ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (11/07/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Friday, November 7, 1986 2:33PM
Volume 7, Issue 49
Today's Topics:
Yet more on SDI
Verifiability of test-bans
Acceptable Bounds for Debate (2 msgs)
prompt responses to nuclear attack (2 messages)
SDI Assumptions
Hair-trigger deterrence
prompt responses to nuclear attack
Launch on Warning
prompt response
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Verifiability of test-bans
Date: 06 Nov 86 19:27:28 EST (Thu)
From: dm@bfly-vax.bbn.com
For those who missed it, one of this year's IEEE Spectrum magazines
was a special issue on verification of arms-control treaties.
Now that the Soviets will permit third-party seismographs onto their
soil we can pretty much verify underground explosion test bans. They
might sneak a few by that could be confused with construction or
mining explosions, so we ban tests of bombs big enough to detect
confidently, and make a lot of noise about any ambiguous seismic
wiggles.
What good is a test ban?
What both sides fear is a first-strike by the other side which will
leave the victim defenseless and unable to retaliate. Bigger missles
which can deliver bigger warheads accurately (MX and Trident on our
side, SS-whatever on theirs) which can destroy silos; a breakthrough
in anti-submarine warfare (which neither side seems to have made,
although we boast of being able to track their submarines) nuclear
weapons minutes away from the opponent's command centers (Pershings in
Europe, submarine-launched cruise missles off of Cape Hatteras); all
contribute to each side fearing a first strike by the other.
In order to pull off a first-strike, almost everything has to work right.
You can't have aging missles fail to launch or going off target, aging
warheads fizzling. You can't trust an untested system to work. Your
trust in a system that hasn't been tested in 10 years is marginal.
You are aiming at small things that are hard to kill (silos and
bunkers).
To pull off a retaliation to a first strike all you have to do is hit
cities (easy -- they're big, and a near miss is still pretty
destructive), and not many of those (say, 100 cities -- if only one of
our Trident submarines survived the war, and only ONE QUARTER of its
warheads got to their targets). In other words, a lot of things can
go wrong and you'll succeed in your goal.
A test ban affects both side's faith in their own equipment. With
each passing year the equipment becomes less and less trustworthy as
systems age or are replaced with untested components. With each
passing year each side fears a first strike by the other less and
less.
What do we do if they violate it?
We run a few tests of our own, of course. One for each of theirs.
We've got some vital tests to run (at least Ronald Reagan and Edward
Teller think so). We'll learn a lot from them if we do them. Right
now, the Russians don't want us doing those tests, so we have a nice
big stick to hold over them.
------------------------------
Date: Thu 6 Nov 86 20:10:52-EST
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Acceptable Bounds for Debate
[cowan@xx, quoted by Herb Lin]
... Where Herb Lin works (the MIT Center for International Studies), I
believe some funding actually comes from the Star Wars office.
[Herb Lin]
I know of no project at CIS that receives DoD money, with one
exception (a DARPA project for Soviet studies). There is a project
being negotiated now with the SDI for someone to do a history of the
SDI in real time. That is hardly support for the goals of SDI.
You changed my quote a bit; I was careful to exclude you when I said
"some funding (not Herb's) actually comes from the Star Wars Office."
I may have jumped the gun on the CIS SDI funding; my source is the
"Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Military Presence at MIT," May
15, 1986, p.27, discussing the status of on campus SDI research:
"Seventeen proposals are listed in all. Two are currently
funded... Four proposals are listed as pending: one in the Chemistry
department... one in the Plasma Fusion Center... one in the Center for
International Studies for 4.5 years at $112K/year... and one in the
Aero/Astro Department."
It hardly would seem necessary for the SDIO to spend so much money,
$504,000 over five years, to do a "history of SDI in real time." It
appears the SDIO is buying a lot more than that. How can you say that
having the prestigious MIT Center for International Studies on its
bankroll would not satisfy a goal of the SDIO?
The director of the Arms Control and Disarmament program in
the center, Jack Ruina, is on the boards of directors of two Star Wars
contractors, MITRE Corporation and General Research corp. I think
this limits his ability to oppose Star Wars research; he has a vested
interest in it. Now, even if his economic dependence on SDI research
weren't so great, his opinion might not be any different. But this
objection misses the point.
