ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (11/05/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Wednesday, November 5, 1986 9:31AM
Volume 7, Issue 46
Today's Topics:
Tended is the night
SDI: boost phase or bust (2 msgs)
Acceptable Bounds for Debate (2 msgs)
Does anyone read the Los Angeles Times?
RE: Unequivocal confirmation of detonation
Re: Unequivocal confirmation of detonation
RE: Unequivocal confirmation of detonation
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Date: Monday, 3 November 1986 17:22-EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
To: LIN
Re: Tended is the night
> I think you would be on stronger
> intellectual ground if you don't push on the unreliability of
> computers so much, and do push on the need for human
> confirmation. The way you present your case makes the whole
> business seem that you don't want to allow the President to do
> *anything*.
I don't want him to do anything if he gets a warning of an SLBM
attack on Washington in time to issue retaliatory orders.
Incidentally, my new improved set of definitions represents the
present launch on warning capability as *inhuman*, rather than
as *mechanical*.
> How would you feel about LOW if you had trained people
> monitoring and interpreting the real-time data coming into
> NORAD, rather than these data fusion computers? Would that
> satisfy your objection? Logically, it should.
It's not possible to have human verification prior to detonation.
There's a big difference between warning and detonation verification.
The reliance on computers for warning is 100%; they must verify
themselves. Obviously it's better if they are tended by experts,
but that's all it is, *tended*.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 3 Nov 86 14:49:36 PST
From: pom@s1-along.arpa
Subject: SDI: boost phase or bust
From: Peter O. Mikes <pom at s1-c.arpa>
At this point in time (just based on common sense) it seems to me that the
boost phase would be the least suitable one..
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
The general argument is that if you don't get them in boost, you will
have too big a load to handle when the boosters deploy all their decoys.
pom: I apologise if I misattributed the quote. I am
aware of the general assertion, that:
White House pamflet:
WITHOUT THE "BOOST PHASE" ELIMINATION OF MULTIPLE WARHEAD
MISSILES, THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE CAN PROVIDE NO
EFFECTIVE DEFENSE DUE TO THE SUBSEQUENT MULTIPLICATION OF
WARHEADS AMIDST A CLOUD OF CHEAP DECOYS.
I just do not find it convincing. The technical issue
( and I stress again, that by trying to understand tec. issues I do not
argue neither for or against sdi - that is a non-tech decision). is:
How long it takes for me to identify one target -- out of the cloud of
N= 1e5 (?) (with equipment which is feasible (in terms of time, cost etc)).
Lets call this time interval tau(id). (for time of identification). Right
now, as far as we know, it may range from microseconds to hours.
Can anyone provide a minorant for this tau(id), based on first principles?
It seems to me, that if for each 'object' they have to 'bring up',
all I would have to do is to 'notice and identify it', I would be considerably
better off. Just a 'simple example' of the 'decoy vs target discrimination':
Did somebody estimated how 'strong' those 'baloons' would have to be, to
survive a blast of an explosion (at distance D) from a decoy? What if the
first boom will strip most of them? I am not saying that this is a 'final
word ' on the topic. I just want us to get beyond all those superficial pseudo-
arguments, which are flying around (like so many decoys and chaff)...:pom
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Date: Tue 4 Nov 86 18:13:24-EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: SDI:: boost phase or bust
How long it takes for me to identify one target -- out of the cloud of
N= 1e5 (?) (with equipment which is feasible (in terms of time, cost
etc)).
Assume that on average there are 3000 km between balloons and a
discrimination sensor (that distinguishes between decoy and target).
You need at least a round trip between the target and the sensor, for
a total of 20 milliseconds. 100,000 decoys means 2000 seconds at
minimum. If you have 100 sensor platforms, then each takes 20
seconds. But a threat cloud of 5 M decoys is 50 times greater, so
that you need 1000 seconds (5 M is the largest I have heard so far).
Midcourse lasts 20 minutes = 1200 seconds, so you don't have much
time.
You can buy more sensor platforms to reduce the time needed.
... Just a 'simple example' of the 'decoy vs target discrimination':
Did somebody estimated how 'strong' those 'baloons' would have to be, to
survive a blast of an explosion (at distance D) from a decoy? What if the
first boom will strip most of them?
You spread the decoys out. That way a single nuclear blast will not
kill most of them. That also stresses the slewing mechanisms of the
beams needed to do discrimination.
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Date: Tue 4 Nov 86 17:35:24-EST
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Acceptable Bounds for Debate
[From LIN@XX:]
Everyone, critics included, supports research. [on SDI]
I see this statement a lot. Is it really true, or do people just
hypnotically repeat it because if they don't they will be seen
as too "anti-military?" I really want to question this statement.
