ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (11/19/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Tuesday, November 18, 1986 9:16PM
Volume 7, Issue 62
Today's Topics:
yet More on SDI (Star Wars flawed #9-of-10)
Launch on warning
Administrivia
LOW
Reykjavik Mystery
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Date: Monday, 3 November 1986 08:07-EST
From: Jane Hesketh <jane%aiva.edinburgh.ac.uk at Cs.Ucl.AC.UK>
To: ARMS-D
Re: Star Wars flawed #9-of-10
Impact of UK Participation in SDI Research
Some Issues
Donald MacKenzie
Summary
The total value of UK SDI contracts is likely to be small.
Nevertheless, there are reasons for concern in at least the
following areas: diversion of skilled personnel in key
fields; general distraction and division of the scientific
and technological community; freedom of research and
publication; long-term effects on the public perception of
certain disciplines.
Scale of UK Participation in SDI
It seems likely that the total value of UK SDI contracts in
the near term (say the next five years) will be small - in
the low tens of millions of pounds, perhaps. The remarks
that follow are based upon that assumption. In many
respects the impact on the UK would be graver if the total
size of contracts were larger. Nevertheless, a mistaken
undertaking (as we believe UK participation in the SDI to
be) cannot be justified simply by saying it was a small
mistake!
Diversion of Skilled Personnel
A total UK participation of, say, 30 million pounds will
probably not exacerbate too seriously the overall problem of
shortage of skilled personnel in advanced information
technology. There are, however, particular `bottleneck'
areas (e.g. Prolog implementation) where the pool of skilled
people in the UK is very small. In these areas, absorption
of significant numbers of them into SDI work could have a
markedly detrimental effect on UK capacities.
General Distraction and Division of the Scientific and
Technological Community
SDI is controversial. For many people SDI involvement would
be a resigning issue. Controversy is most manifest in the
university context (e.g. Heriot-Watt), but we have informal
evidence that there is also unease in companies involved.
There is a serious risk that the scientific and
technological community will become involved in time-wasting
and divisive disputes. In the university context it seems
quite likely that this `negative' effect of SDI will
outweigh any `positive' effect of additional funding, even
were that `positive' effect not mitigated by the other
factors we discuss.
Controversy over SDI may also, in the university
context, make controversial existing MoD supported work.
Intellectual Property Rights
We are informed that the Department of Trade and Industry
has raised objections to the Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) between UK and US governments on SDI on the grounds of
the adequacy of the clauses concerning the intellectual
property rights. Other information we have suggests that the
MoU and subsequent agreement on Administrative Procedures do
in fact adequately protect UK interests in this matter. As
we do not have access to the relevant clauses of the MoU, we
are unable to comment on this.
Freedom of Research and Publication
In the US there is a considerable and growing `grey area' of
work which is not classified but which is nevertheless
considered militarily sensitive: relevant control measures
include the 1979 Export Administration Act; the Militarily
Critical Technologies List; new Department of Defense
security gradings for technical data between `approved for
public release' and the various categories of
classification; controls over personnel and computer access
even on unclassified research. This `grey area' has been a
matter of great concern in the US, and there have been some
most unfortunate and highly publicised incidents.
We would assert that it is in the interests of neither
the scientific and technological community nor the MoD for
this problem to spread to the UK. One inherent risk of SDI
participation is that SDI makes extremely wide areas of
science and technology `militarily sensitive'.
Our concern here is heightened by the statement of Mr.
Bill Davies of the MoD SDI Participation Office that two
categories of contract - US government to UK contractor, and
US contractor to UK contractor - will fall under the laws
and procedures of the US (item cited in the bibliography,
statements on page 6).
The most important issue seems to us to concern
`foreground' information (i.e. information generated by the
UK company or university in the performance of a US SDI
contract) which is not straightforwardly classified but is
nevertheless considered sensitive. To what extent is such
information potentially subject to the provisions of the
Export Administration Act, Militarily Critical Technologies
List, etc?
The MoU may contain some degree of protection of UK
institutions here, but it is of obvious importance to know
how much.
Long-Term effects on the Public Perception of Certain
Disciplines
It is naive to present the SDI as simply a programme of
research. On 22 May this year
almost half the Senate's 100 members - 46 Republi-
cans and Democrats - wrote to the [Senate Armed Ser-
vices] committee's leadership ... voicing concern
that SDI lacks clear goals and is suffering from un-
necessary technical risks because the program is be-
ing pushed too quickly toward a planned development
decision early in the 1990's.
