ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (11/18/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Tuesday, November 18, 1986 3:40PM
Volume 7, Issue 59
Today's Topics:
Velas and N-bombs
Question about Computer War Games
retaliation with Trident
Re: Star Wars flawed #7-of-10
Re: Star Wars flawed #7-of-10
24 hour endurance for bombers
Reykjavik Mystery
Warhead counts, and treaty verification
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Date: 12 Nov 1986 14:19:46-EST
From: Hank.Walker@gauss.ECE.CMU.EDU
Subject: Velas and N-bombs
According to that IEEE Spectrum issue on verification, all the Vela
satellites are dead, and their nuclear detection functions have been
taken over by equipment on SIGINT satellites. These satellites
apparently only watch the SU, so in fact we no longer have the
capability to detect nuclear blasts in random locations, like the
South Atlantic.
There was a New Scientist article within the past year that discussed
the neutron bomb as an anti-tank weapon. The article claimed that the
bomb would be good against old Russian tanks, but that for new tanks
with thick armor, the tank crew kill radius for radiation was the same
as for blast, so in fact a neutron bomb would be worse for the local
population than a bomb with the same blast radius, but only standard
radiation levels. I haven't seen any other articles on this.
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Date: Wed, 12 Nov 86 17:15:29 EST
From: Nancy Breen <njbreen@cch.bbn.com>
Subject: Question about Computer War Games
I was not on the arms list when the movie War Games first came out,
but caught the rerun over the weekend. How true is it that a rampant
computer program could cause people (who push buttons) to believe that
we were being attacked? What safeguards can be built in to ensure
that there is really an attack? If anyone saved the discussion or has
comments on this, I would be very interested in hearing them.
Thanks,
-Nancy Breen
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Subject: retaliation with Trident
Date: 12 Nov 86 17:23:09 EST (Wed)
From: dm@bfly-vax.bbn.com
Date: Tue, 11 Nov 86 18:34:46-1000
From: <sdcsvax!nosc!humu!islenet!scott at ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>
The discussion of what a single Trident (or for that matter, a number
of SSBNs) might do in retaliation ignores the fact that the SRF is
targeted as a whole. The SSBN commander has no way to know which
targets are the best, given those that will be uncovered by lost
attack units, the identity of which he also does not know -- nor does
he know what targets those lost units were to have covered.
One might presume, SHOULD the US go to a ``launch after 24 hours/2
weeks'' policy that the orders given SSBN commanders COULD contain a
contingency plan in the event that it looked like a war had occured
(the sky in the northern hemisphere is extremely cloudy, the Navy's
VLF channel has stopped transmitting, as have all commercial radio
stations, etc.) Such orders could go like this:
Sail to San Diego. If it isn't there anymore, aim your
missiles at the following list of targets and launch.
Then high-tail it to Australia.
With the firepower on a single Trident submarine, even a shotgun
approach to targetting would be pretty devastating. Moscow might get
hit two or three times because it's on the target list for every
surviving submarine, some sites might not get hit at all because they
are only on the target lists of submarines which were destroyed in the
initial war or the mop-up following.
Remember, the question at hand is, would we have a credible
deterrence, even if the people with the button (National Comman
Authority, or President, or whatever those people are called) planned
to take the time to confirm that an attack had actually taken place?
I think that the answer is probably yes, given
that:
at least one submarine is likely to survive a Soviet
attack, even if all our other forces are destroyed
(with a collateral destruction of the American people).
that submarine ALONE (without coordination or outside
communication) has enough fire power to inflict
unacceptable damage on the SU, and can have standing
orders to do so if it appears that the US been
destroyed in an attack.
This seems like enough to deter a Soviet attack. We're not talking
``surgical strike'', here, we're talking ``vengeance''.
That is, COULD we make such a policy work? Yes, we probably could if
we wanted to. SHOULD we want to? Well, it has the advantage of not
being able to start WWIII accidentally. Another advantage is that it
allows for a more measured response in the event of a limited attack
(``hmm, they got New York, eh. Well, we'll tell them on the hotline
that we'll be satisfied with Leningrad.'') What are the
disadvantages? No disadvantage in the event of no attack. No
disadvantage in the event of a limited attack.
