ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (11/20/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Thursday, November 20, 1986 9:26AM
Volume 7, Issue 65
Today's Topics:
ARMS-D content
SDI software vs. Telephone System
Two shorties
Decoys in BMD
The dark side of fusion
SDI dilemma kills the whole idea
Re: bomber crew determining nucwar status for themselves firsthand
why not nuclear airplane?
ground based missile defenses (2 msgs)
offensive uses of BMD
SDI:: boost phase or bust
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Date: Wed, 19 Nov 1986 22:26 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: ARMS-D content
I received the message below from a subscriber that recently asked to
be dropped from the list. I think his comments are worth some
attention; I have edited them to some extent.
I believe ARMS-D would benefit from a greater variety of topics.
ARMS-D seems interminably devoted to a discussion of nuclear
war-fighting strategy, and largely ignores such worthwhile topics as
non-nuclear strategic forces, military aid to third-world nations,
international treaty organizations, military and economic
counter-insurgency measures, etc. I am not an expert on any of these
topics, but I have the feeling that ARMS-D participants have been
limiting themselves and the scope of their discussion too much.
As moderator, I would like to second these comments. I think the
digest could use more breadth, and I would welcome especially
contributions in these areas.
------------------------------
Date: Thursday, 13 November 1986 16:55-EST
From: ihnp4!ihnet!eklhad at seismo.CSS.GOV
To: arms-d
Re: SDI vs. Telephony Rebuttal
On December 3, 1985, Sol Buchsbaum, executive vice president of AT&T
Bell Laboratories, testified before the Senate Subcommittee on
Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces. In his statement, Dr. Buchsbaum
compared the strategic defense initiative (SDI) to the United States
telephone network, in order to demonstrate the technical viability of
SDI. We feel this comparison is irreparably flawed, and that SDI is a
dangerous and destabilizing program. For this reason, we must respond
to Dr. Buchsbaum's statement.
Although we are employed by AT&T, and many of us design the very
telecommunications systems Dr. Buchsbaum references, we do not
represent AT&T or any other organization. We make this statement as
concerned citizens -- well informed citizens on this issue.
Paraphrasing, Dr. Buchsbaum's testimony states that, since the phone
system is extremely reliable, and it is analogous to SDI, SDI may thus
be technically feasible. He then spends several pages explaining how
the phone system attains its impressive reliability, without
questioning whether this reliability is adequate, or whether the two
systems are, in fact, analogous.
The comparison between the phone system and SDI is fallacious for
three reasons:
1. SDI operates in space.
System availability depends critically on two parameters, the mean
time between failures and the mean time to repair. The impressive
availability of the phone system (3 minutes downtime per year for
telephone switches) is due, in part, to established procedures that
ensure quick repairs. Quoting Dr. Buchsbaum, "Once isolated, faults
can easily be fixed by replacing or repairing the small part -- for
instance, an insertable circuit pack." Most phone switches are
monitored 24 hours a day, and spare parts are stored close by.
Whenever a component fails, a technician can make repairs immediately.
Without this capability, sequential errors overlap in time, and system
reliability plummets.
Unlike the phone system, SDI components cannot be replaced or repaired
quickly. At best, mean time to repair is measured in weeks. At
worst, replacing critical space-based components might take years, as
the recent NASA failures illustrate.
Even if the country could develop a strategic defense system with
failure rates comparable to the phone system, reliability would still
remain poor. Mean time to repair would still be unacceptably long,
and sequential failures would combine to compromise entire subsystems.
While we cannot rule out the possibility of a maintainable space-based
defense shield, Dr. Buchsbaum's handwaving leaves us unconvinced.
2. A strategic defense faces overt and covert countermeasures
from an intelligent enemy.
Widespread fraud illustrates the vulnerability of our nation's phone
system. Amateur hackers and professional criminals circumscribe the
ever-tightening defenses of the telecommunications network. An entire
crime industry in fraudulent long distance calling persists in New
York City and elsewhere. Fortunately, these organizations do not
attack the physical and operational integrity of the phone system
directly. A functional, reliable telecommunications network benefits
customer and criminal alike. Unlike the phone system, a strategic
defense will face an intelligent, organized adversary who actively
opposes the very existence of the underlying technology.
Defensive components travel in predictable orbits and are subject to
physical attack. Unexpected transmissions could jam communications or
dazzle sensors. One enemy agent masquerading as a cleared software
developer could sabotage the system from within, introducing subtle
software errors that render the system useless, or worse. Even if we
assume the Soviets will not attack the system directly, credible
countermeasures abound.