Scientific participation in SDI is being used as part of the
process of pushing the programme. James Ionson, director of
the SDI Innovative Science and Technology Program said:
... this office is trying to sell something to
Congress. If we can say that this fellow at M.I.T.
will get money to do such and such research, it's
something real to sell.
If SDI ends as an expensive fiasco (as we believe), it will
not rebound to the credit of any institutions or disciplines
that have been made use of in this way.
Selected Bibliography
Bill Davies,
The SDI Participation Office: the Interface with Industry,
British Defence Exports Conference,
24-25 April 1986.
European Parliament, Committee on Energy, Research and Technology,
Draft report on the Proposal to establish a European Coordinating Agency
(EUREKA) and on Community Participation in Star Wars Research,
28 February 1986.
P.J. Klass,
Defense Department Restricts Papers at SPIE Technical Conference,
Aviation Week and Space Technology,
15 April 1985.
Political Opposition to SDI Program Grows Nationwide,
Aviation Week and Space Technology,
2 June 1986.
William Hartung
Star Wars Pork Barrel,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
January 1986.
Rosemary Chalk,
Continuing Debate over Science and Secrecy,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
March 1986.
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Date: Tue, 18 Nov 1986 12:42 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Launch on warning
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
What will be done is that the President (or military conferees) will
be provided with the opportunity to take a retaliatory decision
based on a 5-way categorization of the attack. That's the "as
pursued" launch on warning policy. My (Oxford American) dictionary
states that a "policy" is "any general plan or course of action
engaged in by a goverment" etc.
We agree that the US government will have the opportunity to take make
a retaliatory decision. Thus, according to your definition, we have a
policy of deciding what to do. We don't have a policy of executing an
LOW, but rather a policy of deciding whether or not to execute an LOW.
There's a preemption targeting policy, and a set of procedures,
which, as with launch on warning, provide for the taking of a
preemption decision.
So by your definition, the U.S. has a "policy of X" if it has a set of
procedures that provide for the taking of a decision of whether or not
to do X. Do I understand you?
In a previous message, you said to me that IF the reports of
incoming missiles could be guaranteed to be true, you
*might* be willing to execute a launch on that warning. Do
you still hold to that position?
No. I used to think a strategic (non-sensor) warning could
conceivably give rise to a certainty. Having since studied the
matter, I agree with the standard authorities who uniformly
conclude that a strategic warning is much flakier than a tactical
warning. So, there being no possibility of such certainty, this
is a discussion I can't logically conceive of any more.
I'm not talking about strategic warning -- I agree that strategic
warning is much flakier than tactical warning. I mean
guaranteed-correct tactical warning.
I don't believe that the operation of an LOWC indicates a
threat of imminent hostilities.
"Imminent"= likely to occur at any moment, according to my
dictionary. I construe the emphasis to be on the "at any moment"
quality, without particular regard to the size of the likelihood,
so long as it is not vanishingly small.
By imminent hostilities, do you mean that the operation of LOWC iteslf
indicates imminenent hostilities (i.e., hostilities that the
capability itself would lead to), or imminent hostilities due ot
other influences, such as Soviet actions? If the first, then you are
right by definition. If the second, then I don't see how.
It's the imminent risk of unintentional
launch due to such things as unreliable sensors that makes
operating a LOWC a form of first-use *at law*.
So if you were guaranteed to have perfect sensors, operating LOWC
would be OK? BTW, I don't understand what "at law" means.
You make my point that game theoretic structures cannot be applied
to *bridge the gulf* between conventional and nuclear war games.
So the simple question is, do you start the game or not?
You try not to. But if deterrence fails, and the Soviets begin to
march into Europe, what do you do? What is your recommendation? If
the choice is nuclear use or surrender, what then? I certainly agree
that we should do all we can to avoid coming to that point, but what
happens if you do?