The disadvantage is, in the event of an all-out attack (remember,
there's hardly anything left to retaliate with -- just a submarine or
two, and there's no one left to tell them to retaliate, or to
coordinate their retaliation), you may not be able to kill every
Russian (I'm not too clear that this is a disadvantage, actually). At
that point, deterrence has failed, few Americans are still alive to be
enslaved by the Soviets (few people in the Northern Hemisphere,
actually), and the Russians will probably freeze to death. An attack
under these circumstances is just pointless vengeance. Whether we go
through with it or not is irrelevant, as long as the Soviet leaders
BELIEVE we really would do it, and are therefore deterred. Once
deterrence has failed completely enough for this policy to be a
disadvantage, I'm not sure I care what happens...
------------------------------
From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Wed, 12 Nov 86 12:07:24 pst
Subject: Re: Star Wars flawed #7-of-10
> Launch detection obviously requires 100% safety, but
> this cannot occur because of sensor limitations. Existing
> strategic alert systems are famous for their failures and
> new systems will require decisions ten times faster, as well
> as being largely automated. Repeated analysis over the
> allowed minute or two will reduce, but cannot eliminate the
> possibility of false alarms and missed events, either of
> which is likely to initiate cycles of automatic activity
> leading to nuclear destruction.
Here again we have the assumption that the "go" decision *must* be
automated and that a minute or two is far too fast for human beings to
have any input. Nonsense. The timing clearly is too fast for command
authorities like the President to be involved in such a decision, but
this does not preclude human involvement as a check on automated
sensors. All that is really required is a human looking at a
television image and deciding whether or not to push a button marked
"attack appears real, open fire if sensors concur". This would take
no more than a few seconds. Note that I am *not* talking about a
human watching a computer-driven display -- the human operator must
see the raw data, or something close to it, with all judgement
processes left to him. I would think that a visible-light image, an
IR image, and a radar image of the space above the USSR would suffice.
Note that it does not *matter* that these sensors are readily jammed
or incapacitated by a serious opponent, because jamming or destruction
of sensors is itself a hostile act, meriting pushing the button.
(Remember that pushing the button does not open fire, it only
authorizes the automated system to do so if its [presumably less
vulnerable] sensors concur.) The only real question, which would have
to be looked at carefully, is whether the sensors could be jammed or
incapa- citated by phenomena *not* associated with deliberate hostile
acts. Given the possibility of meteorite impacts on space-based
sensors, the sensor system would certainly have to have some
redundancy at the very least.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Wed, 12 Nov 86 12:07:34 pst
Subject: Re: Star Wars flawed #7-of-10
> ...possibility of false alarms and missed events, either of
> which is likely to initiate cycles of automatic activity
> leading to nuclear destruction.
The assumption that activation of a defence system necessarily leads
to nuclear destruction is a slightly curious one which is not
adequately explained. Note the word "necessarily"; it is easy to
imagine badly- designed or ill-conceived systems in which it could
(e.g. defensive weapons powered by nuclear explosions).
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Wed, 12 Nov 86 12:07:45 pst
Subject: 24 hour endurance for bombers
> Are you saying that if we wished to spend the money, we could not
> maintain an airborne alert? If you concede this, then it seems my
> suggestion is technically feasible; expensive, perhaps, but feasible.
More expensive than you think, Herb. Airborne alert is feasible, but
doing it on any significant scale is very hard on planes and crews.
Doing it as a matter of policy would probably mean major expansions in
the bomber and tanker forces, to keep the fatigue-life problems under
control. The experiences with airborne alert in the early 60s were not
encouraging; as I recall, it was stopped not only because it was costly,
but because it was becoming very difficult to sustain.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: Wed 12 Nov 86 20:57:57-EST
From: Calton Pu <CALTON@CS.COLUMBIA.EDU>
Subject: Reykjavik Mystery
(My summary of Reykjavik discussion:)
Gorbachev: Let's eliminate all missiles, and you don't deploy SDI
within 10 years. Reagan: Let's eliminate all missiles, and
I have to deploy SDI
within 10 years.
