ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (11/24/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Monday, November 24, 1986 1:45PM
Volume 7, Issue 69
Today's Topics:
Research Mode
Nuclear Airplane, SDI Videogame
SDI is in research mode!
Why defense can look like an attack
Qualitative Arms Control and the ABM Treaty (long)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: 24 Nov 1986 10:11:16-EST
From: Hank.Walker@gauss.ECE.CMU.EDU
Subject: Research Mode
I haven't heard any response yet to my proposal to start the Tau Ceti
Initiative (TCI), a $30B research project to send a manned mission to Tau
Ceti. Sure we don't have hardly any idea of how to do it. But it is
obviously theoretically possible.
TCI is in research mode! The problem with research is that when public
pressure gets heavy and wants results, the TCIO is required to waste
valuable time and money on useless demonstrations, like going to the Moon.
So the very people criticizing the project, force the waste they so
adamantly oppose. It seems that the waste of this kind is what they should
be trying to prevent!
TCI is in research mode! Think of the spinoffs! Warp drive! Dilithium
crystals! Phasers! Transporters! I'm sure some of the more learned
readers can come up with a much more complete list. The point is, they all
began as television research. If that research had been open to public
criticism and the pressure had crumbled the project, our movie and
television special effects would not be as technologically advanced as they
are today.
TCI is in research mode! I keep saying this to remind you that you are
arguing against something that is in the same stages that any of the other
'worthy' projects (like SDI) are in. First you ask the questions, then you
look for the answers. No one will find anything if he isn't looking for it!
------------------------------
Subject: Nuclear Airplane, SDI Videogame
Date: Mon, 24 Nov 86 08:05:11 -0800
From: crummer@aerospace.ARPA
Nuclear Airplane....
I have a physicist friend that worked on the nuclear airplane project.
He says that he and his friends laughed at the outset at the idea and never
stopped laughing. The reason? The requirements for the reactor: speed, power,
weight, shielding, all together made it a nuclear engineer's joke. They
shined it on as long as they could but in the end it was the physical world
that couldn't be fooled. This project is a good example of the fact that
some things are just not possible no matter how much money and time are thrown
at them. It is just not true that the belief of the pure-in-heart is
sufficient to bring the laws of physics to heel.
SDI Videogame....
The videogame might be a good idea, sort of like the WWII tracking system
consisting of pigeons pecking at radar screens to provide feedback for the
AA batteries. The big problems are 1) there are no sensors to work
the midcourse problem, 2) there are no weapons that can hit the
short-burning boosters, and 3) there is no C^3 to translate keystrokes
to commands to shoot. Star Wars doesn't exist except in fantasy.
--Charlie
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 24 Nov 86 10:42:18 EST
From: lwk@caen.engin.umich.edu (Lewis W Kellum)
Subject: SDI is in research mode!
CFCCS> SDI is in research mode!
Billions of dollars spent in "research mode" on a questionable project had
*better* come up with some kind of practical results. It's the Administration
which is pushing the deployment of a half-baked SDI in order to justify this
money. The corporations which live on government military contracts are
also encouraging the building of hardware.
There seems to be the feeling that because we've been to the moon,
developed high-speed computers, and any number of other amazing technical
feats, that it's just a matter of time before we develop an SDI system
that works. What gets completely lost in this reasoning is that there
are equally intelligent people on the SU that will be working on the
much easier task of how to defeat an SDI system! We are trying to solve
a social problem (national security) with a piece of hardware, when the
only real answer is arms control.
------------------------------
Subject: Why defense can look like an attack
Date: 24 Nov 86 13:15:50 EST (Mon)
From: dm@bfly-vax.bbn.com
[this is a re-posting, as my original message seems to have gotten
mis-directed, as I haven't seen in on arms-d in the past week or so.]
Henry Spencer writes:
>The assumption that activation of a defence system necessarily leads
>to nuclear destruction is a slightly curious one which is not
>adequately explained. Note the word "necessarily"; it is easy to
>imagine badly- designed or ill-conceived systems in which it could
>(e.g. defensive weapons powered by nuclear explosions).
I have also been puzzled by this. I think the logic goes like this:
0) In the presence of SDI, the Russians may adopt a launch-on-warning
policy (I believe they have announced they would, but I can provide no
reference). Certainly, in their position, I would be tempted to do so
(for reasons I explained in my recent message on ``the perfectability
of SDI'').
1) Space based systems are vulnerable to pre-emptive ASAT attack, such
ASATs can be too cheap to overwhelm.
2) To make the task of the defense system manageable it should be
a boost-phase intercept (fewer things to shoot at).
3) Therefore, to have a survivable SDI which can do boost-phase
interception, we need a pop-up defense system (probably submarine
launched, so the defense system can be positioned near the
SU in order to have a prayer of getting above the horizon before
the offensive missiles have had Brennschluss and warhead separation).
4) A mistaken launch of the pop-up system is probably hard to
distinguish from a pre-emptive attack with SLBMs, which means
WWIII starts as a result of Soviet launch on warning.
