ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (11/12/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Wednesday, November 12, 1986 1:04PM
Volume 7, Issue 58
Today's Topics:
Meteorite as A-explosion
SDI
Launch on warning
Launch on warning
SDI, test ban
Re: Response to "Hawaii"
The nuclear fix
Independent arms test verification
Launch on warning
ground based missile defenses
retaliation with Trident
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 11 Nov 86 10:13:27 PST
From: Steve Walton <ametek!walton@csvax.caltech.edu>
Subject: Meteorite as A-explosion
Jef Poskanzer writes:
But if a plain old normal matter meteorite did happen to land in a city,
it would be indistinguishable from a nuke until hours or days later, when
reliable reports on the lack of fallout came in. And even a normal matter
meteorite, if it was large enough, would give off some prompt ionizing
radiation. X-rays from the plasma. That wouldn't result in any fallout,
but it might trigger X-ray-detecting satellites such as the Vela series.
That could cause some fingers to stray towards some buttons.
Consider the impact of a small meteorite: In the absence of any
international tension or heightened military alerts anywhere, one city
vanishes. The vanishing is accompanied by reports along a line
extending away from the city of a fireball, with a roaring sound
accompanying the fireball for those nearer the city. The line extends
in a direction from which ICBM's are unlikely to arrive. Said city
vanishes in a flash, but immediate overflights from aircraft reveal no
significant levels of radiation. Encouraged, the pilots land and find
fused rock and charred, irregular chunks of metal around the crater.
Astronomers and geologists who maintain a worldwide watch for meteor
hits (so they can get them fresh) arrive almost immediately and
confirm that the city was the victim of an unlucky meteor strike.
Besides, what would be the point of destroying a city with a bomb with
NO prior announcement and NO "claiming of responsibility" afterwards?
My main point was that we should worry about more plausible
scenarios for accidental nuclear war.
>Besides, the conversion of 1 gram of anti-matter (a cube less than
>1 cm on a side) to energy would produce 9 x 10^20 ergs of energy,
>which is probably enough to split the earth in two.
If you want to get into science fiction, at least get the physics
right. A gram of antimatter would produce 18 x 10^20 ergs, because
an equal mass of normal matter would also be converted to energy.
18e20 ergs is about 40 kilotons, hardly enough to split the earth
in two. For that, you would need about 2.25e39 ergs.
Sorry, I was tired and didn't have appropriate references handy.
To get, say, 5,000 megatons, roughly equal to the Cretaceous event
and enough to cause our probable extinction, you'd need 1e5 g,
or a piece of antimatter rock (3g/cc) about 20 cm in diameter.
I wasn't that far off, and the point was that even a really small
piece would cause our extinction anyway, so there wouldn't be
much worry about it being mistaken for a nuclear explosion.
Can you really quote a 3-significant-digit figure on what it
would take to split the earth? I'd love to see the reference.
>Such a particle would also produce a long trail of annhilations on
>its way in to the Solar System, due to collisions with the atoms in
>the solar wind, the density of which is about 10 atoms per cubic
>centimeter near the earth and more than 1 per cc even at Jupiter.
>The resulting trail would be easily visible.
I doubt it.
A 1 cm diameter chunk of antimatter moving through the solar wind at
20 km/s passes through a volume of 1.6e6 cc each second, thus
annhilating roughly 3e6 atoms per second with a mean atomic weight of
1.3 amu (the sun is 90% H, 10% He by number of atoms). This produces
about 6,000 ergs/s. That isn't much, so you're right. By contrast, a
1 km diameter asteroid with a 10% albedo 2 AU from the sun reflects
about 7e-20 of the incident sunlight, but that's still 3e14 ergs/s.
And such an asteroid is pretty hard to see.
Steve Walton
------------------------------
Date: Tuesday, 11 November 1986 15:42-EST
From: cfccs at HAWAII-EMH
To: LIN, arms-d
Re: SDI
I agree. I don't want to see huge amounts of money (or even small amounts)
spent on 'fluff' for the cameras either. I think that is where the thrust
of the arguements should be directed.
I disagree with restraining SDI research to a low-key level. I do not have
tunnel vision so I see the research being far more valuable than just to
produce a space based defense system. The problem is how to keep the program
directors off the backs of the researchers so they can do their job without
havinto produce occasional 'fluff' for the simple minded.
I hate political games, but sometimes politics can be used to control itself!
