ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU.UUCP (11/22/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Friday, November 21, 1986 9:02PM
Volume 7, Issue 66
Today's Topics:
Selling SDI
RFP: Star Wars game
Launch on warning
invasion of Soviet Union
SLBM Launch
ground based missile defenses
Yet More on SDI (Star Wars flawed #10-of-10)
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Date: Thu, 20 Nov 86 11:49:38 EST
From: campbell%maynard.UUCP@wjh12.HARVARD.EDU
Subject: Selling SDI
Reply-To: campbell%maynard.UUCP@wjh12.HARVARD.EDU (Larry Campbell)
>Date: Thursday, 13 November 1986 00:26-EST
>From: cfccs at HAWAII-EMH
>Re: Selling SDI
>
> o SDI is sold to the masses and Congress via spectacular exaggeration
> about what it will accomplish.
>
>I haven't seen any spectacular exaggerations. Any examples?
Don't you remember Reagan's prime-time soft-shoe about the "Peace Shield"?
The posterboard graphic with little missiles bouncing off a rainbow or
something, and smiling Americans underneath the rainbow? In case you
missed it, or forgot: Reagan claimed that SDI could completely shield
the American population from nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. Sounds
like spectacular exaggeration to me, folks. *No one* associated with SDI
will defend that claim today.
>All we have is different people trying to see into the future without even
>trying the water. An analogy for both sides of the issue is trying to walk
>on water. One side declares it cannot be done because it is impossible. The
>other declares it can be done, we just haven't figured out how yet! Is that
>a good reason to quit trying?
Yes, if "trying" costs hundreds of billions of dollars that could better
be spent elsewhere -- like on feeding the hungry, improving the economy,
making American industry more competitive in the world market, curing
cancer or AIDS... Walking on water might be fun, but few people would
be willing to allocate $200 billion to trying to figure out how to do it.
--
Larry Campbell MCI: LCAMPBELL The Boston Software Works, Inc.
UUCP: {alliant,wjh12}!maynard!campbell 120 Fulton Street, Boston MA 02109
ARPA: campbell%maynard.uucp@harvisr.harvard.edu (617) 367-6846
DOMAINIZED ADDRESS (for the adventurous): campbell@maynard.BSW.COM
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Date: Thursday, 20 Nov 1986 12:01:27-PST
From: jong%delni.DEC@decwrl.DEC.COM (Steve Jong/NaC Pubs)
Subject: RFP: Star Wars game
The excellent Macintosh computer game "Balance of Power" is a
political game, in that it promotes a particular view of
superpower politics, well coated by excellent graphics, stuffed
databases, realistic scenarios, etc.
Recent ARMS-D submissions have imagined extending arcade skills to
SDI, invoking the image of champion video-game players watching
monitors of Soviet ICBMs rising from their silos and trying to zap
them with orbital battle platforms controlled by the operators'
joysticks.
It seems to me that someone could (should!) write the "Star Wars
Game," making the player just such a video Defender of the
American Homeland. The view could be from a network of orbital
sensors (under constant Soviet attack, of course), and the players
would have to watch moving targets (hundreds during boost phase,
more after MIRV separation) and discriminate warheads from decoys.
Then players would have to zap the launchers and warheads. The
game could even have layers, just like SDI; missiles getting past
boost-phase defenses would have to be destroyed via other means.
Afterward, there could be a nifty (grim!) aerial view of blackened
cities, with captions such as, "Here was New York" (or, for the
realists, counts of surviving Minuteman silos :-)
Those who quibble with the feasibility of various SDI technologies
could adjust the parameters to make the layers of defensive weapons
and sensors more or less effective. The Soviet attack, of course,
would always be the same.
Aside from the game being highly playable (like Missile Command,
but covering the entire trajectory of ICBMs), its political and
technological message would be worth imparting: that Star Wars is
damn hard. (Just how hard would depend on the viewpoint of the
programmer, and the adjustments of the players.)
This is not a frivolous proposal. I think such a game would sell,
and I think it would communicate something worth communicating.
If I could do it myself, I would. I'll settle for an
acknowledgement.
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Date: Tuesday, 18 November 1986 20:45-EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
To: LIN, arms-d
Re: Launch on warning
Lin> We don't have a policy of executing an
Lin> LOW, but rather a policy of deciding whether or not to execute an LOW.