That is precisely the point. You claimed that SDI research money
influences his position on SDI. You just said that it might not.
Which is it?
You got rid of the colon after my last sentence, changing the meaning
slightly -- the point was not that money changes Ruina's position, but
that money influences the position of the person who is able to rise
to Ruina's position (otherwise it might be someone else), because
someone would never have attained his
position (former head of ARPA, president of IDA, plus the boards)
without being an enthusiastic advocate of using technology to solve
military problems in the first place.
Ruina is in fact a technological pessimist -- his first reaction to
most proposed military technologies is that it won't work. Saying
that technology is a way to solve military problems is not an
unreasonable premise. Maybe what you meant to say is that technology
is not a way to solve political problems. That's true, but that is
not something that Ruina addresses.
When I said military problems, I was thinking of military problems as
political problems. In the MIT Tech of September 23, 1986, p.1, an
article quotes Ruina: "`Technology is neither the cause or savior of
the arms race. The Reagan administration would continue the arms
buildup with or without advances in nuclear weapons technology,' he
explained. However, military technology may be needed to stop the
arms race."
Now, it wasn't reported, but I was at the forum on September 18, and I
distinctly remember Ruina advocating increases in research funding for
military technology to stop the arms race, and Jerome Wiesner
countering that we aren't spending enough on civilian technology, and
therefore our economic competitiveness is hurting.
3) Naturally, when MIT is questioned about its military research, the
reaction is agreement that research priorities are skewed, but that
MIT can not do anything to alter the "nature and composition of the
defense establishment." In MIT's view, the sources of the problem lie
elsewhere, the government policies must be changed.
MIT is a diverse collection of individuals, and when there is
significant disagreement among them, there is no such thing as an
"MIT" position. You would object, rightly so, if MIT were to order
its faculty to seek out DoD funding.
When a research contract is signed, the institution gives approval to
use its facilities for the project, and that is taking a position.
Someone recently told me that a couple of years ago a professor
applied wanted to apply for arms control money from the DOD, but MIT
REFUSED to sign the proposal, and instead resubmitted it through the
Center For International Studies, because it was felt that relations
with the DOD would be better served (than if that particular professor
were allowed to apply for the money).
Why should MIT order its faculty to refrain from accepting DoD
funding? You want MIT to acknowledge that military research is
fundamentally wrong, and that people should not be doing that work.
Your argument must be pretty weak if you must resort to accusing
me of advocating proposals that I have never even suggested.
(MIT has more effect on the world than many governments, but says
it cannot speak out on such issues or it will compromise its
"political neutrality.")
MIT is politically neutral in the sense that it does not champion a
specific cause unless there is a high degree of consensus on an issue.
But I think you believe that NOT staking out a position is tacit
endorsement of the current trends in, for example, research funding.
I don't believe that.
No; I am not just saying that MIT's refusal to act is an endorsement
of current trends, but that MIT actively does things which involve
taking political positions, things which have great political
significance. For example, when MIT decides to put out a press
release about air traffic control at Lincoln Labs, resulting in a
Globe feature article about the research, without seeking similar
popular analyses of Lincoln's military problems, that is a politically
significant act.
When MIT does not invite the press to cover an MIT-sponsored event on
the Military and the Economy, yet does invite the press to the
dedication of a microelectronics center, that is a political decision
that press reports of the dedication serve MIT's interests, while
publicity about a forum which criticizes the economic effects of
military research does not. When MIT opposes the Nuclear Free
Cambridge act, that is taking a political position.
When the MIT Provost says in the Boston Globe, October 19, 1986, p.
A113, that "MIT is not a political university that is going to make
judgements about the political nature of all research and
development," and then says, in the same article, that "MIT runs
Lincoln Laboratories as a service to the nation," he is contradicting
himself. By running the military lab as part of its public service
function, MIT is taking a political position that the work performed
by Lincoln can be considered a public service.
Unless such connections are exposed and
acknowledged to be part of the political process, the views of
individuals within these institutions will, in my opinion, be given
undue weight in determining the acceptable bounds for political
debate.
But what determines the appropriate weight?