CFCCS @ HAWAII-EMH
PS - On December 19th I won't be in Hawaii any longer, but will be on my way
to D.C. Someone else will be taking over my CFCCS mailbox, so you can leave
it on your mailing list if you don't mind. I will be using EGBERT@PAX
until I get my own again. You can add this one to the mailing list if you
think it will be worth while.
Gary Holt
------------------------------
Date: Tuesday, 11 November 1986 16:27-EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
To: LIN, arms-d
Re: Launch on warning
REPLY TO 11/11/86 05:49 FROM LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU: Launch on warning
LIN> That's why I want to maintain an OPTION for LOW, but not a
LIN> POLICY. The two ARE different; having an option means that
LIN> the other guy must worry that you might, but making it not a
LIN> policy means that you can avoid most of the risks.
By not having a LOW "policy," you mean not having pre-decided to
attempt a LOW in the event of an attack warning, right? And by
maintaining a LOW option, you mean providing that a LOW decision
be taken, perhaps negatively, in the event of a warning, right?
I think this you misapply the word "policy," which we have argued
about before. The "mere" maintenance of the LOW option requires a
huge amount of careful, particular preplanning, and so its
maintenance is itself a very substantial policy. And the word
"policy" connotes generality. I suggest you say that the launch on
warning policy is to take the launch on warning decision in
real-time, and not make a statement liable to be interpreted as that
the U.S. has a policy not to launch on warning. N.B.:
"POLICY also dictates that the President be able to choose from
a variety of pre-planned strike options, and POLICY defines the
kinds of targets that will be included in each option... There
have been numerous launch under attack studies. The most
significant was part of the Nuclear Targeting POLICY Study
(deleted)." (Senate Armed Services Committee, DOD
Appropriations FY 1981 at 2721,2936; testimony of Dr. Perry.)
In particular, launch on warning targeting was "being addressed in
detail by a sub-panel of the Targeting Study," according to a
top-secret (1979) RAND LUA Report (R-2514-AF), which also pointed
out "the depth of planning and coordination that would be required
for an operational LUA strategy." The SIOP's advertised launch on
warning target sets alone prove that at least an active launch on
warning targeting policy exists. Of course, much more than this
exists, notably a continuously operating set of procedures that
solemnly decide that the U.S. is not under nuclear attack over a
hundred times a year.
I think it highly disinformative to say that where all these elements
exist (and many more), there is no launch on warning "policy."
In fact, it's a farcical position, given also that it does not
mean that the policy is not to launch on warning:
Rep. EDWARDS: If I were sitting over in the Soviet Union today I
would conclude that in truth the policy of the United States is not
to launch on warning.
Gen. ELLIS: No, that is not the policy.
(House Armed Services Committee, DOD Appropriations FY 1981,
at 113-114.)
LIN> I believe deterrence to have failed when missiles are on the
LIN> way to the U.S. -- and I don't want to get into the argument
LIN> that sensors could be faulty. HOWEVER I make the judgment
LIN> that missiles are coming, that is sufficient for the
LIN> purposes of this argument.
It is absolutely insufficient. I'd rather not get into the argument
that I'm liable to kill people when I'm drunk and driving, but that
would be sheer irresponsibility.
LIN> I don't see the operation of LOWC at all as a form of first
LIN> use. You could argue (I would not) that it is a form of
LIN> threatened first use, but that's not the same thing.
I argue it's a form of *imminently* threatened first-use. True, it
appears to be a lower degree of use than direct detonation. But
because of the imminent, actual threat it poses, the operation by the
military of the present launch on warning capability must rank at
least as an act of war. A gun may be legally worn, but when that
gun is loaded, aimed, and cocked, then the law intervenes on behalf
of persons threatened. Most pertinently, the War Powers Act
carefully states that circumstances which clearly indicate imminent
hostilities constitute prohibited acts of war, which embraces
the operation of a LOWC.
A gun may be worn, aimed, or fired; these comprise three degrees of
use. Likewise, nuclear weapons have degrees of use, and there is a
boundary between threatened and actual use which would be improperly
blurred were the notion of "first-use" to exclude the operation of a
LOWC. The continuous risk of imminent and unstoppable accidental
catastrophe which accompanies a LOWC crosses the qualitative nuclear
threshold; whereas the reversible threat of intentional use of
nuclear weapons constitutes only a coercive "pre-use." (There is
even mathematical support for this thesis, from game theory, based
on the recognition that an accidental LOW would introduce a
probability of damages utterly incommensurable with those before any
first-use -- the mathematical expectation undergoes a discontinuity
which brackets LOW outside of the pre-use, and in the first-use,
ballpark. Crudely expressed, if the disutility of extinction be
deemed infinite, which is reasonable, even a one percent chance
of it, where there was none before, can't justify its operation,
despite prior conventional damages.)