Since the number of contractors implied by such an enormous project
realistically precludes long-term security, the Soviets may eventually
obtain portions of the design. Soviet engineers will extract the
criteria used to distinguish warheads from decoys and will have
decades to quietly construct warheads that resemble decoys and vice
versa. Even without benefit of the system's blueprints, missiles can
be equipped with such features as fast-burn rockets, heat-resistant
surfaces, electromagnets, and mirrors, depending on the system
specifications for boost phase intercept. A handful of relatively
inexpensive countermeasures can circumvent the most elaborate
multi-layer defense shield.
The telecommunications network, the Apollo space program, and other
impressive technological accomplishments were never threatened by an
intelligent enemy. They are simply not comparable to SDI.
3. SDI must work the first time.
Quoting Dr. Buchsbaum, "the network gracefully evolves each and every
day, with new equipment being installed and with older equipment being
reconfigured or removed." Unlike Dr. Buchsbaum, we have worked with
the million-line software modules that control the telephone network.
We have been in the test labs, we have run the simulations, and we
have watched our equipment perform in the field. Engineers,
operators, and affected customers agree -- modifications to the phone
system are anything but graceful.
Despite rigorous tests, the first time new equipment is incorporated
into the telephone network, it rarely performs reliably. Fortunately,
it doesn't have to. A group of irate customers doesn't compare to the
catastrophic results of a strategic defense failure.
To cite an example, one of our newest telephone switches failed
miserably when it was installed in Minneapolis, Minnesota earlier this
year. It had been tested rigorously in the laboratory over several
months by numerous teams of engineers, using state-of-the-art testing
techniques. The switch worked in the lab, and it performed admirably
under realistic simulations, but the procedural error accompanying
installation was not anticipated. Unlike a space-based defense, we
had the luxury of resurrecting the old switch, correcting the problem
off-line, and installing the new equipment again a few days later.
Similar cutover failures permeate the telecommunications industry.
Adding new equipment is just the tip of the iceberg; even the simplest
software upgrade introduces serious errors. Despite our best efforts,
the software that controls the telephone network has approximately one
error for every thousand lines of code when it is initially
incorporated into the phone system. Extensive testing and simulation
cannot discover these errors. If SDI contains ten million lines of
software (a credible estimate), and its quality is comparable to the
telephone network, we can expect ten thousand errors embedded in its
software when the Soviets attack. It only takes a few disastrous
software errors (one per layer) to cripple any multi-layer SDI
implementation.
Throughout this discussion, we have been unrealistically optimistic,
citing failures that inevitably accompany relatively simple
modifications to a functioning network. Errors resulting from overall
system design or ambiguous specifications are not even addressed.
Suppose the entire phone system had to perform reliably the first time
it was used. If AT&T had spent the last century testing, inspecting,
verifying, and simulating, could the phone system perform reliably
when millions of customers began using it?
Armed with the facts, we find it difficult to see how anyone could use
the phone system to support the technical feasibility of a future
defensive system unprecedented in complexity.
Although we do not require a perfect design, we do feel that it must
be trustworthy. The importance of reliability should not be
underestimated. A strategic defense will never reduce our dependence
on nuclear weaponry if it cannot be trusted to work the first time,
despite Soviet countermeasures. Would you, personally, trust such a
system? Would SDI, in and of itself, give you the confidence to
support a bill drastically reducing the number of nuclear weapons in
our arsenal? We have worked on some of the most reliable systems in
the world, and based on our experience, we would not trust any SDI
implementation.
Historical evidence supports this position as well. Safeguard, an
earlier ABM system, did not slow the arms race. Both sides recognized
this and signed the 1972 ABM treaty. Given two equally intelligent
adversaries armed with nuclear weapons, it is always easier and
cheaper to attack than to defend.
We feel that SDI is unworkable and destabilizing, and we urge Congress
to reject any budget that allocates a substantial portion of the
nation's limited research funds to SDI. Furthermore, we encourage
Congress to work towards a comprehensive test ban and a stronger ABM
treaty. The nuclear arms race is a political problem; it has no
technical solution.
Karl Dahlke 3129795701 ihnp4!ihnet!eklhad
------------------------------
From: Eugene Miya N. <eugene@ames-pioneer.arpa>
Date: 19 Nov 1986 1707-PST (Wednesday)
Subject: Two shorties
From: dm@bfly-vax.bbn.com
>With the firepower on a single Trident submarine, even a shotgun
>approach to targetting would be pretty devastating. Moscow might get
>hit two or three times because it's on the target list for every
>surviving submarine, some sites might not get hit at all because they
>are only on the target lists of submarines which were destroyed in the
>initial war or the mop-up following.
