ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (11/06/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Wednesday, November 5, 1986 11:31PM
Volume 7, Issue 47
Today's Topics:
confirmation of nuclear explosions
autonomous weapons...
SDI IS IMPOSSIBLE
Re: Acceptable Bounds for Debate
Acceptable Bounds for Debate
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Date: Wednesday, 5 November 1986 12:26-EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
re: confirmation of nuclear explosions
LIN> So your position is that only a direct eye-witness account
LIN> of a nuclear explosion is sufficient?
No, the eye-witnesses are necessary, but not necessarily sufficient.
LIN> If people could see missiles
LIN> emerging from Soviet silos, what would you say then?
Draw your own conclusions:
"The consistent high readiness of modern ICBM forces reduces the
potential for misunderstandings about ICBM operations. ICBMs are
unambiguously ready for war. The chief area for concern is that of
testing, because detection of unannounced tests may be mistaken for
an attack. Multiple missile tests and tests from operational silos
have caused consternation in the United States. In particular, the
1982 Soviet multiple test of SS-11s, SS-20s, SLBMs, and ABMs could
have been mistaken for an attack."
This is from "Preventing Nuclear War: A Realstic Approach" (1985)
by the Nunn-Warner Group on accidental nuclear war prevention.
Unfortunately, the group is both powerful and controlled by those who
designed the US posture - who else would claim that that
hair-trigger day-to-day alert levels *reduce* the risk of
accident because of its unambiguous character? The Nunn-Warner
group is gung-ho about launch on warning (a phrase they avoid),
and they recommend improvements, such as better remote sensors to
get an attack confirmation within two minutes after as the missiles
leave their silos.
This, of course, ties in with boost-phase intercept, and I repeat
that regardless of futuristic mid-course techniques, it's boost
phase that's planned first:
"The objective of SDI should be that broad vision of the President's
(but) there are also some shorter term objectives. One is to see
what can be developed and deployed in the near term... we will pass
through a succession of increasingly more capable systems. But even
from the earliest stages a system that could intercept Soviet
missiles in the boost phase before their targets were known or even
designated would add greatly to the stability of a mature force by
destroying Soviet confidence that they can effectively execute a
first strike."
(Richard Perle, Defence, Aug 1986.)
May the force be with us.
Incidentally, wouldn't boost-phase spoofing hardware be feasible?
Here's relevant advertisements re mines (British Aerospace):
"Sea Urchin is a fully programmable multi-influence ground mine."
"Osborn is a towed ... minesweeper which simulates a wide range of
ship's acoustic signatures."
"VEMS can simulate any ground mine in assessing the effectiveness
of mine countermeasures equipment and tactics... simulating either
magnetic, acoustic, pressure, or combined influence mines. It is
re-usable and reprogrammable."
To: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 5 Nov 1986 16:23 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: autonomous weapons...
I've been trying to come up with a definition that does what I want,
and I'm not having much luck. Here's what I've come up with so far.
An autonomous weapon is one with the following characteristics:
1. -- it is capable of acquiring targets within a large distance from
the location from which it is initially set into operation. (or
deployed?)
2. -- It launches an attack on a target on the basis of rules encoded
non-human memory (i.e., computer hardware or software).
This definition captures roving anti-tank vehicles, but excludes
mines. Weapons that are for destroying targets "beyond visual range"
are a problem, but I'm not sure they should be included anyway.
Comments?
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Date: Wed, 5 Nov 86 21:43:15 -0200
From: Jim Hunt <mcvax!tucos!hunt@seismo.CSS.GOV>
Subject: SDI IS IMPOSSIBLE
I have recently caught up with the last twenty or so arms-d digests,
and a few items went by that were not completely cleared in my mind.
I am sorry, I do not have proper acknowledgements at hand, so if you
are among those slighted, please forgive me.