=====> NO DEAL <=====
The mystery that I don't understand is: If all missiles have been
eliminated, why would somebody want to deploy SDI?
Without balistic missiles, it would be foolish for Americans to deploy
SDI. Therefore Reagan seems to have made a mistake, trying to
maintain SDI even after it (SDI) has been made obsolete and aimless by
missile ban.
However, Gorbachev has also made a mistake by preventing Reagan from
deploying SDI. He should have said, "Go ahead; make my day." If the
deployment were at all feasible. The Americans would have looked very
dumb to the world sending up weapons to shoot at retired missiles.
Isn't this conclusion easy to reach? Or, alternatively, maybe there
is a hidden purpose of SDI which would explain their behavior at
Reykjavik? Could somebody illuminate me on the reasons why Reagan,
Gorbachev, and 65% of the American public supporting Reagan's stance
at the pre-summit, believe that the right thing was done at Reykjavik?
More concretely:
1. Why did Reagan insist on SDI when there would be no missiles?
2. Why did Gorbachev insist on the non-deployment of SDI when there
would be no missiles?
3. Why did 65% of American public believe Reagan did the right thing?
-Calton-
Fearfully ignorant
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 13 Nov 86 01:15:30 EST
From: campbell%maynard.UUCP@wjh12.HARVARD.EDU
Subject: Warhead counts, and treaty verification
Reply-To: campbell%maynard.UUCP@wjh12.HARVARD.EDU (Larry Campbell)
>From: rutgers!meccts!meccsd!mvs@seismo.CSS.GOV
>Date: Tue, 11 Nov 86 03:36:03 EST
>Reply-To: meccsd!mvs@seismo.CSS.GOV (Michael V. Stein)
>
>>Subject: on the perfectability of SDI
>>Date: 07 Nov 86 19:45:33 EST (Fri)
>>From: dm@bfly-vax.bbn.com
>> 2) What is a likely Soviet reaction to our building SDI AND
>> retaining our 40,000 warheads aimed at them?
>
>The US has approximately 26,000 nuclear warheads. Of these about
>13,000 could hit the Soviet Union. The Soviet arsenal is thought to
>consist of somewhere between 22,000 and 33,000 warheads. (Data from
>"Nuclear Battlefields").
Let's please distinguish between tactical and strategic forces.
According to the most authoritative source I have at hand (The Defense
Monitor, vol. XIV no. 6), as of July 1985, the US had a total of 11,466
strategic warheads; the SU had either 9,208 or 9,468 depending on
whether you count the Backfire bomber, whose utility as an intercontinental
bomber is disputed.
>Great, but name just *one* time that we have had a verifiable treaty
>with the Soviet Union in regards to arms control. A true verifiable
>treaty must imply on-site verification, something the Soviets have
>always rejected. They have explicitly rejected the concept in the
>Baruch plan, in Eisenhower's Open Sky's proposal, etc.
A truly verifiable treaty need NOT imply on-site verification. SALT I
and SALT II are verifiable, since they limit strategic weapons, which
are large and easily detected by satellite. In addition, a
comprehensive test ban would be verifiable by seismographic sensors.
Leading geologists believe that existing sensors are capable of
detecting all militarily useful nuclear detonations (over 10
kilotons). By placing 15 seismographic sensors within the SU, all
detonations (even decoupled ones) over 1 kiloton could be detected.
Note that the SU *has* agreed to the placement of seismographic
sensors on their soil, in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which was
signed by both parties but not ratified by the US Senate.
>Like just about all major US nuclear programs, SDI was started mostly
>because of actual or suspected Soviet work in the field. And because
>there is no true verification, this is the way the world works.
Sorry, I can't resist this. SDI was started by Reagan as a personal
fantasy, to which too many people who should know better have become
attached.
--
Larry Campbell MCI: LCAMPBELL The Boston Software Works, Inc.
UUCP: {alliant,wjh12}!maynard!campbell 120 Fulton Street, Boston MA 02109
ARPA: campbell%maynard.uucp@harvisr.harvard.edu (617) 367-6846
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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