call". It could have a long standing divisive
impact, in any event.
> We, on the other hand, have decided to deploy "now" (soon) and
> to hell with what is a few years down stream that might really
> work and work cheaply.
>
> Hardly. The primary criticism of the SDI from the pro-SDI people is
> that they are not doing things fast enough (i.e., not deploying), and
> are focusing TOO MUCH on the far term (as far as research is concerned).
Dividing the score board into "pro and anti" SDI almost brings tears to
my eyes. The real danger of "over polarization" is that the "anti-SDI
folks" are effectively on the "outs" and so they have a greatly diminished
capacity to influence the "internal policy" of the SDIO. That's where
the "REALLY CRITICAL Concerns (Nuclear/Non-nuclear, Costs, Safety, etc.)"
issues are. Listen up Democrats!
"Fast deployment" means the "old technology" of the primes dominates, and
that will include both space deployed fission reactors and thermonuclear
bombs. THAT is where the program IS, 98% of the funds go to the "Primes",
only 2 % the budget goes to the small businesses and universities (technical
colleges). Traditionally "the little guy" was the source of America's
innovative and technological strength. Without it our country will continue
to plumit to a second rate technological power with an even more adverse
balance payments while at the same time maintaining a good number of (foreign
born) Nobel prize winners.
So what we are stuck with is hopped up 60's technology, plus the
stuff from Larry Labs and the "Teller-Wood" Darth Vader, version, of
thermonuclear bomb & fission reactor driven devices.
What I would like to see is to deploy a joint Russian/US "Hot Rocks"
(or whatever they calls 'em) system, and then hold everything else "in
the labs" for at least ten years. THEN, the really bright guys at in
the small businesses and Universities could come up with "21 Century"
big clean breakthroughs that would work, and in fact end up impacting
the technology of our space aspirations so much that the Mars project
could become practically a stroll in the park.
The problem is that innovation produces breakthroughs, which develop
new technologies and industries that displace old ones.
Therefore, the best defensive strategy for the survival of the
"established primes" is to do "rush deployment now", freeze the SDI
concept, and wipe out any chances for a cheaper, safer and non-fission
World Shield system. Divide and conquer the opposition, then without
competition optimize the profits and minimize the deliverables.
I would encourage personal initiative to solving this complicated
problem, notwithstanding Lin's comments or others even more simplified
interpretations.
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| Paul M. Koloc, President: (301) 445-1075 | FUSION |
| Prometheus II, Ltd.; College Park, MD 20740-0222 | this |
| {umcp-cs | seismo}!prometheus!pmk; pmk@prometheus.UUCP | decade |
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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