To: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 11 Nov 1986 17:51 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Launch on warning
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
By not having a LOW "policy," you mean not having pre-decided to
attempt a LOW in the event of an attack warning, right?
Right.
And by
maintaining a LOW option, you mean providing that a LOW decision
be taken, perhaps negatively, in the event of a warning, right?
Right.
I think this you misapply the word "policy," which we have argued
about before. The "mere" maintenance of the LOW option requires a
huge amount of careful, particular preplanning, and so its
maintenance is itself a very substantial policy. And the word
"policy" connotes generality.
My Webster's defines policy as "a principle, plan, or course of
action, as pursued by a government, organization, or individual." The
key is the phrase "as pursued", which is to say it is what will be done.
Thus, I think you are the one who misuses the word "policy".
I suggest you say that the launch on
warning policy is to take the launch on warning decision in
real-time, and not make a statement liable to be interpreted as that
the U.S. has a policy not to launch on warning.
I would say that the policy regarding launch on warning is that the
U.S. might execute an LOW, and it might not. It does not have a
policy to not launch on warning, nor does it have a policy to launch
on warning. It does have a policy of retaliation.
The SIOP's advertised launch on
warning target sets alone prove that at least an active launch on
warning targeting policy exists.
But the SIOP has many OTHER target sets too. It has pre-emptive
target sets -- does that mean that it is U.S. policy to pre-empt?
LIN> I believe deterrence to have failed when missiles are on the
LIN> way to the U.S. -- and I don't want to get into the argument
LIN> that sensors could be faulty. HOWEVER I make the judgment
LIN> that missiles are coming, that is sufficient for the
LIN> purposes of this argument.
It is absolutely insufficient. I'd rather not get into the argument
that I'm liable to kill people when I'm drunk and driving, but that
would be sheer irresponsibility.
In a previous message, you said to me that IF the reports of incoming
missiles could be guaranteed to be true, you *might* be willing to
execute a launch on that warning. Do you still hold to that position?
Most pertinently, the War Powers Act
carefully states that circumstances which clearly indicate imminent
hostilities constitute prohibited acts of war, which embraces
the operation of a LOWC.
I don't believe that the operation of an LOWC indicates a threat of
imminent hostilities. I don't particularly like it, but that's not
the same thing.
... Likewise, nuclear weapons have degrees of use, and there is a
boundary between threatened and actual use which would be improperly
blurred were the notion of "first-use" to exclude the operation of a
LOWC.
What bothers me in the presentation of your argument is that you don't
make clear any connection between the unreliability of sensors and the
operation of an LOWC. I am trying to see how they relate to each
other, and I just can't do it.
On the first use question, there has to be some coercive intent
somewhere if you want to draw an analogy to the gun. For example, if
we were to threaten to nuke Soviet cities if they did not pull out of
Eastern Europe, that would be coercive. Saying you will defend
yourself -- whether or not that way is a dumb way -- is not coercive
to anyone.
Crudely expressed, if the disutility of extinction be
deemed infinite, which is reasonable, even a one percent chance
of it, where there was none before, can't justify its operation,
despite prior conventional damages.)
That is based on an expected value notion of how to optimize results.
But expected value has meaning only when you are playing many games.
In the playing of one game, a different calculus should be operative.
------------------------------
Date: 11 Nov 86 18:31:23 EST (Tue)
From: dm@bfly-vax.bbn.com
Subject: SDI, test ban
In reply to my statement regarding SDI:
...Is it cheaper and more reliable than the options? Considering that
one of the options is a verifiable treaty reducing arms, I don't think
so.
Michael V. Stein (ihnp4!meccts!mvs) asks:
Great, but name just *one* time that we have had a verifiable treaty
with the Soviet Union in regards to arms control. A true verifiable
treaty must imply on-site verification, something the Soviets have
always rejected. They have explicitly rejected the concept in the
Baruch plan, in Eisenhower's Open Sky's proposal, etc.
SALT-II was pretty verifiable. The ABM treaty is verifiable. You
don't negotiate treaties on trust. When we dismantled that Poseidon
submarine last winter it sat in port with it's missile tubes open to
the sky for a few days so Russian spy satellites could confirm that
the submarine was being dismantled.
The IEEE Spectrum of July 1986 had a special issue on verification and
arms control. I recommend it highly for exploring the limits and
possibilities of verification.
