ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (11/07/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Thursday, November 6, 1986 5:13PM
Volume 7, Issue 48
Today's Topics:
Unequivocal Confirmation of Detonation
Unequivocal Confirmation of Detonation
Administrivia
Military Institutions and AI
Enforceability of a Test Ban
confirmation of nuclear explosions
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Date: Wednesday, 5 November 1986 16:49-EST
From: The Computer is your friend! <"NGSTL1::SHERZER%ti-eg.csnet" at CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
To: lin@xx.lcs.mit.edu
Re: Unequivocal Confirmation of Detonation
> Neither does the Soviet Union. They would like us to wait 24 hours
> before we retaliate to an attack.
>Please give an example of how waiting 24 hours would significantly
>impede the U.S. response.
OK, in one hour the Soviet ICBM force could destroy both the US ICBM
silo's and our SAC bases with our strategic bomber forces. This leaves
23 hours to put as big a hole in our submarine force as they can.
At best we could launch the bombers at the first warning, however,
we do not have the ability to keep them in the air for 24 hours and then
send them to the USSR. They can't land and refuel because there are no
airfields. This also gives them 24 hours to try to shoot them down
(depending on where they were).
This gives us no ICMB's, no strategic bombers, and some (perhaps a lot)
of our submarines gone. If I was a Soviet leader, I might view that
as an advantage.
Allen Sherzer
Sherzer%ngstl1@ti-eg.csnet
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Date: Thu, 6 Nov 1986 09:14 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Unequivocal Confirmation of Detonation
[... see above message...]
If you believe that in 23 hours (or even 23 days) the Soviets could
significantly dent the submarine force, you just don't talk to the
Navy. Besides, under this circumstance (where they can destroy a
large part of the submarine force), they can do that BEFORE they
launch a nuclear attack on the US in which case waiting one minute
doesn't do any good.
At best we could launch the bombers at the first warning, however,
we do not have the ability to keep them in the air for 24 hours and then
send them to the USSR.
That is not a fundamental limitation. The President's airplane can
stay aloft for 72 hours. If we wanted to keep the bombers aloft for
24 hours, we could. (Besides, B52's *have* been kept in the air for
about 24 hours.)
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Date: Thu, 6 Nov 1986 09:14 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Administivia
My mailer no longer recognizes these sites:
Message failed for the following:
APRI1801%UA.BITNET@WISCVM.WISC.EDU: 550 Unknown Host 'UA.BITNET'
FJOHNSO3%UA.BITNET@WISCVM.WISC.EDU: 550 Unknown Host 'UA.BITNET'
RSHEPHE%UA.BITNET@WISCVM.WISC.EDU: 550 Unknown Host 'UA.BITNET'
Someone please help?
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Date: Thu, 6 Nov 86 11:16:15 PST
From: toma@Sun.COM (Tom Athanasiou)
Subject: Military Institutions and AI
I asked a long form of this question a few weeks ago and got little
response, so let me try a short form:
Does anyone know of institutional forces within the
military that predispose positive receptions for
technologies that don't really work. There's been a lot
of talk about SDI, but I'm interested in AI per se. The
level of hype in the commerical AI world has dropped a
lot faster than in the military AI world. Why?
Does anyone know of anyone that would be helpful to talk
to on this issue? Of anything that would be good to
read?
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Date: Thu, 6 Nov 86 12:24:36 PST
From: ihnp4!ihuxv!eklhad@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
To: arms-d
Subject: Enforceability of a Test Ban
Concerning a comprehensive test ban treaty, Phill writes
> Let's be realistic; the Soviet Union cannot be
> trusted to abide by such a treaty unless we provide them with some strong
> disincentives (the economist comes out). Granted, such treaties would
> be verifiable, but they would be unenforceable.
Yes! The treaties are verifyable.
Concerning enforceability, I agree that simple trust or economic embargos
are inadequate; yet I believe the Soviets would honor such a treaty.
They must, because the planet is at risk.
If they violate such a treaty, and we detect this,
we return to the arms race as usual, and neither side wants that.
This is our only hope.
A recent Sci Am article provided some evidence for Soviet treaty compliance.
Unfortunately, the article was entitled "can the Soviets be trusted",
or something like that. Certainly they cannot,
as previous chemical, biological, and political treaties illustrate.
However, the consequences of treaty violations were traditionally
insignificant. To violate a test ban treaty is to return to an
unbridled arms race, and our only hope is that this is enough
"disincentive" for both sides.
Remember, they trust us as much as we trust them.
karl dahlke ihnp4!ihnet!eklhad
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Date: Thu, 6 Nov 1986 17:04 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: confirmation of nuclear explosions
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
Unfortunately, the group is both powerful and controlled by those who
designed the US posture - who else would claim that that
hair-trigger day-to-day alert levels *reduce* the risk of
accident because of its unambiguous character?
It is true in a sense. Much happens if we see the other side raising
its alert level. If it stays constant, the other side gets used to
it, and nothing much happens because nothing is changing. Of course,
high alert has its own dangers, as you rightly point out.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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