Certainly not a single edict or regulation; I can only advocate
greater citizen participation in politics. There is no blueprint
for something that the Democrats or Republicans can implement.
One last point. Underlying all your arguments, which often try to pin
me down to a particular position, is the assumption that there is A
SOLUTION, ONE SOLUTION. That type of reasoning is fine if you are in
a position of power, and you have the resources to implement one
solution, in a centralized fashion, over a wide area. It is an
authoritarian type of thinking.
But if you are not in a position of power, highly defined arguments or
plans serve little purpose except to determine who to vote for, an
action which is only a small part of the political process. People
who want greater control over their own lives must each have their own
solutions, appropriate to their specific situations. That's why I
don't advocate university-level DOD research bans, but I do advocate
individual labs getting together and deciding to work hard to create
opportunities to apply their know-how to non-military problems
whose solutions are more urgently needed.
-rich
------------------------------
Date: Fri 7 Nov 86 13:43:55-EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Acceptable Bounds for Debate
You bring up several interesting issues. First is that you note I
changed your quotations. You are correct, but when I changed them I
did so to try to minimize the amount of repetition in the digest, and
additionally in one case to get a text line to fint onto a screen
line.
Of course, I did not change anything with the *intent* of changing
your meaning, so that what I left was something I regarded as
identical in meaning to yours. If I did change your meaning, I
apologize, but request that you illustrate how I did so.
[cowan@xx, quoted by Herb Lin]
... Where Herb Lin works (the MIT Center for
International Studies), I
believe some funding actually comes from the Star Wars office.
[Herb Lin]
I know of no project at CIS that receives DoD money, with one
exception (a DARPA project for Soviet studies). There is a project
being negotiated now with the SDI for someone to do a history of the
SDI in real time. That is hardly support for the goals of SDI.
You changed my quote a bit; I was careful to exclude you when I said
"some funding (not Herb's) actually comes from the Star Wars Office."
I see no substantive difference between your statement and mine,
though I do see how its specific exclusion of me makes removes any
suggestion about me personally. Even without your reference to me
though, I would not have taken it as personal.
It hardly would seem necessary for the SDIO to spend so much money,
$504,000 over five years, to do a "history of SDI in real time."
$100,000 per year translates into funding for two research people plus
part time secretarial support. It is easy for me to see how a project
history of SDI could use such resources.
It
appears the SDIO is buying a lot more than that. How can you say that
having the prestigious MIT Center for International Studies on its
bankroll would not satisfy a goal of the SDIO?
To whom would it make a difference? Congress? How?
The MIT CIS has studied the history of the Polaris weapon system too.
Was that support for the Polaris?
I don't think you would argue that the SDI is an unprecedented
national initiative. As such, I think it *deserves* careful scrutiny,
and the opportunity to examine it from the inside is well worth
taking, if nothing else to see how to avoid similar programs in the
future.
Of course, one might worry about official SDI sponsorship corrupting
the investigation. If that is your worry, then that is a different
issue. In that case, an argument has to be made that such a thing
would happen -- it depends on the people in charge, the researchers
involved, and so on. Ultimately it depends on their own intellectual
integrity, just like so many other enterprises. Some people could be
corrupted by funding to cast things in a favorable light. Others
would not be.
.. Jack Ruina, is on the boards of directors of two Star Wars
contractors, MITRE Corporation and General Research corp. I think
this limits his ability to oppose Star Wars research; he has a vested
interest in it. Now, even if his economic dependence on SDI research
weren't so great, his opinion might not be any different. But this
objection misses the point.
That is precisely the point. You claimed that SDI research money
influences his position on SDI. You just said that it might not.
Which is it?
You got rid of the colon after my last sentence, changing the meaning
slightly -- the point was not that money changes Ruina's position, but
that money influences the position of the person who is able to rise
to Ruina's position (otherwise it might be someone else), because
someone would never have attained his
position (former head of ARPA, president of IDA, plus the boards)
without being an enthusiastic advocate of using technology to solve
military problems in the first place.
I don't see the difference between your statement with the colon and
mine without it. How does money "influence the position" without
changing it?
When I said military problems, I was thinking of military problems as
political problems...
Now, it wasn't reported, but I was at the forum on September 18, and I
distinctly remember Ruina advocating increases in research funding for
military technology to stop the arms race..