In a sense, we're both right. Here is why:
The proposed threshold test-ban treaty of the early seventies was
verifiable. It was a THRESHOLD test-ban treaty (no explosions bigger
than 50 kilotons) rather than a TOTAL test-ban, because the Soviets
wouldn't accept our stationing seismic stations on their soil, and
without such stations we couldn't distinguish between a small bomb
test and a real earthquake. Three things have happened since then
which make a total test-ban treaty more realistic: seismic research
has advanced a bit, we can now put seismic listening stations in
China, and the Soviets will permit at least third-party seismic
listening stations in the Soviet Union (they are there now).
Limitations on ICBMs and submarines are verifiable by national
technical means -- spy satellites observing submarine construction and
missile tests, NSA listening posts in the Gobi desert listening to
missile tests, etc.
Limitations on cruise missiles pretty much require on-site
inspections, it's true, but cruise missiles aren't much of a
first-strike (that is, counterforce) threat. Before strategic cruise
missiles were developed, you could distinguish tests between strategic
cruise missiles (with a range >600 miles or so) and battlefield cruise
missiles, due to the infrared signature of the engine observable from
a spy satellite, but it's too late for that now. Now that we've
tested strategic cruise missiles, every cruise missile seen from a spy
satellite has to be counted as a strategic one.
However, probably because of Reagan's hard-line on the SDI fantasy,
the Soviets have started to talk about accepting on-site inspections.
We got onto this subject because I asserted that SDI wasn't a cost
effective means of increasing our security, considering the alternatives.
Here is a cheap, verifiable, alternative to SDI, that will make us
more secure in ten years than SDI is likely to:
A total test-ban. No tests of warheads, no tests
of delivery systems (missiles, cruise missiles).
None.
As time passes, we'll grow less and less fearful of our opponents
being able to pull off a first strike. Old warheads will age and will
get replaced with new ones built of components that have never been
tested as a system. Not only that, it doesn't require a treaty --
one side can announce a moratorium that lasts as long as the other
side is willing to go along with it.
In reply to my assertion that the Soviets might fear our MX and
Trident missiles as first strike weapons, Mr. Stein says:
The goal of a first strike is to eliminate the enemies ability to
fight back with his military. Trident missles are simply not accurate
enough for this sort of mission and shouldn't be included in this
list.
How accurate is a Trident warhead? A 300 kiloton warhead with 50/50
odds of arriving within 300 feet of its destination sounds pretty
counterforce to me. What if we upgraded the Trident warheads with the
MX guidance system? What about after the Navy's new navigation
satellites (NAVSTAR, I believe) go on line (permitting location to
within 30 feet in all three dimensions)? Don't look at it from our
point of view, look at it from the Soviets' point of view. Pretend
they were aimed at your missiles.
Certainly our fear of a Soviet first strike (with most of our missiles
on relatively safe submarines) is less realistic than Soviet fears of
a US first strike (with 3/4ths of their weapons in sitting-duck (which
was the whole argument for the mobile MX missile, after all)
land-based missiles). Our guidance systems are better, our
anti-submarine warfare seems to be more effective. What need do you
have of a CEP of 300 feet if you're never going to aim it at anything
smaller than a city?
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 11 Nov 86 16:06:44 PST
From: weemba@brahms.berkeley.edu (Matthew P Wiener)
Subject: Re: Response to "Hawaii"
> So in 5 years, lets all get together again and argue about
>something real rather than hypothetical
That is, assuming that the next president keeps SDI alive.
> If you aren't
>against SDI R&D (notice the D stands for development), what are you
>arguing about?
Personally, I'm opposed to SDI since (in no particular order):
o SDI is sold to the masses and Congress via spectacular exaggeration
about what it will accomplish.
o SDI is encroaching on our Universities and academic freedom. Just as
bad, in my eyes, is that it is making all University/DoD connections
look untenable.
o SDI will be permanently untestable.
o SDI's workability depends on Soviet cooperation to only use the small
class of countermeasures that we build ahead for.
o SDI will, and here I agree with Harold Brown, former physicist and sec-
retary of Defense, have offensive uses long before--read this moneywise
as well as timewise--any partially practical defensive ones are ready
for (non)testing. Of the top of my head, the rail gun comes to mind, as
does light speed ASAT.