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Date: Tue, 18 Nov 1986 13:15 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Administrivia
==>> Someone at TRIDENT.ARPA please help
Date: Wednesday, 12 November 1986 20:08-EST
From: Mail Delivery Subsystem <postmaster at trident.arpa>
To: <ARMS-D-Request>
Re: Returned mail: Service unavailable
----- Transcript of session follows -----
>>> HELO trident.arpa
<<< 553 trident.arpa I refuse to talk to myself
554 <arms-d-local@AMES.ARPA>... Service unavailable: Bad file number
==>> Help from The SuperUser <root at apg-1.ARPA>
Mail addressed to host apg-4.arpa could not be sent
for the following reason:
550 User "armsd-4" Unknown.
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Date: Tuesday, 18 Nov 86 15:36:23 EST
From: sclafani (Michael Sclafani) @ a.psy.cmu.edu
Subject: LOW
It seems to me that an implication of Bayes Theorem in probability
might have some relevance to this discussion. When a test is performed
for an event of low probability, if the test has even an small
probabilty of returning a false positive, then the chance that a positive
result is valid becomes small. Specifically:
P(attack|warning)
P(warning|attack) * P(attack)
= -----------------------------------------------------------------
P(warning|attack) * P(attack) + P(warning|noattack) * P(noattack)
An arbitary example: Assume we will always detect a real attack, or
P(warning|attack)=1. Assume that P(attack) is 1/10000, since it's not
happened yet. Assume that P(warning|noattack) is 1/1000, since many
cases of malfunction exist. Then, the chance that a warning received
indicates a real attack is about 9%.
Assigning values here is a game that anyone can play. Kennedy is attributed
with estimating the chance of war at 1 in 3 during the missile crisis. The
chance of a false warning is easier to get a handle on. I think this might
be useful to keep in mind when dealing with Launch On Warning.
Michael Sclafani
Carnegie-Mellon University
Undergraduate Student
Internet: sclafani@a.psy.cmu.edu
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Subject: Reykjavik Mystery
Date: Tue, 18 Nov 86 15:10:49 -0800
From: crummer@aerospace.ARPA
>>>Gorbachev: Let's eliminate all missiles, and you don't deploy SDI
>>> within 10 years. Reagan: Let's eliminate all missiles, and
>>>I have to deploy SDI
>>> within 10 years.
>>> =====> NO DEAL <=====
>>>
>>>The mystery that I don't understand is: If all missiles have been
>>>eliminated, why would somebody want to deploy SDI?
Perhaps R. Reagan, as apropos his own communication, doesn't take
Gorbachev seriously; just takes his words as he would a used car commercial.
>>>Without balistic missiles, it would be foolish for Americans to deploy
>>>SDI. Therefore Reagan seems to have made a mistake, trying to
>>>maintain SDI even after it (SDI) has been made obsolete and aimless by
>>>missile ban.
This sounds like breakthrough stuff: "A verifiable treaty that
makes Star Wars impotent and obsolete."
>>>However, Gorbachev has also made a mistake by preventing Reagan from
>>>deploying SDI. He should have said, "Go ahead; make my day." If the
>>>deployment were at all feasible. The Americans would have looked very
>>>dumb to the world sending up weapons to shoot at retired missiles.
Unfortunately for our self-esteem Gorbachev's fear of SDI is quite
sensible. According to Maj. Dr. Pete Worden of the SDIO: "... some
of the very same directed energy technologies that we are looking at,
lasers and particle beams, if you will, could be turned against your
defensive components.", and also satellites. Satellites are in
predictable orbits; sitting ducks.
>>>Isn't this conclusion easy to reach? Or, alternatively, maybe there
>>>is a hidden purpose of SDI which would explain their behavior at
>>>Reykjavik? Could somebody illuminate me on the reasons why Reagan,
>>>Gorbachev, and 65% of the American public supporting Reagan's stance
>>>at the pre-summit, believe that the right thing was done at Reykjavik?
My guess is that people think of him as a responsible, truthful,
serious person who wouldn't lie to the public. The evidence seems to
show, to me at least, that he uses words to sway public opinion, not
to communicate the truth.
>>>More concretely:
>>>
>>>1. Why did Reagan insist on SDI when there would be no missiles?
He wants superiority to, not parity with the Soviet Union.
>>>2. Why did Gorbachev insist on the non-deployment of SDI when there
>>> would be no missiles?
He doesn't want his enemy to control space. He wants to launch
rockets without having to clear the launches with Washington.
>>>3. Why did 65% of American public believe Reagan did the right thing?
The American people like Reagan, they WANT to believe him.
>>>
>>> -Calton-
>>> Fearfully ignorant
(I don't think so; not any more so than thi kid who
didn't understand why the emperor was naked.)
--Charlie
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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