That would be consistent with what I know of Ruina, so let us accept
it as a premise, that Ruina believe what you say he believes.
I read what you are saying as a statement that the arms race is a
political problem, rather than a military one. I agree only partly.
It is also a military/techical one. I believe that the primary
drivers are political, based on fear, mistrust, and ambitious national
instincts. But some military technology DOES help to relieve fear and
mistrust; satellite technology is a prime example. On the basis of
your report, I don't see Ruina as advocating anything more than
"invest in R&D for military technologies that will help the current
situation in much the same way that satellite technology was helpful."
Maybe he said other things too, but I did not hear him, so I must rely
on your report.
MIT is a diverse collection of individuals, and when there is
significant disagreement among them, there is no such thing as an
"MIT" position. You would object, rightly so, if MIT were to order
its faculty to seek out DoD funding.
When a research contract is signed, the institution gives approval to
use its facilities for the project, and that is taking a position.
I partly agree. The position it takes is that the project it approves
is not so far out of accepted norms, as "norms" are defined by the set
of individuals that constitute MIT. Beyond that, I don't think it is
taking a position.
...a professor
applied wanted to apply for arms control money from the DOD, but MIT
REFUSED to sign the proposal, and instead resubmitted it through the
Center For International Studies, because it was felt that relations
with the DOD would be better served (than if that particular professor
were allowed to apply for the money).
On the face of it, that is not so unreasonable to me. They did not
refuse to submit the proposal at all. I need more details to judge
they compromised themselves on it. (Maybe they did -- I can't tell from
the information supplied.)
Why should MIT order its faculty to refrain from accepting DoD
funding? You want MIT to acknowledge that military research is
fundamentally wrong, and that people should not be doing that work.
Your argument must be pretty weak if you must resort to accusing
me of advocating proposals that I have never even suggested.
I apologize for my statement, but that is certainly the way your
arguments come across. I acknowledge that you don't "advocate
university-level DOD research bans", but you do strongly suggest that
people should not be doing military research when you said that
"individual labs [should be] getting together and deciding to work
hard to create opportunities to apply their know-how to non-military
problems whose solutions are more urgently needed."
I am not just saying that MIT's refusal to act is an endorsement
of current trends, but that MIT actively does things which involve
taking political positions, things which have great political
significance.
I guess I don't understand what you mean my a "political position". A
political position and something with great political significance are
things which to me are conceptually distinct, and yet you used them
apparently identically above. I request clarification.
When the MIT Provost says in the Boston Globe, October 19, 1986, p.
A113, that "MIT is not a political university that is going to make
judgements about the political nature of all research and
development," and then says, in the same article, that "MIT runs
Lincoln Laboratories as a service to the nation," he is contradicting
himself. By running the military lab as part of its public service
function, MIT is taking a political position that the work performed
by Lincoln can be considered a public service.
Of all of your examples, this one most clearly illustrates my
confusion about "political position". I don't use the words
"political position" to characterize MIT's position. Rather, a
definition is involved. The NATION has decided to fund the sort of
work Lincoln does; by definition, Lincoln Labs are performing a public
service. Isn't that the definition of a public service -- something
that the nation decides to expend national resources on?
I think I'm missing something here, but I'm not sure what.
.. I can only advocate
greater citizen participation in politics.
I agree with that.
One last point. Underlying all your arguments, which often try to pin
me down to a particular position, is the assumption that there is A
SOLUTION, ONE SOLUTION.
Are you saying that you don't have a specific position? Are you
saying nothing more than people should think about what they do? That
is hard to argue with. But you take it a step further than that. You
make specific charges about what people do and why they do it. For
example, you appear to suggest that individual concerns for money and
the preservation of their livelihood influence their positions on
defense research.
Do I misunderstand?
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 6 Nov 86 07:22 CDT
From: The Computer is your friend! <"NGSTL1::SHERZER%ti-eg.csnet"@RELAY.CS.NET>
Subject: prompt responses to nuclear attack
>> This confirmation should take time. No retaliatory decision by until
>> 24 hrs. after the detonation is good sense, in the nuclear context.
>
> I don't think that is such a bad idea myself.