(There is this awful double standard invoked by SDI proponents that I
just can't stand: technology & engineering & lots of late night program-
ming sessions will overcome all the difficulties, even though we can't
ever figure out all possible countermeasures, but it's somehow obvious
that offensive uses are theoretically impossible, now and forever, no
matter how ingenious our lab boys (and girls) are. Sorry, I just don't
buy that sort of non reasoning, and I don't the Soviets do either.)
o SDI, while it may not do much for stopping arms, does wonders for stop-
ping arms discussions. Considering Reagan's stated antipathy towards
arms agreements in the past, and the fact that SDI is his own brainchild,
I seriously question his motives.
o As mentioned above, SDI can get shot down by a hostile Congress or our
next President. We bank our security on such a controversial program?
So let me turn your R&D question around:
If R&D are so wonderful, why doesn't Reagan throw some gigabucks at the
Universities, no strings attached? After all, Reagan has stated that SDI
research is to be shared with the Soviets, so why not bring it out in the
open to begin with?
Or how about throw some of these gigabucks at NASA? (Directly, not just
SDI trickledowns) And not just money to replace the Challenger, either,
but a full vigorous space program already.
In other words, my final point of contention with SDI is:
o It costs a hell of a lot.
ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
Some billion years ago, an anonymous speck of protoplasm protruded the first
primitive pseudopodium into the primeval slime, and perhaps the first state
of uncertainty occurred. -I J Good
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 11 Nov 86 17:06:03 PST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ@forsythe.stanford.edu>
Subject: The nuclear fix
On the first use question, there has to be some coercive
intent somewhere if you want to draw an analogy to the gun.
For example, if we were to threaten to nuke Soviet cities if
they did not pull out of Eastern Europe, that would be
coercive. Saying you will defend yourself -- whether or not
that way is a dumb way -- is not coercive to anyone.
I think this issue is at the root of the nuclear dilemma, and
worth much separate discussion. It is my perception that the
United States is purposefully upping the risk ante on nuclear
war in order to force conventional conessions in the world at
large. I see Nixon's detente as a realistic attempt to strike
a "gentlemanly" balance in world power, and the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan as a wilfull sabotage of this understanding.
Worse, I think the Soviets decided to test Carter's nuclear
nerve over invading the mid-east oil countries, and he found it
necessary to make his nuclear intentions clear enough that the
Soviets backed down. And now we're in a real pickle, because the
nuclear fix is getting out of hand.
To: ARMS-D@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 11 Nov 86 23:47:32 PST
From: wild@Sun.COM (Will Doherty)
Subject: Independent arms test verification
Sorry if this has been brought up before, but I just heard a
fascinating radio program, I think it was National Public Radio,
where they talked about cooperation between Soviet scientists
of a certain Soviet group and American scientists of an
organization called NDRC (I can't remember what the initials
stand for).
The basic idea is that private Soviet citizens set up seismographic
equipment capable of detecting nuclear arms tests in violation
of treaty on or near all known test sites in the U.S., and likewise
U.S. citizens set up such equipment at these sites in the Soviet
Union. In this way, we could, for instance, determine if the
Soviets really are holding to SALT II like they say they are.
Apparently, the Soviet government responded well to the program,
permitting U.S. scientists to visit and set up equipment at a few
test sites according to a previously agreed upon schedule.
The Reagan administration was not as cooperative, according to
the radio broadcast. At first, they said it would be fine for
the Soviet citizens to come and stay for 15 days. Then they
decided to require that the Soviet citizens come on special
governmental guest visas or something, and requiring that they
attend a presentation on some other kind of arms test verification
procedure. The Soviets refused these guest of the government
visas and apparently said that the presentations about some
specific kind of test verification wasn't necessary or applicable
to the work they wanted to do. The Soviets decided to come in
on private citizen visas instead, which the U.S. granted, but only
with the following conditions:
1) That the Soviets could only stay for 7, not 15, days.
2) That the Soviets could only visit 4 places in the U.S.
3) That the Soviets could not visit anywhere in the state of Nevada.
The radio program went on to speculate that the Reagan administration
tried to defend through words its view that a comprehensive test ban
treaty is impossible because on or near site verification of tests
isn't possible, but now that people in the S.U. and U.S.
are actually cooperating to go ahead and do it anyway, they're
freaking out and may just stop permitting the Soviets to come into
the country at all. (Apparently they can't stop the Soviets from
setting up the seismographic equipment near test sites unless they
refuse visas or issue extremely limited visas, because setting up
these sites is a perfectly legal activity.)
What does everyone think? Does anyone have more information on
this?
Will Doherty
UUCP: ...sun!oscar!wild
ARPA: "oscar!wild"@sun.com
------------------------------
Date: Tuesday, 11 November 1986 19:52-EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
To: LIN, arms-d
Re: Launch on warning
REPLY TO 11/11/86 15:01 FROM LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU: Launch on warning
And the word "policy" connotes generality.