I don't think this is an engineered-to-fail system, since this
scenario is roughly the one originally proposed by Lowell Wood's
O-group, and to which they keep returning (at least as William Broad
tells it in ``Star Warriors'').
Actually, I guess a launch of a land-based pop-up system would be hard
to distinguish from ICBMs, too. Even if launched from railguns or
non-missile systems, how do you tell that the Americans haven't
applied their railgun technology to warhead delivery?
I do agree that this is a badly designed system (because it is
indistinguishable from an attack), but I haven't seen any proposals
for an SDI defense that I didn't think was badly designed. (Maybe some
kind of land-based laser-Maginot line encircling the US could work.)
Of course, O-group keeps talking about bomb-pumped X-ray lasers, too,
which I guess you would consider ill-conceived as well.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 24 Nov 1986 12:49 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Qualitative Arms Control and the ABM Treaty
Enclosed is Part I of a draft of a paper called "Qualitative Arms
Control and the ABM Treaty". As a draft, please do not cite or quote
it in any other forum. Comments are solicited, and will be most
useful by 12/15.
Qualitative Arms Control and the ABM Treaty: Part I
Copyright (c) Herbert Lin, November 1986
All Rights Reserved
1 Introduction
The United States and the Soviet Union each have enormous military
power. Given this characteristic, and the largely adversarial and
potentially dangerous relationship between them, arms control is
widely viewed by its supporters as a way to promote stability and to
reduce the likelihood of nuclear war by limiting the military options
available to each side. A fundamental assumption underlying arms
control is that the financial, scientific, and industrial resources of
one side are very roughly comparable to that of the other. This rough
parity suggests that the unilateral advantages that accrue to one side
as the result of that side's achievements are for the most part
transient; the resources of the other side would allow it to
demonstrate comparable or offsetting achievements within a relatively
short time frame.
Arms control treaties and agreements can take a variety of forms.
For example, an agreement can direct each side to take certain actions
under specified circumstances; two examples of such agreements are the
"Hot Line" Agreement and the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk
of Outbreak of Nuclear War. However, more common are agreements that
prohibit certain actions. Often, quantities of certain types of
weapons can be restricted (e.g., the ABM Treaty forbids the deployment
of more than 100 operational anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
interceptors). Alternatively, the basing mode of weapons can be
restricted (e.g., the ABM Treaty forbids the deployment of ABM
components that are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile
land-based [1]). The technological characteristics of certain weapons
can be limited (e.g., the ABM Treaty prohibits the testing of certain
missiles, launchers, and radars "in an ABM mode".).
The fact that military technology inexorably advances has led some
analysts to conclude that technological change is an important and
negative influence on the feasibility of arms control agreements.[2]
As a result, these technologies can make it possible to perform
destabilizing missions. For example, if one side deployed ABM
defenses of cities that were only modestly capable of defending
against a full-scale nuclear attack, it might have an incentive during
crisis to attack pre-emptively the other side's nuclear forces, in the
belief that its defenses would be capable of blunting a retaliatory
strike reduced by its pre-emptive attack.
Qualitative arms control (i.e., arms control directed at regulating
the evolution of military technology) seeks to forestall such
destabilizing changes. In addition, since weapon capabilities in the
absence of negotiated restraints are limited only by human ingenuity,
qualitative arms control attempts to render the military planning
environment more predictable by reducing the need to consider certain
capabilities. This paper advances a case for the desirability and
feasibility of qualitative arms control under certain conditions.
The issues related to qualitative arms control have been driven to
the front of the public policy agenda by the Strategic Defense
Initiative, whose stated goal directly contravenes the ABM Treaty of
1972. The SDI is ostensibly a research and development program, aimed
at providing a modern technology base for weapons capable of
destroying strategic ballistic missiles in flight. To the extent that
the SDI is intended to remain within Treaty limits, a problem arises
because the ABM Treaty provides its most specific guidance for the ABM
technologies of 1972. Ambiguities in the Treaty text and questions not
fully resolved by the Treaty negotiators become apparent when guidance
is sought regarding the treatment of exotic and multi-purpose
technologies that can be developed and tested as part of systems whose
missions are unrestricted by treaty but similar to the ABM mission.
Thus, these ambiguities and questions must be addressed if both sides
wish the ABM Treaty to endure as a viable instrument forbidding
large-scale ABM defenses.
2 Regulating Technological Change
The process of technological change involves many stages, from the
sketch of a new weapon concept on a blackboard to a fully operational
and ready weapon based on that concept deployed in the field.
Regulation is only feasible at those stages that are visible to
national technical means of each side, as supplemented by cooperative
and/or intrusive measures to which both sides agree.[3] While
scientific experiments performed outside the laboratory fall into this
category, it is not regarded in general as desirable to prohibit such
work, since such work could be put to a variety of uses, both military
and non-military.
On the other hand, the circumstances under which a weapon is tested
provide strong circumstantial (though not necessarily conclusive)
evidence for the purpose of such work. Specifically, it is widely
assumed that a "pre-prototype" weapon tested successfully under a
certain set of circumstances can be further developed into an
operational production-line weapon system that could itself perform
well under similar circumstances. Thus, it is generally agreed that
the observable testing of a weapon provides the first opportunity to
regulate technological advances.