A small discussions went by on stealth and cruise missles. Cruise
missles are the equivalent of a car on a twisty mountain road at
night. No headlights will very soon result in no car. A cruise
missle by nature is a very bright radar source, and that energy is
directed toward the ground, a quite effective radar scatterer. Say
what you will about occaisional look designs, (New Word? ladar ==
laser radar) guidance, and soft radars, but also consider that stealth
weight in such a missle may be less valuable than smaller size (easier
& more delivered) or more speed.
I also saw mentioned a discussion of the weakness of stealth at long
wavelengths. Keep in mind that detection != destruction and that the
trend in fire control radars has long been to shorter wavelengths. An
incoming bomber that can be seen on one radar, though only
approximately due to poor discrimination of such radars, and cannot be
aquired by the defense direction radar will be very confusing to the
software and communication systems. How long do you keep keep trying
to lock the fire control radar onto a target that will not lock? Does
this affect the rest of the system? Long range, long wave radars are
also very poor against ground hugging tactics.
In that this is a computer net, I understand that the discussion of
SDI revolves around the software issue. Personally I believe the
doability of SDI software to be extremely doubtful, but find the job
potential: 1) extremely repugnant and 2) very profitable for a young
software engineer. I will have to decide between morals and cushy job
at some time in the future. Thanks to all who added to the related
discussion in comp-soc.
Still, I base my most fervent objection to SDI on two observations.
1) There exist effective countermeasures to EVERY system I have heard of.
2) Those countermeasures are ONE HELL OF A LOT CHEAPER.
I will digress here to my simplistic understanding of nuclear war.
The purpose of nuke bombs is to kill people, hopefully those of the
other side. Luckily they are crowded into cities. So blow up, or
failing that, poison those cities. Not much accuracy required. Not
even much fancy electronics required if you are willing to give up
efficiency. If bombs are stupid and survivable, they do not have to
be nearly as efficient as smart fragile bombs.
I am leading up to (yes, I admit slowly, but isn't suspense great) the
concept of IMPACT NUCLEAR WEAPONS. I am not anything close to a
weapons expert, but the engineering of a device to detonate the simple
(remember, no argument of low efficiency allowed) two hemisphere model
of a bomb as it impacts ground, water, or even low atmosphere sounds
much simpler than SDI.
The requirements of containment time can be met by planned collapse
structures. compressed air is also a very survivable control system.
WW2 AA shells had time fuses w/o any transistors at all. The list of
cheap engineering alternatives is long. So, if you will give me such
a bomb, where the main idea is immunity to EMP (electromagnetic pulse
from nuke blasts), I can have a field day knocking out your glorious
systems.
Lasers: polished gold coating or better. (still cheaper then your laser)
X rays: big deal, no silicon.
Particle beams: water jacket, with the wonderful idea of vents. So that
when the water (or ice) flashes to steam, it escapes through
(enough) directed vents on the skin of the bomb. Thus, even
when you do hit the target, it scoots out of the way. Though now
it might hit your mothers house in the suburbs instead of your
house in the city. If that isn't fast enough, why not a system of
compressed gas to CONSTANTLY warble the trajectory. Remember,
accuracy is not a valid argument, LA is BIG!
Impact Devices: see gas above, and then add a plastic coating to absorb
bullets. your bullets probably aren't heavy or fast enough to
really wipe the trajectory, and so what if a couple farms get
glass coated. That idea still probably pisses off the American
public, eh? These devices also suffer that the first one to hit
(if a glancing blow) may make the rest miss.
I also have to add that, if possible, I might have these bombs
designed to go off when successfully destroyed, so that the unknown
tracking system gets to deal with a nice fat EMP coming through that
big dish on that very sensative highly directional reciever.
Of course, I could not do all of the above in one bomb, but I would
love to see you spend a few zillion and then I do whatever is needed.
Concepts (CHEAP) not mentioned yet: smokescreen (can be done in space
too), chaff, wax layers, thermal controls, passive stealth on whatever
detection scheme you deploy, and I'm sure you can think of more.