My Webster's defines policy as "a principle, plan, or course
of action, as pursued by a government, organization, or
individual." The key is the phrase "as pursued", which is
to say it is what will be done. Thus, I think you are the
one who misuses the word "policy".
What will be done is that the President (or military conferees) will
be provided with the opportunity to take a retaliatory decision
based on a 5-way categorization of the attack. That's the "as
pursued" launch on warning policy. My (Oxford American) dictionary
states that a "policy" is "any general plan or course of action
engaged in by a goverment" etc. So I stick to my position, but
note that the facts are not disputed between us.
The SIOP's advertised launch on
warning target sets alone prove that at least an active launch on
warning targeting policy exists.
But the SIOP has many OTHER target sets too. It has
pre-emptive target sets -- does that mean that it is U.S.
policy to pre-empt?
No, but I do say the U.S. has a preemption policy on this account.
There's a preemption targeting policy, and a set of procedures,
which, as with launch on warning, provide for the taking of a
preemption decision.
In a previous message, you said to me that IF the reports of
incoming missiles could be guaranteed to be true, you
*might* be willing to execute a launch on that warning. Do
you still hold to that position?
No. I used to think a strategic (non-sensor) warning could
conceivably give rise to a certainty. Having since studied the
matter, I agree with the standard authorities who uniformly
conclude that a strategic warning is much flakier than a tactical
warning. So, there being no possibility of such certainty, this
is a discussion I can't logically conceive of any more.
Incidentally, since preemption=launch on strategic warning, and
since such warning is less certain than tactical warning, I think
preemption is worse than LOW. First-strike is different, of course,
and I'm against that on other, though overlapping, grounds.
I don't believe that the operation of an LOWC indicates a
threat of imminent hostilities.
"Imminent"= likely to occur at any moment, according to my
dictionary. I construe the emphasis to be on the "at any moment"
quality, without particular regard to the size of the likelihood,
so long as it is not vanishingly small.
What bothers me in the presentation of your argument is that
you don't make clear any connection between the
unreliability of sensors and the operation of an LOWC.
I don't mean to be obscure. It's the imminent risk of unintentional
launch due to such things as unreliable sensors that makes
operating a LOWC a form of first-use *at law*.
On the first use question, there has to be some coercive
intent somewhere if you want to draw an analogy to the gun.
For example, if we were to threaten to nuke Soviet cities if
they did not pull out of Eastern Europe, that would be
coercive. Saying you will defend yourself -- whether or not
that way is a dumb way -- is not coercive to anyone.
Ellsberg's classical definition of "coercion" brackets these
uses together: "Call it blackmail; call it deterrence; call both
coercion." However, I take your point about the difference.
Crudely expressed, if the disutility of extinction be
deemed infinite, which is reasonable, even a one percent chance
of it, where there was none before, can't justify its operation,
despite prior conventional damages.)
That is based on an expected value notion of how to optimize
results. But expected value has meaning only when you are
playing many games. In the playing of one game, a different
calculus should be operative.
You make my point that game theoretic structures cannot be applied
to *bridge the gulf* between conventional and nuclear war games.
So the simple question is, do you start the game or not?
To: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
------------------------------
Date: Tuesday, 11 November 1986 19:36-EST
From: cfccs at HAWAII-EMH
To: ARMS-D
Re: ground based missile defenses
I haven't heard any discussion on ground base nuclear missile defenses yet.
Any comments?
Supposedly under the ABM t treaty, both sides are allowed certain anti-missile
defenses. The Soviet Union currently has a defense system of this type
around Moscow (I don't know if other cities are protected). The United States
chose not to develop this technology because it wouldn't be of much help to the
rest of the country. Kind of a 'if we can't protect all of it we won't
protect any of it' attitude. The point is, no one has mentioned this in their
talks on firing missiles at the S.U.
CFCCS @ HAWAII-EMH
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 11 Nov 86 18:34:46-1000
From: <sdcsvax!nosc!humu!islenet!scott at ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>
To: arms-d@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Re: retaliation with Trident
The discussion of what a single Trident (or for that matter, a number
of SSBNs) might do in retaliation ignores the fact that the SRF is
targeted as a whole. The SSBN commander has no way to know which targets
are the best, given those that will be uncovered by lost attack units,
the identity of which he also does not know -- nor does he know what targets
those lost units were to have covered.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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