Targeting and ASW bring up some interesting possibilities. 1) you can't
assume you will get all shots from your SSBN off. 2) you want to wreck
vengence on Moscow (some one on this group noted 60 warheads targeted to
Moscow or WDC, talk about potential overkill). 3) You calculate that
you might be 3-4 missiles off before your SSBN might be sunk (not worse
case) So, first missile will be to Moscow, so the question is how to
spread the coverage (a variation of scheduling problems) of the set of
all first missiles 1) without skipping Moscow, or 2) concentrating on
already destroyed targets. Sounds like a tough offensive problem.
From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Wed, 12 Nov 86 12:07:24 pst
Subject: Re: Star Wars flawed #7-of-10
>All that is really required is a human looking at a
>television image and deciding whether or not to push a button marked
>"attack appears real, open fire if sensors concur". This would take
>no more than a few seconds. Note that I am *not* talking about a
>human watching a computer-driven display -- the human operator must
>see the raw data, or something close to it, with all judgement
>processes left to him. I would think that a visible-light image, an
>IR image, and a radar image of the space above the USSR would suffice.
>Note that it does not *matter* that these sensors are readily jammed
>or incapacitated by a serious opponent, because jamming or destruction
>of sensors is itself a hostile act, meriting pushing the button.
^^^^ I have problems with this.
>
>Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
I think Henry would not be a good candidate for judging the Turing test,
he does not sound skeptical enough. I don't think images are enough,
and I don't think the military would trust them either (authetication
problem). The case of jamming: this is not enough to be considered a
hostile act meriting push of buttons. This is a unfortunate hacker
attitude of security like: any one not smart enough to know deserves
what they get. Relatively safe for computers, not acceptable in N-war.
Aside: I once lived near Raytheon (ECM maker). Some of their systems
have been know to play havoc with ATC radars in the San Diego area as
well as television and other EM traffic (more in the 1960s). Great our
ECM, not Soviet.
--eugene miya
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 19 Nov 86 20:07:38 est
From: yetti!geac!charles@seismo.CSS.GOV (Charles Cohen)
Subject: Decoys in BMD
"The viewer has the job of visually discriminating warheads from decoys
. . ."
I see -- it's coming at me, travelling about a mile per second, in a
cloud of similar objects, and I'm supposed to decide -- looking at a TV-
quality picture -- whether or not there's a bomb inside. Sure, no problem.
It's massively parallel, and it may even be intelligent, but its input
data is inadequate.
Charles Cohen @ Geac
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 19 Nov 86 16:48 EDT
From: "Paul F. Dietz" <DIETZ%slb-test.csnet@RELAY.CS.NET>
Subject: The dark side of fusion
There was a discussion on the SPACE mailing list about fusion reactors.
An interesting side point arose: D-T fueled magnetic fusion reactors
may not be very good electricity producers (at best, current designs
seem to produce energy at around $.04/KWHr), but they can serve as
breeders for actinides such as curium-245. An abstract I read
(Trans. ANS, vol. 52, pages 269-271) says that Cm-244, produced
in conventional fission reactors, can serve as a neutron multiplier
in the fusion reactor blankets, and that a 1 MW(thermal) DT reactor
with such a blanket can produce 50 grams of Cm-245 a year, at
75% availability.
This is interesting, because the critical mass for Cm-245 may be
as low as 100 grams. So, a 100 MW(thermal) fusion reactor could
breed 50 bomb's worth of Cm-245 a year. Cm-245 apparently cannot
be bred fission reactors, since it burns up too quickly.
Anyway, this show that fusion energy is far from the lilly white, clean
technology that its proponents claim it to be, and may explain why
the government continues to fund the program even though its application
to civilian power is so doubtful. Also, note that using Cm-245
it might be possible to design fusion weapons with much less fissionable
material in them, which might mean packing many extra RV's into
existing ICBMs (bad news for SDI).
------------------------------
From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Wed, 19 Nov 86 22:28:16 pst
Subject: SDI dilemma kills the whole idea
REM comments:
> ...you can't use boost phase interception because ... [it's bad]
> as well as requiring too-fast decision (about 2 minutes) which would
> preclude human intervention and make accidental war likely...
