ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (11/24/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Monday, November 24, 1986 10:27AM
Volume 7, Issue 68
Today's Topics:
SDI and the ABM Treaty
SDI is research
Launch on warning
Selling SDI
invasion of Soviet Union
Selling SDI
Re: Star Wars flawed #10-of-10
AI and the Arms Race (from AILIST)
AI and the Arms Race (from AILIST)
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Date: Sun, 23 Nov 1986 13:47 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: SDI and the ABM Treaty
From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry at ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
The other side of my statement is that yes, it is *possible* to build an
SDI system which *would* have major offensive uses.
Does a BMD system used to blunt Soviet retaliation count as a system
with offensive uses? If so, that offensive use is system independent.
My understanding -- I have not followed this issue in detail -- is that the
crash of the latest talks was because the Soviets insisted that SDI work be
strictly confined to the laboratory, and would not budge even when it was
pointed out that this would go far beyond our ability to verify compliance.
My impression is that nobody who has studied the issue thinks this a viable
idea.
On the contrary -- it was this language that was used by Treaty
negotiators in presenting the ABM Treaty to the U.S. Senate in 1972.
Specifically: "The obligation not the develop [ABM] systems, devices
or warheads would be applicable only to that stage of development
which follows laboratory development and testing... It was understood
by both sides that the prohibition on 'development' applies to
activities involved after a component moves from the laboratory
development and testing stage to the field testing stage, wherever
performed." The SDIO cites this language in its 1985 report to
Congress, but omits it from its 1986 report.
A similar statement on laboratory work but also including the
Treaty-permitted exception for fixed land-based systems was recently
made by the Soviet Foreign Minister.
If the Soviets will scale down
their non-negotiable demands to the level of, say, strict compliance with
a restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty, the next round might have
a chance.
They have, in the Foreign Minister's statement.
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Date: Sun, 23 Nov 1986 13:50 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: SDI is research
Just for the sake of argument, what criteria would YOU (CFCCS) use to
determine research priorities, i.e., money to be spent on X cannot be
spent on Y? It is my claim that the high priority given to SDI is
migsuided, and I can articulate criteria for making that judgment.
What are your criteria for making the judgment that SDI should be
funded in the way it is being funded?
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Date: Sun, 23 Nov 1986 14:29 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Launch on warning
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
Lin> We don't have a policy of executing an
Lin> LOW, but rather a policy of deciding whether or not to
execute an LOW.
Whoa! That's the DECLARATORY policy. The DE FACTO policy is one
of launch on warning.
Making judgments on what DE FACTO policy is very tough. You have
submitted statements from senior commanders etc saying that they would
the Soviets cannot exclude the possibility of LOW and other such
statements. Such statements are not proof of this assertion. You
would have to include other statements and actions too. For example,
a de facto policy of LOW (presumably as a way of protecting strategic
forces) would mean that we would not spend money on trying to make
strategic forces invulnerable. The SLBM force is more expensive to
maintain and operate than the ICBM force, and many allege that the C3
to the SLBM forces is less secure. Why would we do that if we had
such a de facto LOW policy?
In the full sense, the decision to retaliate
is already taken, we promise retaliation as part of deterrence.
Right. That's what makes retaliation a policy.
The ONLY real "decision" that occurs is whether the probability
of a warning being correct is "sufficient" to warrant retaliation.
Given the appearance of an "unequivocal" warning, we are indeed set
to attempt retaliation via launch on warning. Even today.
Agreed. But being set to do something does NOT mean that you will do
it. That's what makes it NOT policy.
Lin> So by your definition, the U.S. has a "policy of X" if it has a
Lin> set of procedures that provide for the taking of a decision of
Lin> whether or not to do X. Do I understand you?
Not quite. In that event, it has an "X policy," which, depending
on context, may not be the same of having a "policy of X."
I read your clarification in the following way: By your definition,
the U.S. has a "policy ON X" if it has a set of procedures that
provide for the taking of a decision of whether or not to do X. Now
do I understand you?
... on imminent hostilities..