In summary I would like to address those of you who are poised over
the "f" key (for flame). You have so much technical knowledge of why
my ideas are ludicrous, that YOU can probably do better. The above is
just an amateurs first look. YOU are the experts! Can you imagine a
cheap way that a bomb can be made immune to {insert latest
technovision here}. If there is a weapon that cannot be defended
against, please give details, but allow me to ask you to think on it a
while, USING MY START. The operative idea is retrograde technology,
the simpler the better; that seems to be something this world has
forgotten all about.
Jim Hunt, visiting Finland at
mcvax!penet!tucos!hunt@seismo.css.gov
or home acct at CAL
hunt@ucbcory.berkeley.edu
hunt@ucbcory.BITNET
------------------------------
Date: Wed 5 Nov 86 21:33:54-EST
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Acceptable Bounds for Debate
Below I give examples of what I meant by limits of debate defined by
patterns of opinion within institutions. But first, reviewing...
[From LIN@XX:]
Everyone, critics included, supports research. [on SDI]
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Who do you define as critics?...
I think it would be accurate to say that NOT everyone supports SDI
research, but "everyone whose opinions fall within the bounds of some
acceptable limits which are defined by patterns of opinion within
institutions whose members that have a stake in such limits" supports
SDI research. Such patterns of opinion are enforced by branding
people who stray beyond the bounds as "radicals."
[Herb Lin:]
I am not consciously aware of my opinions being determined by some
institutionally determined set of limits, which is I think the thrust
of your statement.
I never said that the process was an overt, conscious one.
It seems to me that opinion beyond such bounds is by definition
radical. Why should that be a perjorative statement to you? Would
you argue with the claim that your opinions on force and the U.S.
military etc are not shared by most of the populace, or even most
mainstream intelligentsia, or most defense analysts?
Good point, so let me be clear. I don't find it bad that opinion
straying beyond such bounds is considered radical -- as you say,
that's the definition of radical. What IS unfortunate is the way in
which the bounds are set -- by the power of money. Three examples:
1) Last Saturday, Bernard O'Keefe, chairman of nuclear testing
contractor and instrumentation company EG&G, criticized the effect of
military spending on the economy, and the effect of Star Wars, which
he opposes. But he said he supports a substantial research program.
I fear his opinions are constrained by the fact that his company works
on the research -- yet, he is an important and respected figure, and
his views help set the tone for the Star Wars debate. When someone
asked him a question about the test ban, he was very confusing. He
sort of wanted to support it without saying so outright; it seemed
that the reason for his contradictory reasoning was that 20% of his
company's revenues come from nuclear testing.
2) Where Herb Lin works (the MIT Center for International Studies), I
believe some funding (not Herb's) actually comes from the Star Wars
office. The director of the Arms Control and Disarmament program in
the center, Jack Ruina, is on the boards of directors of two Star Wars
contractors, MITRE Corporation and General Research corp. I think
this limits his ability to oppose Star Wars research; he has a vested
interest in it. Now, even if his economic dependence on SDI research
weren't so great, his opinion might not be any different. But this
objection misses the point: someone would never have attained his
position (former head of ARPA, president of IDA, plus the boards)
without being an enthusiastic advocate of using technology to solve
military problems in the first place. Dr. Ruina is very influential;
he wrote a piece in Technology Review against the pledge drive
opposing SDI research, again setting the tone for debate at MIT.
3) Naturally, when MIT is questioned about its military research, the
reaction is agreement that research priorities are skewed, but that
MIT can not do anything to alter the "nature and composition of the
defense establishment." In MIT's view, the sources of the problem lie
elsewhere, the government policies must be changed. (MIT has more
effect on the world than many governments, but says it cannot speak
out on such issues or it will compromise its "political neutrality.")