If you quoted that to your local air traffic controller, he'd probably
laugh in your face at the thought of two whole minutes being too short
a time for a human to make a decision.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Wed, 19 Nov 86 22:30:17 pst
Subject: Re: bomber crew determining nucwar status for themselves firsthand
REM writes:
> I would think it reasonable to give bomber crews standing orders to this
> effect: "If you take off (scramble) in response to an alert of soviet
> attack (as yet unconfirmed or only partially confirmed), and if after you
> are airborne you or your crew personally observe your base behind you
> being destroyed in a thermonuclear fireball, you should immediately begin
> flying toward the USSR... [proceed to attack if unable to contact US]
One problem with this is the obvious issue of whether one can trust the
bomber crews with the authority to make their own attack decision. The
officers of missile subs do have this authority, since it's so difficult
to communicate with them reliably. My impression is that bomber crews
are now physically unable to arm their bombs without arming codes supplied
by higher command, and that the same applies to ICBM launch crews unless
an automatic timer confirms that they have been out of touch with command
for some substantial time.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Wed, 19 Nov 86 22:28:55 pst
Subject: why not nuclear airplane?
> [nuclear airplane] ... cheaper than SDI. Anybody know why it wasn't built?
> It'd cost more than a billion dollars per plane? Nowadays that may be
> "cheap" compared to alternatives...
Monumental technical difficulties in getting the whole package (including
shielding!) light enough for a practical aircraft, plus steady increases
in range and endurance of conventional aircraft making it look less needed.
The problems aren't totally insuperable; a reactor did fly aboard a modified
B-36. But it wasn't powering the aircraft, and indeed had nowhere near the
power output needed to do so.
Crashworthiness is also a worry. Military aircraft crash a lot; it's not
unusual to buy a small second batch of aircraft some years after an initial
purchase, as attrition replacements. The experimental B-36 was flown very
carefully with emergency crews standing by.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
Date: 1986 November 17 00:54:11 PST (=GMT-8hr)
From: Robert Elton Maas <REM%IMSSS@SU-AI.ARPA>
Subject:bomber crew determining nucwar status for themselves firsthand
<H> From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
<H> Date: Sun, 9 Nov 86 08:40:11 pst
<H> Subject: Unequivocal Confirmation of Detonation
<H> Related thought: if the B-52s and B-1s get airborne under attack, a
<H> large percentage of the surviving bomber crews will be able to personally
<H> verify nuclear explosions on US soil. They don't scramble that fast; they
<H> will know about it when the base behind them gets blasted. How good are
<H> the bomber -> command communications? (Communications systems intended
<H> for "go" orders aren't necessarily two-way.)
I would think it reasonable to give bomber crews standing orders to this
effect: "If you take off (scramble) in response to an alert of soviet
attack (as yet unconfirmed or only partially confirmed), and if after you
are airborne you or your crew personally observe your base behind you
being destroyed in a thermonuclear fireball, you should immediately begin
flying toward the USSR. During your flight you should make all reasonable
attempts to intercept military or commercial broadcasts to determine
whether any CCC posts or cities still exist. If during the next 12 hours
you do not obtain any evidence that the USA still exists, you are hereby
ordered to go ahead and destroy your targets without any further
authorization. If however you do continue to receive radio signals that
indicate the USA still exists, but do not receive any explicit orders,
you should use your own judgement whether to attack your target or not."
------------------------------
Date: Wednesday, 19 November 1986 17:25-EST
From: cfccs at HAWAII-EMH
To: LIN, arms-d
Re: ground based missile defenses
I agree that 80 to 1 (warheads vs ABM) are not good odds for the ABM, but what
about a retaliatory attack? There wouldn't be 8000 warheads, and of those left,
not all would be aimed at Moscow.
Just curious.
CFCCS @ HAWAII-EMH
read
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 20 Nov 1986 09:12 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: ground based missile defenses
From: cfccs at HAWAII-EMH
I agree that 80 to 1 (warheads vs ABM) are not good odds for the
ABM, but what about a retaliatory attack? There wouldn't be 8000
warheads, and of those left, not all would be aimed at Moscow.
Why do you assume that 1 ABM interceptor would destroy on average one
warhead?
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 20 Nov 1986 09:15 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: offensive uses of BMD
Probably the best offensive use of BMD is to use it to blunt or
eliminate a retaliatory strike, making a first strike a "realistic"
option.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 20 Nov 1986 09:22 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: SDI:: boost phase or bust
<LIN> From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
<LIN> The general argument is that if you don't get them in boost, you will
<LIN> have too big a load to handle when the boosters deploy all their
decoys.
From: pom at s1-along.arpa
POM: Lin's 'general argument' is just an unproven conjecture.
I have been misunderstood. What I meant by "general argument" was not
something based on first principles, but what the general wisdom is.
I used the word "general" in a colloquial, rather than scientific,
way. I now understand why you have been pressing me for a "first
principles" argument.
You should know that most BMD architectures are based on that
argument, though.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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