Who do you define as critics? Only those people who are paid to be
critics -- funded to examine arms control questions? Only those
people who are interviewed by the mainstream media? These would
pretty limited definitions.
Does the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Council count as a critic? They
support no research. Do I count as a critic? I support cutting
out 98% of the funds of the SDI program.
I think it would be accurate to say that NOT everyone supports SDI
research, but "everyone whose opinions fall within the bounds of some
acceptable limits which are defined by patterns of opinion within
institutions whose members that have a stake in such limits" supports
SDI research. Such patterns of opinion are enforced by branding
people who stray beyond the bounds as "radicals."
-rich
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Date: Tue 4 Nov 86 18:28:18-EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Acceptable Bounds for Debate
[From LIN@XX:]
Everyone, critics included, supports research. [on SDI]
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Who do you define as critics?
Touche. Your question is valid, and points out my own bias in my
statement. On the other hand, I don't repudiate that bias, so let me
state it clearly.
When I made the statement, I had in mind a certain set of people that
I generally regard as credible in their views about the use of force.
This set of people does indeed overlap with what you might term
mainstream defense opinion. (Please do not take this as a personal
attack -- I do respect the sincerity of your views, but I can do so
without finding them credible.) I did not have you or the Freeze
council or any one of many pacifist groups in mind when I made my
statement.
I think it would be accurate to say that NOT everyone supports SDI
research, but "everyone whose opinions fall within the bounds of some
acceptable limits which are defined by patterns of opinion within
institutions whose members that have a stake in such limits" supports
SDI research.
I am not consciously aware of my opinions being determined by some
institutionally determined set of limits, which is I think the thrust
of your statement.
Such patterns of opinion are enforced by branding
people who stray beyond the bounds as "radicals."
It seems to me that opinion beyond such bounds is by definition
radical. Why should that be a perjorative statement to you? Would
you argue with the claim that your opinions on force and the U.S.
military etc are not shared by most of the populace, or even most
mainstream intelligentsia, or most defense analysts?
------------------------------
Date: Tue 4 Nov 86 17:38:22-EST
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Does anyone read the Los Angeles Times?
There was a reporter calling around MIT and other places doing a
followup story on the pledge drive against the SDI program. Her name
was Anne Roark, I think. Has anyone seen her story; it would have
been within the last month? If so, please send me the date it
appeared in the Times.
Thank you,
Rich
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Date: Tue, 4 Nov 86 08:11 CDT
From: The Computer is your friend! <"NGSTL1::SHERZER%ti-eg.csnet"@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: RE: Unequivocal confirmation of detonation
Subject: Unequivocal confirmation of detonation
>> From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
>> Voice confirmations from *several* sources, besides agreement from
>> working sensors.
>> This confirmation should take time. No retaliatory decision by until
>> 24 hrs. after the detonation is good sense, in the nuclear context.
>> I think a 30-minute break mandatory.
>From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
> So you propose that under no circumstances should any nuclear
> retaliation occur until 24 hours after an attack on the US?
>
> Actually, the waiting part of your proposal is endorsed by McNamara,
> who told LBJ that in the event of receiving a report of a nuclear
> attack on the US, he (LBJ) should do nothing until LBJ received a
> personal report from McNamara, who would fly to the alleged site of
> the attack and report back on an eye-witness basis.
>
> I don't think that is such a bad idea myself.
Neither does the Soviet Union. They would like us to wait 24 hours before we
retaliate to an attack.
Allen Sherzer
SHERZER%NGSTL1@TI-EG.CSNET
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Date: Wed 5 Nov 86 09:30:56-EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: RE: Unequivocal confirmation of detonation
(from above message)
Neither does the Soviet Union. They would like us to wait 24 hours
before we retaliate to an attack.
Please give an example of how waiting 24 hours would significantly
impede the U.S. response. Without such an example, the only plausible
conclusion is that you are engaging in hyperbole and ad hominem
argument, suggesting that "if the Soviets want it, it must be bad for
us, and if you want the same thing, you must be in their camp."
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Date: Wed, 5 Nov 86 02:45:29 EST
From: campbell%maynard.UUCP@harvisr.harvard.edu
Subject: Re: Unequivocal confirmation of detonation
Reply-To: campbell%maynard.UUCP@harvisr.HARVARD.EDU (Larry Campbell)
Just a thought... would current systems (both technical and human) be
able to distinguish a nuclear attack from the impact of a very large
meteorite? How about an anti-matter meteorite?
--
Larry Campbell MCI: LCAMPBELL The Boston Software Works, Inc.
UUCP: {alliant,wjh12}!maynard!campbell 120 Fulton Street, Boston MA 02109
ARPA: campbell%maynard.uucp@harvisr.harvard.edu (617) 367-6846
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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