An optimally desirable qualitative arms control agreement would be
one in which actual military capabilities could be known not to exceed
those exhibited in weapon tests. However, in practice, disputes can
arise over the extent to which the testing regime must actually match
the performance required. A more realistic expectation for
qualitative arms control is that as the spread between the performance
level to which a weapon has actually been tested and the performance
level actually required for a certain military capability increases,
planners will have less and less confidence in the ability of that
weapon to perform as required.[4]
For example, an air-breathing cruise missile may never have been
tested beyond a certain range, say X km. However, by extending its
fuselage to accommodate extra fuel, its range might be increased. Its
increased range could be demonstrated by flying the missile to X km on
several occasions while varying the amount of fuel carried by the
missile. In this way, the missile could be tested in every applicable
flight regime. On the other hand, if the increased range sought were
a great deal larger than the original range (e.g., ten times larger),
it is likely that an entirely new missile would have to be designed; a
new missile would require an entirely new program of testing as well.
The regulation of weapons testing prohibits certain types of weapon
operation or behavior during a test. In general, the regulation of
weapons testing has required the two sides to agree on specific
parameters that characterize the weapon involved. These parameters
may relate to the physical characteristics of the weapon; for example,
under the SALT II agreement, an ICBM would be defined as "new" if its
volume or throw-weight changed by more than 5%. Alternatively, these
parameters may relate to the performance characteristics of the weapon
involved, as in the case of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of
1974 limiting nuclear tests to a 150 kiloton yield.
Once it is agreed that a certain parameter characterizes the
performance of a particular military technology, the two sides must
agree on a threshold value for that parameter which defines the regime
to which each side will confine its weapons testing. To the extent
that the parameter is one that is observable at values above the
threshold, the agreement is a workable one.
The determination of the appropriate threshold value is a complex
process, into which military, political and technical judgments must
enter. Historically, threshold values appear to have been set
according to one of the following two criteria:
- The threshold level could be set at a level commensurate
with the maximum detection and measurement capabilities of
verification technology. For example, SALT II negotiators
believed that the 5% limit on increases in missile volume
and throw-weight were adequately verifiable, but that
smaller increases were not.
- The threshold level could be set a level that does not
place significant restrictions on any military programs
(existing or planned) at the time of the agreement. For
example, the limit of 150 kiloton yield of the TTBT did
not significantly impede weapon development planned at the
time.[5]
These criteria do not exhaust the possibilities for qualitative
arms control. Another approach would be to ban the testing of entire
classes of weapons. For example, the ABM Treaty forbids the testing
of ABM systems or components that are space-based. The U.S. and the
Soviet Union could agree to a ban on the flight-testing of all
ballistic missiles. Such agreements are conceptually simple and close
off entire areas of weaponry. However, since they are such blunt
instruments, they do not allow military planners the latitude to take
into account their own requirements.
If it is desirable for arms control agreements to permit greater
military flexibility, agreement on appropriate threshold values should
be based on the technical requirements of a specific military
capability that each side wished to ban. This would be possible if
the two sides can agree on particular parameters that are relevant to
the military capability to be banned, and if it is possible to
distinguish between parameter regimes that characterize the capability
to be banned from other permitted military capabilities.
While such an approach could be more precisely tailored to the
military requirements and concerns of each side, in practice, this
approach poses at least three difficulties, whose resolution would
require both technical and political inputs.
For example, one complication is that when restrictions are placed
on certain parameters, it may be possible for weapons engineers to
circumvent the implied limits on military technology by improving the
performance of a weapon in ways that are permitted. For example, the
SALT II Treaty of 1979 limited changes in missile throw-weight (a
measure of the destructive capability of a missile) to 5%. However,
the Mark 12A re-entry vehicle was fitted onto 300 Minuteman III
missiles by 1983, doubling the explosive yield of missiles so equipped
without changing the throw-weight.[6] On the other hand, the
introduction of a weapon capable of exceeding these implied limits
would be delayed, thus providing a "grace period" during which
military planners would not need to be concerned about the other
side's possession of the forbidden military capability or in which
they could plan to counter these capabilities.
A second complication is that few military capabilities will
separate cleanly according to performance characteristics. In this
case, a political judgment must be made concerning the relative
importance of military capabilities that require performance similar
to that required by the forbidden military capability. Thus, the U.S.
must judge that denying the Soviets a particular military capability
is worth foregoing that capability itself and also related
capabilities.
A third complication is that the U.S. tends to favor limitations
based on capability (e.g., limiting systems capable of countering
ballistic missiles), whereas the Soviets tend to favor limitations
based on intentions (e.g., limiting systems intended to counter
ballistic missiles).[7] Each side has legitimate reasons for its
position: the U.S. attributes great significance to the fact that
intentions cannot be monitored and may change easily, while the
Soviets attribute great significance to the fact that many
technologies have a variety of useful military purposes. This
capability-oriented approach to regulation "splits the difference" in
that it defines military capabilities using a metric of objective
parameters.
[... To be Continued in one more part...]
------------------------------
End of Arms-Discussion Digest
*****************************