Whoa! That's the DECLARATORY policy. The DE FACTO policy is one
of launch on warning. In the full sense, the decision to retaliate
is already taken, we promise retaliation as part of deterrence.
The ONLY real "decision" that occurs is whether the probability
of a warning being correct is "sufficient" to warrant retaliation.
Given the appearance of an "unequivocal" warning, we are indeed set
to attempt retaliation via launch on warning. Even today.
Lin> So by your definition, the U.S. has a "policy of X" if it has a
Lin> set of procedures that provide for the taking of a decision of
Lin> whether or not to do X. Do I understand you?
Not quite. In that event, it has an "X policy," which, depending
on context, may not be the same of having a "policy of X."
Lin> By imminent hostilities, do you mean that the operation of LOWC
Lin> iteslf indicates imminenent hostilities (i.e., hostilities that
Lin> the capability itself would lead to), or imminent hostilities
Lin> due ot other influences, such as Soviet actions? If the first,
Lin> then you are right by definition. If the second, then I don't
Lin> see how.
I mean the first.
Lin> It's the imminent risk of unintentional
Lin> launch due to such things as unreliable sensors that makes
Lin> operating a LOWC a form of first-use *at law*.
Lin>
Lin> So if you were guaranteed to have perfect sensors, operating
Lin> LOWC would be OK? BTW, I don't understand what "at law" means.
"At-law" means if the judges say so. In my previous appeal,
one of the judges expressed the opinion that operating a LOWC
could be construed, as a matter of law, as a form of first-use,
in that it's past the loss-of-control decision point.
Lin> You try not to. But if deterrence fails, and the Soviets begin
Lin> to march into Europe, what do you do? What is your
Lin> recommendation? If the choice is nuclear use or surrender, what
Lin> then? I certainly agree that we should do all we can to avoid
Lin> coming to that point, but what happens if you do?
At the very least, a nuclear response should be congressionally
authorized. The decision's obviously too big for one man, and
there would be time to get a congressional subcommittee together.
To: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
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Date: Thursday, 20 November 1986 15:17-EST
From: sundc!oktext!nears!ks at seismo.CSS.GOV
To: lin, ARMS-D
Re: invasion of Soviet Union
From: Eugene Miya N. <eugene at ames-nas>
...Depending on damage level of the Soviet Union, do we have invasion
plans (conventional with perhaps some tactical nuc capability?)
>From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Actually, the new naval maritime strategy postulates Marine amphibious
assaults in two places on the SU during the latter phases of the war.
From where do you have information about U.S. Marines' amphibious
assault strategy or war planning?
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Date: Fri, 21 Nov 1986 15:32 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: SLBM launch
From: Eugene Miya N. <eugene at ames-pioneer.arpa>
Targeting and ASW bring up some interesting possibilities. 1) you can't
assume you will get all shots from your SSBN off... you might be
3-4 missiles off before your SSBN might be sunk (not worse
It takes 5 minutes to empty 16 tubes. It isn't guaranteed, but it is
a good bet.
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Date: Fri, 21 Nov 1986 17:12 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: ground based missile defenses
From: cfccs at HAWAII-EMH
I agree that 80 to 1 (warheads vs ABM) are not good odds for the
ABM, but what about a retaliatory attack? There wouldn't be 8000
warheads, and of those left, not all would be aimed at Moscow.
Why do you assume that 1 ABM interceptor would destroy on average one
warhead?
I'm not assuming anything... I know nothing about the
SU ABM system. Comparing it to what we used to have is like comparing the
space shuttle to the gemini program... Do you
know what the SU has (Not necessarily what the treaty allows)?
They have a system comparable to what Safeguard (what we used to have)
was. That's supposed to be a generous comparison. They have 100
interceptors now.
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Date: Monday, 3 November 1986 08:07-EST
From: Jane Hesketh <jane%aiva.edinburgh.ac.uk at Cs.Ucl.AC.UK>
To: ARMS-D
Re: Star Wars flawed #10-of-10
Spin-off from SDI
Donald MacKenzie
Summary: Spin-off beneficial to the UK from SDI research is
likely to be slight.
The context in which the spin-off must be placed is the
following. The defence share of UK research and development
spending already exceeds considerably that of our major
European competitors and Japan. But there is little evidence
of benefits accruing to the UK civil economy because of
this.