> Neither does the Soviet Union. They would like us to wait 24 hours
> before we retaliate to an attack.
>Please give an example of how waiting 24 hours would significantly
>impede the U.S. response. Without such an example, the only plausible
>conclusion is that you are engaging in hyperbole and ad hominem
>argument, suggesting that "if the Soviets want it, it must be bad for
>us, and if you want the same thing, you must be in their camp."
OK, in one hour the Soviet ICBM force could destroy both the US ICBM
silo's and our SAC bases with our strategic bomber forces. This leaves
23 hours to put as big a hole in our submarine force as they can.
At best we could launch the bombers at the first warning, however,
we do not have the ability to keep them in the air for 24 hours and then
send them to the USSR. They can't land and refuel because there are no
airfields. This also gives them 24 hours to try to shoot them down
(depending on where they were).
I assume also that the president will be in a safe place for the 24 hours.
This means that he will be alive to order the retaliation. However, I
think there would be very little left of the C3 capabilities needed to
retaliate.
This gives us no ICMB's, no strategic bombers, and some (perhaps a lot)
of our submarines gone (and no way to order the remaining subs to launch).
If I was a Soviet leader, I might view that as an advantage.
Allen Sherzer
Sherzer%ngstl1@ti-eg.csnet
------------------------------
Date: Thursday, 6 November 1986 12:32-EST
From: The Computer is your friend! <"NGSTL1::SHERZER%ti-eg.csnet" at RELAY.CS.NET>
To: arms-d
Re: prompt responses to nuclear attack
> If you believe that in 23 hours (or even 23 days) the Soviets could
> significantly dent the submarine force, you just don't talk to the
> Navy. Besides, under this circumstance (where they can destroy a
> large part of the submarine force), they can do that BEFORE they
> launch a nuclear attack on the US in which case waiting one minute
> doesn't do any good.
Nither one of us knows the exact capability of Soviet ASW. It is in
the Navy's interest to have us beleive that what you say is true. It does
not matter however, because the C3 capabilities needed to order retailation
would no longer exist. Also, the ability to destroy a large part of
the sub force in 24 hours does not imply that is is just as easy
to do it in one hour.
>> At best we could launch the bombers at the first warning, however,
>> we do not have the ability to keep them in the air for 24 hours and then
>> send them to the USSR.
> That is not a fundamental limitation. The President's airplane can
> stay aloft for 72 hours. If we wanted to keep the bombers aloft for
> 24 hours, we could. (Besides, B52's *have* been kept in the air for
> about 24 hours.)
Given that we have a place for tankers to land and refuel, we can keep
SOME of the bombers in the air for 24 hours. This means the use of
airfields which will not exist after the Soviet attack so it is not
feasable in this situation. Also, the time needed is more like 36 hours
(they still need to fly to the USSR). After talking with a firend
who is a retired tanker navigator, I was assured that it is not
possible to keep the tanker and bobmer force aloft for the 24 hours
(much less the actual 36 hours).
So, after 24 hours, we have no land based ICBM's, no bombers, some
(exact number unknown) of subs. We also have no way to order the
retaliation (because of no C3).
Allen Sherzer
sherzer%ngstl1@ti-eg.csnet
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 6 Nov 86 22:12:16 EST
From: David_S._Allan@ub.cc.umich.edu
Subject: SDI Assumptions
> From: prairie!dan at rsch.wisc.edu
> Re: SDI assumptions
> I am not convinced about SDI for the simple reason that not enough
> evidence exists one way or another about whether useful systems can
> be built to do what its proponents want. That's what research is for.
> When you do research, your peers presumably judge your results on a
> (relatively) objective basis.
But do you believe that if the scientists and engineers say, "We can't
achieve the goals you set forth," then the Star Wars program will be
dismantled? The committment to SDI is entirely political, not scientific.
"Objective" review by peers may weed out some projects, but SDI is here to
stay. If "we" (the M-I complex) decide to build a Star Wars system, we will
modify the goals of the program to reflect the level of technology we can
achieve.
David Allan (David_Allan@UM.CC.UMICH.EDU)
------------------------------
Date: Thursday, 6 November 1986 21:27-EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
To: LIN, arms-d
Re: Hair-trigger deterrence
LIN> Much happens if we see the other side raising its alert level.