We should recap. This discussion started out when you said
From: Johnson
Most pertinently, the War Powers Act
carefully states that circumstances which clearly indicate imminent
hostilities constitute prohibited acts of war, which embraces
the operation of a LOWC.
From: Lin
I don't believe that the operation of an LOWC indicates a threat of
imminent hostilities.
From: Johnson (as paraphrased by Lin)
The operation of LOWC iteslf indicates imminenent hostilities (i.e.,
hostilities that the capability itself would lead to), not that
hostilities are imminent due to other influences, such as Soviet actions?
The WP Act says that Congress must be notified when there is a
significant probability that U.S. forces will be committed. As I
understand the act, it refers to situations in which outside
influences could lead to the committment of forces. It postulates a
President reacting to these outside influences, and contemplating the
use of forces. I don't think it is meant to deal with situations in
which the President initiates actions that might be foolish or
misguided.
Indeed, while you can argue that the President sending carriers to
Libya should be covered under the WP Act (I agree), that is a
situation in which U.S. forces might be committed because they had to
react to an outside threat. Carriers to Libya results in a
significant likelihood of Libyan response, which in turn requires an
American response; hence, it is covered by the WP act.
However, operating an LOWC is different, because it does not have in
the cycle before execution of launch a Soviet aspect. The whole
business is primarily internal. U.S. operates LOWC, U.S. sensors
could report false attack, U.S. could launch missiles in error.
Forces are thereby committed, but nothing external has influenced the
system. Thus, WP Act is not in issue.
You may be arguing that it is dumb to have LOW, but I don't think you
have a legal case.
Lin> It's the imminent risk of unintentional
Lin> launch due to such things as unreliable sensors that makes
Lin> operating a LOWC a form of first-use *at law*.
Lin>
Lin> So if you were guaranteed to have perfect sensors, operating
Lin> LOWC would be OK?
You didn't answer this question in my previous message.
... a nuclear response should be congressionally
authorized. The decision's obviously too big for one man, and
there would be time to get a congressional subcommittee together.
I'm not sure I entirely disagree. But such a decision for a nuclear
response is certainly not covered under current statutes.
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Date: Sun, 23 Nov 1986 18:03 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Selling SDI
From: campbell%maynard.UUCP at wjh12.HARVARD.EDU
Don't you remember Reagan's prime-time soft-shoe about the "Peace Shield"?
The posterboard graphic with little missiles bouncing off a rainbow or
something, and smiling Americans underneath the rainbow?
That was a High Frontier commercial. It wasn't an
Administration-commissioned piece, though they certainly did not go
out of their way to disavow it. Abramson once even said that
sometimes friends of SDI go overboard in selling it.
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Date: Sun, 23 Nov 1986 18:05 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: invasion of Soviet Union
>From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Actually, the new naval maritime strategy postulates Marine amphibious
assaults in two places on the SU during the latter phases of the war.
From: sundc!oktext!nears!ks at seismo.CSS.GOV
From where do you have information about U.S. Marines' amphibious
assault strategy or war planning?
This was published last January in the Proceedings of the U.S. Naval
Institute, in articles by the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps.
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From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Sun, 23 Nov 86 18:42:51 pst
Subject: Selling SDI
> >I haven't seen any spectacular exaggerations. Any examples?
>
> Don't you remember Reagan's prime-time soft-shoe about the "Peace Shield"?
> The posterboard graphic with little missiles bouncing off a rainbow or
> something, and smiling Americans underneath the rainbow? ...
My understanding -- I haven't seen it -- is that the soft-shoe you're
referring to came from General Graham's organization, not from the government.
Graham is not a spokesman for the US government; he is, essentially, a
lobbyist. Short of repealing the First Amendment, there is no way the
government can prevent well-financed crazies from jumping on whatever
bandwagon they please. Don't blame Reagan for Graham's antics. I suspect
that SDIO quietly wishes Graham would shut up.