The question of spin-off cannot be approached wholly
`technically'. Clearly there are areas of technical overlap
between SDI technologies and civil concerns - these are
probably more evident in the computing and software areas
than elsewhere, where the overlap may be quite small. But
the existence of technical overlap in no way guarantees that
technology developed in a defence programme such as SDI will
find civil application, or that the economic benefits of
such civil application will flow to the countries sponsoring
the technological developments or in which they take place.
The small size of likely UK SDI contracts militates
powerfully against any `spin-off' effects. Thirty million
pounds is peanuts - if one is thinking in terms of the
amount of capital needed to bring a major technological
breakthrough to successful commercial exploitation. At this
level of contracts, the division, distraction and diversion
effects of SDI participation probably far outweigh any
spin-off effects.
Nor would the prospects for spin-off necessarily be any
better at a higher level of contracts. The difficulties
faced by the UK in this matter are well-known: they have,
for example, been well analysed by Sir Ieuan Maddock.
In brief, Maddock's conclusion is that many commercially
exploitable developments are `locked in' defence contractors
- especially in what he calls `Type A' firms, those with
deep dependence on the defence market, and little expertise
(sometimes little interest) in following civil commercial
opportunities. The MoD are aware of this phenomenon, but it
is not clear to us that their praiseworthy efforts to
overcome it are enough. A significant level of UK
involvement in SDI work would, by increasing the focus in
key leading-edge areas on defence applications, cut against
the efforts to alleviate this situation. It would be bound
to increase concern about the untypically high level of the
defence share in British government funded R&D. Demands for
a reduction in MoD research funding, and a commensurate
increase in DTI R&D funding, would be bound to increase.
The major economic benefit to the UK of high levels of
defence R&D currently comes not from civil spin-off but from
overseas military sales. It seems very likely that the US
government would seek to restrict the sale of SDI-derived
military technology by the UK, even to friendly nations. If
SDI contracts are small, but in key areas, these
restrictions may spill over beyond contract work, narrowly-
defined, to the larger projects of which it may be part. So
little benefit may be gained by the UK (because of the small
size of the SDI contracts), but tightening export controls,
or simply delays caused by disputes, may significantly
damage the UK's export potential here. Again, this issue is
difficult to be clear about without the knowledge of the
terms of the Memorandum of Understanding.
The Memorandum of Understanding between West Germany and
the US appears potentially quite damaging in this respect to
the interests of the Federal Republic. We have some evidence
that the British MoU is more favourable to British interests
in this matter, but the net effect of SDI participation on
British military exports may still be negative.
Spin-off, therefore, seems to us to be a poor
justification of either the SDI itself or of UK
participation in it. Both the US and the UK have to remember
that they face a major competitor, Japan, in which advanced
information technologies are being pursued with direct
commercial exploitation fully in view. It is not
inconceivable that the Japanese could over the next twenty
years pursue a directly commercial information technology
programme at around SDI scale. The prospects for the UK IT
industry, and even the US IT industry, in the world market
would then be very poor. The processes we have seen in
fields such as consumer electronics could well be repeated
in areas in which the UK and US are still strong.
Selected Bibliography
Council for Science and Society,
UK Military R&D,
Oxford University Press, 1986.
Civil Exploitation of Defence Technology,
Report to the Electronics EDC by Sir Ieuan Maddock CB OBE FENG FRS and
Observations by the Ministry of Defence, London, National Economic
Development Office, February 1983.
German Press reveals SDI Trade Deal
New Scientist,
24 April 1986.
Information about the author
Dr Donald MacKenzie has been Lecturer in Sociology at the
University of Edinburgh since 1975. His main research
interest is the sociology and social history of science and
technology, especially modern military technology. He
graduated from the University of Edinburgh in 1972 with
First Class Honours in Applied Mathematics, and after post-
graduate study in the Science Studies Unit, University of
Edinburgh, was awarded his PhD in 1978 for a study of the
development of the mathematical theory of statistics. He is
the author of
Statistics in Britain, 1865-1930: The Social Construction of
Scientific Knowledge (Edinburgh University Press 1981)
and co-editor of
The Social Shaping of Technology
(Open University Press 1985).
He has published widely in journals and edited collections
in the social studies of science and technology, and his
work has been translated into French, German, Dutch and
Japanese. Currently, he is directing a research project,
funded by the Nuffield Foundation, on the developement of
strategic missile guidance technology. See "Missile
Accuracy - An Arms Control Opportunity", Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists June/July, 1986.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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