I am not saying that these examples point out an "evil conspiracy";
rather, they just illustrate that individuals and organizations are
properly concerned with preserving the sources of their livelihood --
their funding, their directorships, their security clearances, and
their chances of being picked to serve on important DOD and
congressional panels. Unless such connections are exposed and
acknowledged to be part of the political process, the views of
individuals within these institutions will, in my opinion, be given
undue weight in determining the acceptable bounds for political debate.
Rich
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 5 Nov 1986 23:24 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Acceptable Bounds for Debate
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
I think it would be accurate to say that NOT everyone supports SDI
research, but "everyone whose opinions fall within the bounds of some
acceptable limits which are defined by patterns of opinion within
institutions whose members that have a stake in such limits" supports
SDI research.
... Where Herb Lin works (the MIT Center for International Studies), I
believe some funding actually comes from the Star Wars office.
I know of no project at CIS that receives DoD money, with one
exception (a DARPA project for Soviet studies). There is a project
being negotiated now with the SDI for someone to do a history of the
SDI in real time. That is hardly support for the goals of SDI.
Now, even if his economic dependence on SDI research
weren't so great, his opinion might not be any different. But this
objection misses the point.
That is precisely the point. You claimed that SDI research money
influences his position on SDI. You just said that it might not.
Which is it?
someone would never have attained his
position (former head of ARPA, president of IDA, plus the boards)
without being an enthusiastic advocate of using technology to solve
military problems in the first place.
Ruina is in fact a technological pessimist -- his first reaction to
most proposed military technologies is that it won't work. Saying
that technology is a way to solve military problems is not an
unreasonable premise. Maybe what you meant to say is that technology
is not a way to solve political problems. That's true, but that is
not something that Ruina addresses.
Besides, supporting technology as a solution to military problems is a
different thing than supporting SDI. SDI is a silly idea, but that is
largely for implementation reasons: most people I know would support a
perfect and free defense against ballistic missiles. It won't solve
basic political problems, and may lull people into a false sense of
security, but those are challenges that all socially conscious people
have to address anyway. Technology is a solution to SOME military
problems, and it is even a solution to SOME political ones (the
technology of satellite observation comes to mind).
3) Naturally, when MIT is questioned about its military research, the
reaction is agreement that research priorities are skewed, but that
MIT can not do anything to alter the "nature and composition of the
defense establishment." In MIT's view, the sources of the problem lie
elsewhere, the government policies must be changed.
MIT is a diverse collection of individuals, and when there is
significant disagreement among them, there is no such thing as an
"MIT" position. You would object, rightly so, if MIT were to order
its faculty to seek out DoD funding. Why should MIT order its faculty
to refrain from accepting DoD funding? (I think it is like the debate
over abortion and choice issues. In my view, no one should order
pregnant women to have abortions, or to forbid them from having
abortions. The right to choose is just that, and the role of the
government is to enforce that right. In this case, MIT is analagous
to the government.)
You want MIT to acknowledge that military research is fundamentally
wrong, and that people should not be doing that work. But many people
don't feel that way. You are free to persuade people to your point of
view, and when you have persuaded a large enough majority that it
should not do so, it will be appropriate for MIT to take a collective
stand.
(MIT has more
effect on the world than many governments, but says it cannot speak
out on such issues or it will compromise its "political neutrality.")
MIT is politically neutral in the sense that it does not champion a
specific cause unless there is a high degree of consensus on an issue.
But I think you believe that NOT staking out a position is tacit
endorsement of the current trends in, for example, research funding.
I don't believe that.
... individuals and organizations are
properly concerned with preserving the sources of their livelihood --
their funding, their directorships, their security clearances, and
their chances of being picked to serve on important DOD and
congressional panels.
But you're saying more than that connections exist. You have said
that their opinions on defense issues are a RESULT of their concerns
about preservation of livelihood. You haven't documented *that* claim
at all.
Unless such connections are exposed and
acknowledged to be part of the political process, the views of
individuals within these institutions will, in my opinion, be given
undue weight in determining the acceptable bounds for political debate.
But what determines the appropriate weight?
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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