Incidentally, Aviation Leak (Oct 13th) reported that Graham is dissatisfied
with SDI for slow progress towards objectives. He's now pushing prompt
deployment of a three-layer defense using "mature and proven" kinetic-energy
weapons. "The public supports self-defense, Graham said, and they are not
much interested in endless research, perfection in defenses, the sanctity
of the antiballistic missile treaty or even cost." He supports research
on advanced technologies, but at a maximum of $1 billion/year.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
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From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Sun, 23 Nov 86 18:43:02 pst
Subject: Re: Star Wars flawed #10-of-10
> ... It is not
> inconceivable that the Japanese could over the next twenty
> years pursue a directly commercial information technology
> programme at around SDI scale. The prospects for the UK IT
> industry, and even the US IT industry, in the world market
> would then be very poor...
We have here an implication that if the Japanese were to do so, obviously
our most sensible move would be to reprogram SDI funding into IT. This is
(a) reasonable, and (b) so improbable that it can safely be ignored. Let
us be realistic: if Japan is going to do this, the prospects for the UK
and US IT industries will be very poor regardless of what happens with
SDI funding. It's a very weak argument once the "money not spent on A
would be reprogrammed for B" fallacy is removed.
Personally, I agree that spinoff is a poor justification for anything; it
should be viewed as a useful but unpredictable bonus, not as a serious
justification. However, schemes to advance technology X directly, without
a specific application as a driving force, in practice receive very little
funding once the first flush of enthusiasm wears off.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
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Date: Thursday, 20 November 1986 23:32-EST
From: rutgers!cbmvax!bpa!burdvax!blenko at SPAM.ISTC.SRI.COM (Tom
To: AIList@sri-stripe, arms-d
Subject: AI and the Arms Race
In article <8611181719.AA00510@watdcsu.uucp> "B. Lindsay Patten"
<shen5%watdcsu.waterloo.edu@RELAY.CS.NET> writes:
[... stuff ...]
|The real point Dr. Weizenbaum was trying to make (in my
|opinion) was that we should weigh the good and bad applications of
|our work and decide which outweighs the other.
If Weizenbaum or anyone else thinks he or she can succeeded in weighing
possible good and bad applications, I think he is mistaken. Wildly
mistaken.
Why does Weizenbaum think technologists are, even within the bounds of
conventional wisdom, competent to make such judgements in the first
place? Everywhere I turn there is a technologist telling me why SDI
cannot succeed -- which tells me that technologists fail to comprehend
consequences of their work from any perspective except their own. Is
it not possible that the principal consequences of SDI will be
something other than an operational defense system?
Why doesn't Weizenbaum do some research and talk about it? Why is
Waterloo inviting him to talk on anything other than his research
results? No reply necessary, but doesn't the fact that technically-
oriented audiences are willing to spend their time listening to this
sort of amateur preaching itself suggest what their limitations are
with regard to difficult ethical questions?
Tom
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Date: Saturday, 22 November 1986 02:46-EST
From: anderson at unix.macc.wisc.edu (Jess Anderson)
To: AIList@sri-stripe, arms-d
Re: AI and the Arms Race
In article <2862@burdvax.UUCP>, blenko@burdvax.UUCP (Tom Blenko) writes:
| Why doesn't Weizenbaum do some research and talk about it? Why is
| Waterloo inviting him to talk on anything other than his research
| results? No reply necessary, but doesn't the fact that technically-
| oriented audiences are willing to spend their time listening to this
| sort of amateur preaching itself suggest what their limitations are
| with regard to difficult ethical questions?
Even as a preacher, Weizenbaum is hardly an amateur! Do be fair. On
your last point, I would claim the evidence shows just the opposite
of what you claim, namely that technically-oriented audiences are
willing to spend their time listening to intelligent opinions shows
that they are more qualified than some people think to consider
difficult ethical questions. Of course I am an amateur, too -- of
life (remember what the word means!).
--
==ARPA:====================anderson@unix.macc.wisc.edu===Jess Anderson======
| UUCP: {harvard,seismo,topaz, 1210 W. Dayton |
| akgua,allegra,ihnp4,usbvax}!uwvax!uwmacc!anderson Madison, WI 53706 |
==BITNET:============================anderson@wiscmacc===608/263-6988=======
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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