LIN> If it stays constant, the other side gets used to it, and
LIN> nothing much happens because nothing is changing. Of course,
LIN> high alert has its own dangers, as you rightly point out.
I think the latter dangers outweigh the former not merely as a matter
of opinion but as a matter of logic. Familiarity breeds contempt is
a relevant truism. The alert-level argument is flawed because
there remain alert levels within alert levels, and what the
hair-trigger posture means is that the first-upped level of alert has
Minuteman launch control officers strapped in their chairs with
their keys in the launch locks and the release codes in the
consoles. The argument that peacetime hair-trigger posture is a
risk-reducer is like saying the faster one drives, the safer one
is, because you spend less time on the road.
To: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
------------------------------
From: ut-sally!ut-ngp!melpad!reality1!james@seismo.CSS.GOV
Date: Fri, 7 Nov 86 08:47:05 CST
Subject: prompt responses to nuclear attack
Reply-To: ut-sally!ut-ngp!reality1!james@seismo.CSS.GOV (james)
IN article <8611051641.AA01021@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>, LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Herb Lin) wrote:
>Please give an example of how waiting 24 hours would significantly
>impede the U.S. response. Without such an example, the only plausible
>conclusion is that you are engaging in hyperbole and ad hominem
>argument, suggesting that "if the Soviets want it, it must be bad for
>us, and if you want the same thing, you must be in their camp."
Exactly how long would it take the Soviets to completely destroy all land and
air based systems in an all out attack? My assumption is that everything but
the submarine based forces would be long gone by the time 24 hours rolled
around, and that the president and most other command forces would also be
"incapacitated". I have no idea how fast the military system could be
disabled, but since it is so easy to track the location of the president, I
must assume that the president would be a primary target in an attempt to
confuse the command picture (and there's no way a first strike would miss
the president).
Rather than say "if the Soviets want it, it must be bad", one might say "If
the Soviets want it, it *might* be bad". The rest of the quote is the pot
calling the kettle black, or however it goes.
---
James R. Van Artsdalen ...!ut-ngp!utastro!osi3b2!james "Live Free or Die"
------------------------------
Date: Friday, 7 November 1986 01:50-EST
From: cfccs at HAWAII-EMH
To: ARMS-D
Re: Launch on Warning
Seems like a lot of paranoia here to me. Since when have we been able to
depend on the military policy of either the Soviet Uniion or the United States?
When the time comes, the policy will be made at the moment, to fit the
situation. Whether we have a launch on warning policy or not doesn't really
matter when the situation occurs. When a person feels the future of the World
is i the balance, no amount of policy verbage is going to matter!
SDI is just what it says, an initiative. Without initiative, we would not
move forward. I am glad we, as a people, have recognized the old accepted
"defense by intimidation" is a never ending spiral with no benefit coming from
the immense cost. On the other hand, even if a "Star Wars" defense is not
feasible in the minds of some experts, it is a better road than the one we
have been on for so many years. It has hope. It has a future. Nothing was
ever gained withoutinitiative. We can sit on our hands complaining about
the nuclear threat while both sides declare the other is stronger, or we can
push our technology to the limits and beyond to make the world just a little
bit safer. We might even get some benefits from the technology ourselves!
Guess what. I heard a rumor that our governemt and a few others have evidence
that intelligent life exists outside of our World. I think SDI is also a
push to develop technology for a defense against the unknown...just in case.
Gary Holt
CFCCS@HAWAII-EMH.ARPA
------------------------------
Date: Friday, 7 November 1986 03:19-EST From: cfccs at HAWAII-EMH To:
ARMS-D Re: prompt response I don't know where your head is on the 24
hour wait issue. Do you really believe that the remaining submarines
we would have would have even a slim chance at destroying the Soviet
military after our silos, bombers, major cities like Washington D.C.,
and probably all of our military bases have been destroyed? Even if
they did survive, and even if they had enough power to do the job,
they won't have a common communication link! It was just destoyed
along with all the bases and the battle staff! I know the Navy has an
over-inflated vision of its own power, but this is absolutely
ridiculous! Even they would say so!
Gary Holt
CFCCS@HAWAII-EMH.ARPA
------------------------------
End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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